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ABSTRACT 
 
The impact of ‘global’ archaeology on ‘local’ communities that live upon or beside archaeological 
sites is a question of great importance and an emerging topic in archaeological discourse. The studies 
that have taken place so far have focused mostly on how archaeology is used in the construction of 
identity in ‘descendant’ communities, that is, communities which claim an ancestral link to the 
ancient inhabitants of the archaeological sites. However, these studies have tended to sideline the 
many ‘non-descendant’ communities that exist across the world and who are equally subject to the 
archaeological phenomenon; they have also largely neglected to consider archaeology’s not 
inconsiderable socio-economic impacts.  
Using a range of investigatory models and analytical frameworks, this study therefore seeks to go 
‘beyond identity’ to illuminate the impacts of archaeology on local communities through an 
ethnographic case-study of a non-descendant community living amid ancient ‘Nubian’ archaeological 
sites in Sudan’s Nile Valley. In doing so it contributes to the relatively new field of archaeological 
ethnography, as spearheaded by scholars such as Meskell (2005) and Hamilakis (2011).    
The study finds that although the residents living in the case-study community do not identify 
with ancient Nubia, let alone ancient Nubians, both of which the archaeological sites officially 
represent, the sites are nevertheless endowed with significant cultural and historical meaning. This 
meaning is, however, being eroded: a mixture of increasing religious orthodoxy and the alienating 
effects of archaeological site management plans are both contributing to this decline. 
In addition to, or perhaps now in place of, cultural and historical connections, this study finds 
that the community residents frame archaeology’s impact, or lack thereof, in economic terms. And, 
although most scholars have assumed that archaeology’s main economic impact comes through its 
ability to stimulate tourism, in the case-study area it is archaeological employment that has the most 
important economic impact. Indeed, such is the scale of its importance, it has a tangible knock-on 
effect on social and political relationships between the community residents. Once again, the study 
finds that archaeological site management in the case-study area is part of this issue, as it has been 
experienced as a slow process of economic dispossession. Among other things, this study therefore 
concludes that site management plans cannot be separated from economic, or cultural, concerns.  
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NOTE ON TRANSLATION AND TRANSLITERATION 
 
This research follows the transliteration guidelines provided by the International Journal of Middle 
East Studies
1
 and the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies,
2
 with corresponding transliteration 
standards.  
This work incorporates a transliteration style in which all Arabic words are transliterated with 
diacritical marks and italicized except with reference to personal names, tribal names, place names, 
names of political parties and titles of books/newspapers/magazines. In the cases of the 
aforementioned, transliteration is used albeit without diacriticals, with the exception of ‘ayn and 
hamza (although not initial hamza).  
Common terms found in standard English dictionaries such as Merriam-Webster, e.g. ‘Hadith’, 
‘Quran’ are neither transliterated nor italicized, again with the exception of the use of ‘ayn and hamza 
(although not initial hamza). In keeping with abovementioned guidelines, care has also been taken to 
avoid Anglicized plurals of transliterated words, with the exception of words commonly found in 
standard English dictionaries. 
Of note, given the focus of this research on Sudan and its people, transliteration has been adapted 
in the sense that emphasis is placed on colloquial, oral, Sudanese Arabic (darajiya) and its 
pronunciation rather than spelling of the term in the script of the original language, e.g. Modern 
Standard Arabic.  
Definitions for Sudanese and Arabic terms have been incorporated into the main body of the text 
rather than listed separately. 
Lastly, any translated materials within this research has been translated by one set of translators 
and then verified by a second set of translators, for optimal accuracy. 
  
                                                     
1  See the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies’ website. 
2  See the International Journal of Middle East Studies’ website. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This study aims to shed light on the impacts of archaeology on communities located on or beside 
archaeological sites. The question of archaeology’s impact on such ‘local’ communities nagged at me 
during the many seasons I worked as a field archaeologist in Sudan, Egypt and Iraq. I was curious 
about three questions in particular: how official archaeological history of the site(s) are perceived by 
the residents; how the residents experience and connect with the physicality of the site(s); and what 
impact the archaeologists who work on the site(s) have upon the residents’ lives. It seemed to me that 
answering questions such as these should be of central interest and importance to archaeologists. 
However, although archaeologists frequently ruminate upon such issues in private, few have 
attempted to examine them in a systematic way. 
Of these few, the work of Lynn Meskell in South Africa (e.g. 2005), and Yannis Hamilakis in 
Greece (e.g. 2011), stand out as paradigmatic examples. Theoretically, these projects cut across the 
interlocking traditions of social archaeology and archaeological ethnography, both of which place 
emphasis on establishing how archaeology functions in and what it means to modern society. 
Methodologically, they advocate the use of ethnographic interviews and observations as tools to gain 
such understandings. Crucially, projects such as these represent a key research stage between 
recognising that archaeological materials exist in what Soja (1996) calls a ‘third space’, but before the 
results can be utilized to effect changes in archaeological practice.  
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Therefore, using a range of investigatory models and analytical frameworks, this thesis seeks to 
illuminate the impacts of archaeology on local communities through an ethnographic case-study of 
one particular community in Sudan’s Nile Valley. In this way, this study hopes to provide insights 
into the question of archaeology’s impact more generally. As an innovative and ground-breaking 
study based upon considerable ethnographic field research, it also demonstrates the value of 
embracing several approaches to data analysis ranging from the empirical to the phenomenological. 
* 
Sudan’s physical landscapes are diverse. They range from the Bayuda Desert in the north to the 
savannah of Dinder National Park in the south, and from the Jebel Marra massif in the west to the 
hills of Kassala and the Red Sea littoral in the east. The Nile winds from south to north roughly 
bisecting the country and is punctuated by six cataracts, sets of rapids where the Nile crosses hard 
granite outcrops, which disrupt the river’s navigability. Sudan’s cultural landscapes are, if anything, 
even more diverse than its physical ones; they are mosaics of social and cultural groups that reflect 
Sudan’s complex history and its location at the junction of the Arab and African worlds. 
Archaeological sites are significant elements of both the physical and cultural landscape. In the 
east is the abandoned Red Sea port of Suakin, sometimes known as the ‘Coral City’, an important 
trading centre from the 15
th
 Century;
3
 in northern Darfur in the west is the 18
th
 Century mosque and 
palace associated with Sultan Mohammed Tayrub at Old Shoba in northern Darfur.
4
 However, most 
of Sudan’s best-known archaeological sites are in the Nile Valley, where archaeologists have found 
sites dating back to the fourth millennium BCE that include 14
th
 Century BCE Pharaonic Egyptian 
temples near the Second Cataract;
5
 ruined cities at Dongola at the Third Cataract; pyramid-fields at 
Napata near the Fourth Cataract and at Meroe near the Fifth Cataract (both from the so-called 
Kingdom of Kush, 8
th
 Century BCE to 4
th
 Century CE); and 5
th
 Century CE Christian churches at 
Soba above the Sixth Cataract.
6
 Indeed, Sudan’s Nile Valley has well over 10,000 archaeological sites 
of varying dimensions and more are discovered every year. Archaeological sites thus contextualize 
the lives of millions of Sudanese people. But how do the Sudanese relate to these sites, in particular 
those who live upon or close to them? Are they interested in the archaeological sites? What social or 
historical significance do they attach to them? Do they see them as meaningful to their day-to-day 
experience? And what role do archaeologists play in the phenomenon? Have the histories they write 
had an impact on how the local residents construct their identity?  
Explorers and antiquarians first investigated archaeological sites in Sudan in the 18
th
 Century and 
since that time interest in Sudan’s archaeology has grown. The number of archaeological expeditions 
                                                     
3  Greenlaw 1995. 
4  Edwards 2004; Tesch 2007; McGregor 2011. 
5  For example Soleb (Schiff-Giorgini 1958) and Sedeinga (Rilly and Francigny 2013). 
6  Welsby and Daniels 1991. 
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at work has fluctuated over the years, going from over 60 between 1960 and 1969
7
 to 18 in 1980
8
 to 
40 in 2015.
9
 The archaeological teams are typically eight to 15 archaeologists strong, although the 
numbers can be much higher, and each team can spend from one to six months in the field each year, 
usually between November and March to avoid the oppressive summer heat. In many Nile Valley 
communities, therefore, archaeologists are a bigger population than NGO workers or health workers, 
or any other ‘foreign’ or ‘imported’ group, and live in close physical proximity to the local 
communities when they are in the field. So how do residents of these communities perceive the 
archaeologists both inside and outside the archaeological sites? How do their interactions with the 
archaeologists affect them? Does the archaeologists’ presence change their communities’ socio-
economic dynamics, especially in a context where most households live at or close to the poverty line? 
And, if all politics are local,
10
 do the archaeologists affect political relationships within these 
communities? These, and those listed above, are some of the questions that this study seeks to address.  
* 
This study is cross-disciplinary, taking themes, questions, perspectives and methods from different 
fields of scholarship, from archaeology to anthropology to economics, each of which is framed by a 
research tradition. Cross-disciplinary research such as this is becoming increasingly common, gaining 
popularity because of the potential it provides to glimpse the world through a variety of lenses to 
produce richer and more meaningful results. Cross-disciplinary research encourages the exchange of 
knowledge and productive discourse between scholars of different specializations. Consequently 
disciplines that were previously taxonomized and rigidly bounded by their practitioners are now re-
emerging as interlinked areas of enquiry. In this view, academic disciplines interact with each another 
in the same matrix-like way that characterizes the relationship between people, materials and 
landscapes.
11
 The wealth of the ethnographic data collected for this project required a variety of 
insights to develop a range of understandings of archaeology. Each chapter uses different 
ethnographic data to give answers to the question of archaeology’s impact. Each data set brings a light 
with which to illuminate the phenomenon of archaeology in Sudan, reinforcing Lyotard’s (1977) idea 
that no single approach can explain ‘culture’ or ‘humanity’ and that a wide range of investigatory and 
interpretative traditions can be valued as legitimate ways of viewing the world. It is proposed that the 
data collected for the study, the analytical frameworks used to understand that data and the 
conclusions reached together represent an original contribution to knowledge and understanding of 
how archaeology functions and impacts modern society and has the potential to radically affect 
archaeological practice in Sudan and elsewhere. 
                                                     
7 Jakob and Ali 2011: 516. 
8  Shinnie 1981. 
9  See the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website, page named ‘QSAP Sites’. 
10  Kervliet 2009; Boyte 2010. 
11  Meskell 1999, 2002a, 2005b; Tilley 1994; 2010. 
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
 
 
2.1 Reaching an ‘Interpretive Time and Space’ 
2.1.1 Colonial archaeology 
In addressing archaeology’s impact on local communities in Sudan, this study is distinct from 
traditional archaeological scholarship, which is rooted in “antiquarianism, history, philology, 
ethnology, geology and natural history”.12 Its use of ethnographic methods also departs from the 
methods of excavation and material analysis with which archaeology has historically been associated. 
This study thus reflects the growing dimensions of archaeology as a discipline.  
Many scholars have traced archaeology’s development from its emergence in the late 18th 
Century.
13
 Rising nationalism and post-Enlightenment thought reinforced European interest in cultural 
antecedents in Classical Greece and Rome, and encouraged relevant archaeological exploration there. 
Meanwhile, the desire to verify Biblical history drove development of archaeology in Palestine, Egypt 
and Mesopotamia. These developments are reflected in the sub-fields of Classical Archaeology, 
Egyptology and Assyriology. 19
th
-Century archaeology was closely linked to European empire-
building across Africa and the Middle East and in those parts of Asia and the Americas that were 
colonized by European powers. As Meskell and others have shown, Europeans often used the 
archaeological record as evidence of cultural superiority over colonized peoples;
14
 “to know and 
control the ‘Other’, by investigating and dividing the different identities.”15 As such, archaeology is 
commonly seen to be part of the tapestry of European political, economic and cultural dominance of 
                                                     
12  Murray and Evans 2008: 1. 
13  Trigger 1984, 1989; Anderson 1991; Díaz-Andreu and Champion 1995; Graves-Brown et al. 1996; Murray and 
Evans 2008; Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012.  
14   Meskell 1998, 2002c. 
15  Gillot 2010: 6. 
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the non-West, a heritage now recognized by most archaeologists as ethically dubious and even 
‘structurally violent’.16  
Scholars such as Wait and Altschul (2014) show that the early focus of archaeology was 
manifested in the imperative to collect and preserve objects and monuments, which forms part of a 
material-centred ‘authorized heritage discourse’ that Smith (2006) has argued persists to the present.17 
The authorized heritage discourse sees archaeology as a practice that upholds hegemonic ideas and 
furthers global imbalances as well as reinforces and reflects a Western hierarchy of values (the term is 
also echoed in proximate phrases such as Kusimba’s “sacred colonial paradigms”18). This hierarchy 
determines which knowledges are sought by archaeologists (scientific, verifiable) and which are not; 
and thus whose constructions of ‘place’ are acknowledged (‘world heritage’, ‘global property’), and 
whose are not.
19
 For Mydland and Grahn, authorized heritage discourse is,  
…an ‘official’ way of understanding heritage…a particular way of understanding heritage which 
stresses the importance of expert knowledge, and privileges the cultural recollection of a limited social 
stratum, which tends to belong to the upper middle or upper class. It usually focuses upon the tangible 
aspects of the object, such as aesthetics, architectonic styles, technical aspects, age and grandness.
20
 
Such discourse clearly comes with concomitant ‘authorized heritage actors’, a group in which 
archaeologists have been placed, along with their “authorized heritage management processes,”21 
which “often fail to provide opportunities for professionals to ask people how they understand 
heritage…”22  According to Belford “[i]t has been widely accepted that elements of the historic 
environment have been displayed to create an [authorized heritage discourse] which supports top-
down reinforcement of particular identities.”23 Such a concept has naturally been compared with 
Spivak’s notion of the “subaltern”,24 often synonymous with the ‘local’, ‘oral’, ‘intangible’ or perhaps 
‘unauthorized heritage discourse’. Mydland and Grahn hold a similar view, and show it by 
demonstrating the lack of take-up of decolonized archaeological paradigms by the Norwegian 
Cultural Heritage Fund. Studying the applications for funding conservation work at one-room 
schoolhouses, they show that the Norwegian authorized heritage discourse seems above all to be 
concentrated on the material aspects of heritage, privileging sites and monuments. Even though these 
values at times touch upon the social impact of archaeology upon contemporary society, its material 
and physical aspects are prioritized. As Mydland and Grahn put it, “The privileged concepts 
                                                     
16   Bernbeck 2004; Starzman 2012.  
17  Also see Mire (2006) as well as Waterton and Smith (2010). 
18  Kusimba 2009. Lane 2011: 14. Lane notes that historians such as Jewsiewicki 1989, Lonsdale 1989 and Ranger 
1976 have also voiced these concerns. 
19   Herzfeld 2012. 
20  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 565. Smith 2006: pg; Belford 2014; Meskell 2007: 390. 
21  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 579. 
22  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 567 using Waterton and Smith 2010: 11. 
23 Belford 2014: pg. 
24   Lane 2011. See Spivak 1988. 
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crystallized in this discourse are above all the ‘antiquarian approach’, ‘documentation’, ‘authenticity’, 
and ‘inherent values’, aspects that should be proven by a certificate from a cultural heritage expert.”25 
Meanwhile in the 19
th
 Century, the archaeological mandate began to broaden to include 
establishing detailed narratives and chronological sequences to piece together human history through 
systematic collection and scientific interpretation of material evidence.
26
 For many scholars, this shift 
in the discipline’s central purpose marks a break with its early history and a move towards modern 
archaeology.
27
 Lane (2011) describes the link between archaeology and modernity as largely one of 
Western self-construction; living in a ‘Now’ separate from the ‘Past’, differentiating Occident from 
Orient. The emphasis on self, difference and spatio-temporal distance in the construction of these 
‘Other’ Worlds28 appears to have eroticized the archaeological mandate and, as Lane notes, furnished 
archaeological sites with a layer of economic, political and cultural value from their designation as 
windows into ‘alien’ life.29  
Gillot posits that archaeology’s development in Syria “constitutes a case study, both specific and 
representative, of the history of archaeology.”30 The same may also be said of the development of 
archaeology in Sudan, where the earliest modern reports about archaeological remains emanated from 
Western explorers, travellers and collectors of antiquities, some of whom also carried out rudimentary 
excavations. The first of these reports was written in the 1770s by a Scottish explorer named Bruce.
31
 
A Swiss explorer, Burckhardt, came to Sudan in the early 1800s;
32
 Waddington and Hanbury, both 
English, in 1820;
33
 Cailliaud and Letorzec, both French, in 1821 and 1822 respectively;
34
 English, an 
American, in 1821;
35
 Linant de Bellefonds
 
and Ricci, French and Italian, and their English patron, 
Bankes, came in 1821,
36
 Prudoe, Felix and Burton, all English, arrived in 1828;
37
 Ferlini, an Italian 
doctor-turned-treasure-hunter, in the 1830s;
38
 Hoskins, an Englishman, in 1833;
39
 Lowell and Gleyre, 
American and Swiss respectively, in September 1835;
40
 Trémaux, French, in 1847;
 41
 the Prussian, 
                                                     
25  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 580. 
26  Trigger 1989. 
27  See Appadurai 1996 and Thomas 2012, both of whom argue that archaeology and its link to the question of ‘who 
we are’ is a thoroughly modern preoccupation. See Giddens (1991) for a broader study of identity and modernity. 
28  Fabian (1983) makes similar arguments about the ways in which anthropologists distance themselves from their 
object of study. 
29  Lane 2011: 10-11. Lowenthal (1985) famously argues that this distancing device turns the past into a ‘foreign 
country’. 
30  Gillot 2010: 5. 
31  Bruce 1790. 
32  Burckhardt 1819. 
33  Waddington and Hanbury 1822. 
34  Cailliaud 1826. 
35  English 1822. 
36  Usick 2002 regarding Bankes; see M. Shinnie 1958 regarding Linant de Bellefonds (and Shinnie 1967: 172, Note 
2). 
37  Griffith 1929. 
38  Ferlini 1838, also noted in Budge 1907. 
39  Hoskins 1835. 
40  Opdycke 2010. The Lowell Diaries are now stored in the Boston Athenaeum with early copies in the Museum of 
Fine Arts in Boston, US.  
41  Trémaux 1858. 
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Lepsius,
 
in 1844;
42
 Wilkinson, an Englishman, from 1848-9 and again in the 1850s
43
 at the same time 
as Taylor, an American.
44
 The Englishmen Budge,
45
 Crowfoot,
46
 Garstang,
47
 and the Americans 
Breasted
48
 and Reisner
49
 worked in Sudan in the first decades of the 20
th
 Century and all of them 
carried out scientific investigations recognizable as modern archaeology.  
The nationalities of these men, and the contexts in which they operated, are significant because 
they help demonstrate how archaeology in Sudan was largely a European colonial construction. 
Indeed there is now recognition of the impossibility of data collection being truly “objective” and that 
“scientific practice is guided socially and politically.”50 This point is further evidence by the fact that 
several of these early ‘archaeological’ investigators in Sudan arrived on the back of imperial 
adventures: Cailliaud and Letorzec, as well as English, entered with a Turco-Egyptian army; Lepsius 
with a Royal Prussian Expedition; and Budge with Lord Kitchener’s Anglo-Egyptian army sent to re-
conquer Sudan in 1897, after the Mahdist rebellion against Turco-Egyptian rule.  
Many of the men listed above were, by contemporary standards, akin to treasure hunters 
principally aiming to verify their own civilised identity, clarify the inferiority of the ‘Other’, and 
enrich themselves by collecting ‘antiquities’ for collectors or museums. Ferlini, for example, is 
notorious for raiding and vandalizing the royal pyramids at Meroe. Indeed, early archaeologists in 
Sudan showed little interest in the communities amongst which they worked, let alone archaeology’s 
impact upon them. H. C. Jackson, the Governor of the Provinces of Berber and Halfa in the Anglo-
Egyptian government of Sudan in the 1920s, was like many of his peers a ‘scholar official’51 with a 
deep interest in Sudan’s ancient past. His views, typical of early-20th Century attitudes, are worth 
quoting: 
Omdas [regional leaders] and shaykhs could not understand my progressively increasing interest in 
scraps of broken brick or dilapidated pottery…Furthermore [they said nothing about the] ruins not 
more than a mile or two away from where I was camped. In many instances, too, the people were 
woefully ignorant of, and completely uninterested in, a conglomeration of ancient materials that was 
only of value in so far as it supplied top dressing for their irrigated land.
52   
 Jackson’s observations betray an almost contemptuous attitude towards Sudanese who lived 
among the ruins, who, in his mind, should have had an interest in for the monuments of past 
civlizations. 
                                                     
42  Lepsius 1853. 
43  Wilkinson’s unpublished journals are now in the Bodleian Library in Oxford, UK. 
44  Taylor 1854. 
45  Budge 1907. Budge had returned to Sudan to continue his archaeological work in 1905. 
46  Crowfoot and Griffith 1911. 
47  Garstang, Sayce and Griffith 1911, Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997. 
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Recent trends 
Although attitudes such as these have not vanished, they have certainly diminished over time and with 
the removal of colonialism’s formal institutions. Today, “individuals are recognised as having ‘needs’ 
and ‘rights’ which must be understood and protected by society,”53 as well as having their own 
knowledges and cultures, which have intrinsic and equal value. As attitudes have changed, so have the 
questions asked by archaeologists.
54
 For instance, Meskell suggests that identity, defined as “the ways 
in which individuals and collectivities are distinguished in their social relations with other[s],”55 has 
received academic interest because of the angst and uncertainty created by the homogenizing and 
disrupting effects of globalization.
56
 Meskell also shows how, as concern for the integrity of human 
rights, experiences, lives and bodies has developed, scholars have sought to pursue Feminist and/or 
Marxist agendas that look for the ‘faceless’ (unrepresented) within the material record.57 As Reid and 
Lane note, one of archaeology’s most important contributions to the search for the past is that it 
“…allows us to access the “voiceless” elements in society…which are not represented by written text 
or remembered in oral accounts.”58 In this schema of values, women, workers, slaves, minorities and 
their domestic and industrial architectures are the objects of archaeological investigation as much as 
kings, queens, high priests and their palaces and temples. For Meskell, these developments have 
helped pull archaeology away from its colonial roots to make it “socially relevant again.”59 This is 
partly, she suggests, because most archaeologists have become ‘reflexive’, a quality they previously 
lacked as they were under “the illusion that the subject of [archaeological] research is dead and buried, 
literally.”60 Such shifts are always ongoing, but can only take place when “the interpretive time and 
space make it possible.”61 Though Gillot notes that some scholars lack concern about “their impact on 
local settings”, the question is unquestionably important.  
Since the 1970s, two theoretical trends have emerged within archaeology that are particularly 
relevant to the above; this research uses the umbrella terms of ‘social archaeology’ and 
‘archaeological ethnography’ for these trends. ‘Social archaeology’ emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, 
and ‘archaeological ethnography’ sprang from the latter in the 2000s and 2010s. ‘Social archaeology’ 
reflects archaeology’s move towards its own socially-produced dimensions; its interest in how 
archaeology is used in the social world; and its status as offering interpretation rather than fact. 
‘Archaeological ethnography’ places the entire phenomenon of archaeology under the microscope. 
Using the tools of ‘social archaeology’ to understand the interpretations (‘histories’) that archaeology 
                                                     
53  Foucault 1977. 
54  Trigger 1989. 
55  Jenkins 1996: 4. 
56   Meskell 2002c.  
57  Meskell 2002c, 2010. 
58   Reid and Lane 2003: 10. 
59   Meskell 2002c: 282-3. Also see Jewsiewicki 1989 and Lane 2011 for the idea of history and archaeology’s 
potential to be ‘useable’. 
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produces, ‘archaeological ethnography’ also queries the way in which archaeology operates as an 
industry and practice: “the ways in which archaeology works in the world”.62 Both approaches have 
emerged out of what Collier and Mahon (1993) would call the ‘conceptual stretching’ of the 
archaeological discipline, and enabled studies such as this to gain currency, even though research 
questions and methods deviate from traditional practice. 
 
2.1.2 Social archaeology 
‘Social archaeology’ has come to mean different things to different scholars, but is generally 
understood to reflect a movement away from the ‘material’ towards the ‘social’.63 Scholars were 
concerned with the subtleties of interpretation within the construction and production of 
archaeological knowledge,
64
 the active role of material culture in producing social worlds,
65
 and the 
experience (phenomenology) of archaeological sites as part of the landscape.
66
 Such hermeneutic 
considerations have been dubbed archaeology’s move towards reflexivity67 and, amongst other things, 
have led to further questions namely how other groups in society might interpret or attribute value to 
archaeological sites.  
During fieldwork, such scholars began to use ‘multi-sited’ ethnographic methodologies, 68 
including participant observation and interviews, sometimes in collaboration with anthropologists, to 
discover how consumers (e.g. tourists) and stakeholders (e.g. local communities) perceive 
archaeological sites and their histories. What they found was that while a site might occupy one 
physical space, it is a place of multiple cultural, historical, political and economic meanings.
69
 For 
example, Shankland (1996) demonstrated that while the Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük was being used 
as ‘symbolic capital’ in the identity constructions of local Turkish secular civil society, such capital 
was largely irrelevant for the nearest local community, Küçükköy, whose residents identified as 
Muslim. Later, Bartu showed that Çatalhöyük has meaning for the identities of multiple groups, from 
“New Age goddess worshippers to government officials, as well as local people and archaeologists 
themselves” and is thus “at the intersection of local and global processes.”70 Through such studies, 
                                                     
62  Meskell 2005a: 83. 
63  Hodder 2008b. Also see Patterson 1994. 
64  Hodder 1991; Hodder and Hutson 2003. 
65   Meskell 1999, 2005b. Also see Tilley 2006. 
66  Tilley 1994, 2010. 
67  Castañeda 2008. 
68  Bartu 2000. Also see Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009, below. 
69   Hodder 1998. 
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archaeology has been repositioned as an exercise in multivocal interpretation,
71
 with the 
archaeologist’s reading rebranded as one of many. 
Of course, recognizing such plurality also means acknowledging that interpretations do not 
always align. As Meskell explains, identity and self-definition “revolve around genealogy, heritage, 
citizenship and sameness…but also disenfranchisement and difference.”72 Misalignment can, in turn, 
produce negative contestation and even conflict around the physical site itself, something that was 
recognised after the Second World War by the Hague Convention (1954), which stipulated that 
archaeological sites should be immune from political upheaval and conflict.
73
 Yet in the most extreme 
cases of ideological opposition, archaeological sites have continued to be used as weapons of war, 
most recently in Syria and Iraq.
74
  
Nevertheless, given their understanding of the site’s potency and (at least a normative) belief in 
that all interpretations are of equal value,
75
 these scholars inserted reflexive interpretations and multi-
sited ethnographies into ethical archaeological practice under a new, post-processual, interpretive and, 
ultimately, social archaeology. Issues of sites as places of multiple pasts, presents and futures, the 
influence of the archaeologist’s person in the construction of knowledge and the epistemological and 
ethical consequences of such actions were thus addressed via a practice in which ethnography and 
archaeology go hand in hand, as will be discussed below.  
This ‘interpretive space’ has had a significant impact on archaeology. This brief overview cannot 
do justice to the scale of the output produced by scholars whose works, in the words of Renfrew and 
Bahn, led archaeology to begin to recognise “the variety of perspectives of different social groups, 
and [accepting] the consequent ‘multivocality’ of the post-modern world.”76  
 
2.1.3 Archaeological ethnography 
‘Archaeological ethnography’, which became popular in the 2000s, may be understood as an 
endeavour to understand the mechanics of archaeology beyond what Gnecco would call merely 
“expanded archaeological hermeneutics”.77 While ‘social archaeology’ studied site interpretations, the 
                                                     
71  Hodder 2008a. 
72   Meskell 2002c: 280. 
73  Hladik 1999a and 1999b, specifically regarding its two Protocols on the Protection of Cultural Property in the 
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74  Turku 2017. The great mosque at Ayodhya in India was destroyed by Hindu fundamentalists in 1992; and the 
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meanings attributed to them and their use and abuse in nationalist projects and for indigenous peoples, 
‘archaeological ethnographers’ also foreground activities in the field, such as excavations, as objects 
of study in themselves. Other practices, such as post-season work and desk-based assessments, are 
also conceptualised as important places of social production, each riddled with ethical implications. 
For Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos, the former having done much to popularize the term, 
‘archaeological ethnography’ stems from synergy between ethno-archaeology, post-processual 
archaeology
 
and anthropology.
78
  It is used by scholars who wish to give their work a ‘thick’ or 
‘textured’ character,79 and thus includes: 
the introduction of ethnographic methods into archaeological projects…the merging of ethnographic 
and archaeological practices in order to explore the contemporary relevance and meaning of the 
material past for diverse publics…the politics of archaeological practice…and the claims and 
contestations involving past material traces and landscapes...
80
 
Meskell, for whom archaeological ethnography is a “holistic anthropology”,81 asked the local 
Venda communities around Kruger National Park in South Africa about the histories of excavations; 
their assessment of a new museum; their view of recent reconstructions of ancient sites; the current 
benefits, tourist potential and future development of sites; “what else could be done;” and what “could 
have been done better.”82 Finally, she asked what “impact all these vectors [has] on the forging of 
identity.”83   
Others, including Robin and Rothschild (2002) as well as Lane (2011), also undertake this work, 
though it is unclear if they identify as scholars belonging to a distinct field of ‘archaeological 
ethnography’. Suffice it to note that there are differences across scholarly perspectives and that the 
term is subject to heterogeneous usage and definition, and even modification. For instance, 
‘archaeological ethnography’ is conceptually close to what is referred to by its key scholar, 
Edgeworth, as ‘ethnography of archaeology’.84 In Edgeworth’s view, the latter is largely, though not 
exclusively, undertaken by archaeologists to make “the cultural processes of archaeological practice a 
subject of ethnographic investigation.” 85  It asks questions such as how “might archaeological 
activities be interpreted from an ethnographic perspective?”, and, what effect “[d]oes the presence of 
visiting archaeologists have in ethnographic contexts?”86 Edgeworth suggests that the turning point 
for these studies, including his own, was in the 1980s, when the influence of social archaeology was 
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79   Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 66. 
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gaining traction.
87
 Indeed Shanks, a key scholar of ‘social archaeology’, sums up the need for 
‘archaeological ethnography’:  
While we continue to give credit to a focus on broad social or political processes that intersect 
archaeology…we need a richer, more nuanced, more human account of archaeology. We need to 
engage the human face of archaeology—what archaeologists get up to, and not just academics, not just 
publication, and the quite artificial accounts of debate in journals and professional discourse.
88
 
Shared by the present research, this approach is drawn from a volume of dialogues in which 
Shanks and contributors including Rathje, Witmore, Buchli and McGuire conceptualise archaeology 
as alive and ripe to become a central subject of enquiry. ‘Social archaeology’ has thus grown to 
enquire about how archaeology works as a cultural and material phenomenon as well as about how 
histories, or rather interpretations, are generated and how they should be managed. It also echoes 
Shankland’s observation that in “informal conversation” with archaeologists, archaeology reveals 
itself to be a  
complex juggling of academic renown and influence, financial strictures, local political prestige, 
national economic and political considerations, strikes, good and bad cooks, and struggles with local 
labour forces.
89
   
Under the title of ‘anthropology of archaeology’, this partly led Shankland to generate 
substantive data on “the socially intrusive aspects of the archaeological enterprise” at Çatalhöyük and 
“the side-effects of excavating”90 upon the community of Küçükköy,91 all of which “is unrecorded 
and unexplained…streamlined into concise explanation accompanied by slides showing neat trenches 
and labelled artefacts”. 92  To Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos, Meskell, Shankland, Shanks and, 
indeed, for the present author, “the circumstances in which archaeological research is conducted are 
shrouded in obscurity”93—even though they lie at the heart of archaeology.  
In a further semantic twist, ‘archaeological ethnography’ is also conceptually close to the work 
spearheaded by anthropologists such as Castañeda (2008) namely ‘ethnographic archaeology’.94 This 
refers to work in which archaeology is the subject matter with ethnography as the method, an 
endeavour that scholars like Hodder, Shankland, Bartu and others have often undertaken with 
archaeologists. Though their interest in studying archaeology from an anthropological perspective was 
independently conceived, Castañeda nevertheless notes that it is a form of inquiry into archaeological 
dilemmas. Conscious of their role in (first) interrupting (and later) co-producing any given social 
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situation, scholars such as Castañeda, like Shankland, see anthropology as allowing study of the gulf 
between what archaeology “actually does” and what researchers “think it is doing”:  
[w]hether the economic circumstances of the local people have been radically altered, whether they 
wished for the excavation to take place at all, whether political battles have been fought over the 
heritage being explored, how the knowledge from the site has been used, who has benefited from 
excavation…95 
* 
Despite considerable heterogeneity, ‘archaeological ethnography’, ‘ethnography of archaeology’, 
‘anthropology of archaeology’ and ‘ethnographic archaeology’ have common aims: to qualify and 
quantify the impact of sites, histories and archaeologists on local communities and to generate more 
thematic data on archaeology’s historical, economic, social and political impact, or lack thereof, 
usually with the aim of improving or even ‘decolonizing’ archaeological practice. Yet, a term is 
needed to more firmly locate the present thesis within the extant literature. While having reservations 
about some of their arguments, the present research utilizes an adaptation of Meskell’s 
‘archaeological ethnography’.  
 The broad question of archaeology’s impact on local communities has over the past 40-30 years 
arguably reached its ‘interpretive time and space’. The space has emerged alongside, and as a 
consequence of, the archaeological and anthropological pursuits outlined above, which are themselves 
responses to the changing perceptions that human populations have had about one another. Such is the 
urgency of these issues that the topic is now also being explored by historians, economists, 
sociologists and psychologists, all of whom increasingly recognise the links between archaeology, 
history, identity, materiality, development, land ownership, nation-statehood and citizenship, slavery, 
colonialism and post-colonialism, ethics, politics, economics and warfare. It is thus possible to see the 
emerging status of the question of archaeology’s impacts in contemporary studies, some of which are 
analyzed and evaluated in this review. 
 
 
2.2 Defining Terms  
Before evaluating the current literature, a number of key terms must first be defined. While concepts 
such as ‘archaeology’, ‘local communities’ and ‘impact’ have vastly different meanings, it is 
nevertheless possible to provide working definitions to act as benchmarks. 
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2.2.1 ‘Archaeology’ 
As Lane notes, “defining archaeology has always been problematic.”96 In simple terms, it is study of 
the past via material remains, and is thus a composite term that incorporates (1) the academic 
discipline and (2) the source material. Burtenshaw’s definition of archaeology as “sites, materials, and 
knowledge”97 also incorporates (3) the history or “knowledge” that is created for consumption. We 
may also add to this that archaeology is commonly defined by (4) the methods (e.g. excavation) used 
to reveal the source material and (5) the specialist expertise of the archaeologists.  
However, this five-point definition belies considerable variation of opinion. As noted by Wait 
and Altschul, this is due, in part, to scholars’ different disciplinary emphases (1): some professionals 
“limit their work to archaeology, others to historic buildings…giv[ing] rise to very different ways of 
looking…and working.”98 Thus, ‘material remains’ (2) might be conceptualized as “archaeological 
sites”, or as defined by Matero et al., “clusters” of “artefacts, ecofacts and features in any 
combination”, geographically placed at “[t]he location of a significant event, a prehistoric occupation 
or activity or a building or structure, whether standing, ruined or vanished, subterranean or 
underwater…”99 
Equally, echoing Plenderleith, ‘material remains’ might be further divided into “unexcavated, 
underground antiquities” and “excavated archaeological sites.”100 In this definition, Matero et al.’s 
focus on the site’s original environment is given less emphasis, and “archaeological materials” may 
thus include: 
“a) known and unknown, unexcavated, underground antiquities; b) exposed or excavated 
immoveable monuments of architecture, art or history, and archaeological sites; c) moveable objects in 
museums and collections of archaeological origin, books, manuscripts etc.”101 
‘Material remains’ therefore includes everything from botanical remains of household waste to 
graves and long-buried bodies, monumental royal palaces and temples as well as the broader 
landscape and ecosystem, whether still in situ or not.  
The more controversial question of what kind of knowledge archaeology creates (3), if indeed it 
creates ‘knowledge’ at all, is also subject of debate and affects how different people define 
archaeology, as was noted above. In contrast to social archaeologists, Courbin suggests that the 
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mandate of the archaeologist is to establish ‘facts’ from the material record via fieldwork.102 This 
search for ‘facts’ is often contrasted with the other “cognate disciplines”103 of anthropology, the study 
of human societies, and history, narratives built from written sources. Courbin suggests that writing 
archaeological history — assimilating and interpreting the archaeological data — involves a change in 
identity towards that of an historian.
104
 Although the idea of producing facts has now changed, the 
production of ‘archaeological histories’, narratives of past events in human societies by archaeologists 
who are at the “trowel’s edge”,105 continues to justify investment in the discipline. 
Archaeology is also subject to differing definitions because of the diversity of the methods it uses 
(4). As public and private investment in archaeology has grown, archaeologists have developed a 
range of methods for investigation
 
that go far beyond excavation, including use of complex 
technological tools such as ground-penetrating radar (GPR) or geographic information systems (GIS). 
‘Archaeological science’ has developed as a vast sub-discipline concerned with extracting 
information not readily available through visual and contextual analysis. Indeed archaeology 
continues to develop new specializations and sub-fields, expanding its boundaries as a discipline, 
methods such as biogenetic and forensic analysis produce data that add significantly to understanding 
of the past but nevertheless complicate any one definition of archaeology. 
Finally, as many different practitioners now work within the archaeological realm (5) ‘field 
archaeologists’ may be distinguished from abstract ‘archaeological theorists’, laboratory-based 
‘archaeological scientists’ or even ‘salvage archaeologists’106  as their work focuses upon on-site 
excavation and often involves spending months on the same site per year.  
* 
On aggregate, archaeology is a dynamic discipline. However for the purposes of this study, 
‘archaeology’ is conceptualized as an academic discipline that aims to create historical knowledge (1), 
which involves the investigation of physical archaeological materials (2) by archaeologists and other 
professionals (5) who use specialized methods to examine, record, interpret, protect or conserve data 
(4) and who are thus the creators of archaeological history (3). More specifically, this study addresses 
the impact on local communities of a) immoveable and in situ archaeological sites in their original 
environment (2); b) seasonal field archaeologists (5) (whatever stage of career or research they are at 
and whatever methods they use, from excavation to site management (4)); and c) archaeological 
narratives about the sites.
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2.2.2 ‘Local Communities’ 
Many scholars define the communities they study on the basis of a key characteristic that unites them; 
an ‘affected’ community, namely people affected by the same issue or event, or a ‘speech’ community, 
namely people who speak the same language. This study is concerned with archaeology’s impact on 
‘local communities’, which, although a widely used term, lacks a common scholarly definition due to 
the considerable heterogeneity of such communities.
107
 Two broad characteristics of what makes a 
‘local community’ for this study may nevertheless be noted.  
First, scholars tend to use the term ‘community’ to signify both a set of physical components 
(buildings, landscape; often small in scale such as a village) and to the people or residents who live 
amongst them. Second, scholars use the term ‘local’ to denote any community in the locale of an 
archaeological site or sites. For example, in Shankland’s (1996, 1999) studies, the ‘local community’ 
is the agricultural village of Küçükköy situated next to the Neolithic site of Çatalhöyük (7,400 BCE) 
in Tukey’s Konya plain; to Rodriguez (2006), it is a Maya farming village known as the Kochol who 
live near the pre-Columbian Maya site of Chunchucmil (400-650 CE), in Yucatán, Mexico; and for 
Gomes (2006), it is the Parauá riverside community (caboclos) based in a largely unexplored part of 
Brazil’s Amazon rainforest, on the periphery of the pre-colonial Indian chiefdom of Santarém (1000-
1500 CE). Site proximity is important, since those living near a site are commonly most affected by it; 
however, this is not always the case: Gomes notes that the Parauá community lives 100km south of 
Santarém.  
This term is far from unproblematic. For scholars such as Smith and Waterton (2009), and 
Starzman (2012), who are concerned with how hegemony is established discursively via discourse, 
‘local community’ is a belittling term used largely to describe the developing world in contrast to the 
conception of Western communities as ‘publics’. In this vein, the term might even be said to suggest 
people’s lack of agency in the face of stronger and more powerful global forces. Yet, as Meskell 
reminds us, whether in Britain or Sudan, ‘local communities’, 
…are not passive constituencies there for our intellectual mining, nor are they there awaiting our 
theoretical insights into their situations or histories. They are directly enmeshed in their own critical 
reformulations, political negotiations, and constitutions of theory and interpretation.
108
 
No ‘local community’ is monolithic. Most scholars stress the importance of including disparate 
opinions and identifying ‘community dissonance’ as a means of understanding society and its groups, 
no matter their size (see Chapter 3).
109
 Meskell again notes that:  
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…as we all know, there are so many locals, and it very much depends on the conversation: whether you 
are talking to the chief (in the case of South Africa), an elder, a woman, people of different generations, 
or people belonging to different socioeconomic groups.
110
  
Despite its shortcomings, including the danger of reducing the ‘local community’ to a static unit 
upon which external forces act without resistance, the term remains current as it aids communication 
and facilitates cross-disciplinary and cross-cultural comparisons. Indeed Gillot concludes that ‘local 
community’ is a less controversial term than other potential designations and generally “refers to the 
current localization of people who live nearby archaeological sites.”111  
A further semantic note is required, however. Throughout this thesis, the primary analytical unit 
is conceptualised and referred to as a ‘site-community’. It is a useful signifier for a village or cluster 
of villages that are situated in close proximity to an archaeological site. The term itself is not strictly a 
pre-existing concept—although Lane (2011) and others have used it less self-consciously—but one 
that has emerged from the research. It seems preferable to the endemic designation of ‘local 
community’ and centralizes the archaeological site as the ’common denominator’ for the community 
residents, without, of course, presupposing that it is important to any, let alone all, of them. Indeed 
this term may even be a useful concept to archaeologists and ethnographers alike. 
 
2.2.3 ‘Impact’  
Like ‘archaeology’ and ‘local community’, the term ‘impact’ may be conceptualized in many ways. In 
its simplest definition, it describes the effect of one force upon another. In such a broad reading, an 
impact may occur regardless of whether relevant forces collide suddenly or over time (short-term vs. 
long-term impacts), or whether one force is stronger than another. Indeed while this research 
addresses archaeology’s impact on site-communities, it would be equally intriguing to examine the 
reverse (see Further Lines of Enquiry). ‘Impact’ may also be used synonymously with ‘effect’, 
‘influence’ or ‘impression’; the ‘change’ engendered and its ‘consequences’. These words appear in 
most of the scholarly literature under review. Shankland (1999) writes about the ‘side-effects’ of 
archaeological activities; Douglas (2014) about the ‘impact’ of Çatalhöyük-as-cultural heritage; and 
Burtenshaw (2014) and Klamer (2014) about archaeology’s ‘capital’, and especially its ‘ability’ or 
‘capacity’ to effect change. These impacts are often grouped into themes, such as the impact of 
archaeology, or of archaeology’s different components—sites, histories, or archaeologists—upon a 
site-community’s history, identity, economy, political processes, social life or cultural landscapes. 
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Some studies seek to evaluate the (relative) value of archaeology; e.g. its value for site-
communities compared with state governments or official archaeological histories;
112
 its value in 
cross-cultural perspectives in relation to Europe and the Middle East;
113
 or the value of materials for 
conservation.
114
 As Burtenshaw notes, ‘cultural economics’ has produced frameworks whereby the 
economic value of non-market goods, such as ecosystems and, theoretically, archaeological sites, are 
quantitatively evaluated:  
‘Value’ in these methodologies is often expressed in monetary measures as this is the ‘language’ of 
decision-making and so offers the opportunity to be directly compared to the value of other goods and 
opportunities.
115
 
However, as Burtenshaw also notes, the “application of the valuation methodologies to cultural 
heritage and archaeology has been marginal”,116 perhaps because of continued separation between 
archaeologists and economists. Indeed, for these and other reasons, Miller (2008) is correct to 
describe value, with its financial (economic) and moral (cultural) meanings, as a difficult quality to 
assess. 
Scholars often make value judgments in their evaluations of archaeology’s impacts, casting them 
in binary terms; e.g. reviewing whether they can provide or remove opportunities for a better quality 
of life, including “less poverty, better education and healthcare, a more sustainable approach to the 
use of physical resources.”117 As Joyce asks, “archaeologists have long offered examples of how our 
research will benefit descendant communities [defined below]; how often do we ask what harm we 
might do?”118 Thus, the implication is that archaeology should seek to produce as many good impacts 
and as few bad impacts as possible; indeed, it is the move from substantive results to moral 
evaluations that inform recommendations for the future. 
Ultimately, then, the term ‘impact’ is preferred in this study because, while it is not free from 
bias, it encourages a more objective assessment of how archaeology works and allows for moral 
judgments to be suspended until later in the analytical process. In this review, therefore, the present 
researcher has grouped the extant literature into six inevitably overlapping themes—archaeology’s 
ideational impact on nationalist groups and states; upon indigenous descendant communities; and 
upon indigenous non-descendant communities; and archaeology’s economic impact upon site-
communities via tourism, employment and site management—which are then followed by a 
discussion of what elements of archaeology’s impact are ‘missing’ and are consequently addressed by 
the study. 
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2.3 The Impacts of Archaeology  
The books and articles reviewed below were selected for presentation as they raise questions similar 
to those posed in this study, and also because, by and large, the authors are archaeologists who, like 
the present researcher, utilize ethnographic methods. The sources thus not only offer a conceptual and 
methodological framework appropriate for and comparable with this study, but have also contributed 
to the choices made during this research.  
 
2.3.1 The Impacts of Archaeology on Identity Formation 
As Burtenshaw notes, archaeology appears to be most commonly valued for its impact on history and 
culture, for its ideational output, for the “emotional power” it has in “linking the present to a 
particular golden age”,119 “for the formation of identity…and for inspiration.”120 It is therefore these 
impacts that will be considered first. 
 
2.3.1.1 Nationalist Groups and States 
One key predicament of scholars operating in the milieu of ‘social archaeology’ in the 1990s was how 
archaeology was used by post-colonial nationalist movements to help cement national identity. 
Scholars sought to understand the mechanisms by which narratives from archaeological history and 
iconic images of sites, typically representing apex moments of cultural achievement or sophistication, 
were ‘logoized’ by many burgeoning post-colonial states in Africa, Asia and South America, 121 
similar to how European states in the preceding century utilized archaeological symbolism in their 
construction of national identity.
122
 These states often used carefully calculated re-interpretations of 
archaeology, ‘inventing traditions’123 and ‘imagining communities’124 to legitimize their power as 
much as cementing nationhood. 
For instance, Colla (2007) shows that when nationalist groups began to emerge in 1920s Egypt, 
they asserted pre- and non-Islamic traditions as a rallying point against British colonial rule. The 
umbrella term ‘pharaonism’ refers to the phenomenon of elite intellectuals and secular nationalists 
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identifying themselves as descendants of the Pharaohs, based on the premise that Ancient Egypt was 
the foundation of modern Egyptian identity.
125
 And as Grigor (2005) shows, Reza Khan, a former 
officer in the Persian Cossack Brigade who crowned himself Shah in 1925, after the collapse of the 
Qajar dynasty, also turned to the pre-Islamic era to portray his rule as a continuation of a monarchical 
tradition that began with the Achaemenids of 550-330 BCE, the founders of the Persian Empire. Reza 
Khan changed his surname to Pahlavi, after the language of the Parthians who ruled Iran for five 
hundred years from the 3
rd
 Century BCE. The history of ancient Persia was granted a prominent place 
in school curricula, and the Iranian calendar was changed to date not from the Hijra, the flight of 
Islam’s Prophet Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622 CE, but from the reign of Cyrus the Great, 
the founder of the Achaemenid dynasty. 
The deliberate linking of the identity of modern nation-states to ancient pasts occurs across the 
globe, with mixed results. Archaeology has arguably played an influential role in helping create 
lasting national identities, such as in Peru and Guatemala.
126
 ‘Pharaonism’ has also become 
naturalized in Egypt as a popular sentiment as well as aesthetic style; the use of symbols and motifs 
from Ancient Egypt is clear in the murals painted by young artists on Mohammed Mahmoud Street in 
downtown Cairo during, and after, the ‘Arab Spring’ protests in 2011 (author’s own observations). 
These murals, which have since been destroyed, depicted killed protesters surrounded by replicas of 
mourning scenes from ancient Egyptian funerary reliefs in the Book of the Dead; seeking to highlight 
grief felt by Egyptians. Visual elements of ancient Egyptian Pharaonic culture have therefore survived 
into the present, showing how sites and archaeological histories can provide contemporary societies 
with symbols to help construct identity, community, history and origins. 
On the other hand, when authoritarian regimes have been deposed, their archaeological narratives 
have sometimes been discarded, too. The establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran after the 1979 
Iranian Revolution saw a backlash against the glorification of the imperial past and a revived 
emphasis on Iran’s Islamic character. However, as Arenas has shown of post-colonial Latin American 
states, official state histories are not always easy to dislodge. Ideology is entrenched within schools, 
universities, and training courses; libraries and museums are all controlled by the state bureaucracy,
127
 
thus reproducing what Arenas and others now consider to be “deformed perceptions…about 
themselves, their national identity and their nation.”128  
It may thus be posited that abstracted forms of archaeology have impacted national groups and 
those who identify with it, but that they have often been abused by authoritarian states seeking to 
consolidate their rule. Indeed, if a ‘nation’ is a concept that must be built upon consensus and an 
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active remembering, an idea hailed by Smith (1991), then the impact of archaeological history upon 
states, and the myriad site-communities that make up a nation, has at best had mixed results.  
Some of the (ab)uses of archaeology “in the service of [both the colonial and post-colonial] 
state”,129 namely to search for and help create ‘alternative histories’, are being resolved by a process 
of de-colonization.
130
 Referred to by Lane as “revisionist” histories,131 the archaeological record as 
well as other cultural and historical evidence, both tangible and intangible, is used to show the other 
stories of the nation’s citizens to counter the hegemony of official state histories. 
 
2.3.1.2 Indigenous Descendant Communities 
Archaeological sites and history have had a significant impact upon the perceived identity of 
‘indigenous descendant communities’. Although it is impossible to generalize, indigenous descendant 
communities generally claim a direct or ‘lineal’ link with the subjects of archaeological endeavours; 
they choose to view the sites as their ‘heritage’ and in need of their stewardship.132 The impact of 
archaeological sites and history upon site-communities that claim indigenous descent has thus to do 
with the conscious formation of genealogical and cultural identity and inheritance, Meskell’s “cultural 
affiliation and cultural patrimony”,133 rather than national affinity.134 
Indigenous descendant communities have used evidence produced by archaeology to reinforce 
senses of historic identity; claims to land and other rights; and to legitimize their demands for 
recognition of nationhood. Indeed Straight et al. (2015) have pointed out how ethnographic methods 
have long been used to evaluate how specific archaeological materials are used within peoples’ 
histories and identities, in order to improve the ethics of archaeological site management and 
protection. Yet as Meskell notes, it was not archaeologists but the contestation by citizen activists 
about what archaeologists should do with excavated human remains (“reburial, repatriations, 
representation”) and other “…problems related to archaeological intervention” that initially brought 
archaeological attention to this issue.
135
 The aforementioned citizens were members of groups such as 
the Native Americans in the United States, many of whom had been active since the 1970s
136
 (e.g. 
Cherokee, Navajho); the First Nations in Canada (e.g. Inuit, Métis, Indian); the Māori in New Zealand 
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(e.g. Ngāpuhi, Ngāti Porou); and the Native Australians (e.g. Pitjantjatjara, Arrernte) who initially 
challenged archaeologists based on their identity as ‘indigenous descendant’ communities.137 In these 
instances the problematic issue was (is) not that archaeology had a negative impact per se, but rather 
that the practices of excavation, publication and display of bodies transgressed the values the 
indigenous descendant communities attach to their ancestors after death. Indeed, it is because 
archaeological sites and history are vital to the identity formation of descendant communities that the 
issue arose in the first place.  
After much lobbying some success was forthcoming: for example in 1990, Native American 
groups persuaded the United States’ government to recognize the “rights of lineal descendants, Indian 
tribes, and Native Hawaiian organizations to Native American cultural items, including human 
remains, funerary objects, sacred objects, and objects of cultural patrimony”138 and to agree that such 
remains should be returned to the descendant communities and interred rather than be stored in a 
museum. These wishes were enshrined in law via the Native American Graves Protection and 
Repatriation Act in the same year, and have continued to influence the passing of legislation for 
Cultural Resource Management in the United States.
139
 Native Australians were also successful in 
changing the law around cultural material, for example in the Aboriginal Heritage Act (1988, for 
South Australia). In short, the “compromise” reached by Native Australians and archaeologists was 
much like those of the Native Americans, namely that all human skeletal remains (and sometimes 
cultural artifacts) should be returned to them as the living inheritors and stewards of such material.
140
 
Later in 1991 a code of ethics was adopted by the Australian Archaeological Association that require 
displays of skeletal material to be replaced by casts and obliges its members’ to consult with the 
living people whose ancestors’ lives are being studied on a case-by-case basis. Similar statements 
were made and laws enacted in New Zealand,
141
 and although Canada does not seem to have passed 
such laws, professional bodies and cultural institutions such as the Canadian Archaeological 
Association have written documents such as the Statement of Principles for Ethical Conduct 
Pertaining to Aboriginal Peoples (1997). Indeed most archaeologists, if not their governments also, 
now see it as their duty to conserve and protect archaeological sites according to the wishes of 
indigenous descendant communities.   
As Lane (2011) has pointed out, archaeology’s impact has thus gone further than merely being a 
source of historic capital for contemporary identities among indigenous descendant communities. The 
process of negotiation for the rights of indigenous descendant communities has also a) induced 
international acknowledgment of their existence as their identities, names, territories, histories and 
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rights have become legally recognized,
142
 along with awareness of their “marginalization within a 
culturally or ethnically different wider society; and often, a history of colonization”:143  
…in southern Africa where Khoisan populations have become increasingly conscious of their 
‘indigenous’ status from the perspective of international bodies such as the UN and ILO and relative to 
‘non-Khoisan’ [and Bantu] peoples…[which] has been given considerable prominence as a human 
rights issue, pitting the global benefits of conservation against local community rights of access and 
resource use.
144
 
Consequently, because ‘indigeneity’ suggests marginalization, it has b) served to counteract the 
hegemonic historical discourse of the US, British, Canadian, New Zealand and Australian states. 
Indeed, as scholars point out, the development of these laws and the increasing amount of scholarly 
work on the link between indigenous descendant communities and the archaeological past have been 
very effective foils to colonial legacies and then the abuses of post-colonial nationalisms. Although 
the extent to which archaeologists abide by laws and guidelines varies, such studies are nevertheless 
heralded as models for how archaeologists should conceptualize the link between archaeology, history 
and identity in real terms, and work in tandem with people that claim indigenous descent to establish 
the meaning they give to archaeological remains.
145
 These evaluations have also led to the 
development of what scholars refer to as ‘indigenous archaeology’, 146  which essentially aims to 
institute an archaeological practice in which Western scientists collaborate with indigenous 
descendant communities to produce archaeological knowledge. 
* 
However, with the passage of time, the concept of and focus on indigenous descent has been critiqued, 
not least as the recognition has grown that claims to ‘descent’ are heuristic and motivated by a host of 
contemporary factors, and hence such claims should not be taken at face value. Findings such as 
Gillot’s, that site-communities “could be, but are not necessarily…‘[d]escendant’ communities”147 
(author’s italics), have also been prominent in such discussions. In short, scholars have found that to 
identify or be identified as an ‘indigenous descendant’ community is not necessarily the same as to 
identify or be identified as an ‘indigenous’ community, or a ‘descendant’ community. For example, a 
‘descendant’ community or person may claim a cultural or genealogical link between themselves and 
the ancient inhabitants of archaeological sites, whether the descendent group or individual inhabits the 
‘original’ land or not.148 One can thus be part of a descendant community and not an indigenous 
community, as expatriates and diasporic communities often find themselves to be. In contrast, an 
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‘indigenous’ community or person (‘native’) may be seen as any group or individual born and living 
in the locale in question and that claims a historic link with the land, rather than with the people who 
occupied it; the fundamental component of belonging to or inheriting the land is so important to the 
formation of these identities that the discourse surrounding them is often known as ‘autochthonous 
identity politics’.149 It is therefore possible to claim to be ‘indigenous’ but not part of an archaeology-
focused ‘descendant’ community.150 (The application of these terms are discussed in Chapter 5.) 
Of course, as Lane notes about, “there are also multiple and sometimes conflicting definitions 
used by archaeologists”:151 ‘indigenous descent’, ‘descent’ and ‘indigeneity’ are fluid concepts that 
considerably overlap. However, the relationships signified by these terms are usually those claimed 
between a) people and the land (indigeneity), b) people’s relationship to other people (descendant), or 
both (indigenous descendant). The common thread is that those who adopt these titles identify as, and 
are often recognized by outsiders to be, either a) ‘original to’ the ancient land which archaeologists 
study and/or b) the lineal descendants of the ancient people who inhabited the land which 
archaeologists study. What they share, and thus what remains as a bone of contention, is what Yeh 
implies about claiming indigeneity, namely “firstness, nativeness or original or prior occupancy of a 
place; attachment to a particular territory or homeland.”152 In other words: a claim to authenticity.153 
Another prominent critique may be found in studies such as Lilli’s (2000), which, using the 
example of Australia, show that claims by indigenous descendant communities can be wrongly 
granted first priority, including above those of the resident non-descendant community. Critiques such 
as these may be based on three premeis: 
1. It is scientifically incorrect: Meskell (following Jameson 1997) notes that identifying indigenous 
descent (deemed ‘ethnicity’) through materials and symbols is dangerous because experience 
(commonly the foundation of identity) is often materially invisible: “it is pretty much impossible 
to isolate vectors of identity from the archaeological record”;154  
2. It is open to abuse: Just like archaeology and nationalism, indigenous archaeology can be used to 
instantiate claims of legitimacy, superiority and territoriality.
155
 For example, at the site of 
Thulamela in South Africa’s Kruger National Park, Meskell found that even though: 
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the use of monoliths find more resonance in historic Venda culture, this should not preclude [rival and 
non-descendent but indigenous] Tsonga-speakers of their rights as stakeholders. The notion of direct 
lineage and ancestry, as espoused by some archaeologists, is potentially dangerous and divisive
156
 
 Meskell further notes that by:  
favour[ing] Venda claims to the site [and] reminding Shangaan people that their own origins are lodged 
firmly in what is now Mozambique… archaeologists have only exacerbated these tensions over 
ascribing modern ethnic identities to the ancient inhabitants of Thulamela..
157
  
3. It is contingent on pre-existing sentiment: as Zimmermann (2008) notes in a brief critique of his 
own ‘ethnocritical archaeology,’ which he openly equates to ‘indigenous archaeology’, its scope 
is limited to peoples and groups who are somehow already unified; it is dependent upon pre-
existing communities which possess significant degrees of collective solidarity. 
Thus, Meskell posits that it is important to “address multiple understandings of the site—now 
and in the past—without privileging one ‘ethnic’ group”158 because “the danger is always that the 
politics of recognition, if conceived too literally, can promote the telescoping and hardening of 
cultural and political identities”. 159  Burtenshaw—for whom archaeology can “support political 
agendas which enhance the position of some groups and cut out others”160—notes the same thing in 
Jordan. 
What these endeavours have shown, essentially, is that archaeological sites and history (or 
interpretations of history) in some cases are used in the construction of individual and collective 
identities for indigenous descendant communities. However, the late 1990s and 2000s seem to have 
been a turning point thereafter scholars became concerned not only about whether people do identify 
with the archaeological history and sites but also whether they do not. In this schema of values, 
people’s choice not to claim or want ‘descent’, or even their “indifference”161 or “ambivalence”162 
towards archaeology, becomes equally important to explore. Indeed, scholars are slowly becoming 
aware that precious insights can also be gained if sites are viewed as places of experiential importance 
independently of their official archaeological meaning.  
What the following section clarifies, then, is that contrary to popular archaeological philosophy, 
the meanings of histories and sites for people who do not claim ‘descent’ (‘non-descendant 
communities’), but who are nonetheless exposed to the same archaeology, are not restricted to what 
they are able to contribute to indigenous history and identity, and certainly not to ‘World Heritage’. 
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2.3.1.3 Indigenous Non-Descendant Communities 
While archaeology has had a significant impact upon the formation of identities adopted by 
indigenous descendant communities, its impact upon indigenous non-descendant communities—
broadly conceived here as people who place a high cultural value on their land but do not necessarily 
choose to adhere to the idea of being descended from ancient people in the archaeological past—is 
more complicated.  
Rodriguez conducted a multi-sited ethnographic study in Yucatán, Mexico, with the Maya 
farming community known as the Kochol who live near the pre-Columbian Maya site of 
Chunchucmil. Taking a Casey-esque (1997) and Bordieu-influenced (1993) perspective of sites as 
‘spaces’ constructed “by the engaging gaze of a social actor”163 and the performance of multiple 
activities and onto which multiple perceptions of ‘place’ are inscribed, 164  Rodriguez notes that 
“archaeologists conduct research on this landscape”165 and see it as “promising a tremendous yield of 
knowledge from which to produce academic capital” about the ancient Maya.166 Simultaneously, “the 
local communities use the same land—to raise cattle, hunt and farm—often directly over the ruins.”167 
Despite this “disparity of dependence”168 it is still the same land and thus, echoing Bartu (2000), 
Chunchucmil is “multiple places in a local space”.169  
Nevertheless, misaligned conceptions of archaeological ‘space’, as ‘heritage’ on the one hand 
and ‘landscape’ on the other, seem to have gone largely unchallenged and alternatives unsought until 
2002, when a North American archaeological team declared their desire to build a Chunchucmil 
museum directly on the Kochol’s communal farmland (ejido). According to Rodriguez, this was an 
idea that the archaeologists thought would augment the positive economic impact of archaeology for 
the Kochol, but that “once rumours spread about land being taken away”170 concerns about fencing off 
the site crystallized
 and the archaeologists were prevented from working for over two months”,171 
until a contract was signed outlining their ownership rights. Indeed, with hindsight, Rodriguez regrets 
not realizing that, when viewed through what Joyce (2002) calls the ‘global economy of knowledge 
production’, the proposal of a museum on the ejido essentially required the disempowerment of the 
Kochol and the appropriation of their land:  
                                                     
163   Rodriguez 2006: 161. 
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…[first] because it entailed the privileging of archaeological and thus a Westernized conceptual 
framework and second because it would have set into motion a series of events that would have created 
very different kinds of relations between farmers and their land.
172
 
While noting the range of opinions within the community, including some positivity about a 
museum, Rodriguez’ overwhelming impression was that archaeology, and the desire to effect 
economic results for the local community, actually had a negative impact upon the Kochol’s 
agricultural economy. However, Rodriguez’ argument goes further in two inter-related ways. First, 
Rodriguez found that ejido is not only an economic but also a cultural asset that reinforces the farmers’ 
historic identity—that of being ejido owners. Second, he found that the Kochol primarily identify as 
possessing Mestizo lineage, “not that of a descendant of the ancient Maya”,173 and they therefore told 
Rodriguez that “the builders of the [Chunchucmil archaeological sites] were a different generation, a 
different race and of a different epoch.”174 
Ejido is thus economically and historically impactful for the Kochol, and part of their cultural 
patrimony, but in ways wholly independent of the meanings ascribed to it by archaeologists. 
Rodriguez notes that the archaeologists had made the erroneous assumption that the Kochol would 
choose to identify as indigenous descendant communities and would thus also choose to view the 
ruins as their ‘ancestral heritage’, thereby welcoming a museum and preserving the site rather than 
understanding how sites function as important parts of the indigenous landscape. 
Similar findings have been made at Çatalhöyük in Turkey. There, Shankland found that residents 
of the modern settlement of Küçükköy saw themselves as descendants of those who built part of the 
site, referring to it as “old village” (Eskiköy).175 Yet, they did not perceive a historic, genealogical or 
cultural connection with the Neolithic people who built the first settlements there. Instead, Shankland 
found that over time, alternative rationalizations had been cultivated to make historic sense of the 
mound that covers the site’s remains, one of which was that it was created by pre-Küçükköy Greek 
(Rum) populations who, although having left in the 1920s, were nonetheless likelier to be the “true 
descendants” of those who used to live there.176 Just like the findings of other authors above, the site-
community residents are indigenous to the land and place a high cultural value on the archaeological 
site, but not because of its partial status as an archaeological site, which is merely incidental.  
Shankland suggests that by using participant observation and interviews it is possible to see, as 
Malinowksi suggested, “the difference between what people say goes on, what people say should go 
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on, and what is actually found on the ground.”177 In this vein, he lists the ways in which archaeology 
and the archaeological site seem—at first sight—not to have had an impact on Küçükköy’s residents. 
However, in a later research season, Shankland moved onto mapping the places of importance within 
the landscape according to Küçükköy residents and found it as a far more effective way of addressing 
the importance of Çatalhöyük to local representations of the past.
 
He is careful to point out that it 
would be wrong to fix any one quality to any one object, but that “[s]ome objects do appear to hold a 
fairly constant position in the collective representation of the village.”178 In looking at these constants, 
Shankland suggests that “the archaeological landscape acts as a number of mnemonic points” for 
people in Küçükköy. For example, the mounds are simultaneously seen as a source of buried treasure; 
a picnic place at festival times (particularly valued by women as a location they may frequent without 
men); a source of fodder for grazing; a source of earth; and sometimes as field boundaries.
179
 He calls 
this a “complex but subtle and tolerant interaction between the villages and the heritage…”180  
However, Shankland finds that for residents of Küçükköy, Çatalhöyük’s most compelling 
physical characteristic was related to its partial status as a modern-day cemetery that thus contained 
“the souls ('arūah, s. rūh) of those who used to inhabit [the land] and are now buried there, as well as 
being a locus of “other supernatural sanction” and host of “the devil.”181 He suggests that beliefs 
about these metaphysical beings and forces were attached and reinforced by the presence of human 
bones, which were often visible on the surface due to natural ground erosion or truncation.
182
 And, 
despite his limited access to them, Shankland suggests that this physical-metaphysical but non-
archaeological connection to Çatalhöyük may be even stronger among the local Muslim women than 
with the men. Against the background of women’s general exclusion from public Islamic praxis, they 
are “much more prominent in just those areas of the faith which the believing politically active men 
regard as being unacceptable and far from central orthodoxy.”183 For people in Küçükköy, then:  
the mounds [of Çatalhöyük] occupy a position in the village cosmology somewhere between what is 
usually regarded as the ‘folklore’ of the region (that is, the activities of supernatural mythical 
archetypical beings) and the Islamic faith.
184
  
Shankland thus hypothesizes that “plotting those parts of the landscape which may be said to 
play a part in [Küçükköy’s] religious life…against the visible archaeological remains would reveal a 
                                                     
177  Shankland 1996: 349. 
178  Shankland 1999: 145. 
179  Shankland 1999: 145. 
180  Shankland 1999: 145. 
181  Shankland 1999: 145. Other scholars have also noted this. In the Parauá caboclos in the Brazilian Amazon, Gomes 
also noted that archaeological sites are connected to cosmological beliefs, especially those about supernatural 
beings both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ who act as guardians to natural resources like the forests (igapó), the streams 
(igarapés) and other sacred spaces (Gomes 2006: 156). 
182  Shankland 1999: 150. 
183  Shankland 1999: 154. 
184  Shankland 1999: 148. 
  
45 
high degree of correlation.”185 Shankland reports that although “ideologically” there was potential for 
disruption—the villagers are Muslim but many people outside Küçükköy see Çatalhöyük’s figurative 
art as symbolic of a pre-Islamic female ‘Goddess’ religion—this was not apparent.186 Indeed, to 
Shankland, the Küçükköy residents: 
…are already aware of the multiplicity of past civilizations in their land and have linked these already 
in a coherent way with their sense of being Islamic. Answers are already in place which cope well with 
the challenge bought by the presence of archaeologists in their midsts.
187
 
Indeed, this is the problem that arises when ‘heritage’ is conflated with ‘archaeology’, a mistake 
made even by the most attentive anthropologists such as Shankland (see above). Useful here is 
Gillot’s observation that in Syria the closest Arabic terms for archaeology, ‘antiquities’ (athâr) and 
‘heritage’ (turâth), have several meanings, depending on who is using them.188 Formally-educated and 
often Western-influenced Syrian civil society, for example, has come to conceptualize the 
archaeological objects as material evidence of their own heritage: something they have inherited and 
must protect.
189
 And, although the Syrian government does not use the word turâth in its Antiquities 
Law and formal title, Gillot shows that it too has chosen to visualize athâr as ‘national heritage’.190 
One important dimension revealed by the analysis of language in this manner is that, in Arabic at 
least, the leap from athâr to turâth reflects a different level of connection; referring to something as 
‘heritage’ requires some sort of conscious acceptance or belief that the objects or histories are one’s to 
inherit. Archaeologists may assign people a heritage (as Rodriguez did) but it does not necessarily 
follow that the people themselves will choose to follow suit. To demonstrate this, Gillot moves to 
archaeology’s historical impact upon indigenous site-communities in Syria, noting that:  
They…do recognise the cultural values of archaeological remains, considering them as part of their 
history and formation of their identity, even in the case of the remains from a distant past or a different 
culture. What differs is the criteria of recognition of archaeological remains as heritage (turâth), which 
may diverge from the more widely accepted or nationalist aesthetic, historical and national values 
recognized by Syrian Antiquities Law.
191
 
Jacobs and Porter (2009) make similar findings in their study of site-communities in Jordan, but 
further noted that, in legal terms, athâr and turâth are still seen as separate. For these and other 
reasons, scholars such as Loosley (2005) have suggested that there is an epistemological gulf between 
Western ideas of archaeology and heritage are incompatible with Arab Muslim senses of history. 
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However, as Gillot notes, the situation is “more complex”192—and examples can be drawn from 
elsewhere. For instance, while conducting archaeological research in Nigeria, Eze-Uzomaka found 
that some indigenous Igbo communities do not regard themselves as descendants of the ancient 
peoples that occupied the land, and therefore do not make a direct connection with the ‘heritage’ that 
archaeologists assign to them. Instead, Nigerians “have a concept of their past which is divergent 
from the past presented by archaeologists.”193 
Gomes also found a clash in worldview and conceptions of identity whilst investigating the 
social interactions between an archaeological project focused on the periphery of the pre-colonial 
Indian chiefdom of Santarém and the contemporary Parauá riverside community (caboclos) in the 
Brazilian Amazon. According to the official archaeological history of the Amazon, Santarém society 
was paradigmatic of sophisticated pre-European societies. Yet the Parauá caboclos are “mixed-blood 
populations resulting from marriages between Indians and Portuguese colonizers…between 1615 and 
1800, which homogenized the existing diversity of former indigenous groups.” 194  Although 
“historically and culturally related” to indigenous Indian populations, caboclos, such as the Parauá, 
“do not consider themselves to be Indians and vehemently refuse to be classified” as such.195 However, 
Gomes finds that two neighbouring and rival Parauá groups have reacted differently to the reception 
of official archaeological history; the political leadership of one group appropriated aspects of it into 
their identity and began recreating ‘Indian’ traditions (although Gomes does not specify which 
traditions these were). In contrast, the Parauá near Gomes’ site tried to undermine this claim by filing 
a report to the authorities “linking the archaeological research to biopiracy activities” which resulted 
in the suspension of Gomes’ research and her “physical removal” from the caboclos.196   
Although the theoretical framework is not explicitly noted by her, it is clear that Gomes sees the 
construction of Parauá identity from a strongly Wendt-ian (1992) constructivist viewpoint; that is, 
identities are adopted strategically in relation to interests (see Chapter 3). This being the case, she 
suggests that the marginalized residents of Parauá caboclos have two options:  
the first option is to state that they are modern citizens, denying any connection with the past. The 
second option is to identify with an indigenous heritage…[a]nd th[e group nearest her site]…has 
chosen the first alternative—that is, they have chosen to use the result of the archaeological work to 
help support the statement that they are modern citizens.
197
  
Archaeology thus provides “alternative political option[s]”, even if it is not used as such.198 
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2.3.2 The Impacts of Archaeology on Local Economies 
Extant literature on archaeology’s economic impact upon site-communities is scant, perhaps because 
of the separation of ‘economists’ and ‘culturalists’,199 the fracture line between whom Burtenshaw 
calls a “gap”200 (see below). However where it has been studied, a number of perspectives have been 
chosen, from the dividends provided by archaeo-tourism and the dimensions of the commercial 
antiquities market and ‘looting’ pratices; the non-commercial uses of excavated materials, such as the 
reuse and recycling of archaeological material for construction;
201
 to questions about how site 
management plans that change the landscape can affect agricultural practices and yields.
202
 What 
these studies have shown is that the impact can be considerable: mercantile practices such as the sale 
of antiquities found through ‘subsistence digging’ (Staley 1993), ‘commercial archaeology’ (Heath 
1973) or other ‘undocumented excavation’ (Hollowell 2006)203 are a case in point. For example Rose 
and Burke (2004) have estimated that if all the Roman-Byzantine tomb artefacts in northern Jordan 
were to be sold they would generate US$10-18 million, which, as Brodie (2010) notes is equivalent to 
US$1-2 million per year for 10 years. Hollowell finds similarly vast numbers in her research in St. 
Lawrence Island in Alaska’s Bering Straight, which generates something like “U.S.$1.5 million per 
year for the island, or about U.S.$1,000 per person”204 through the sale of artifacts they find and sell 
“at prices from [US]$40 per pound for bulk scraps and fragments up to asking prices of [US]$175,000 
for one exceptional piece”.205 Across the world, then, trade in archaeological materials can generate 
such amounts as to enable the digger “to start a business, attend college or medical school or start a 
new life after fleeing a war-torn country by selling excavated goods”.206  Hollowell further notes that 
scholars have found that “one major find can provide the equivalent of a family’s annual income”;207 a 
considerable amount considering that most subsistence diggers usually receive a comparatively small 
cut of the object’s final sale price.  
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Heath (1973) provides another such example. In his study of huaqueros (translated by him as 
‘commercial archaeologists’) and the associated livelihood (huaquerismo) in Costa Rica, Heath found 
that, 
[t]he illicit trade in artifacts probably totaled at least U.S.$500,000 in 1968-69; only 10% of the 
country's manufacturing establishments produced as much! The roughly 4400 people involved are 
almost exactly 1% of the total economically active population and more than twice the number of 
medical personnel in the country…It is, in crass economic terms, a profitable kind of industry for a 
predominantly agrarian nation…208  
Indeed he continues to note that income from commercial archaeology is substantial when, 
[w]e are speaking of a region where a family of 5 can meet the rent on a tiny hut and eat rice and beans 
(the staple foods) on about U.S.$34 a month, but where an unskilled laborer must be both industrious 
and lucky to earn much more than that, and where the highest paid teacher earned U.S.$102 a month.
209
 
Of course this study is 45 years old, so the monetary returns might well be very different today: 
such practices may not still be current in Costa Rica as there has been a significant rise in 
environmental protection in the country since the 1970s, which may have had a knock-on effect on 
heritage protection. More importantly, some archaeologists view subsistence digging as a practice that 
it inherently at odds with their own principles (see footnote, above). Nevertheless, it taps into the 
broader debate surrounding the economic nature of archaeological materials and the extent to which, 
morally speaking, archaeology can and should be a tool of economic development, particularly in 
developing countries where many people live below the poverty line.
210
 For example regarding field 
schools, Boytner calculates that: 
Between 2009 and 2012, over $5.8 million was directed towards [field schools] in Europe (Spain, Italy, 
Greece, Ireland, and the UK captured 47 per cent of these funds) and $2.3 million towards North 
American field schools. But $1.6 million reported/$2.4 million weighted was spent in the Middle East 
and over $1.5 reported/$2.2 million weighted in Latin America.
211
 
Boytner argues that this money goes directly to local economies via payments made for 
accommodation, food, local labour, equipment and supplies from local businesses and payments for 
the use of services such as transport, laundry, Internet cafes, etc.
212
 Less quantifiably, Boytner notes 
that the cross-cultural partnerships forged during archaeological seasons also have significant 
economic effects upon the local community, noting, “[w]hether through development work, the 
creation of service-learning projects, or through the (rare) cases of marriage, migration, and 
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remittance, these relationships yield lasting and profound impact on local communities.”213 Moreover, 
he notes that the partial data available “produced conservative results. It is likely that actual funding 
and therefore spending in and impact on local communities, is higher.” 214  Of course, Boytner 
acknowledges that some field schools have only a negligible economic impact upon site-communities, 
“especially if they are a single season project.” Yet Boytner nonetheless concludes that archaeologists 
have a significantly positive economic impact upon site-communities simply by “doing 
archaeological research.”215 
ICOMOS clearly belives archaeologists have a responsibility to use their work to produce 
economic dividends, declaring that “tourism should bring benefits to host communities”.216 Even 
regarding developed Europe, Wait and Altschul have remarked that “the notion of heritage and 
economic development as [being] equally necessary…for a sustainable future is shared by all the 
major participants.” 217  Indeed, a number of organizations promote the use of archaeology as a 
development tool, including the Global Heritage Fund, the Sustainable Preservation Initiative, the 
World Heritage Fund, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank, all of which “focus on 
archaeological sites as leverage for broader economic development…”218 
Of course, that archaeology should produce economic benefits is not universally agreed. As 
Burtenshaw notes, some laws and codes of ethics “de-emphasize” or “exclude” the aforementioned 
entirely, such as in Australia’s amendments to the Venice Charter (1964), known as the Burra Charter 
(1979).
219
 Scholars such as Carmen (2005) also argue that economic thinking has had a negative 
impact on archaeologists’ views of archaeology. Nevertheless, as Carmen also acknowledges:  
There is sometimes a tendency among archaeologists to be scornful of the ‘dismal science’ of 
economics, based upon the misconception that all that economists care about is money. This is not 
necessarily true, as economists take a sophisticated approach to question of value, grounded in the 
recognition of the environment as a scarce (that is, finite) resource.
220
  
For such reasons, as Gould and Burtenshaw have noted, interest in “the use of archaeology and 
heritage as resources for economic and social development”221 has been growing for some years.  
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2.3.2.1 Tourism 
While Boynter’s list of the ways in which archaeological field schools can generate economic 
dividends is useful, most scholars assume that archaeology’s economic impact upon site-communities 
comes primarily through its contribution to tourism.
222
 Indeed, archaeologists seeking to explain what 
they give back to site-communities often cite tourism as a prime example. Walker and Carr note that 
“while tourism and archaeology are without a doubt separate disciplines, they share a significant 
number of interests.” 223  Such is tourism’s perceived value to local economies that Gould and 
Burtenshaw argue that “efforts to turn heritage into a tourism asset [should be] a primary focus of 
archaeologists’ efforts related to economic development.”224  
According to this literature, archaeological tourism can provide a range of economic benefits, 
visible not least in the net sums that a country receives annually. In Alaska, 1.2 million "visitors" 
spent close to one billion US dollars in the state in 1999 (a significant percent of which must have 
also gone into the legal trade in antiquities, above).
225
 Using figures provided by Goodwin and Nizette 
(2001), Brodie (2010) has also shown that in the north-eastern area of Peru, 69,000 foreign tourists 
(spending c.US$119 per day) provided something like USD$40 million in 2003, with the domestic 
market 1.2 million Peruvians (spending c.US$19 per day) adding more. In 1999, it was estimated that 
just one of these towns, Chiclayo, was receiving US$14 million per year (Watson 1999). Boytner 
further notes that “if a[n archaeological] site is selected for further development for tourism or as 
regional or national symbol”, it may be possible to “produce lucrative micro-economic niches” by 
reproducing “archaeological artefacts using traditional designs and/or methods.”226 As Coben shows, 
the Sustainable Preservation Initiative at the site-scommunity of San José de Morro in northern Peru 
is based on the reproduction of Moche ceramics found in the burials there, and has proven popular 
with tourists, directly producing $50,000 in revenue for the community, one full-time job, and 22 
other part-time jobs.
227
 The importance of tourism revenue to site-community economies is evident. In 
interviews conducted in Jordan’s Wadi Feynan, Burtenshaw found that: 
over 90 per cent [of the respondents] agreed that the archaeological remains [which date from Neolithic 
to Roman] were ‘important’ to them…Two-thirds of these respondents said this was due to the 
economic contribution from the archaeology through tourism…and through employment in 
archaeological projects.
228
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However, current literature also shows that for most site-communities, tourism is either non-
existent or does not generate revenues which trickle down in any significant way. In his study of the 
Kochol in Yucatán, Rodriguez concludes that there have been few benefits from tourism and that even 
at other important Mexican archaeological sites, such as Tulum and Uxmal, economic benefits for 
site-communities have been minimal—despite improvements to the local infrastructure.229  
Moreover, intrusive archaeological site-management plans, usually designed with tourism in 
mind, “may diminish cultural meanings and access for some populations, reducing cultural and social 
capital.”230 Lastly, tourism may actually become a source of social conflict within site-communities. 
During fieldwork in Wadi Feynan, where tourism has been successful, Burtenshaw found that:  
disputes about how to organize tourism as well as access to economic opportunities offered by 
archaeological projects caused significant tension between tribes, and between tribes and national 
organizations in the area.
231
 
In a paper published in 1996, Shankland reported that there was no significant tourism industry 
in the immediate area of Küçükköy and that he “suspect[ed] that [its] effect on the community 
is…rather small.”232 In another paper, published in 1999, Shankland noted that “the success of the site 
reopening is clearly attracting important people to the area” and that tourism had become 
ubiquitous.
233
 However, rather than heralding an economic bonanza, Shankland suggested that the 
impact of tourism was not entirely positive, noting that people were “resigned” to the idea of selling 
their houses and their lands to make way for developments that did not include them. Shankland 
attributed this to the fact that “many people do not feel powerful enough to enter into a complicated 
procedural battle, one which would involve both the local authorities and various different 
government departments.”234 
 
2.3.2.2 Employment 
Archaeology has an economic impact on site-communities through the seasonal wages earned by 
locals working for archaeological teams, although this has barely been studied. An historic 
perspective on this is provided by Agatha Christie (1946), who describes the day-to-day life of the 
archaeological projects she worked on in northern Syria and Turkey with her husband Max Mallowan. 
Recounting her conversation with their Armenian cook, Dmitri, Christie writes: 
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He has come all the way from the coast to be ready for us. ‘How did you know we were coming?’ ‘It is 
known that there is to be digging again this year. […] It is very welcome. I have now the family of two 
of my brothers to support; there are eight children in one and ten in the other. They eat much. It is good 
to earn money. […] I said to my brother’s wife, ‘God is good. We shall not starve this year – we are 
saved – the Khwajas [foreigners] are coming to dig!’235 
Christie’s descriptions strongly suggest that archaeology’s economic impact upon such 
employees, who were otherwise “desperately poor” and “next door to starvation”, was significant.236 
Gillot, who worked in the same area as Christie and Mallowan 70 years later, agrees that 
archaeological employment is economically beneficial to site-communities. In a case-study of Afamia 
in north-west Syria, he notes that “[s]alaries paid to the workers are two or three times higher than 
those paid in the Syrian public sector, industry and agriculture.”237 More specifically, Gillot observes 
that the archaeological mission he studied employed between 30 and 50 people for an average of six 
weeks per season. By working out the daily salary (200–250 Syrian pounds, equivalent to €3 at the 
exchange rate in 2008), the addition of a sixth paid day of work (paid at double the daily rate), the 
consequent weekly salary (some €33), and salary over the typical six-week season (some €200), Gillot 
is able to positively conclude that, “In monthly terms, a worker [who works continuously] thus 
earns…approximately €130. As a comparison, the legal minimum wage is at present…€87 [per 
month].”238 
Gillot is of course aware of the shortcomings of archaeological employment as a source of 
income. Its “temporary character”, for example, means that it is primarily regarded as an appendage to 
a primary occupation: a “person will therefore share their working day between the excavation and its 
exploitation or business or [their] post in the administration.”239 Overall, however, Gillot concludes 
that archaeology provides “secure well-paid seasonal and temporary employment and as the number 
of posts is limited they are subject to fierce competition between local people”240 and that while 
“[w]orking conditions can vary from one mission to another…generally, the appreciation of the 
workers is positive.”241 
Boytner, too, finds that archaeological field schools have a significantly positive economic 
impact upon local communities.
242
 Utilizing his long experience as an archaeologist who runs field 
schools, Boytner concludes that while limited in terms of total financial investment, the latter “make a 
local impact that is economically broader, deeper, and longer lasting [than tourism]”, particularly 
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when archaeologists return to the same site and region over several years and operate in poor regions 
of the world where “[t]ourists do not stay long.”243  
Like Gillot and Boytner, Rodriguez argues that while the Kochol living near the archaeological 
site of Chunchucmil in Yucatán had not benefited from tourism, wages paid by archaeologists had 
brought positive benefits. He notes that: 
…most locals agreed that the relatively high wages paid by the [archaeological] project for labor are 
truly beneficial. An elderly ejidatario [landowner] stated, ‘We pray to God that the project gets funds 
to return next year so we can work because the community really benefit in this time when things are 
very difficult.’244 
Shankland makes similar remarks at Çatalhöyük. Shankland noted how, although the first 
archaeological teams that worked sporadically at Çatalhöyük in the 1960s lived within Küçükköy 
village, and although the villagers were “acutely sensitive to any opportunities that such direct contact 
with the outside world offer[ed]”, archaeology at that time produced few economic impacts for 
Küçükköy.
245
 Of the much later archaeological team that worked at Çatalhöyük from 1993-5, 
Shankland notes that they hired an average of 15 workmen per six-week season.
246
 Shankland does 
not specify how many seasons the archaeologists worked per year, who the employees were, or who 
might have lost out on economic opportunity when the archaeologists changed their accommodation. 
However, his assessment that archaeological employment’s impact upon Küçükköy is “negligible” 
does not change, and that even “after the site…opened up [in 1993,] the effect on the local community 
[wa]s still economically rather small”,247 because the 15 workers: 
represent almost the sole extent of [Küçükköy’s] surplus labour; the remainder of men of suitable age 
being either busy in their fields or having emigrated. Whilst the prospect of cash is always welcome, 
and there are always a few poor folk, the village’s comparative wealth means that the money coming in 
through the workmen's wages is of little significance in the village economy as a whole.
248
 
Shankland’s reaches similar conclusions in his 1999 paper. He writes that “it is certain that the 
money paid to [Küçükköy residents] from the site represents only a tiny proportion of [Küçükköy’s] 
overall economy.”249 However, he adds that residents were concerned by the fencing of the site 
because it could no longer be used as a pasture for sheep; and that the only person who received 
                                                     
243  Boytner 2014: 263. 
244   Rodriguez 2006: 168. 
245  Shankland 1996: 351. 
246  Shankland 1996: 351. 
247  Shankland 1996: 351. 
248  Shankland 1999: 354. 
249  Shankland 1999: 143. 
  
54 
regular wages was a watchman employed by the local museum.
250
 He thus suggests that instead of a 
general economic impact archaeology had “highly specific effects”:251  
the villagers who have worked for the site are often those who have the least property. Just as did the 
first watchman, after a number of years (particularly if more than one person from the same family 
works there regularly) a family may succeed in moving up the village social hierarchy by buying a 
house or land. The[refore the] money going into the community may be important in its selective 
influence on the village order, but much less so in its total economy.
252
 
 
2.3.2.3 Site Management 
Regardless of any positive economic impacts archaeology might bring, many scholars have reported 
that relationships between archaeologists and site-communities are not always free from conflict. In 
great part this seems to be attributable to the archaeologist’s interventions in the land and the impact it 
has, or could have, on local livelihoods and thus site-community economies: Rodriguez notes the 
downside of archaeology for those whose land had been integrated into the Chunchucmil 
archaeological zone, quoting one of them as saying, “What good is the pay if it ultimately leads to our 
land being closed to us?”253 Gomes describes two related clashes between the archaeologists and the 
local Parauá community in the Amazon. About the first, Gomes notes “political opposition”254 to the 
archaeological project. In part she attributes this to the lack of familiarity of some members of the 
Parauá with the purpose of archaeological activities and in particular with surveys, “which involves 
the opening of transects across the territory”.255 Gomes also points to the pervading feeling of land 
insecurity in the caboclos; the same land had, only recently, been turned into an “Extractivist Reserve” 
and to the pervading feeling that archaeologists seem analogous with other “seek[ers of] mineral 
riches” who sold artifacts for financial advantage (see the comment about biopiracy, above). 256 
Similar parallels between archaeology and commercial processes are said to be drawn by Canadian 
Inuits (Bielawski 1994). However, Gillot writes that the archaeologists are often equally suspicious of 
local community members, who are often thought of 
as a threat to the knowledge and protection of archaeological sites. Therefore, local populations are 
usually excluded, or access is limited by private ownership. These measures can lead, in some cases, to 
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misunderstanding and strong opposition towards archaeological research and conservation 
procedures.
257
  
This shows just a few of the apparent subtleties of how archaeology’s impact on local economies 
might be conceived. Beyond creating economic complications, Shankland also strongly suggests that 
site management activities erode the residents’ organic connections with the Çatalhöyük mounds (that 
is the connections that have emerged independently of archaeology or archaeologists): the links 
between archaeology’s ideational and economic impacts are, in many cases, direct. For example in 
describing the process by which archaeological sites are formally made in Turkey (site 
identification—visit by the authorities—arrival of archaeologists—beginning of excavations—
creation of the dig-house—installation of a site guard—establishment of a museum—the rumours of 
tourism—the construction of hotels and concomitant infrastructure—the interest of outside 
organisations—the attention of the press—the involvement of politicians and the sponsorship by 
private investors and businessmen), Shankland comments that the meanings given to the mounds have 
not been transplanted or revitalized elsewhere: “[n]ow Çatalhöyük is cordoned off…[and] the 
villagers have not sought a direct replacement.”258 Far more than just the erection of borders, then, site 
management plans may therefore be said to erode these organic connections and may very well be 
quietly playing a role in the broader “polarization of gender practices” that Shankland forecasts will 
continue concomitantly with the increasing trend towards Islamic orthodoxy.
259
 He predicts that,  
unorthodox aspects of the faith will decline…[and a]s this shift occurs, there is a possibility that the 
mounds will become increasingly viewed as archaeological sites with a distinct place in the past and 
perhaps excluded from the incorporation into the sacred that the lack of periodicisation currently 
permits.
260
  
Importantly, Shankland also suggests that, if this connection is broken, the archaeological sites of 
Çatalhöyük would be forced to confront the even bigger question, which is about “the place of 
prehistoric archaeology in a predominantly Islamic nation.”261 
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2.4 Gaps in the Academic Literature 
2.4.1 Identity  
As shown above, most of the scholarship relating to the impact of archaeology addresses how official 
archaeological history—what we might call archaeology’s ideational output—is used to build a sense 
of identity by three different groups: nationalist groups and states; indigenous descendant 
communities; and indigenous non-descendant communities. Scholarly examples were drawn from 
Africa, South America and the Middle East, demonstrating that although there are great variations in 
the way these groups use or reject archaeological history, cross-cultural trends can nonetheless be 
identified. Transposing the question of archaeological history and identity to Sudan, it is clear that 
archaeology’s impact upon, and use by, these three groups have been only partially addressed in the 
available literature. 
First, Sudan’s official state histories and its endeavours to forge a national identity have received 
attention from scholars such as Deng (1994, 1995). These scholars have looked at the Sudanese 
state’s identification with Arabism and Islam as well as its dogged pursuit of a narrowly-defined 
national vision, which has contributed to internal conflict in Sudan and, indeed, to a long running civil 
war that drew to a close in 2005 and finally ended with the secession of South Sudan in 2011. 
However, few studies look specifically at the impact on Sudanese site-communities of the dichotomy 
between the Sudanese state’s identification with Arabism and Islam vis-à-vis Sudan’s official 
archaeological history, which centres upon the ancient pre-Islamic civilisations of Nubia. Scholars 
such Leturcq (2011) have provided some insights into this topic in the course of their work, and along 
with the literature on national identity, will be drawn upon in the first part of Chapter 5, where this 
dichotomy is examined.  
Second, and in contrast, the impact of archaeological history on Sudan’s main indigenous 
descendant community, the Nubians, has been studied more closely. Scholars such as Poeschke (1996) 
and Edwards (2003) have shown how archaeological history has been used by Nubian groups to 
construct direct lineal descent to the ancient past, and that this has been vital to the Nubians’ 
emergence as an internationally-recognized, if nationally-marginalized, people during the 20
th
 
Century. However, there has been little discussion about what broader implications this might have 
for Sudanese society, even though scholars such as Meskell have shown that over-privileging the 
narratives of indigenous descendant communities can threaten social cohesion and undermine the 
equally valuable rights held by other indigenous groups and site-communities. The second part of 
Chapter 5 is therefore dedicated to such a discussion, and will utilize Poeschke, Edwards and other’s 
work in doing so.  
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Third, and perhaps most importantly, the impact of archaeological history upon indigenous non-
descendant communities, and how it might (not) have meaning or contribute to their sense of identity, 
has not been addressed at all in the Sudanese context. The one study that purports to do so was carried 
out by Kurt Beck (Bayreuth University) at the Meroitic site of Musawwarat es-Sufra in early 2015, at 
the same time as this study, and has not yet been published. This is a major oversight considering that 
most archaeological sites in Sudan are outside Nubia and that archaeologists are most likely to 
encounter indigenous non-descendant communities. How do the latter perceive Sudan’s 
archaeological history? Do they feel any cultural affiliation or historic connection with sites? Again, 
aside from Osman’s (1992) study on folklore, there has been little published research into these 
questions in Sudan, even though elsewhere, archaeological sites are significant phenomena and have 
meaning to site-communities independently of archaeological history. Addressing these questions 
thus makes up the third part of Chapter 5.  
 
2.4.2 Economics 
The brief presentation of literature above notwithstanding, few scholars have sought to evaluate 
archaeology’s economic impact, let alone its economic impact upon site-communities; this is one of 
the main gaps in the extant literature, regardless of region. Gould and Burtenshaw, whose study on 
archaeology and economics is arguably the most significant so far, argue that there is a need for 
“more and better quantitative and statistical data about the [economic] impact of archaeology”262 but 
that, according to Burtenshaw, “enthusiasm to do so seems slim.”263 This is certainly the state of 
research in Sudan, where even research on the links between archaeology and tourism is scant, 
although this is likely due to the fact that tourism remains more of an aspiration than a reality. 
Whatever the reason for such a dearth, the first part of Chapter 6 will address the lack of scholarship 
regarding tourism. 
The second part of Chapter 6 will address an even more obvious gap in the literature, this time 
regarding archaeologists’ employment of members of site-communities to work on excavations. For 
such a long-standing practice across the globe,
264
 it is extraordinary that there have been so few 
scholarly studies about its economic impact. As Boytner notes, the financial returns “that 
[archaeological] research activities per se actually generate are neglected and poorly understood.”265 
Moreover, of the few articles written about it (presented above), there are some glaring shortcomings. 
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Boytner’s own study on site-communities in Egypt concludes that the money made from archaeology 
by site-community residents makes a significant contribution to the local economy, even though 
during field-school seasons, “[American and European] student labour is used as an alternative to 
hiring local workers.”266 Similarly, Gillot shows the impact of archaeological employment on the site-
community of Afamia in Syria but only provides simple calculations of the daily, weekly and monthly 
wages paid by archaeologists to local employees; he does not note the conditions of the wider labour 
market nor the status of archaeological employment as an option for those who take such jobs—both 
of which are vital contextual data needed to gauge archaeology’s real economic impact on site-
communities. 
The economic impact of archaeological site management plans is also little-studied. Yet, again, 
Sudan has two multi-period UNESCO World Heritage sites, ‘Jebel Barkal and the Sites of the 
Napatan Region’ and the ‘Island of Meroe’. Both sites cover large geographical areas and have helped 
to precipitate major changes to the landscape. The economic effect of ‘World Heritage’ in the 
Sudanese context. Chapter 7 will therefore present the results of an examination of precisely this 
phenomenon. 
 
2.4.3 Society? 
The impact of archaeology on power structures and social dynamics has been briefly addressed above, 
in relation to how colonial and post-colonial administrations have utilized archaeological history for 
their own interests. However, three key aspects of archaeology’s impact on site-community power 
structures and social relationships are poorly addressed by the extant literature both generally and 
with regard to Sudan. The first aspect relates to the social consequences of archaeological 
employment. As noted above, several authors argue that archaeological employment has a positive 
economic impact, but only Shankland notes that the economic benefit is limited to key members of 
the site-community. Yet not even he takes the investigation further to consider how this might have 
significant social ramifications. Burtenshaw (2014) hints that this might be the case, noting that 
archaeology’s social, cultural, and economic impacts are interrelated and that positive socio-economic 
impacts for some likely means negative socio-economic impacts for others. But, again, Burtenshaw 
fails to fully examine what broader implications this might have for the social and political status quo. 
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The second aspect, which is even less studied, is that archaeological employment, and other 
relationships fostered by the seasonal presence of archaeologists, create unique social groups
267
 as 
well as social networks of service and exchange. Such groups and networks are often controlled by 
one or two local families that occupy official positions on the archaeological site. Although not 
explicitly studied, the existence of these networks is hinted at throughout the extant literature. For 
instance, referring to the men who worked on excavations at Chagar Bazar, a Neolithic site in present-
day northern Syria, Mallowan records that they:  
were controlled by our foreman…Hamoudi Ibn Sheikh Ibrahim from Jerablus…who had worked for 
Woolley for many years at Carcemish before coming to Ur, and brought with him three sons.
268
 
Mallowan’s wife, Christie, noted in 1946 that Shaykh Ibrahim’s “elderly cousin, Abd el-Salaam, 
is also a foreman.”269 Many archaeological teams repeatedly employ a few ‘key men’ who pass on 
their roles to their families, often enjoying a largely unapprised monopoly on job allocations at sites. 
These men often enjoy significant power at the local level. Gillot’s describes how, in Syria:  
The project’s field director will ask the foreman to propose workers for the site, based on his 
recruitment list that he has established, based on the qualifications of the workers or their interpersonal 
affinities. The foreman is someone the field director can trust, who looks after the site and the house 
and who is the link between foreign archaeologists and local workers. He generally enjoys a higher 
position in the community due to his authority. Foremen are selected at the beginning of a dig and 
usually stay in the role as long as the excavation lasts. The function is generally passed on from father 
to son.
270
   
Gillot’s description broadly aligns with the present author’s observations of archaeological 
employment in large parts of the Middle East and Africa, and is a reminder that, in this context, the 
site guards, foremen and their families are powerful entities who derive their authority from their role 
in deciding who is and is not employed at the site; their responsibility for the site as well as the dig-
house; and, their role as mediators between the foreign archaeologists and the site-communities. In 
particular, this latter ability transforms them into precious channels of information between 
archaeologists, site-communities and government officials.   
With some important exceptions, such as Meskell (2005), most scholars who have studied this 
question are dealing with ethnically homogeneous populations: the case-study communities 
referenced above: the residents of Shankland’s (1996, 1999) site-community, Küçükköy in Turkey, 
self-identify as Turkish; residents of Rodriguez’ (2006) site-community in Yucatán, Mexico, self-
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identify as Mestizo; and, residents of Gomes’ (2006) site-community in Parauá in the Brazilian 
Amazon self-identify as Indo-Portuguese (a contentious term but the one Gomes uses). Yet none of 
the site-communities the present author has worked with have been ethnically homogenous; even if 
they were, no community is likely to stay homogenous in future. This is a significant third aspect 
because competition between different local groups for limited archaeological work can lead to 
tensions and even conflict. During a season at Chagar Bazaar, Christie (1946) records that her team 
hired Arabs from the foreman’s hometown and Armenians, Kurds and Yezidis from the surrounding 
area. According to Christie’s diaries, this had violent consequences; she describes ferocious fights and 
Arab systematic bullying of Yezidi team members.  
Other glimpses of the social ramifications of archaeological employment are found in the letters 
written by the archaeologist John Goodwin (1900–1959), published in Shepherd (2003). Goodwin 
was excavating in Nigeria in the 1950s, and in correspondence to his wife notes (as have many 
archaeologists in different parts of the world) the existence of itinerant labourers who travel around 
the region working as seasonal archaeological employees: 
Two of my labourers, Gáruba and Adámu, I had at Ife, both very nice men, not very hard workers, but 
willing, a third is Enobi…who is new to me. Then by some curious chance another man (known as 
Conjo) has drifted up from the Kongo tribe at the north of the Conjo.
271
  
Two years later, Goodwin wrote to his wife that considerable trouble had been caused by traders 
in the local communities who had purposely increased their prices for the non-local archaeological 
employees, thereby challenging the net worth of the archaeological wage: 
The real trouble is my men get from 2/8 to 3/- per day and are ‘foreigners’, while the local minimum is 
5/- a day. The results are that everyone puts prices up to outside people, and my men can’t meet it out 
of their pay…Rooms run from 12/6 to £1–10–0 a month, but they have only been offered a room 
between them for £1–10–0.272 
Some archaeologists are clearly aware of these kinds of potential problems and have taken steps 
to minimize them. For example in apparent response to a local monopoly on archaeological jobs 
(which she does not describe), Oland says that she instituted ‘equitable hiring practices’ by giving all 
members of the community “equal opportunity to apply for work” hiring men and women “in the 
other in which they applied.”273 However, it is unlear how she managed to give a large community 
equal opportunity, nor the number of jobs that were actually on offer. Similarly, and although she is 
not speaking explicitly about employment, Gomes reports that “in relation to social inequalities” in 
the Parauá community, she tried to “minimize existing differences by offering democratic access to 
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information and strengthening social ties with the workers.”274 She suggests that “this may have 
helped to develop the team spirit and group cohesion manifested on many different occasions, 
especially in situations involving conflict.”275 However, her description remains a supposition rather 
than evidenced interpretation and she does not say what the social inequalities were, how she 
strengthened ties, or whom the conflict involved, preventing the latter from becoming a more 
substantive element of her work. The third part of Chapter 6 is thus based around addressing this 
obvious line of enquiry, which is essentially the question of archaeological employment’s impact 
upon power and social relations within small site-community units, what Boyte (2010) and others call 
‘everyday politics’. 
 
 
2.5 Research Questions and Thesis Structure 
The review of the scholarly literature has shown that the impact of archaeology, in its broadest sense, 
on site-communities, that is communities which live upon or alongside archaeological sites, has been 
little, and unevenly, studied. Those studies that have taken place have almost invariably focused 
mostly on the how archaeology’s ideational output (‘history’) is used in the construction of identity by 
modern indigenous ‘descendant communities’, site-communities that claim an ancestral link to the 
ancient inhabitants of the archaeological sites. The literature review has also shown that there has 
been virtually no research on the impact of archaeological history upon ‘non-descendant 
communities’, site-communities that claim no such ancestral link. The economic impacts of 
archaeology on site-communities—whether regarding tourism, employment or site management—has 
been even more neglected by scholars; nor has there been any significant research into the social 
impacts of the economic impacts. Using Sudan as a case-study, this thesis therefore seeks to shed light 
on these three overlooked (and overlapping) areas by seeking answers to three groups of questions, 
specifically: 
1. What is the ideational impact of archaeology, archaeological history and archaeological sites on 
non-descendant communities; and how does this compare with its impact on descendant 
communities, in this case Sudan’s Nubian population, and on the Sudanese state? 
2. What is the economic impact of archaeology on site-communities? Does the tourism industry 
have any significant impact, or are the practices of employment and site management more 
relevant to site-community economies? And are these impacts enough to be classed as ‘positive’? 
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3. Does archaeology affect social relationships and ‘everyday politics’ within site-communities? 
How? And are these impacts precipitated by archaeology’s economic or ideational impacts?  
As noted briefly in the preceding section, Chapter 5 will aim to address questions outlined in ‘1’; 
the first two thirds of Chapters 6 and Chapter 7  will address the questions in ‘2’; and the third part of 
Chapter 6 will address the questions in ‘3’. The next chapter, Chapter 3, will outline the methods used 
for data collection and analysis, the justifications for their selection and the decision to focus on a 
single case study based on c.5-month period of fieldwork in the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya 
(defined as ‘site communities’ of the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe, being 
investigated by a team from UCL Qatar). Chapter 4 will provide a general historical and socio-
political overview of contemporary Sudan so as to place the study sites in broader context. Extended 
discussions of the findings, cross-cultural comparisons and further lines of enquiry are presented in 
Chapter 8. Throughout these chapters, the thesis will contribute to and extend the literature on 
archaeology’s historical and ideational impact, and perhaps most importantly it will make a very 
unique and original argument about archaeology’s economic impact, how it relates to both 
archaeology’s ideational and social impacts, as well as providing a new framework with which to 
gauge said impacts in other site-communities across the globe. 
 
 
2.6 Rationale 
That there are glaring gaps in the academic literature has thus been shown. That these gaps need 
addressing in the Sudanese context, where nothing like this has been done before, has also been 
emphasized as part of the rationale for undertaking this project. However there is also a particular 
urgency to examine such questions because of the context in which archaeologists currently operate in 
Sudan. In short, the Sudan government has built at least one major multi-purpose dam along the Nile 
in the past decade, at Merowe in the Fourth Cataract region, and the perceived role of archaeologists 
within or alongside its construction has made relationships between local communities and 
archaeologists somewhat more than fraught. The dam’s reservoir extends 175km upstream, 
submerged over 2,500 archaeological sites and over 400 villages and caused the displacement of 
50,000-70,000 people. It was opposed by all main local groups that inhabit the Fourth Cataract region: 
the Manāsīr, the Shagiyya and the Rubātāb; the farming Manāsīr were the most affected as the 
reservoir submerged much of their Nile-side home- and farm-land, but nomads and farmers came 
together to establish the Manāsīr Association and its Executive Committee, which coordinated 
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resistance. There was also diaspora support, from the UK-based Hamdab Affected People.
276
 In 2002, 
and in response to the imminent construction of the Merowe dam, Sudan’s National Corporation of 
Antiquities and Museums (NCAM) appealed for practitioners to ‘rescue a piece of man’s cultural 
heritage’;277 a number of Sudanese and foreign teams thus went to the region in the succeeding years 
to conduct salvage archaeology. However, in 2007, Manāsīr communities near the Fourth Cataract 
used the threat of violence to ban archaeologists from working in the region and to expel the teams 
already in the area. For the Manāsīr, whose customarily owned land had been drowned and their 
people permanently displaced, and whose date-palms were grossly inadequately compensated by the 
government (if at all),
278
 the situation had come to a head earlier that same year when governmental 
forces had killed at least three people taking part in anti-dam protests, and severely wounded others.
279
 
Indeed, according to news reports and archaeologists who were there at the time,
 the archaeologists’ 
expulsion was because the Manāsīr Executive Committee “considered the[m]…to be ignorant of the 
sufferings of the local people under a suppressive regime and saw them as contributing to the 
legitimization of the dam project.”280  
Since then, there has been heated debate about the rights and wrongs of salvage archaeology in 
Sudan (although as dam construction has stalled, this debate has cooled somewhat), and, because of 
the ongoing popularity of dam building, across the globe.
281
 Yet naturally there is no one agreed-upon 
response for how archaeologists should react. One camp have decided how to respond on a small-
group basis (such as the Committees to Preserve the Middle Nile
282
) and/or taken it upon themselves 
                                                     
276  Interview with Ali Askouri, August 2013. 
277  The Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage Project (MDASP) organised by NCAM, issued the appeal in 2002. See 
the MDASP website and its ‘Appeal for rescuing a piece of man’s cultural heritage’. 
278  For the compensation of the people in the affected area, see the Dams Implementation Unit website. “For instance, 
the Joint Committee had agreed on a compensation for a fruit-yielding date palm at a sum of 2000 SDG; as an 
absolute minimum, compensation was not to fall below the value of 1000 SDG per palm. However, by-law no. 2 
of 2003 fixed the compensation value of a date palm at 500 SDG. With this sum, the payment of which was to be 
spread over six years, the annual payment rate for a date palm would be barely equal to the price of a single sack of 
dates, as the Manâsîr pointed out” (Hänsch 2012: 212). There are also reports that some households have still not 
received any compensation. 
279  Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudanese militia kill three people in Merowe Dam area’, 23 April 2007. 
280  Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011: 60. Agence France Presse reported that “the Manāsīr tribe…has recently expelled foreign 
archaeologists, whom they accuse of helping the Khartoum regime put an acceptable face on the dam project” 
(Sudan Tribune, ‘Sudan archeology flourishes before the flood’, 19 March 2007. Also see Sudan Tribune, 
‘Sudan’s Merowe requests to stop excavating reservoir area’, 27 February 2007). 
281  Salvage archaeology now accounts for more than half of all the excavations carried out in the world and probably 
80% to 90% of those in America and other developed countries (Adams 2007). See also Kankpeyeng, Insoll and 
MacLean 2009 and Ronayne 2006, 2008 for the discussions about archaeological practice in development contexts 
in Ghana and Turkey respectively. 
282  See the Preserve the Middle Nile website and its petition to ‘Stop the Dams in Sudan’. The American Committee 
for Preserving the Middle Nile is made up of five high-ranking academics from the universities of Yale, Brown, 
California and Chicago. The European Committee for Preserving the Middle Nile is made up of six distinguished 
academics from Norway, England, Germany, Italy and Sweden. The European Committee of Preserve the Middle 
Nile wrote: “[j]oin us in contacting anyone who may be able to influence the Sudan Government. Circulate this to 
friends and colleagues. Share your ideas how we may further pursue this work.  Contact us to be listed as a 
supporter of the committee’s work and for further information” (European Committee for Preserving the Middle 
Nile 2012: 3). 
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to confront the situation individually within specific local contexts.
283
 Others have lobbied for the 
application of universal policies to provide ethical guidelines for development processes, or indeed a 
cease to dam building entirely, so that the problem might be ‘cut off at the source’. One of the former 
is the World Commission on Dams (1998-2000), and it notes that dams should only be built if the 
local communities agree.
284
 Some institutions, such as the British Institute in Eastern Africa (BIEA), 
have issued statements threatening the removal of their support in the case of non-compliance with 
the World Commission on Dams, thereby showing solidarity with the communities under threat.
285
  
However, generally speaking there has been a limited commitment to dialogue about 
archaeological behaviour and practice. When the Society for Africanist Archaeologists (SAfA) and 
the BIEA wrote to the two most prominent Sudanese archaeological societies—the International 
Society for Nubian Studies (ISNS) and the British Museum’s Sudan Archaeological Research Society 
(SARS)—expressing their desire to be supported in their motions, neither society responded or 
published their own motion on the situation.
286
 Many individual practitioners and stakeholder 
institutions have been heavily involved in critiquing these archaeologists’ apparent lack of empathy 
with affected communities when the government of Sudan does not comply with international 
standards with regards to human rights and ecological standards.
287
 
Deep divisions have thus appeared within the global archaeological community based on whether 
practitioners should conduct salvage archaeology, with the belief that relics need to be saved in the 
                                                     
283  Bruce Williams, whose ‘Appeal to Stop the Destruction of Nubia’ sets out his personal view, states that while 
archaeologists have traditionally had little influence in political or economic spheres, and that ‘ethnography and 
archaeology alone will not halt or delay an ugly project hell-bent on completion’, argued that archaeologists could 
not do salvage work without appearing to support dam construction (Williams n/d). Writers at Preserve the Middle 
Nile were also present at the British Museum meeting to discuss the dams in May 2012 also note the stance of 
other individuals, for example that Dietrich Wildung, director of the Egyptian Museum in Berlin, and Matthieu 
Honegger, of Neuchatel University, are proponents of the idea of protesting dam building as a developmental 
method (see post on 22 May 2012 on the Preserve the Middle Nile website). 
284  See the World Commission on Dams (2000) and their website. 
285  The BIEA, who make the following remark: “[t]he BIEA has decided that it will only support archaeological or 
other research in the affected areas if it is satisfied that the construction of these dams adheres to the principles laid 
down by the World Commission on Dams, including the carrying out of a comprehensive and publicly accessible 
environmental impact assessment and, in particular, the consent of the local community” (BIEA website, May 
2012). The Society for Africanist Archaeologists (SAfA) also stated that: “[r]eaffirming its commitment to an 
African archaeology that is both socially engaged and socially responsible, and mindful of its own code of ethics, 
SAfA calls on its members to refrain from participating in fieldwork in areas to be affected by the proposed dams 
on the Middle Nile (Sudan) until and unless those projects enjoy the support of the resident local population and 
have been the subject of independently conducted publically available Environmental Impact Assessments’ (SAfA 
website, June 2012). 
286  More specifically Dr. Vincent Rondot, president of ISNS and Dr Derek Welsby, president of SARS. The latter’s 
view, that ‘stalling’ archaeological work is pointless and irresponsible, is well known. 
287  Nicholas Hildyard, CEO of Corner House (UK), has been particularly critical of what he sees as the British 
Museum’s criticism of the Manāsīr Executive Committee. He notes that “[a]lthough the British Museum undertook 
an archaeological survey, it was too late to affect the siting or planning of the project, a key requirement of best 
practice standards. Despite international recognition amongst archaeologists of the importance of consulting with 
local people in order to assess the cultural significance of sites, no systematic consultation has taken place.” 
(Hildyard 2008: 8). He goes on to say that, “[g]iven th[e] limited demands [of the Manāsīr Executive Committee], 
the reluctance of the companies involved and the British Museum to respond positively to the communities’ 
requests might be interpreted as arising less from a reluctant “neutrality” born of powerlessness (“we are simply 
contractors”) as from a deliberate decision to turn a blind eye to the impacts of the project, even at the cost of the 
communities’ lives and livelihoods” (Hildyard 2008: 10). 
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largely inevitable context of development or protest against the government plans by refusing to 
answer international rescue appeals, particularly if they have been asked to by the local communities 
in which they work. Furthermore these are only two (and the footnotes only a small sample) of the 
many stances taken by those involved. In the absence of a mutually respected policy document 
outlining ethical strategies to deal with such problems, cohesion in the archaeological community has 
deteriorated and the silence about the ethics of practice has grown. And yet discussion and critique 
has never been more urgently needed: at the current time there are at least three major dam projects in 
the Sudan, at Dal on the Second Cataract, Kajbar on the Third, Shereik on the Fifth, as well as a 
potential dam planned at Sabaloka on the Sixth and other, smaller, dams at Dagash, Mograt and on the 
Upper Atbara. Indeed, historically, the Nubian region in north Sudan has been most affected by dam 
building schemes, and Nubians have therefore been the most vocal when protesting against them (see 
below, Chapter 5). However news that the government plans to build a dam at each of the four 
remaining Nile cataracts, on the Atbara River and elsewhere has turned this complex and regional 
issue into a national social problem.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the question of archaeology’s impact on the identity, economics and 
society of contemporary site-communities has been ignored, albeit with some important exceptions.
288
 
Time pressures in archaeological and anthropological salvage contexts have required archaeologists to 
focus upon excavating, interpreting and presenting archaeological material, which has left them little 
time to investigate this question. Similarly, anthropologists working in salvage contexts have 
concentrated on clarifying people’s interaction with the natural landscape and addressing the 
problems of relocating and losing their homeland.
289
 More recently, archaeologists at the British 
Museum in partnership with the Royal Anthropological Institute sponsored two research fellowships 
to conduct ‘urgent anthropology’ at the site of Amara West, where museum staff are excavating and 
which are under threat from dam-building.
290
 However, once again that research took place 
concurrently with the present study and is not yet published. In short, therefore, despite the urgency 
with which such questions should be pursued, scholarly work in salvage contexts focuses either upon 
traditional archaeological or anthropological research and ignores local communities’ historic 
identification with the archaeological sites or their interaction with archaeologists, whose presence in 
their landscape is also historic. This project was therefore designed to not only to create a pragmatic 
framework for other social scientists to understand such (dis)connections, but to genuinely evaluate 
and improve our understanding of archaeological practices in the context of a national social problem. 
The timing of this study—undertaken before the next series of dams are constructed—is therefore 
extremely significant. 
                                                     
288  Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011, Kleinitz and Näser 2011, 2013. 
289  Kennedy 1997 and Hopkins and Mehanna 2010 in response to the case of the Aswan dam; papers in Kleinitz and 
Näser (eds., 2012) in response to the case of the Merowe dam. 
290  Both are well-known anthropologists of Sudan, Karin Willemse (2015-16) and Enrico Ille (2016-17). 
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3. THE PRESENT STUDY AND ITS METHODS  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.1 Ethnographic Theory 
The present research is not a conventional archaeological study. It does not use excavations, 
laboratory-based examinations or linguistic analyses to gather knowledge about past peoples or to 
address gaps in archaeological history. Instead, the study is more akin to what Gibbons et al. (1994) 
call ‘curiosity-driven’ research, whose initial questions about archaeology’s impact upon site-
communities in Sudan were formed from the author’s professional engagements with the discipline 
and with Sudan (Chapter 1). The study was designed so that the question of archaeology’s impact 
could be answered, first and foremost, from the perspective of site-community residents themselves. 
While this author did not seek to identify with the community residents—given that this research is an 
academic study—there can be no doubt that like many scholars cited in Chapter 2, there was an 
inherent motivation to bring as the focus of this research their points of view, given the lesser power 
and thus perhaps priority of the latter relative to other stakeholders (e.g. archaeologists, the Sudanese 
state, tourists). Yet, this author is aware, as Silverman (2001) makes clear, that speaking on behalf of 
people from whom one is so different is not a solution to imbalances of power, whether local or 
global. Indeed, presuming to do so would also presuppose a lack of agency on the part of the site-
community residents and suggest that they cannot adequately express themselves or adapt to changing 
conditions in the face of hegemonic political structures.  
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Therefore, although this study foregrounds the site-community residents’ opinions and 
experiences of archaeology and draws conclusions about its impact primarily from their testimonies, it 
is written explicitly from the author’s personal point of view, within the framework of the principles 
of academic research.
291
 Echoing Rodriguez, this author neither wishes nor intends to “…to pretend to 
be a voice for the people of the study…instead I position my voice in conversation with others.”292 
Indeed, the interpretations contained in this study are based not only upon ethnographic evidence but 
also upon other ‘naturally-occurring’293 data, which are analysed both qualitatively and quantitatively 
to build a fuller and more critical understanding of the impact of archaeology. Such a methodology 
thus adopts the frameworks of the many social archaeologists and archaeological ethnographers who 
use qualitative methods including ethnography as the backbone of a mixed-methods approach 
(Chapter 2).  
Ethnography is a set of data collection tools typically used by anthropologists to investigate other 
people’s perceptions, opinions, “subjective experiences” and their “situational meanings.”294 Such 
tools include, but are not limited to, participant observation, interviews, conversations, focus group 
meetings and other dialogues, ethno-historical and archival research, “events in 
schools…performative and art installations in various media…and sites which can also generate 
further ethnographic research [such as] exhibitions, blogs, photo-essays [and] other 
performances…”295 Of these, long-term and immersive participant observation, Meskell’s “hanging 
out”, in one cultural, social, economic or political setting is usually chosen in preference to other data 
collection methods because it “involve[s] witnessing or critically viewing the values, dynamics, 
internal relationships, structures, and conflicts as they play out in communities.”296 The use of such 
methods follows Geertz’s (1973) principle of ‘thick description’ and thus what one might call ‘thick 
understanding’ of contextual nuances and ways of life, which Liamputtung (2010) terms ‘culturally 
competent knowledge’, an understanding of which cannot be gained without such immersion. Un- or 
semi-structured interviews, as well as surveys and questionnaires, often form additional parts of the 
process of participant observation of everyday life because they enable “respondents to move beyond 
answering the questions asked, to raising other issues and concerns which the researcher may not have 
considered or seen as relevant”.297  
Some scholars make a sharp distinction between what Nilan (2002) calls the ‘empirical’ and 
‘formal’ methods of qualitative social science research, and ethnography, which is usually seen as 
anthropology’s preferred method. Such a strict line recalls Edgeworth’s description of the gulf 
                                                     
291  About Amazonia, Gomes says she writes from a “personal point of view” but notes, nonetheless, that “an 
ethnography of archaeology emerges” (Gomes 2006: 148). 
292   Rodriguez 2006: 162. 
293   Silverman 1989. 
294  Davies, Hughes and Gudmundsdottir 2008: 352. 
295  Hamilakis and Anagnostopoulos 2009: 67. 
296  Meskell 2005: 83. Heath also says he “hung around” in Costa Rica (Heath 1973: 260). 
297  Mirza 1998: 82. 
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between archaeology and anthropology as “policed boundaries”298 and Silverman’s argument that 
qualitative and quantitative researchers act as “rival ‘armed camps’”299 and does not seem worth 
retaining. Indeed the mixing of methods has become popular because, as Meskell notes, “[p]ersonal 
observation often counters the normative statements given in interviews, and the two can operate 
successfully in a dialogic relationship.”300  
Related to this issue are the hurdles presented by being both an ‘insider’ and an ‘outsider’ in the 
ethnographic context. The projection of etic ‘outsider’ ideas on to research participants’ emic ‘insider’ 
concepts has been highlighted by scholars such as Liamputtung as a particular risk of ethnography as 
a one-size-fits-all method. Potential bias towards this author’s own discipline and colleagues may be 
noted as another. Indeed, if participant observation and interviews can be analytically recast as 
producing ‘naturally-occurring’ data and ‘researcher-provoked’ data respectively, they can aid rather 
than obstruct the analyses. For example, Silverman has a rule of thumb that emic ideas are most 
visible in naturally-occurring phenomena that come into being “primarily from the intentions and 
actions of local participants”.301 It is more likely that etic and potentially artificial data surfaces when 
researchers set up highly structured and inflexible (etically-conceived) interviews, surveys and 
questionnaires with which to investigate lived experience. According to Silverman, data produced 
from such events may be classed as ‘researcher-provoked’ or “data that are an artifact of a research 
setting”302 and should be handled with care. In practical terms, and for the purpose of this research, 
this meant that during the coding of the collected data (a key analytical step discussed below), there 
                                                     
298  Edgeworth 2006: 62. Scholars have spent much time theorizing the relationship between archaeology and 
anthropology, outlining the contours and discussing how the two may or may not fit together. The first thing to 
note is that, as Meskell (2012) notes, “disciplinary boundaries are constituted differently in different national 
traditions of social science.” To Shankland, a British anthropologist commenting upon the British system of which 
the present author is also a part, the “two disciplines…have grown sadly apart.” Having identified a “divorce”, 
Shankland nevertheless goes on to urge a “reconciliation.” (Shankland 1999: 156). In contrast, in the United States, 
archaeology is not located as a peer of anthropology but one of its sub-disciplines and from the results of a survey, 
Hollowell and Nicholas (2008) show that practitioners of both archaeology and anthropology see the two 
disciplines as having been historically intertwined. While set in a hierarchy—Yarrow and Garrow (2010) describe 
this relationship as “asymmetrical”; Ingold (2010) as “co-dependent”—the two disciplines are also, by default, less 
divisible. Studies in which archaeologists become ethnographers are thus less likely to cause a controversy. In the 
British system, the disciplines’ relationship is not hierarchical but collaboration is likely to trigger more 
contestation. However, in both cases, the increasing collaboration between archaeology and anthropology is now 
seen as inevitable; as Edgeworth points out, “[t]he site of archaeological knowledge is becoming…the site of the 
production of ethnographic knowledge too, with ethnographers and archaeologists operating in the same space.” 
(Edgeworth 2006: 12). The opinions above are changing, too: both in terms of archaeology and anthropology’s 
perceived hierarchy (in the United States) and their perceived distance (in the UK). Because, as Thomas argues, 
archaeology and anthropology can only ever provide a partial understanding of the whole (Thomas 2010: 183), 
most, if not all, authors cited in this review now see the increased interdisciplinary exchange between archaeology 
and anthropology to be beneficial, whether they envision a disciplinary ‘reintegration’ (Feuchtwang and Rowlands 
(2010) echoing Shankland’s ‘reconciliation’); an intersection that creates ‘hybrid methodologies’ (Meskell 2012) 
and ‘interdisciplinarity’ (Souvatzi 2012). Finally, while the relationship between archaeology and anthropology is 
highly complex, the present study conceptualizes their joining as productive and even necessary if they are to 
emerge from the colonial backdrop which hinders them both. Studying one discipline, archaeology, using the tools 
of another, anthropology, is not easy. But to echo Edgeworth, scholars need to view these studies as being at an 
intersection of “cross-field dialogues” which, while lying “on the disciplinary boundary”, are nonetheless spaces of 
“great potential.” (Edgeworth 2006: 15; also see Meskell 2008). 
299  Silverman 1989: 222. 
300  Meskell 2005: 83. 
301   Silverman 1989. 
302  Silverman 1989: 226. 
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was a need to systematically distinguish between researcher-provoked and naturally occurring data, 
and check the context in which information was given to ensure that descriptive fieldwork notes were 
distinguished from interpretations.  
Of course, as Silverman concedes, to think that even naturally-occurring data are wholly 
unmediated “is, self-evidently, a fiction.”303 However, there can be no doubt that researchers have 
different degrees of closeness with the ethnographic context. In this instance the author is both an 
insider and an outsider. To the world of archaeology, this author is an ‘insider’ and as such 
simultaneously her own object of study. Indeed, there is an advantage in knowing about archaeology’s 
social life abroad, and especially in Sudan; how it works in the field; how its theories and principles 
are applied; and, when its idiosyncratic habits emerge. Meskell agrees that for studies such as these, 
“we [archaeologists] have the requisite “insider” expertise; we benefit from our knowledge of the 
craft and its results…[as well as] a deep experiential understanding” of the field.304 But for this study, 
this author has also had to act as an outsider to archaeology and take on the role of anthropological 
observer. Thus, “[t]he seemingly discrete positions of insider and outsider become more 
permeable…”305 
However, this researcher’s relationship to the site-community remained that of an outsider, 
despite gaining increasing degrees of familiarity with it. This author is self-consciously aware that as 
a female British archaeologist with a background in Egyptology, there is an almost-insurmountable 
challenge in attempting to answer questions about archaeology’s impact upon site-communities in 
Sudan from the perspective of the residents. Of course, not everyone agrees that ‘outsider’ status is 
final, including Silverman and Meskell; the latter argues that long-term participation and immersion is 
a transformative process that takes researchers such as herself from a worldview that looks from the 
outside to one that looks “from within”. 306  However, “[n]o one has ever devised a method for 
detaching the scholar from the circumstances of life” and “no one writing, thinking, or acting on the 
Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and action imposed by 
Orientalism”;307 ‘outsider’ status is therefore never truly reconciled.  
The present author’s status as an outsider also affected the responses given in conversations and 
interviews. Indeed this research is persuaded by the constructivist perspectives of Baker (1984) and 
others, who argue that when people meet, they respond to one another based upon what they take to 
be self-evident about the other person in the context of the encounter. As interactions such as dialogue 
are two-way, each person changes depending upon the desires, motives, and allegiances they attribute 
to one another; both parties ‘present’ themselves. The author of this study has thus attempted to 
                                                     
303  Silverman 1989: 227. 
304  Meskell 2005: 85. 
305  Meskell 2005: 85. 
306  Meskell 2005: 83. 
307  Said 1978: 3. 
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understand how the site-community residents’ vision of her as an outsider might affect their responses. 
For most people in the site-community, this researcher would have been identified as no more than a 
female foreigner (khwāja pl. khwajāt),308 although the site-community residents who work with the 
archaeologists would often identify this author as one of ‘them’ until receiving explanations about this 
research. There is no doubt that this author was seen to a greater or lesser extent by all site-
community residents as someone with authority and wealth, which, in their eyes, was proved by her 
very presence in Sudan; on many occasions, this author was asked for money, computers, phones and 
jobs. Whenever the local, Sudanese translator felt that this perception affected the participant’s 
response, that is, beyond the obvious artifice of formal interview settings, this was noted in the Post-
Interview Notes (see below) and taken into account in later analysis and interpretation of collected 
data (see Coding, below). There were many occasions in which the expectations generated by this 
author’s identity or gender clearly affected the outcome of an encounter with respondents. Indeed, this 
author’s person and behaviour, and that of the translator, underscored the entire process of data 
collection. To paraphrase Meskell, as we are ‘reading’ them, we too are being ‘read’.  
Of course, the importance of context to outcome means that it was not merely this author’s 
presence that dictated the tone of an encounter; there was, of course, also the factors related to the 
presence or absence of other individuals and their relative roles and statuses. (Self-)construction of 
this kind does not necessarily imply negative manipulation, artifice or lack of authenticity but rather 
the importance of understanding context and emphasis. In relation to international relations, for 
instance, Wendt has through his realist-constructivist approach sought to argue that “identities are the 
basis of interests”;309 that in any given situation, a state will rationally choose to present itself, or 
adopt a certain identity, in ways that best suit its interests, whether they be economic, social or 
political. The rationality behind the fluidity and even momentary nature of identity is also noted by 
Moerman (1974) at the local level, when writing about the Lue tribe in Thailand. Moerman argued 
that the Lue self-characterize and self-define in an almost infinite variety of ways and that the most 
telling element was the context in which each element of their identity was revealed. This has proved 
important for this thesis not only with regard to forms of self-identification but also the identification 
of Others. For example, inter-subjective terms used within the discourse of social relations seemed to 
change depending upon the level of (in)security the respondent felt. Respondents tended to use their 
neighbours’ first names when describing forms of cooperation between them, but stereotyped 
signifiers when they felt threatened. Of course many scholars have noted this tendancy, not least Hall 
(1991), and its relevance for this study is expanded upon on the national level in Chapter 4 and the 
local level in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6.  
                                                     
308  The word comes from New Persian, khāje (lit. ‘master’, ‘lord’). In Egypt and Sudan, it is commonly used to refer 
to ‘white’ Europeans, or, less commonly, any of those with foreign heritage. 
309  Wendt 1992: 392. 
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Silverman sees these findings as the result of analyzing dialogic data “in the context of the rules 
of sequencing conversation”.310 The interpretive method adopted by this research takes into account 
the (constructed) interview context when interpreting the collected data so as to be able to suggest 
prudent meaning. This author thus analyzed a) who was present; b) the point in the interview at which 
a subject arises; and c) what was said thereafter (see Coding, below). To maintain clarity between etic 
and emic ideas, this author further distinguished between who raised a topic or theme—whether it was 
this author, the translator or the respondent(s). For example, the theme of land and territory came up 
frequently in conversation and was always raised by the respondent rather than by the interviewer. 
Land ownership is a potentially dangerous topic in Sudan for many reasons and at no time, barring 
one occasion in November 2013, did this author or the present translator deliberately bring up the 
topic with any of the respondents. However, if a respondent raised the topic of land, there was 
engagement in conversation on the subject matter. Indeed, the frequency with which this happened 
encouraged thoughts on archaeology’s relationship with the land, which over the span of time grew to 
become an ever more salient feature of this research.  
A consequence of their situated and co-produced quality means that ethnographic responses 
cannot necessarily be re-produced, repeated or replicated exactly by other researchers. As Nilan has 
suggested, such “…quasi-scientific ‘control’ is the very thing which must be set aside for effective 
participant observation to take place”. 311  Indeed “ethnography can no longer concern itself with 
discovering truths which are unmediated by the situated use of forms of representation.”312 Although 
ethnographic methods are widely contested, not least because ethnography is itself a product of 
colonial practice,
313
 such methods “provide deeper and more nuanced understandings of a range of 
relationships between cultural groups, the sites themselves, and those who manage them.”314 
 
 
3.2 Data Collection 
3.2.1 Basic Logistics   
In late 2012, this author was granted permission to conduct ethnographic research at and around 
archaeological sites in Sudan by the Director-General of the National Corporation of Antiquities and 
                                                     
310  Silverman 1989: 216. 
311   Nilan 2002: 364. 
312  Silverman 1989: 216. 
313   Marcus and Fischer 1986. 
314   McClanahan 2006: 126. 
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Museums (NCAM). Subsequently, more than six and a half months over a three-year period (2013-15) 
were spent in Sudan’s Nile Valley gathering data for this study. Another 18 months were spent in 
Sudan or Egypt completing post-fieldwork tasks and writing up results. During the six and a half 
month period, this researcher lived in three different site-communities, accompanied by a Sudanese 
translator. Two separate three-week periods in November 2013 and November 2014 were spent in the 
village of Dangeil, River Nile State, with the archaeological team from NCAM that was then co-
directed by Salah Eldin Mohammed Ahmed and Julie Anderson. Under the same arrangement, two 
weeks were spent in January 2014 on Sai Island, Northern State, with the team directed by Julia 
Budka from the Austrian Academy of Sciences. From January to April 2015, this author stayed in the 
villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya (henceforth conceptualized as one site-community called 
‘Hamadab-Bejrawiya’), also in River Nile State, with the team directed by Jane Humphris of UCL 
Qatar (henceforth ‘UCLQ’). 315  Later, November to December 2015 were spent in Hamadab-
Bejrawiya working for UCLQ, which allowed the collection of any outstanding data.  
Apart from the last season in late 2015, each period of fieldwork was based upon a three-stage 
strategy (see below). Roughly one third of the time was spent living with and observing the 
archaeologists while two-thirds were spent with the local community. Observations were made and 
conversations were had simply by walking around, visiting houses, schools, and events as well as 
talking to willing respondents. Apart from relying on the goodwill and hospitality of the Sudanese 
residents, the archaeological project directors helped with the costs of accommodation, food and 
transport. The bulk of the expenses were paid from the Arts and Humanities Research Council 
(AHRC) Studentship granted for the purpose of this study, or from personal funds.  
Due to previous professional experience of working in Sudan as an archaeologist, this author 
already had a network of support before starting the fieldwork for this study. This network included 
Western and Sudanese archaeologists, the latter from both NCAM and Sudanese universities; 
community residents; translators; university students; and fixers, such as the Pagoulatos family, the 
owners of the Acropole Hotel in Khartoum. However it was important to work with archaeological 
project directors who would be willing and able to host this author: Gillot notes that some scholars 
lack concern about “their impact on local settings”, 316  and it was important to ensure that 
collaborating project directors shared my conceptual and moral approach. Although not the direct 
subject of enquiries, their teams, themselves, and indeed their whole mission, would inevitably come 
under scrutiny. When project directors were approached, all offered to act as hosts without seeking to 
                                                     
315  This author is grateful to be able to add that invitations were also extended to the author to conduct the research at 
the site of el-Khandaq by the project director Intisar el-Zein (University of Khartoum), the site of Abu Erteila by 
project director Richard Lobban (Rhode Island College), and Jebel Barkal by project co-directors Tim Kendall and 
El-Hassan Ahmed (NCAM). This suggested to the author that while not commonly undertaken, studies such as this 
are of increasing interest to archaeologists. 
316  Gillot suggests that “British archaeologists are particularly concerned with their impact on local settings…while 
French [and German] archaeologists do not generally express any views about it” (2010: 13). 
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influence the work in any way, although given their palpable anxiety about my research (partly 
explicable by the context of wider scrutiny of archaeologists working practices (above, ‘Rationale’)), 
this was not always possible: the project directors in Dangeil and Sai Island were particularly 
concered about the impact of my work and unwilling to discuss their practices in-depth. This led, in 
part, to my decision to focus exclusively upon the data collected in Hamadab-Bejrawiya (see below) 
as well as to my decision to largely avoid an examination of the interests and motivations of the 
archaeologists and focus exclusively on the experiences of the site-community residents. Of course, as 
Edgeworth (2006) has noted, the ‘ethnographized’ archaeologists, not to mention the community 
residents, will eventually be able to read the study and to challenge its findings. More than this, 
though, the informed cooperation of all research participants (whether this author, the translators, the 
project directors and the local residents) was needed to ensure one another’s mutual safety. The 
Sudanese state is highly authoritarian, unsympathetic to the West and suspicious of foreign 
motivations; it is also notoriously harsh when it comes to punishing political opponents. There are 
state informers in every village; if research participants were to be suspected of having overly-familiar 
encounters with this author, or were suspected of speaking against the state, their safety would 
undoubtedly be at risk. Observation has shown that Western lawyers, NGO workers, anthropologists 
and sociologists face even more severe challenges than archaeologists when working in Sudan. A 
Sudanese human-rights advocate based at Columbia University who was consulted for this study in 
September 2016, emphasised on the strict controls imposed by the Sudanese state’s Federal 
Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) and National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) to 
monitor and control outsiders. Salmon (2003) and others have written from experience about the 
potential hazards of doing research in Sudan; for instance, Salmon was detained for two weeks in 
Khober, Khartoum’s most notorious prison, for having transcribed a popular joke about Osama bin 
Laden in his fieldwork journal.  
Thorough preparation was especially important as social unrest was growing in the Nile Valley at 
the time of the initial fieldwork in 2013. Almost two years after the secession of South Sudan in July 
2011, the Khartoum government was struggling to cope with the loss of over 50% of its oil revenues. 
It had implemented a strict policy of austerity, removed subsidies on fuel and other basic goods, 
leased unprecedented tracts of land to foreign investors and revived plans for more dam construction. 
Inflation rates soared and life for many citizens was getting harder, with many finding it hard to afford 
basic commodities. Upon this author’s arrival in Khartoum in late September 2013, the towns and 
cities of the Nile Valley were witnessing some of the “largest and most intense public protests in 
years”.317 
                                                     
317  Human Rights Watch 2014: 7. Also see Omar al-Bashir’s speech on austerity measures on September 22, 2013; P. 
Kingsley, “Death and dissent in Sudan as anger spreads to middle classes”, The Guardian, 10 October 2013. 
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The rising tensions between state and society added to the ethical responsibilities of this author. 
It was important not to inadvertently incriminate or jeopardize the safety of site-community residents 
or to do something that might label oneself as a ‘trouble maker’ in the eyes of the authorities and 
thereby complicate the archaeologists’ work. Indeed, archaeologists have an easier time than most 
foreigners in gaining supervision-free permission to work, and are anxious not to compromise that 
privilege (see Chapter 8). In any event, there was little political and social unrest in the site-
communities whilst fieldwork for this study was conducted. This author has been in touch with the 
archaeologists and residents in all three locations since the conclusion of data collection and this study 
does not appear to have had negative repercussions, although it is hard to be absolutely certain. The 
anonymization of respondents and secure data management means that there should be no future risk 
to any participant or interviewee, but the uncertain political context justifies this author’s decision to 
give logistical and security needs—permissions, transparent working models, collaborations—
precedence over theoretical ones when preparing for fieldwork and choosing which project directors 
to work with and thus which site-communities to use for case-studies. 
  
3.2.2 The Case-Study Area 
This thesis uses a case-study approach to enable in-depth exploration of the impact of archaeology on 
site-communities in Sudan. This approach is generally used in ethnography, which deals with the 
situated and textured production of meaning by “a particular society or case.”318 A very large volume 
of data was collected from each of the three locations in which research for this study was carried out. 
However, a decision has been made to present data collected from just one of the three locations, 
namely the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. While a comparative study of all three sites 
would have allowed for a degree of generalization that a single case-study cannot provide, there were 
good reasons for not doing so. First and most importantly was the clear anxiety felt by the project 
directors at Dangeil and Sai Island (mentioned above). This undoubtedly affected my confidence and 
the freedom I felt I had to fully investigate the impact of archaeology in these areas. In comparison, 
the project director in Hamadab-Bejrawiya was eager to hear about the local reception of her practices, 
whether positive or negative, and was even keen to hear suggestions from the present author on how 
negative impacts might be ameliorated. Second, longer time was spent in Hamadab-Bejrawiya relative 
to Dangeil and Sai Island because of the short seasons of the latter, and thus the data set for the former 
is more expansive. Third, Hamadab-Bejrawiya was the last site of fieldwork, in 2015, at which point 
this researcher was far more experienced. As a result, the dynamics at Hamadab-Bejrawiya relevant to 
this research are better understood by this author relative to the other sites. Therefore while the 
                                                     
318  Hopkins and Mehanna 2010: 15. 
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epistemological gulf with the site-community residents can never be completely bridged, this author 
can make a credible claim of possessing a deeper, less superficial understanding of life in Hamadab-
Bejrawiya than in the other two site-communities which suits the ethnographic approach taken and the 
need for ‘thick description’. The later section in Chapter 8, ‘Further Lines of Enquiry’, will 
nevertheless attempt to posit some ideas for where such a comparison might lead.  
The site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya is situated 250km to the north-east of Sudan’s 
capital, Khartoum (Figure 1). It sits on the east bank of the Nile, directly north of the Wadi al-Hawad 
delta and some 75km below the junction with the Atbara River. As separate but neighbouring villages, 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya each have one major archaeological site, both sandwiched between the 
cultivated strip and the villages. The main archaeological site in Hamadab is known as Domat al-
Hamadab. The main archaeological site in Bejrawiya, three km to the north, is known as Meroe Royal 
City (hereafter ‘Meroe’). Both archaeological sites belong to the Kushite-Meroitic period of Sudanese 
history (350 BCE-350 CE). Meroe was the capital of the Kushite kingdom; that is, it was the royal 
residence and administrative centre of the ruling dynasty. Domat al-Hamadab was a residential area, 
but for non-royals. Both sites have had archaeologists working on them periodically for over 100 
years. At the time of the fieldwork conducted for the present study, there were three teams at work, 
one of which was a UCLQ team studying ancient iron production at both Domat al-Hamadab and 
Meroe. This author was associated with the UCLQ team. The three teams live in houses next to each 
other in Hamadab, and this was also the present author’s accommodation for the duration of the 
fieldwork for this research.  
Although the sites within them have received more archaeological attention than most, Hamadab 
and Bejrawiya are typical examples of sedentary agricultural villages in Sudan’s Nile Valley, most of 
which are located between the fertile strip of cultivation along the Nile and the desert hinterland, and 
therefore of site-communities in Sudan more generally, because archaeology is a predominantly Nile-
based rural phenomenon. This is important for considerations of applicability (Chapter 8). Full details 
of the case-study location are provided in Chapter 4, and further particulars of the sites are given in 
Chapter 5.  
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Figure 1. The Case-Study Area (outline in red dots) (Source: Graphics added to Welsby 2002, Fig. 9 (L) and to 
ESRI (R)). 
 
3.2.3 Primary Sources  
Ethnographic data collected in Sudan, such as observational notes, interviews and conversations, are 
here classed as ‘primary data’ and the respondents as ‘primary sources’. Echoing a number of scholars 
mentioned above, this study adapts the framework set out by Hopkins and Mehanna (2010, attributed 
originally to their colleague, Robert Fernea) of ‘nets and anchors’. In short, this concept advises the 
researcher to get a broad perspective of life in the case-study area through everyday observations and 
conversations with their residents (the ‘nets’) before attempting an in-depth perspective of life as it is 
narrated by ‘key respondents’ of community groups (the ‘anchors’). This allows the researcher to gain 
exposure to diversity to before considering how particular groups might assemble themselves with 
respect to the phenomenon of interest. In other words, the issues surrounding any phenomenon—even 
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one such as widespread food insecurity—do not pertain in a critical sense to all social groups in the 
area of interest although they may be related. Rather, each phenomenon has more critical ‘impact’ for 
some groups than for others, and a ‘net’ approach to participant observation allows these groups—and 
their spokespeople (‘anchors’)—to emerge. Such a method finds analogies in multi-sited ethnography 
(interviews with several different groups of people) and theoretical sampling (testing a hypothesis) 
both of which are also methods used to hone in on a phenomenon’s key actors and people of interest 
to complement the more random and unstructured approach of participant observation.  
A common charge leveled by quantitative researchers against qualitative research is that the latter 
rely too much on anecdotal responses and ‘key quotes’, both of which preclude them from being able 
to produce statistically representative results. Factors such as the dominance of adult respondents 
leave this study without much claim to statistical validity. This was partly out of this author’s control; 
foreigners’ interaction with children in Sudan is restricted by the HAC so this thesis would never have 
been able to produce anything more than a very limited window into the perspective of under-19s, 
even though they make up the majority of Sudan’s population.319 It is thus almost impossible to truly 
circumvent the tension between evaluating how phenomena affect large groups of people on the one 
hand and understanding the subjectivity of experience on the other. As Lane observed, “the 
deconstructionist/postmodernist debate has highlighted the partial and contextually dependent nature 
of all theories, including those of ‘general scientific procedure’”.320 Qualitative methods provide more 
than just a foil to accusations of inadequacy because the depth needed to respond to this studies’ lines 
of enquiry regarding archaeology’s impact from the perspective of site-community residents could 
only be attained through using qualitative methods.
321
  
Because they are used in the present study, the nature of ethnographic data deserves further 
comment. Quite specifically, this comment is about the challenges it poses for the archaeologist-as-
ethnographer, which essentially revolve around the archaeologist’s natural predisposition for 
scientific neutrality and verifiable (re-testable) results and the messy, emotional and ultimately 
situated results of ethnography. Such a tension has been noted before: from his observations of 
archaeologists, Shankland notes that they “…seem often split between politically-correct post-
modernist relativists, and empiricists, oblivious that there is such a thing as social theory at all.”322 
Shankland has noticed further that, for archaeologists, this can give “rise to an over-emphasis on the 
social creation of reality”.323 This is a charge of which the present author is guilty, which leads me to 
support the view of Shankland, which aligns with those of Strathern (1995), that archaeologists should,  
                                                     
319  According to the CBS’ 5th Population Census, under-19s made up 53% of the population (CBS 2009: 3, Table 
T01). 
320   Lane 2011: 11. 
321   McClanahan 2006: 126. 
322  Shankland 1996: 349. 
323  Shankland 1996: 349. 
  
78 
accept the need to face these problems [posed by ethnographic data] without losing faith in the 
empirical basis of their results…to sit on the fence; to accept both that the world is real and that 
knowledge is invariably context bound.
324
  
For example, the concept of dissonance (“that different information will be provided by the same 
source depending on the context or setting of the source at the time of the interview”325) is analytically 
daunting. However, if “the disparities between the two (or more) accounts and the consideration of 
the contextual setting at the time of generation of the account provide information on the key issues 
and debates within the society”,326 then clearly such concepts can be used systematically to create 
order from what are usually chaotic fieldwork journals, recorded interviews, observations and 
reflexive notes.  
 
3.2.3.1 Nets: Participant Observation 
The fieldwork schedule was divided equally between three stages. The first two stages were dedicated 
to two levels of participant observation in order to cast a wide ‘net’ across the site-community. The 
third stage was dedicated to targeted interviews with the chosen ‘anchors’: those individuals whose 
experience and/or narrative acts as an example through which to view the impact of archaeology.  
The first stage of the fieldwork for this research was a familiarization period for this author and 
the translator with the site-communities. The present author and the translator, Hana Ahmed, had 
already spent time at the start of the 2014 season spent in Dangeil getting to know each other and 
discussing the research project, its aims and objectives, its data-collection methods, and about the 
dimensions of the translator’s involvement, including going through the fieldwork plan with the 
translator, as suggested by Liamputtung (2010). This author and the translator were therefore able to 
spend the whole first two weeks of fieldwork in Hamadab and Bejrawiya becoming familiarized with 
the site-community by walking around, taking in the general surroundings and “hanging out”, as 
Meskell (2005) advised. The aim was not to exclusively study any one person or family but to speak 
with people who were willing to talk to us; to visit homes, farms and places of work; and, to attend 
social events, as randomly as possible. Early on, there was also a formal introduction to the 
archaeologists during which this author and the project director described and explained the study to 
the UCLQ team and in exchange learned about theirs.  
Data collection started immediately. In accordance with the guidelines provided by Poulin (2007), 
the day’s experiences were each evening noted in a fieldwork journal and then discussed with the 
                                                     
324  Shankland 1996: 349. 
325   Reid and Lane 2003: 10. 
326   Reid and Lane 2003: 10. 
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translator, making notes in black and adding the translator’s comments in red to keep the sources of 
information clear. Notes were immediately elaborated upon with reflexive musings—whether it 
related to personal responses, or this author or the translator’s impact upon contexts—and 
photographs were logged. These notes were also used to fill in a standardised ‘Community Profile 
Sheet’ (Appendix 1), which was drawn up using examples from the extant literature (mostly 
Silverman 2001), which included prompting points such as the distinct geographical setting, the 
services available, social organisation and hierarchy, the total population, the village’s position in the 
trade network, its role in state administration and, of course, how the archaeological sites relate to 
houses, local residents and farmers.  
The second stage of fieldwork, which lasted for a further two weeks, was semi-structured. 
Approximately one-third of this time was spent observing the archaeologists and two-thirds in the 
site-communities. In Hamadab and Bejrawiya, this author and the translator spoke with adult men and 
women of most ages and from varied socio-economic backgrounds: from the Governor of River Nile 
State to the honey sellers in Hamadab. Speeches and public statements, books, magazines and 
newspapers, newsletters, school textbooks, posters, songs and poems were heard and read; festivals, 
weddings and funerals were attended; and, discussions were held with people about their jobs, their 
homes and families, their love lives, the outside world, their aspirations, disappointments and 
anxieties. In keeping with the guidelines provided by Liamputtung, conversations were had with 
whomever possible about topics of which there was a sense of propriety, depending on the context 
such as the gender of the respondents and of course guided by intuition. Perhaps more importantly, 
issues that were raised by the respondents themselves were discussed. Like Salmon, there were open 
statement of the purpose of the research, with the intention to “to use my openness as a foil against 
suspicion and make myself rather than any of my contacts the focus of security officials”.327 Of course, 
and despite the efforts to participate with as wide a cross-section of the community as possible, more 
was certainly heard from the more outgoing members of the community. Routine conversations often 
led to recommendations of who to speak with—often a male group leader who knows about local 
history (see Chapter 5)—but such cases were recognised and only followed up in a few cases to avoid 
limiting the diversity of respondents. Most residents were eager to talk and were curious about the 
author and the translator, and encounters snowballed; over the first month in Hamadab and Bejrawiya 
in 2015, there were meetings and interactions with hundreds of people. 
 
                                                     
327 Salmon 2003: 4. 
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3.2.3.2 Anchors: Key Respondents 
The first month of participant observation helped forge understanding of how different groups of 
people in Hamadab and Bejrawiya are positioned in relation to archaeology, which eventually led to 
the identification and selection of the study’s ‘anchors’. These individuals are representative of those 
engaged in issues that pertain to archaeology and they are presented in this study as ‘key respondents’ 
(Table 1, a-f). The key respondents from the case-study area are community leaders (including the 
heads of leading families and representatives of farmers and pastoralists); archaeological site guards; 
UCLQ’s excavation employees; randomly-met men and women; and charcoal traders. Non-site-
community members also classed as key respondents are Hana Ahmed, my translator,
328
 John 
Robertson, who sheds light on archaeology in the case-study area in the 1970s, and Ali Askouri, who 
has provided insights into the protest movements surrounding dam-building. With the exception of the 
archaeological site guards, whose identity it would never be possible to obscure, the respondents from 
the case-study area have been anonymized. Formal consent was sought from all participant(s); every 
person whose voice appears in this study was given an in-depth explanation of what the project is 
about, and gave their verbal consent to be included.
329
 
It is important to emphasise that many people have shared their views with the present author but 
have not been listed here. These include many more people within the site-community as well as the 
(few) traders at the archaeological sites, the Tourism Police, the village leaders and residents of other 
Bejrawiya villages of Old Deraqab, Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South and other UCLQ employees. 
The same goes even for those outside the case-study area: the input received from NCAM employees 
has been de-personalized, as has the information received from a human rights lawyer, a Western 
anthropologist and a University of Shendi lecturer.  
                                                     
328 Edwards (1998) argues that researchers should treat interpreters/translators as ‘key informants’ rather than as 
‘neutral transmitters of messages’. 
329  Informed consent was acquired verbally. Paper forms had been used to ill effect in Dangeil and Sai Island (i.e. 
2013-14) and were abandoned by 2015. Hennings et al.’s (1996: 15) note, that “in a culture where the spoken word 
is taken as a binding legal contract, to ask for signed consent would be to imply mistrust” is important here. 
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Table 1. Key Respondents. 
 
Most of those listed in Table 1 occupy roles that would be important for any study of the impact 
of archaeology; for instance, the site guards, employees, traders and policemen. They are the people 
whose views or ‘narratives’ are most likely to represent the social groups that are most obviously 
affected by archaeology in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and are thus key to understanding it. The site 
guards are a paradigmatic example of local prime movers in relation to archaeology. Seeking out such 
people is a technique akin to what Neuman (2007) calls ‘purposive sampling’ and while it does not 
produce a statistically relevant number of respondents, the individuals were selected for their social 
relevance to the phenomenon, whether in their abstract status as gatekeepers (such as site guards) or 
as spokespeople for the community and groups within it (such as Local Committee members). Other 
key respondents, for example, the charcoal makers, emerged because they have a stake in the issues 
raised by this study and could not have been identified in advance.  
Encounters with ‘key respondents’, or ‘anchors,’ and witnessing key events, such as the public 
payment of employees, made up the third stage of the fieldwork. Inevitably, the nature of each of 
these encounters was different. Some conversations were private and one-on-one while others were 
held in open, public settings with a number of people present; some were formal and audio-recorded 
interviews, but most were simply long conversations recorded by hand.
330
 Although a short list of 
general questions were kept at hand in the event that they would be deemed necessary, they were not 
used to structure any encounters. The experience of fieldwork in 2013-14 had shown that the 
                                                     
330  Hand-written notes were used in Hamadab and Bejrawiya since during the fieldwork in Dangeil and Sai Island in 
2013-14 it had taken on average eight hours for this author and the translator to translate and transcribe 45 minutes 
of recorded interview material from Arabic to English. 
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questions that had been written beforehand were largely unhelpful; essentially they were abstract 
research questions and designed to avoid topics such as land and politics. Indeed, by the time of 
arrival in Hamadab and Bejrawiya for fieldwork in 2015, it was clear that if people did want to talk 
about archaeology it was usually in reference to how it impacted these exact subjects, hence their 
inclusion in this study.  
There has only been one exception to this rule and that was to conduct semi-structured interviews 
with the UCLQ employees to systematically gather wage and employment data because project 
directors commonly keep the finer financial details of their employment records private (see Chapter 
6). The interviews took place in February 2015, and included the present author, the translator (Hana 
Ahmed) and the employee. Each employee was informed about the study and the purpose of the 
interview and consented to give information. The interviews were held individually, or in one case, in 
a pair, and always privately. The questions were structured around demographic questions (the 
employee’s age, gabīla, 331  household size, number of dependents etc.); questions about their 
employment (other jobs, wages received from other jobs, destination of wages etc.); and finally 
questions about archaeological employment (earnings from UCLQ, previous seasons worked) and 
their opinion of the job (see Appendix 2). For lack of other means, wage data for 2016 was collected 
by telephone. 
 
These interviews aside, structured questioning was largely abandoned after 2014; this change in 
strategy, and the rich results it produced, further supported the decision to present the data from 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya, rather than that from Dangeil and Sai Island, in this study. Following Salmon 
(2003), there was a desire for interviewees to lead the research towards topics they wished to speak 
about and to allow for them to choose the limits of what they wish to say. While always entering each 
encounter mindful of which themes that were sought for exploration, the technique shifted to “face-to-
face interview situations that are conversational and do not narrowly prescribe possible answers as is 
the case with standardized questionnaires.” 332  Echoing Starzman, such approaches anticipate the 
“complexities and…messiness…” of life 333  and, echoing McClanahan, reject the “over-arching 
answers that lack specific detail about why people respond as they do”334 that are generated by 
surveys. To compensate for such an open approach, this author was keen to systematise the data 
collection in other ways. A degree of standardization was achieved through the use of Respondent 
Profile sheets (Appendix 3) and Post-Interview Notes sheets (Appendix 4), adapted from Liamputtung 
                                                     
331  The Arabic word gabīla (pl. gabâīl) is most commonly translated in English as ‘tribe’ (such as in Shankland 1999, 
Maliński 2014 and Burtenshaw 2014). However, the word ‘tribe’, etymologically derived from Latin, is 
problematic, mainly on account of its use by colonial administrations, in which it signified collectives belonging to 
‘primitive’ societies with ‘unchanged’ cultures who were seen at the time to be in need of Western civilizing 
influences. Therefore, this study prefers to use the terms gabīla/gabâīl where possible because these terms stress 
kinship and brotherhood rather than subjugated units of political administration. 
332  Starzman 2012: 405. 
333  Starzman 2012: 405. 
334   McClanahan 2006: 126. 
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(2010) and Silverman (2001), both of which were compiled after each encounter. The Respondent 
Profile sheet included prompts to help the present author to collect the demographic and personal 
details of a respondent’s life, such as their ages or approximate dates of birth; their gabīla; the names 
of their parents, spouse and children; their livelihoods and basic economic situations; their places of 
residence (past and present); and the number of years they have spent in education, including what 
they studied. Although that level of detail was only usually obtained after several—sometimes half a 
dozen or more—visits to the same person, it provided a solid basis of demographic data relevant to 
how archaeology affects ethnically heterogeneous site-communities; how archaeology impacts the 
site-community economy; and how the state may have pre-determined their consumption of 
archaeological history through their control of Sudan’s educational syllabus. The Post-Interview 
Notes sheet prompted this author’s further attention to interview arrangements such as the time of day; 
whether or not it was arranged through a contact and, if so, which one; the interview location; the 
setting and dynamic (e.g. the way in which the individual behaves; who else was present); sensory 
impressions (sights, sounds, tastes, smells, textures); the activities going on in the background and 
who is doing them; reflections on the methods used (e.g. what questions worked and which did not 
work, and why); and summarization of the content (e.g. specific words, phrases, insider language, 
problems and ideas that arise) and to log the associated pictures (if any). These notes were followed 
by personal reflections on the account as well as that of the translator, and finally questions were 
noted for future encounters. These questions were chosen for inclusion during the fieldwork process 
because they foreground the hybrid nature of data collection as well as because they highlight the way 
in which settings affect outcomes.  
 
3.2.3.3 Translation  
Another hurdle that had to be overcome, and one directly related to the question of insider/outsider 
status (above), was the language gap. This author has a command of basic conversational Arabic 
while most of the Sudanese respondents spoke only Arabic. Surprisingly, despite being limited, the 
present researcher’s command of Arabic proved useful and as time went on, there was less reliance 
upon translation. However, to be clear, the study could not have been undertaken without a translator, 
as it was deemed by NCAM to a legal as well as a logistical requirement. In total, three translators 
were used. The first translator accompanied this author to Dangeil in November 2013 and the second 
translator traveled along to Sai Island in January 2014. Both women were assigned through NCAM. 
The third translator, Hana Ahmed, was initially recommended to the author by a friend and 
subsequently ‘approved’ by NCAM. Hana accompanied the author to Dangeil in November 2014 and 
also stayed in Hamadab and Bejrawiya from January to April 2015. Translators 1 and 2 were in their 
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early 20s while Hana was in her mid-30s. All three women were single, university-educated and from 
Khartoum. Each read and signed the ‘Informed Consent Form’ that instructed them to keep private all 
the information they heard during the course of the project.  
Using translators raises a number of issues. “The social world is a pervasively conversational one 
in which an overwhelming proportion of the world’s business is conducted through the medium of 
spoken interaction”,335 and the use of translators creates a dependency whereby researchers rely upon 
them to explain everything that they are seeing and hearing; in Liamputtung’s words, researchers use 
translators “not just for words but also for perspective”.336 Certainly, the translators were vital links 
between this author and the site-communities. While NCAM and the archaeological teams provided 
official access, the translators were the media through which communication with respondents was 
conducted and through which experiences were given further meaning.  
Mindful of the criticisms of operating in a language of which one does not have complete 
command, vigorous (and expensive) steps were taken to address such concerns. For example, this 
study has made use of double translation to ensure the accuracy of the data. In practical terms, this 
entailed Hana and this author translating and transcribing all the fieldwork notes, audio recorded 
interviews and texts from the many pieces of naturally occurring data that were collected (such as 
school textbooks, brochures from the Ministry of Tourism, signs) while still present in the case-study 
area—a demanding task. Upon the return of this author to Khartoum in April 2015, three other 
translators, Basil Kamal Bushra, Omer Sharif and Rayan Alamin, translated the materials a second 
time and helped this author understand specific Arabic terms. Double translation ensured a high 
standard of translation and thus a reliable data set. Indeed with such measures in place, language 
became less of a barrier and more useful as a means of interpretation. On a conceptual level, then, this 
author has attempted to follow Temple, who suggests that the relationship between researcher and 
translator be a “productive methodological exercise”.337  
As mentioned above, the long time spent working with Hana was insightful to the author and 
provided yet another reason to present data collected with her in Hamadab and Bejrawiya in this 
research, rather than that collected from Dangeil or Sai Island. Because of the close nature of the 
relationship with Hana, the present researcher also feels fully able to account for the occasions in 
which an interpretation belongs to Hana and when it belongs to the researcher; this was achieved, at 
least in part, by colour-coding the notes. More importantly, it is possible to identify the instances in 
which this author has incorporated the translator’s suggestions into the conclusions in this study. For 
instance, it was Hana that drew this author’s attention to the patronage of local schools by religious 
orders based in the Arab states of the Gulf, an observation that helped to clarify how the site-
                                                     
335  Heritage 1984: 239. 
336  Liamputtung 2010: 143. 
337  Temple 1997: 608. 
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community economy was driven in the absence of a fully functioning state (Chapter 4). It was also her 
knowledge of the rich, powerful and well-organized Nubian-dominated Sufi sects, such as the 
Burhānīyya, that encouraged this author to look further into the hybrid but ultimately contradictory 
elements of Nubian identity as simultaneously ‘victim’ and ‘victor’ (Chapter 5).  
An introduction to Hana is therefore necessary and respectful. Hana was 32, and comes from a 
marginalized gabīla from Kordofan called the Kawāhla whose family have long since migrated to 
Khartoum. By training, Hana is an engineer and currently works in a freelance capacity installing and 
maintaining CCTV cameras for a handful of businesses in Khartoum. As her family’s eldest and only 
unmarried daughter, Hana is a tough and determined career woman, as she needs to be in a male-
dominated world. She loves learning, is a keen gardener (she planted trees at both Dangeil and 
Hamadab), has a cheerful disposition and is deeply empathetic. During the time spent in Dangeil and 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya, there was a sense on the part of this author that the residents had a particular 
liking for Hana. In part, this was because she can be very forthright in her opinions: empathy makes 
her no less of a humorous and interesting conversationalist. Hana also cares sincerely about Sudan. 
However, and perhaps because of this, in many private discussions with this author, she showed 
sadness that Sudanese society does not value the same things as she does, particularly freedom of 
expression and the acceptance of social differences. Hana’s English is very good if somewhat old-
fashioned as she learned it from the Longman English language books (such as those by Corbluth 
(1979) and Bates and Palmer (1981)), and she enjoys English aphorisms such as “a bird in the hand is 
worth two in the bush,” a saying that she used frequently when an opportunity was presented to either 
seize a spontaneous chance for a conversation or try and fit two shorter encounters into the same time 
space. The present researcher enjoyed a productive and honest rapport with Hana; especially after 
having lived, worked and slept in the same room together for a month in Dangeil, ten weeks in 
Hamadab followed consecutively by another month in Khartoum. It would not be too much to state 
that she became a true friend, co-researcher and highly capable “culture broker”338 who enhanced this 
author’s knowledge and understanding of Sudan. 
 
 
                                                     
338  Eide and Allen 2005: 6. 
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3.3 Data Analysis 
3.3.1 Coding 
In total, over 400 pages of fieldwork journal notes and 80 hours of recorded interview data as well as 
hundreds of photographs, recordings of poems and songs, copies of posters and documents, and other 
objects and gifts were collected by this author. Appropriate techniques were therefore sought to aid 
analysis of this sprawling data set, and ‘coding’ was the method eventually chosen. 
Coding is “...the process of identifying categories and meanings in text, creating and applying a 
code to each, and systematically marking similar strings of text with the same code name”339 and 
represents a practical way of organizing the data and generating concepts and identifying the 
connections between them. Coding is used as a method in many analytical traditions (including 
thematic analysis, content analysis, conversation analysis and narrative analysis) because it can 
incorporate diverse data sets (photographs and non-textual data can also be coded) and be conducted 
in several discrete rounds. Four coding rounds were undertaken for this study and are described here. 
As noted above, a key distinction needed to be made between researcher-provoked and naturally 
occurring data, and coding the data according to its status made up the first coding round. While 
naturally-occurring data have not necessarily been analyzed as ‘more authentic’ than conversational 
data, the context in which information was given was taken into account (see above regarding analysis 
of who was present; the point in the interview at which a subject arises; and what was said thereafter). 
The detailed hand-written notes aside, the Respondent Profile sheets and Post-Interview Notes sheets 
(above) were vital to this stage of analysis. 
The second round of coding categorized these data according to theme. “A theme captures 
something important about the data in relation to the research question and represents some level of 
patterned response or meaning within the data set.”340 This author’s initial codes were archaeology’s a) 
historical, b) economic and c) social impact on the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. These 
themes overlap so in some cases a passage of text or object was coded several times. Equally, much 
data could not be coded using these themes, which required the generation of additional coding 
categories. For example later, as the rough, broader argument of this research became clearer, 
additional coding rounds included searching for specific themes like ‘the pastoralist-farmer 
relationship’ and ‘the lack of access to resources’. Nevertheless, these four thematic codes remained 
the core categories throughout analyses and were elaborated upon with other rounds of coding; they 
have also roughly provided the thematic structure for the thesis. 
                                                     
339  Silverman 2001: 236. 
340  Braun and Clarke 2006: 82. 
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The third round of coding was an adaptation of what Silverman calls ‘quantitative coding’, which 
in essence is counting the frequency of themes; the number of times certain coded topics came up in 
conversations and interviews. A coding round was added to this, which was counting the number of 
times themes come up most unprompted.
341
 To give one fundamental example, and discounting the 
few occasions when it could be interpreted as having been ‘researcher-provoked’, the topic of ‘land’ 
was mentioned by most of the respondents (this should be evident in all forthcoming chapters). In 
comparison, discounting the occasions when it could be interpreted as having been ‘researcher-
provoked’, the topic of ‘archaeology’ only came up a handful of times in some hundreds of 
conversations. In seeking to explain the reasons for a theme’s content, coding rounds also included 
searching for occasions in which the present author’s presence affected the participant’s response (see 
above). Given the amount of data collected, this coding round was extremely useful to highlight the 
themes that needed concentrating on, and those that could, or sometimes should, be discarded.  
The fourth round of coding interrogated the remaining data according to Sacks et al.’s (1995) 
theory of language as providing crucial insights into worldview. Linguistic coding thus searched for 
commonly used words whose repetition may indicate so-called emic (insider) categories and in vivo 
codes as well as such key words in context (studying the range of uses of key terms in the phrases and 
sentences in which they occur). With the help of the translators, extensive notes had been made on the 
language used by participants, and depending upon their relative importance to the argument, Sack-
ian ‘ethnomethodological’ version of conversation analysis and the meaning of important conceptual 
words in Arabic have been expanded upon, such athâr, meaning ‘antiquities’ and the closest word for 
‘archaeology’ in Chapter 5, and fāida, the word for ‘benefit’, in Chapter 6.  
In the initial stages of post-fieldwork analysis, coding proved to be a useful organizational and 
analytical tool. However, after the four rounds were complete and writing up commenced, the present 
author found that the best method of analysis was simply to write and compare with the data as ideas 
developed; indeed while it was not always the case, many issues that seemed overwhelmingly 
complex and fractured by dissonance became less problematic when explained on paper. 
 
3.3.2 Supplementary Sources  
Ethnographic material gathered first hand from the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya provides 
the primary data for this study, but supplementary sources are also used to add depth to the picture. A 
‘supplementary source’ is here defined as information that exists independently of the present author 
and in many cases were generated outside the case-study area, outside Sudan, or sometimes in 
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altogether different contexts. These sources include but are not limited to visual images, blogs, tweets, 
emails, and statistical records. Most often, supplementary sources have been used to support the 
interpretation of the primary sources. For example, Chapter 5 of this study is greatly augmented by 
materials kindly given to this author in 2013 by Tim Kendall, which consist of interviews and 
observational notes he made over his 25 years as archaeological project director at the royal Kushite-
Napatan site of Jebel Barkal; to evaluate the economic impact of archaeology in Hamadab-Bejrawiya 
in Chapter 6, public documents including local and national demographic data from the Sudan 
government as well as country-wide reports from the World Bank and the IMF have been used; and in 
Chapter 7 heavy use is made of the UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File for the Island of 
Meroe as well as ICOMOS’ evaluation report. Via Appendices 6 and 7, Chapters 4 and 6 also use 
sources such as Holt (1961) and Warburg (1992), which are indispensable for understanding the 18
th
-
Century origins of contemporary Sudanese social relations in Hamadab-Bejrawiya and the impact of 
archaeology upon them.  
Despite Mason’s (2006) comments about the ‘easy’ rhetorical logic of mixing methods, using 
such supplementary sources has not always been straightforward; in many ways they are just as 
analytically tricky as primary ethnographic sources. For example, the supplementary socio-economic 
data used in Chapter 6 proved particularly challenging because of its unreliability, especially at the 
local level.
342
 Official data from government sources is weak and inconsistent particularly with regard 
to pastoral and nomadic populations.
343
 Salmon (2003) also writes that official data is not always to be 
trusted; he notes that “the Bank of Sudan's economic report had been ‘tidied’…”344 Much government 
data pre-dates the secession of South Sudan in 2011 when the government in Khartoum lost 10 
million people, “75 per cent of its oil resources [and] 90 per cent of its export earnings”.345 This 
makes pre-2012 government data problematic for purposes of comparison. Reports by international 
organizations including the World Bank, the IMF and the United Nations also have shortcomings. 
Many of them use pre-2012 government data, which reduces their usefulness for a study of current 
economic conditions;
346
 the IMF’s 2013 Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, for example, uses 
data from 2009 or earlier. Moreover, “[t]he tools of poverty measurement designed by the western 
institutions…[are] inconvenient to use in measuring poverty in a society in which a considerable part 
of its economy operates through reciprocity and redistribution.”347  Reliable data on the financial 
inputs of archaeology into the economies of site-communities is also difficult to acquire because it is 
usually confidential to the archaeologists, their institutions or funders and their employees. Primary 
economic data have therefore been gathered through observations, conversations and interviews with 
                                                     
342 A source of frustration shared by Salih 1999 and Ahmed et al. 2012. 
343 The 2009 National Baseline Household Survey (CBS 2010) does not mention nomads at all. Indeed, it is one of the 
aims of the UN in Sudan to “build and/or strengthen capacities in population analysis” (UNDP 2015a). 
344 Salmon 2003: 6.  
345 UNDP 2015b. 
346 IMF 2013. 
347 Salih 1999: 42. 
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the employees, residents of the site-communities and people in the broader locale. This material has 
been evaluated alongside material gathered by agricultural economists and others, using a cross-
disciplinary approach. Of course “not all relevant phenomena are easily cast in mathematical terms”348 
and useful insights into the economic impact of archaeology can emerge from the qualitative 
conversational data, even if the hard numbers are limited.  
                                                     
348 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001: 15. 
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4. SUDAN 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To evaluate the impact of archaeology on site-communities in Sudan it is necessary to develop a 
critical understanding of the day-to-day lives of the Sudanese. In most of the conversations and 
interviews carried out for this study, respondents returned at some point to the hardships and 
vicissitudes of daily life. This chapter is thus written with their testimonies in mind and thus sets out 
the context for the entire study; it will be referred to frequently in subsequent chapters. 
 
 
4.1 Rural Sudan in 2015 
4.1.1 Nation and Gabīla 
In political science, a ‘nation’ is typically defined as a large group of people who perceive themselves 
to share a common social identity and vision, and for many scholars of nationalism, also shared 
characteristics such as language and mythology.
349
 In contrast, a ‘state’ is understood as an 
operational structure which has authority (or sovereignty) over a defined territory and people.
350
 A 
‘nation-state’ is thus the aggregate of these two phenomena: a nation with a state structure whose laws 
and trappings echo its vision of collective ‘self’, or as Newton and Van Deth describe it as, 
“acceptance of a common culture, history and fate, irrespective of socio-economic or political 
                                                     
349 Anderson 1991, Smith 1991, Hobsbawm and Ranger 2012. 
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differences”.351 Using these terms as benchmarks, Sudanese scholars such as Malwal (1981, 1991) 
have long since posited that Sudan is not a nation-state, but rather a failed nation (umma) and a weak 
state (dawla; hukūma) organised largely along discriminatory lines and dominated by elite members 
of the Ja’aliyīn and Shaygiyya, two Nile-based Muslim gabâīl that claim Arab descent and whose 
hegemony has been reinforced by their long-standing control of the military. Elsewhere, such societal 
circumstances have been described as ‘tribal’,352 and on the basis of the ethnographic research carried 
out for this study, it seems reasonable to follow earlier scholars in using this term to describe 
Sudanese society. 
With regards to nation-building, most scholars agree that neither Sudan’s nationalist movements 
nor its governments, and in particular the various administrations since independence in 1956, have 
succeeded in constructing a nation out of Sudan’s heterogeneous population (see Appendix 6). In the 
early 1880s, the “proto-nationalist”353 revolution against Sudan’s Turco-Egyptian rulers, led by a 
charismatic Islamist visionary known as the Mahdi, was a movement whose vision of religious, social 
and economic freedom brought together many disparate groups, from the Hadendoa in the east to the 
Baqqāra in the west. This was particularly impressive because the previously self-governing states of 
Darfur in the west, Nubia in the northern Nile Valley and Sennar on the Blue Nile to the south-east, 
had only recently been merged into one territory by a decree (firmān) of the Turco-Egyptian 
government. However, any ‘nation-wide’ consensus forged by the Mahdi dissipated during the rule of 
his successor (khalifa), Abdullahi ibn Muhammad of the Ta’aishī clan of the Baqqāra, who provoked 
                                                     
351 Newton and Van Deth 2010: 23. Similarly a nation state may be defined as a population that purportedly has a 
right to a state of its own (Roeder 2007). 
352 To be clear: the adjective ‘tribal’ and the associated noun, ‘tribalism’, do not always refer to a society based 
around ‘the tribe’ (gabīla) or other ethnic stratifiations—in urban areas, it may be the community that is the most 
critical collective. Nor do these terms relate to a country or people being ‘pre-modern’ or ‘homogeneous’, nor is do 
they presuppose high levels of ‘conformity’. Instead, the terms refer to how society is ordered; a state of being 
wherein action and identification are organized around smaller sub-national socio-political units (see James (2006) 
and Gluckman (2007) for a more nuanced discussion). 
353 Warburg 1992: 37, also Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005. There is a debate surrounding the date at which 
‘nationalism’ emerged. Predominantly split into two camps, one defines nationalism as a product of 18th Century 
Europe (e.g. Diachenko 2016); the other argues that nationalist sentiment and unionistic movements that share 
characteristics with European nationalism had been around for a lot longer (see works by Smith 1991 and 
Hobsbawm 1992); the term ‘proto-nationalism’ is often used to describe such a movement and, as Warburg 
suggests, seems apt here because if successful nationalisms are, as Smith (1991) argues, built around a shared 
feeling of unity across a group of people, then hatred of the corrupt and avaricious Turco-Egyptian state (Shibeika 
1959, Beshir 1974) and discontent at the suppression of the slave trade (Holt 1958), rather than a sense of common 
nationhood or territory, seems to have been the most powerful unifying factors for those who joined the Mahdi’s 
cause. Of course some scholars believe the religious and tribal aspects of the Mahdi’s movement to have been the 
most important factors in rallying support (e.g. by Mohammed Ahmed al-Hajj, cited in Warburg 1992: 49). Indeed 
the Mahdi himself described his movement as being “against the Turks who changed religion and replaced it by 
kufr (infidels)” (Manshurat Vol. 2 1963). The biography of the Mahdi, the Sira, also includes statements such as 
this (see Shaked 1978). This is somewhat ironic as Ottoman interest had been largely secular: letters from 
Mohammad Ali Pasha, the Turco-Egyptian ruler to his sons, Ismail and Ibrahim, detail Egypt’s foremost interest in 
“slaves, gold and other precious metals” and reference a letter from the governor of Kordofan to the governor 
(defterdār) not to annex Sudan “on Islamic grounds” because it was already Muslim (Warburg 1992: 39). Even so, 
the Islamic element was still not enough to keep the Mahdist ‘nation’ from collapsing. 
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opposition through his nepotism.
354
 Weakened by famine as well as rebellion, the Mahdist state was 
toppled by British forces in 1898. 
The Mahdist movement was nevertheless an important precursor to Sudanese nationalisms in the 
20
th
 Century and was, in fact, more inclusive than many of its proverbial successors. The first half of 
the 20
th
 Century was a period of empowerment for the northern, Nile-based Arab-Muslim elite, whom 
the Anglo-Egyptian system had primed with the aim of producing an educated class to fill the ranks of 
the bureaucracy. Helped by the Anglo-Egyptian policy of not only recruiting from these groups but 
also segregating the south (the latter known as the ‘Southern Policy’355), this elite monopolized the 
nationalist platform, side-lined alternative visions of the Sudanese ‘nation’, repressed minorities 
believed to harbour separatist tendencies, including Nubians, and thus inherited power upon 
independence from the Anglo-Egyptian colonial administration in 1956. In the succeeding decades, 
various Arab-Muslim elites dominated the state, commonly staffing it through nepotism rather than a 
merit-based system of recruitment (a policy that has roots far back into the 16
th
 Century
356
). This 
approach was compounded by ‘ethnic stratification’ whereby non-Arabs and non-Muslims from the 
south, west and east were excluded from government posts and jobs; resources and opportunities were 
allocated to families, communities and gabāīl who shared ‘ethno’-religious 357 —namely Arab-
Muslim—characteristics. The simultaneous marginalization of some and patrimony of others has 
continued till the present: from the late 1970s the Islamist and Arab-nationalist party, the National 
Islamic Front (NIF), founded by Hassan Turabi, influenced government policy and helped President 
Omar Bashir come to power through one of Sudan’s periodic military coups. An ardent Islamist with 
the Muslim Brotherhood, Turabi argued that “[Without Islam] Sudan has no identity, no direction.”358 
From 1989 to 1999, the NIF oversaw a comprehensive top-down Islamization of the state 
administration, army, educational system and economy, and allowed “legally reinforced 
discrimination” 359 through the imposition of Islamic law (shari’a360) and strict dress codes. Since then, 
Islamization and Arabization policies have been aggressively enforced with widespread human-rights 
abuses.
361
 Radical jihadists, including Osama bin Laden, were given refuge, leading to the imposition 
                                                     
354 Sidahmed and Sidahmed 2005. 
355 Mayo 1994. 
356   Safwat 1991. 
357 Adar 2001. 
358 Hassan al-Turabi quoted in Viorst 1995: 46. 
359 Idris 2005: 12. 
360 Shari’a had first been imposed in Sudan in 1983 by Jafaar Nimeiri through the ‘September Laws’ (Willis 2011); 
Sudan is to this day one of few states where shari’a is formally incorporated into the constitution. 
361 Terms such as ‘Arabization’ and ‘Islamization’ must be used with caution when approaching empirical evidence 
because they act as benchmarks with which to measure people and the historical record (this has certainly been the 
case in the ancient world: Luther and Panayotis 2004; Mattingly 2011). However, the terms are used here to refer 
to “myriad social, religious and political processes that integrate individuals and groups into the cultural value 
system of Muslims and Arabs” (Adar 2001). In Sudan, these terms have also been used to refer to the gradual 
influx of Arab settlers into the region since the 7th Century CE, and to the interaction they had with pre-existing 
populations through intermarriage, trade and warfare and to the impact of the emergence in the 16th Century of 
Muslim states such as the Fūnj Sultanate of Sennar and the Sultanate of Darfur (Hasan 1971). These terms are 
therefore useful in the study of modern Sudan as they effectively communicate the key fact demonstrated above 
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of international sanctions that were only removed at the time of editing (September 2017), two 
decades after they were first imposed.  
Of course, there is no single vision of Arabism or Islamism in Sudan; Islamist groups differ on 
how Islam should function in a modern state.
 362
 Indeed, by 1999, Bashir came to view Turabi’s 
policies as excessive and expelled him from the NIF, which was renamed the National Congress Party 
(NCP). Although its methods have arguably become less brutal, the Sudanese state’s emphasis on 
Arab-Muslim identity has remained the same under the NCP. 
The development and characteristics of the modern Sudanese state is an important aspect of the 
context for this study and will thus be addressed more in Chapter 5. Meanwhile, based on the above 
distinctions between nation and state, it appears that Sudan has a state but has not become a nation; no 
proto-nationalist or nationalist movement has so far succeeded in producing a unifying vision of 
nationhood, rather perpetuating tribalism and disunity. This lays the foundation for one of the key 
arguments of this study, namely that the failure of Sudanese nationalisms has contributed to the 
continuing identification of most modern Sudanese with their gabāīl: not with the archaeology of 
‘ancient Nubia’ or its ‘World Heritage’ archaeological sites (Chapter 5).  
* 
Gabīla (pl. gabāīl) is one of the most common forms of self-identification in Sudan (Figure 2). The 
south of post-2011 Sudan is home to the Nūba gabāīl and the gabāīl of the White Nile, such as the 
Hassaniyya, as well as the Shūkriyya of the Blue Nile. In the centre, using Khartoum as a point of 
reference, the Baqqāra, Kabābish and Fūr gabāīl inhabit the west and far west of the country; the 
Fadniyya, Shūkriyya and Kawāhla gabāīl are based to the east, on the Butana plain; the Bijā, 
Hadendoa and Rashāida gabāīl can be found in the north east.363 North of these groups are the two 
largest and most powerful of Sudan’s gabāīl, the Ja’aliyīn and the Shaygiyya, with the smaller 
Manāsīr and Rubātāb between them. Finally, in the far north, the Nile’s Second and Third Cataract 
regions are home to the Nubian gabāīl namely, in order from north to south, the Halfāwīn, Sukōt, 
Mahās and Danaglā. Of course this description is a rather rigid taxonimization of gabāīl and their 
homelands, representing something of an early 20
th
-Century ‘tribal map’ of Sudan that belies great 
complexity and wholly ignores the movement undertaken by many gabāīl, it nonetheless still 
represents the way in which many rural Sudanese see territorial divisions. Indeed the vitality of gabīla 
as a signifier of identity is visible in the way Sudanese address one another: the present researcher 
observed on numerous occasions that “gabīla shenū?” or “jinsu shenu?” (what is your gabīla? What it 
                                                                                                                                                        
that Arabization and Islamization are not only social and cultural processes, but also policies that have been 
ardently promoted by every Sudanese government since independence. 
362  For instance, in the early 20th Century, the Umma Party, which advocated independence from Egypt, often clashed 
with the Khatmiya Party, which favoured unification with Egypt; a conflict that persists till the present. Also see 
Adar 2001. 
363 Ryle 2011a. 
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your race/ethnicity?) is asked of strangers upon first encounter; some even pride themselves on being 
able to guess a stranger’s gabīla. 
 
 
Figure 2. Sudanese gabāīl (Source: Al-Shahi and Moore 1978). 
 
The members of these gabāīl perceive themselves to share a common and distinctive ancestry, 
language, religion, homeland (dār) and livelihood (with an associated set of characteristics or skills—
some groups, for example, define themselves in part by the breeds of animals they rear or by their 
members’ involvement in particular professions). Together, these attributes constitute something 
approaching ‘ethnicity’, but which might more accurately be termed ‘cultural group’, as identifying 
an individual’s gabīla can also help to establish a certain number of other ‘facts’ about that person, 
including their social status and political loyalties. Individuals may have parents from different gabāīl, 
but ancestral gabīla affiliation is inherited along paternal lines. Male and female facial scarification 
(shilūkh), though falling out of use, is designed as a conspicuous mark of gabīla identity,364 and the 
permanence of scarification reflects the aforementioned belief that one’s gabīla is fixed and 
unchangeable. Although most Sudanese speak Arabic, a gabīla’s name is sometimes interchangeable 
with the relevant ancestral language, and almost always interchangeable with its homeland. For 
example, the Fur speak Fur and the Mahās-Nubians speak Mahasi Nubian. One’s gabīla is thus 
perceived to be strongly suggestive, if not quite an exact, signifier of the language one speaks. 
                                                     
364 Błażyński 2003. 
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Similarly the related question to “gabīla shenū?”, “intū min wīn?” (where are you from?) shows that 
the link between gabīla and dār is perceived to be very important even on an individual level and, if 
anything, has become even more important given the migrations of Sudanese both within Sudan and 
across the globe
365
 as a result of labour emigration, conflict and “territorial disruptions”366 such as 
population growth, land grabs and dam building (below).  
The five criteria for gabīla belonging—ancestry, language, religion, homeland and livelihood—
recall the criteria by which Herodotus in c. 440 BCE noted that the ancient Greeks defined themselves, 
namely “blood and language, temples and ritual; our common way of life.”367  Hall (1991) famously 
referred to these as ‘proofs of ethnicity’, socially-constructed categories by which individuals and 
groups separate and differentiate themselves from ‘others’; as Boyte notes, local discourse about 
social relations is “about difference more than similarity.” 368  Of course, virtually all human 
populations set and use criteria for membership (in-groups) and thus non-membership (out-groups). 
But the specificities of each category change over time and space: “apparently uniform institutions 
like ‘the family’, ‘a tribe’ or ’science’ take on a variety of meanings in different contexts.”369 In Sudan, 
at a national level, two of the five abovementioned proofs or criteria, namely ancestry and religion, 
have acted as fundamental components of the state’s vision of the ideal Sudanese citizen. Indeed, 
greatly due to the long, continuous and successful economic and political dominance of the Ja’aliyīn 
and Shaygiyya, the proofs are ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’; non-Arab and non-Muslim groups are 
marginalized in many ways. Of note, there is also discrimination among Arab-Muslim groups, such as 
based upon livelihood, with settled famers largely regarded as socially superior to migratory nomads 
and this distinction is particularly relevant for this study (see Chapter 6).
370
    
Skin colour is frequently spoken about as a signifier of ancestry, or ethnic origin, as was 
demonstrated frequently in this researcher’s conversations with site-community respondents. The 
colour coding of the racial hierarchy ranges from yellow to black: Nubians in the north are often 
referred to as ‘blue’ (azraq) while dark-skinned individuals from the south are called ‘black’ (aswad) 
or ‘negro’ (zanjī). 371  Dark skin signifies being ‘African’, descended from slaves; dark-skinned 
Sudanese are thus often generally referred to as ‘slaves’ 'abīd (s. 'abd): the Nubians of north Sudan 
were enslaved by the Egyptians in the millennia BCE, as were groups in what is now South Sudan. 
The south and south-west of Sudan, home to groups such as the Nūba and the Hassaniyya, suffered 
                                                     
365 For example, a large population of Mahās Nubians inhabits Tuti Island in Khartoum. There is also a large 
Sudanese diaspora, mainly in the Arab states of the Gulf, Europe, the US and Malaysia. 
366 Gertel et al. 2014. 
367  Herodotus 2015, trans. G. Rawlinson. 
368 Boyte 2010: 37.   
369 Silverman 2000: 10. 
370 In 2009, Sudan’s Central Bureau of Statistics’ (CBS) National Baseline Household Survey (NBHS) wrote, “[t]he 
sample for the NBHS 2009 does not include population groups such as nomads, people living in camps and 
homeless people etc.” (CBS 2010: 14) which confirms this point about discrimination on the basis of livelihood. 
371  Deng 2004: 1-2.   
  
99 
from slave raids by riverine Arabs such as the Ja’aliyīn since at least the 15th Century. The designation 
of such groups as 'abīd is thus a longstanding tradition.  
Above black and blue are the ‘yellow’ (asfar), followed by ‘red’ (asmar); according to Deng, the 
latter “literally means reddish, but it is used interchangeably to describe a range of color shades from 
light to dark brown.”372 At the top of the pyramid is ‘green’ (akhḍar), signifying close ancestral ties 
with the Arabian Peninsula. It is important to note that the attitudes behind the hierarchy of skin 
colour have historical roots: “although these colours describe individuals rather than racial groups, 
they are remnants of racial consciousness deeply engraved by a long history of stratification and 
discrimination.”373 Deng cites al-Baghir al-Afifi Mukhtar as noting: 
Sudanese passports never describe the holder as ‘black.’ The description used for the overwhelming 
majority of the holders would be ‘green,’ the standard color of the nation in official Northern eyes. 
Indeed, green is seen as the ideal Sudanese color of skin because it reflects a brown that is not too dark, 
giving associations with black Africa and possibly slavery, and is not too light, hinting at gypsy (halabi) 
or European Christian forbears, the infidel khawajat.
374
  
Moreover, even though elite Nubians are educated, landed, wealthy and powerful, they are 
commonly viewed by Arab-Muslim groups through the Sudan state’s ‘ethno-religious’ prism and thus 
denigrated as descendants of Christians and other pre-Islamic religious groups: Arab-Muslim 
Sudanese perceive Islam as a religion to be superior to Christianity and other non-Islamic belief 
systems.
375
 It is also common for Arabic to be viewed as superior to other languages in Sudan, which 
are not taught in schools. The distaste of many among the Ja’aliyīn and Shaygiyya for other languages 
in Sudan is reflected in the denigrating word used to describe them: rutāna (gobbledygook). This 
word has become normalised in Sudanese society to the extent that some respondents whose mother 
tongue were not Arabic described their own native language to the present researcher as rutāna, and 
apologised self-consciously for speaking it. 
The five criteria for belonging to a gabīla are thus widely recognized categories in Sudan for 
defining identity; including via construction of in- and out-groups, promoting the ‘Self’ and 
denigrating the ‘Other’. The control of the state by Arab-Muslim groups has enabled not only the 
writing of their hierarchy of values into legislation, most notoriously via the institutionalization of 
Islamic law, but also the harassment and undermining of opposition groups, such as the Darfur-based 
Justice and Equality Movement, via the arming of nefarious militias such as the Janjawīd. The bloody 
civil conflicts that have arisen stem from the attempts of Arab-Muslim elites to impose a dominating 
                                                     
372  Deng 2004: 1-2.   
373  Deng 2004: 1-2.   
374  Deng 2004: 1-2.   
375 Although this happens the other way around, too: in the 1970s, Southerners were known to call the riverine 
northerners Buonyo in contrast to their own Col (‘Southern’) and referred to any Arabized and Islamized 
Southerners as having been ‘Buonyalized’ (Gwado-Ayoker 1986: 155).  
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vision of an Arab-Islamic nation are well-documented and demonstrate the high human cost of these 
‘proofs’ and categorizations when applied on the national level. 
However, two important qualifications need to be made. The first is that despite the divisions 
based on these criteria, there is still a broad-based aspiration to build a nation-state that is not divided 
along discriminatory lines. All the translators that worked with the present researcher in 2013-15 
confessed that they “hated” to be asked “gabīla shenu?” because in their view it represented a 
“backward” way of thinking. 376  Instead, these respondents advocated a more inclusive national 
identity. Even in the 1980s, there was a “silent unorganized majority” that wished to move away from 
“primordial sentiments” of “religion, language, race, tribe, sect and colour.”377 This does not mean 
that such people necessarily buy into the ruling state’s vision of what it means to be Sudanese—
although some do. Rather, in these cases, it is indicative of a wish to move beyond the use of such 
categories as vehicles of discrimination recognition of the power of discourse to perpetuate the status 
quo. The second qualification is that while gabīla is perhaps the most important social identity, there 
are some social collectives that attract and incorporate individuals from many gabāīl. Sufi movements, 
for example, have a strong and historic presence in Sudan and appeal to audiences that go beyond 
identity based on gabīla, capturing the primary social allegiance of many people from different gabāīl 
(for some historians this the strength of Sufism was neatly illustrated by the success of the Mahdi, 
who was himself a Sufi (above)).
378
 Others might identify most strongly via their political leanings, 
although in Sudan religion and politics tend to align.
379
  
Nevertheless at present, “[t]he tribal basis of local society”380 remains overt in rural Sudan, where 
Sudanese primarily identify as members of their gabīla and in which provides what Kinnvall (2006) 
calls ‘ontological security’; the present researcher has rarely heard someone identify as Sudanese 
unless “by virtue of control by a common government.” 381  Again, with regard to the impact of 
archaeology, the context of a failed nation is important because it means that ones gabīla is the 
ideological group with whom one identifies, often to the detriment of other putative identities—
including those identities that might otherwise link them with the peoples who built the archaeological 
sites. 
                                                     
376 Conversations with Hana Ahmed, Basil Kamal Bushra, Omer Sharif and Rayan Alamin throughout 2015. 
377 El-Bashir 1987: 162. 
378 Despite the continued strength of Sudan's medieval Sufi orders, through which groups like the Ja’aliyīn gained 
much power during the 19th Century, membership of the Islamist group known as the Muslim Brotherhood has 
been a major factor for promotion since 1989; the Salafist group Ansar al-Sunna is also an increasingly large group 
in Sudan, largely due to the ideological influence of Saudi Arabia on Sudanese and Sudanese migrants in the Gulf. 
379 The comparative unimportance of gabīla identification in urban settings was remarked upon by Rehfisch (1972), 
who noted that membership in rotating credit associations in Khartoum was based on geographical features 
(neighbourhood and locality, i.e. proximity and community) and personal characteristics (trustworthiness and 
shared backgrounds) and not gabīla allegiance. Harries-Jones (1972) similarly notes that when pastoral households 
migrate on a seasonal basis, the ties of gabīla unity are even more important, but that as they settle, the household 
becomes the more important social unit. 
380 Coughenour 1991: 192. 
381 Adar 2001. 
  
101 
4.1.2 State and Livelihoods 
Sudan is one of the poorest countries in the world. Its per-capita GDP is very low and it scores weakly 
on indices including infant mortality, life expectancy, health, education and access to basic services 
such as piped water and electricity. In 2009, only 65% of the population had access to safe drinking 
water; only 42% had access to improved sanitation; only 57% of children completed their primary 
education; and average life expectancy was only 61.7 years.
382
 In the 2013 Global Hunger Index, 
Sudan fell into the category of “Alarming Hunger Situation” and had the dubious distinction of being 
the fifth hungriest country in the world.
383
 Sudan ranked 166th of 187 countries in the 2014 Human 
Development Index, with only one hospital for every 90,000 people.
384
  
Human development indices are much weaker in the rural areas, where some two-thirds of 
Sudanese live.
 
For example, while some 46.5% of the total population lives below the poverty line, 
the rate rises to 57.6% in rural areas.
385
 Rural-urban disparities are exacerbated by environmental 
events, such as flash floods (tissāb), droughts (mahāll) and desertification, which have caused 
widespread famine in the countryside.
386
 Rural areas have also suffered from a lack of investment as 
urban areas have received most international aid and local and overseas investment.
387
 The rural 
infrastructure—roads, schools, health clinics, water, sewage, and electricity—lags well behind that in 
the towns, and is particularly poor in isolated areas and regions affected by civil conflict. Regions 
with poor infrastructure suffer from higher costs of goods and services; professionals such as teachers 
and health workers are reluctant to work there; and, businesspeople are less willing to invest.
388
  
Agriculture is Sudan’s most important economic sector in terms of employment, engaging some 
70% of the active labour force, although it contributes only some 27% of Sudan’s GDP, compared 
with around 32% for industry and around 41% for services.
389
 Six main agricultural systems can be 
identified in Sudan: three rain-fed, two irrigated and one nomadic/semi-nomadic (Figure 3). The three 
rain-fed systems (mechanised, lowland smallholder subsistence and shifting/agro-pastoralist) 
dominate the southern third of the country. Medium to large-scale commercial irrigated farming is 
carried in a number of locations close to Sudan’s great rivers, the Nile, the Blue Nile, the White Nile 
and the Atbara, but is relatively limited in total acreage. Medium to large-scale smallholder irrigated 
farming covers extensive acreage in the triangle between the Nile and the Blue Nile south of 
Khartoum, on the upper Atbara and along these rivers. Finally there is a nomadic and semi-nomadic 
belt some 200km-400km wide running across the centre of the country. North of the nomadic and 
                                                     
382 All figures from IMF 2013. 
383  Von Grebmer et al. 2013.  
384 Human Development Index 2014; UNDP 2014. 
385 CBS 2010; World Bank 2011. 
386 Ibrahim 1988; Rone 1999. 
387 Sidahmed and Sidahmed (2005: 98) call this process the “urbanization of economic power”. 
388 IMF 2013 
389 IMF 2014. 
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semi-nomadic belt is a hyper-arid zone covering about 40% of Sudan’s surface area that is not utilised 
for agriculture or livestock-raising, except for the narrow belt of irrigated farming that borders the 
Nile.
390
  
The most important crops in Sudan are sorghum, wheat, cotton, sugar cane, oilseeds, including 
sesame and groundnuts, and gum Arabic. Sorghum, wheat and groundnuts are grown mostly for 
domestic consumption; sesame, cotton and Gum Arabic are grown mainly for export. The raising and 
trading of sheep, camels and goats by nomadic and semi-nomadic pastoralists is a vital part of the 
rural economy, contributing almost half of the value of all agricultural production, roughly the same 
as crop farming. While the exact number of pastoralists, semi-pastoralists and nomads in Sudan is 
unknown because they were not counted in the last census (see footnote above), estimates suggest 
they make up 10% of the population.
391
 Despite being small in number, pastoralists dominate the 
central belt.  
There is strong regional demand for Sudan’s agricultural products; agricultural goods account for 
over one–third of total exports. Indeed, livestock, mostly sheep and camels, is the leading agricultural 
export, and Sudan’s second-leading export after gold, earning more than US$670m in 2013.392 Indeed, 
far from being economically marginal as they are sometimes viewed, “[p]astoral societies…contribute 
considerably to the national economy [via livestock to GDP and foreign exchange earnings] and 
supply domestic markets with meat, milk and ghee, white cheese and hides.”393  
However, all types of agriculture and animal husbandry are underdeveloped and inefficient. 
Rates of mechanisation and use of fertilisers and modern and high-yielding seeds are low; yields are 
even lower than those of countries with similar environmental conditions. Most farms are rain-fed and 
susceptible to drought. From the early 1960s, investment in farming focussed on mechanised rain-fed 
and commercial irrigated agriculture while traditional, smallholder rain-fed and irrigated farming was 
drastically underfunded.
394
 Pastoralism suffers, too, particularly from a lack of selective breeding of 
stock and weak veterinary services. Livestock exports are also hindered by the high costs of transport 
to the Red Sea ports of Port Sudan and Suakin.
395
  
 
                                                     
390 Nile Basin Initiative 2012. 
391 UNFPA 2012. In 2010, the United Nations’ High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) put the number between 
8% and 20% of the national population. These figures obviously differ wildly; estimating precise numbers is 
difficult, particularly as temporary labour migration skews figures even further. Therefore, the later finding from 
UNFPA is used here. 
392 World Bank Group 2015a. 
393 Salih 1999. Also see Salih 1990. 
394 Paragraph paraphrasing Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
395 IMF 2013. 
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Figure 3. The six main agricultural systems in Sudan (adapted from Nile Basin Initiative 2012: 124). 
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Crop farming and livestock-raising are the main occupations of rural Sudanese households, but 
the provision of services by blacksmiths, carpenters and potters, as well as builders, traders, teachers 
and members of professional classes are also important to the rural economy. Some rural Sudanese 
additionally find both permanent and casual employment in factories located on the outskirts of towns 
and cities. These include cement factories (mostly state-owned but some in private ownership) as well 
as a small number of mostly private “factories…producing [clothes], leather goods, sugar, flour and 
vegetable oil; as well as…petrol industries.” 396  Mining for “gold, silver, chromite, asbestos, 
manganese, gypsum, mica, zinc, iron, lead, uranium, copper, kaolin, cobalt, granite, nickel, tin”397 are 
important occupations in the rural areas.  
Gold mining has boomed over the past decade and has created a Sudanese gold rush.
398
 Gold is 
Sudan’s single most important export; in 2013, gold exports, mostly from artisanal mining, generated 
US$1bn, around one-third of all exports.
399
 However, the surface gold deposits are becoming 
increasingly depleted and the government is turning to foreign investors to develop commercial deep-
mining operations for gold. 
Labour migration is a longstanding feature of Sudan’s rural economy. 400  The main flow of 
migrants from Sudan’s rural areas is to the towns and cities, especially Khartoum, but the emigration 
of both skilled and unskilled work is also well established; indeed, Sudan has one of the highest net 
emigration rates in the region.
401
 In 2011, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) 
estimated the number at 1.3m with around half of this number in Saudi Arabia and other Arab states 
of the Gulf.
402
 Official sources valued remittances in cash and kind sent back from Sudanese working 
abroad at US$400m in 2014, but the wide gap between official and ‘black market’ exchange rates for 
the Sudanese pound encourages many Sudanese expatriates to transfer funds through unofficial 
channels, and the real value of remittances is likely to have been several times higher. In this vein, it 
should be noted that in November 2016, the Central Bank of Sudan introduced “an incentive policy” 
which allowed commercial banks to adopt much higher conversion rates, close to the black market 
rate, largely to “attract the savings of workers abroad and providing more foreign currency resources 
to the banks to fund imports for private companies.”403   
                                                     
396 CBS 2010. 
397 UNDP 2015a. 
398 Calkins and Ille 2014. Sudan has been a gold mining centre for millennia. In recent years, however, the mines in 
the Nubian Desert, for example at Wadi Qubquba, have dried up, and many people have now gone south to the 
Fifth Cataract region, near the case-study area (see below). 
399 World Bank 2015a. 
400 Beck 1999. 
401 World Bank 2011. 
402         IOM 2011. Sudanese emigration accelerated in the 1970s when the Arab states of the Gulf began their 
development drives. According to IOM figures, another 360,000 Sudanese are in Chad, 164,000 in Uganda and 
smaller numbers in Ethiopia and other north-east African states, although many of these are refugees from Sudan’s 
internal conflicts, which have also caused the internal displacement of several million people. 
403  Reuters, ‘Sudan offers its citizens broad incentive to sell dollars to banks’, 5 November 2016. 
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Workers’ remittances are an important part of the income of rural households and their 
communities. From a rural point of view, however, high levels of migration are a mixed blessing. 
Villages have lost many of their young people to the towns, cities and overseas; from the observations 
of the present author, at least half of any riverine village is taken up by empty and dilapidated houses. 
The loss of help with farm or livestock work, not to mention the emotional strain of being apart, is felt 
keenly by remaining members of the family and household,
404
 even though remittances can outweigh 
the loss of manpower. 
At the national level, labour force participation (measured as a percentage of the population 
above the age of 15) is estimated to be 54% overall, 76% for men and 32% for women; the national 
unemployment rate was estimated at 14.8% in 2012, rising to 20% for women and 24% for young 
people.
405
 The last number is especially significant given that Sudan has a young demographic profile, 
with 58% of the population below 18 years of age. Unemployment rates are significantly higher in the 
countryside than in the towns, as observed by the present researcher. The Sudanese state has sought to 
reduce unemployment and the 1997 Labour Act did establish a number of employment exchanges;
406
 
nonetheless, generally those living in rural areas find it hard to participate in these schemes, 
particularly if they are nomadic or pastoral.
407
  
The descriptions given here about the weakness of the Sudanese economy and the disarray in 
which the state keeps country’s main industries are important for the present study because they 
compound the argument given above about the failure of the nation contributing to continued 
identification of Sudan’s population with their gabāīl and not with Sudan’s ancient ‘Nubian’ history 
or ‘World Heritage’. Just as Sudan’s gabāīl provide a measure of ontological security they also 
provide economic security in the absence of a working state: a state which fails to deliver adequate 
services, i.e. a ‘weak’ or ‘failed’ state, almost invariably induces individuals to seek to (further) rely 
on other actors/entities and/or social units, including gabāīl. Indeed, whether in Sudan or the Middle 
East, ‘tribal’ identity and the political strength of ‘tribes’ are oftentimes a direct result of the state’s 
performance, including its delivery of security and socio-economic development (see Chapter 6). The 
impact of archaeology in Sudan is thus further determined by factors such as whether the state is 
marginalizing and/or providing patrimony to certain groups, including gabāīl (see Chapter 5). This 
argument is also aided by the following descriptions (till the end of Chapter 4, especially 4.3.1). 
 
                                                     
404 Chen and Korinek 2010. 
405 All figures from IMF 2014. 
406 Sudan, Labour Act 1997, see §8.3. 
407 This was apparent from conversations with Ali al-Hassani and Medowi al-Mansūrī, Nov. 2015. 
  
106 
4.2 Household (In)Security 
The household (bayt) is the main economic unit by which people orientate themselves and organize 
their finances.
408
 The individuals interviewed for this study variously defined their household in terms 
of family (‘usra); residence (also bayt; ‘household’ and ‘residence’ are differentiated by context); and 
shared means of livelihood.
409
 Family members are officially classified as “husband or wife, father, 
mother, grandfather, grandmother, daughter, granddaughter, grandson, brother, sister, half-brother, 
half-sister, stepfather, stepmother, stepson, and stepdaughter”410 but unofficially also include uncles, 
aunts and cousins. Household members usually share a residence or live in the same village. Some 
households may include non-family members. Increasingly, households include family members who 
live and work in other parts of Sudan or abroad, particularly if they support dependants “who have no 
work, profession or income by which they earn a living and…relatives…who depend wholly on [that 
family member] for their livelihood”.411  
Due in large part to the weakness of the state (above), households in Sudan are mutual-support 
systems in which the survival of the collective is paramount.
412
 Personal incomes and outgoings are 
secondary to making provision for the group, an aim to which all household members contribute. 
Young children and the elderly may or may not be income-producing (observation shows both), but 
they help with food and land preparation and the associated tasks of crop-farming and livestock-
raising. Equally, there are cultural values that determine the division of labour and Sudanese families 
tend to live by the principle that young, economically-active men must support their household, 
family and dependants. In this context, this burden can be considerable: young rurally-based men face 
challenges from unemployment and agricultural stagnation. Even those who are educated find it hard 
to find work in the saturated job market for graduates. Moreover, “Sudan has a very high dependency 
ratio[;] there are four persons of dependent age (under 15 and over 65 years) for every Sudanese of 
working age (15-64 years)”. 413  Furthermore, as noted above, at the national level, labour force 
participation among women is only 32%, despite the fact that “women outnumber men in every 
cohort of the population aged 20 years and over.”414 As 68% of working age women are not in 
separate employment outside the household,
415
 the ratio of dependents to workers is even higher.  
                                                     
408 Grawert 1998. Chen and Korinek also identify the household as the “salient economic unit” in rural China (2010: 
965). 
409 Salih reported similar responses in 1999, see Salih 1999: 15. 
410 Sudan, Labour Act 1997: 3. It seems likely that the inclusion of half- and step-relations into the definition of 
‘family’ is a consequence of the practice of polygamy, which is now beginning to decline. 
411 Sudan, Labour Act 1997: 4. Even though the Labour Act uses the pronoun ‘his’, there are a number of women in 
Sudan who are the head of the household. 
412 Abdalla 1987. 
413 UNFPA 2012. This is a dire situation but it does seem to have improved: the households analysed by Abdalla 
(1987) in 1981 had an average of nine dependants. 
414 BTI 2014: 13.  
415 Sudan Housing and Population Census 2008 in UNFPA 2012. 
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A sense of economic insecurity was pervasive among all of the rural Sudanese with whom the 
present researcher had contact, regardless of their location, age, job, residence or gabīla, and this has 
an important bearing on Chapter 6 of this study, as well as for the arguments about the link between 
‘nation’, ‘state’ and ‘gabīla’(above). However, two economic challenges in particular were relevant 
for this study: land scarcity and lack of access to credit.  
 
4.2.1 Land Scarcity 
Many rural communities in Sudan perceive that one of the main reasons their lives are hard is that 
land is scarce.
416
 Most farms in Sudan are small. In 1992, “the average land holding in the Sudan was 
estimated at [eight] faddans,”417 which equates to 3.4ha or 8.3 acres. “However…in riverine…Sudan 
the average land holding is one faddan.”418 Small farm sizes are the result of a number of factors, 
including rural population growth and the endogamous nature of inheritance law, which has led to the 
steady sub-division of land holdings. The systematic appropriation of land by the state, which “dates 
precisely to the moment [Anglo-Egyptian government] took control of the territory of Sudan…in 
1898”419 has compounded the problem.  
Indeed, land appropriation was initiated by the Anglo-Egyptian administration with the Titles to 
Land Ordinance in 1899, which only recognized private ownership of irrigated land; withdrew most 
customary or communal, as opposed to legal or statutory, rights to land; and declared all non-irrigated 
rain-fed farmland and pasture to be state property. This hit the pastoralists especially hard. Not only 
were their ancestral grazing lands almost entirely rain-fed and their rights to that land customary and 
communal, but later Anglo-Egyptian land laws in the 1940s would also state “that the rights of the 
cultivator should be considered as paramount to nomadic pastoralists”420 (which again adds evidence 
to the argument about the state’s discrimination against its citizens based upon their livelihood). 
Since independence in 1956, successive Sudanese governments have followed similar policies.
421
 
The 1971 Unregistered Land Act denied the legitimacy of customary and communal property rights 
across all rain-fed land and transferred all rights to rain-fed land, water and grazing—some 596.6m 
faddān, or around 99% of all Sudanese territory—to the state.422 The 1974 Law of Criminal Trespass 
made breaching the boundaries of agricultural projects a criminal offence. These policies have, in 
effect, nationalized the pastoralists’ traditional grazing lands and the rain-fed plots of small farmers 
                                                     
416 Salih 1999. This was also more than apparent from this author’s interviews. 
417 One faddān (sometimes feddān) equals 0.42 hectares or 1.038 acres. 
418 Salih 1999: 123. 
419 Umbadda 2014: 36-7. 
420 Suleiman and Ahmed 2013: 2, regarding the Soil Conservation Committee 1944. 
421 Umbadda 2014: 33-4. 
422 Elnur 2012. 
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and left both groups vulnerable to state policies of leasing land to investors, including foreign entities, 
in large-scale, mechanized and commercial farming.
423
 The land tenure system was under review at 
the time of writing but was not expected to reverse the earlier state policies.
424
 
The use of appropriated land for large-scale commercial farming began under the Anglo-
Egyptian administration, with the Gezira Agricultural Scheme to grow cotton for export. Over the last 
two decades, the Sudanese state has encouraged domestic and foreign investment in commercial 
agriculture as part of efforts to diversify the economy.
425
 These efforts have intensified since the 
secession of South Sudan in 2011, which deprived the government in Khartoum of 75% of the oil 
revenues on which it had previously relied to pay for imports. Indeed, the rehabilitation of the 
agricultural sector, which had long been neglected, has become a national priority.
426
 Saudi Arabia, 
Qatar, the UAE and other Arab states of the Gulf (which are members of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council or GCC
427
) have responded eagerly to the invitation from the Sudanese state to lease land for 
big commercial irrigated-agricultural schemes;
428
 these states have rapidly growing populations
429
 and 
import most of their food
430
 and see these investments as helping to secure their own food security. 
Other states, including China, have also been involved. From 2004 to 2008, ‘land grabs’ have 
“amounted to 4 million hectares of land on leases whose average term is fifty years”, though many 
have been longer.
431
  
Pastoralists have traditionally opposed any move to fence off land that blocks the movement of 
their herds or prevents access to pasture. However, they have been unable to prevent the state’s 
appropriation of their traditional grazing lands and the steady encroachment of commercial farming, 
mainly because their rights to these lands are customary as opposed to legal or statutory. The 
                                                     
423 World Bank Group 2015a.   
424 B. Evans-Pritchard, ‘Agriculture Sudan: Can local investors beat foreign investment?’, IPS News Agency, 18 
December 2008. 
425 IMF 2014. For similar reasons, other cash-poor countries in the Horn of Africa have also sought to develop their 
agricultural sectors and open them up to foreign investors. 
426 Speaking in 2014, Higher Council of Investment Secretary General Ahmed Shawur told the influential London-
based Arabic newspaper, al-Sharq al-Awsat, that Sudan “is the most qualified country to bridge the gap in food 
shortage not only in the Arab World…but also a big portion of the global food shortfall.” (Taha 2014). But 
Shawur’s idea is not new. Private international companies have been leasing land in Sudan since 1990, while the 
Gulf countries began investing in the early 2000s. Indeed this idea goes even further back; it is a ‘policy hangover’ 
from the 1970s at which time the socialist-turned-capitalist government of President Jafaar Nimeiri was also 
spearheading a national revival based upon increasing agricultural exports and the idea of Sudan as ‘the world’s 
breadbasket’. Broadly speaking, the actors and their roles in the breadbasket enterprise have remained the same 
until now: Sudan still provides the raw resources, the wealthy Arab states of the Gulf are still providing the 
finance, and investors are still promised a number of perks as part of this open-door policy. Therefore this 
agricultural ‘revival’ may more usefully be seen as an ‘agricultural renaissance’ [al-nahda al-zira’iyya] which has 
done little to aid the lives of local farmers, let alone address hunger. (Also see Verhoeven 2015.) 
427 The Gulf Cooperation Council, GCC, is a political and economic alliance between the UAE, Bahrain, Kuwait, 
Oman, Qatar and Saudi Arabia, established in 1981. 
428 B. Jopson and A. England, ‘Sudan woos investors to put $1bn in farming’, Financial Times, 11 August 2008. 
429 Population growth in this region is more than double the world average. 
430 K. Garber, ‘As food crisis worsens, some nations are desperate for arable land’, US News and World Report, 12 
June 2008. 
431 In 2012, the Sudan government granted one private UAE company a 99-year lease for land in Sudan. (D. K. 
Yousef, ‘Al Ghurair to seal 99-year farmland lease in Sudan’, Gulf News, 20 February 2012.) 
  
109 
extension of big commercial farming projects has caused a sharp reduction in the amount of grazing 
land available to the pastoralists. A study on Gedaref State south-east of Khartoum reported that 
grazing lands had reduced from 78.5% of the state’s area in 1941 to 18.6% in 2002.432 The steady 
parcelling off of land for big public or private agricultural projects has blocked their traditional 
migration routes, forced them to make lengthy detours and led to a pasture shortage. Increasingly, the 
pastoralists have had to buy fodder (birsîm or gesh) to supplement the pasture, which has driven up 
fodder prices. This has had the effect of making wage-labour jobs that also provide free fodder as 
part-payment-in-kind particularly sought after by the pastoralists. 
Inevitably, “behind every land grab is a water grab”,433 and the extension of these big agricultural 
projects has increased Sudan’s demand for Nile water434 and helped trigger an expansion of dam 
building. Dam building has been one of the most important development policies pursued by 
Sudanese governments since the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (1899-1955).
435
 The Sennar Dam was 
built on the Blue Nile in 1925 to further the cultivation of cotton for export on the vast Gezira 
irrigation project in the triangle of land between the confluence of the White Nile and Blue Nile.
436
 
The Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile just south of Khartoum followed in 1937.
437
 Alongside the 
Aswan dam (see Chapter 5), post-colonial Sudanese governments have built three big dams, Khashm 
al-Girba (1964) on the Atbara, Roseires (1966) on the Blue Nile and Merowe (2009) on the Nile,
 
though the purpose of all three dams was as much to generate electricity as to store water for 
irrigation. The Merowe (sometimes called the Hamdab) dam was the biggest such project in post-
colonial Sudan with a generating capacity of 1,250 megawatts (MW), equivalent to just under half of 
Sudan’s total capacity, and holds the equivalent of 20% of the Nile’s annual flow.  
The Sudanese state is planning several more dams on the Nile for hydro-electric power 
generation and irrigation; three are in an advanced state of planning, although at the time of writing, 
construction had not yet begun. The three are Dal at the Second Cataract with a generating capacity of 
340-450 MW; Kajbar at the Third Cataract with a planned capacity of 360 MW; and Shereik at the 
Fifth Cataract with a planned capacity of 350 MW. The Nile cataracts are preferred sites for dam 
construction because the bedrock is close to the surface at these points which forces the river into 
multiple smaller branches and making it “more tractable”438 for dam construction. Although this has 
increased tensions with Egypt over rights to Nile water, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and China, now Sudan’s 
largest trading partners, have invested heavily in dam building to feed the agricultural schemes in 
                                                     
432 Babiker 2011. Also see Sulieman and Elagib 2012; Sulieman 2013. 
433 GRAIN, 2012. ‘Squeezing Africa Dry: Behind every land grab there is a water grab’, GRAIN Reports, 11 June 
2012. 
434 Speaking in 2010, the Saudi Arabian Minister of Agriculture said that his country “aims to grow cereals and 
animal feed in Sudan” because “these crops consume large quantities of water.” (Arabian Business, ‘Saudi Arabia 
boosts Sudan agriculture investment, says minister’, 7 December 2010.) 
435  See Welsby 2008 for a good overview of Sudan’s dam building history. 
436  Gertel et al. 2014. 
437  Willis 2011. 
438  Willis 2011: 19. 
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which these countries have also invested heavily (see below).
439
 Although the human rights abuses 
and large-scale confiscation of land that has come with dam construction is widely condemned, and 
whilst the policy of building has become one of the most controversial and persistent themes of 
Sudan’s recent history (see Chapter 2, ‘Rationale’), successive Sudanese governments have argued 
that the dams are needed to support economic development. On a visit to the Merowe dam in 2007, 
Bashir declared, “Our battle against poverty starts from here.”440  
Dispossession of land is a traumatic event, whether in relation to farmers or pastoralists. The 
suddenness and rapidity with which oftentimes ‘ancestral’ lands can be taken away has added to the 
sense of insecurity of the farming and pastoral communities, partly because land represents not only 
economic security but also social prestige. In Salih’s words:  
…land is not a single factor of production; rather it is a fabric of social, cultural and symbolic 
interactions and is understood as an essential means of maintaining natural balance between themselves, 
their ancestors and the generation yet unborn.
441
  
Indeed, “intensive love of land has been growing deeper with every generation due to its scarcity 
and population increase.”442 Land scarcity means that few households, even those who are better off, 
are able to live solely on the income they make from the land, whether from crops or livestock. The 
appropriation by the state of the traditional rights of large populations has intensified the competition 
and conflict over resources within and between rural communities. “The social landscape of present-
day Sudan is littered with land-related and resource-based conflicts that have…rupture[d]…the rural 
economy.” 443  As such, these dispossessions have led to mass protests, indeed violent regional 
uprisings, over the years, most of which have been quickly suppressed by the authorities, sometimes 
violently.
444
 The resistance to land appropriations has been so widespread and fierce that some 
observers have suggested that it might lead to wider political instability.
445
 This is particularly 
important for this research since the ideas that land scarcity is directly linked to social peace
446
 and 
that socio-economic insecurity “affects human behaviour”447 has an important bearing on this study.  
                                                     
439 Verhoeven 2015. The mass displacement of people and the damage done to archaeological sites has caused 
increasing unease about dam building, and a growing reluctance of Western governments and financial institutions 
to finance them; major Western-led international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and the EU, 
refused to support the $3.8 billion Ethiopian Grand Renaissance Dam Project in 2011. Instead, the Merowe dam 
was financed by Arab development funds and a Chinese bank.  
440  M. Lacey, ‘A Race to Save Sudan’s Past from Progress’, New York Times, 30 May 2005. Also see Sudan Tribune, 
‘Beshir says new dam will help reduce poverty in Sudan’, 20 March 2005. 
441 Salih 1999: 222. 
442 Salih 1999: 2. 
443 World Bank Group 2015a: 70. 
444 Agence France Presse, ‘Sudan farmers protest government ‘land grab’’, 1 April 2011; Sudan Tribune, ‘Hundreds 
of farmers stage demonstrations in central Sudan’, 11 May 2011; Reuters, ‘Sudan police teargas protesters in 
Khartoum – witnesses’, 12 June 2015. 
445 S. Martelli, ‘In Sudan’s breadbasket, a revolution is waiting to happen’, Agence France Presse, 5 July 2011. 
446 Egemi 2006. 
447 Sloman 2000: 2. Strictly speaking, Sloman refers to “scarcity” and sees its effect upon behaviour as economics’ 
central question. 
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4.2.2 Lack of Credit 
In addition to land scarcity, the chronic shortage of credit is another major cause of hardship for rural 
communities. Both farmers and pastoralists need liquidity to purchase equipment, seeds, fertilisers, 
pesticides and animal fodder at key points of the annual agricultural cycle and if their cash reserves 
have run out, as is often the case at certain points in the cycle, they need access to credit. According to 
Ahmed and Ammar, ‘informal’ sources of credit, such as local merchants, friends or relatives, are 
generally inadequate.
448
 Liquidity loaned by ‘formal’ credit providers, including government 
institutions (e.g. the Savings and Social Development Bank) and private banks (e.g. the Agricultural 
Bank of Sudan), do not fulfil households’ needs either.449  
Loans with interest (ribā) as well as shari’a-compliant Islamic microfinance are theoretically 
available; in 1990, the government introduced measures intended to make microcredit available in 
rural areas. However, rural microfinance providers are few and far between. Even where they exist, 
small-scale farmers find it hard to obtain credit partly because they are considered to be high-risk 
borrowers; indeed, some 53% of farmers who have secured loans have defaulted on them;
450
 
pastoralists, who do not have a permanent place of residence, find it even harder to get loans. The 
credit system is, from their perspective, exclusive and biased in favour of those who are already 
wealthy. Suffice it to say there “is no sustainable, i.e. profitable, microfinance model for the rural 
areas.”451 
To meet their need for liquidity, households turn to a number of informal credit systems based on 
reciprocity and ‘rotating credit’. 452  Sandūg (lit. ‘fund’) is one such system. 453  In Sudan, it is 
predominantly run and used by women, though men are not excluded, and developed to allow 
households to meet day-to-day expenses as well as the costs of social obligations such as illness, 
pregnancy, birth, circumcision, marriage and death.
454
 Registers of contributors are kept (or 
memorized) and households are duty-bound to contribute in proportion to their means. Other 
economic support systems include nafīr, a system where a village’s manpower is mobilised to support 
an individual household to build a house or an animal enclosure;
455
 and ishtrākiyya, a system whereby 
households contribute cash for the purchase of goods to be used by the community. Again, each 
                                                     
448 Ahmed and Ammar 2015. 
449 Salih 1999; Ahmed 2012. 
450 Ahmed 2012. 
451 Ahmed and Ammar 2015: 153. 
452 Salih 1999: 39. 
453 Ardener defines rotating credit associations as: “[a]n association formed upon a core of participants who agree to 
make regular contributions to a fund which is give, in whole or in part, to each contributor in rotation.” (Ardener 
1964: 201). 
454 Rehfisch 1972. Sandūg emerged during and after World War II, with the sharing of tea and sugar between 
neighbours during rationing (a good example of economic scarcity). However, observations in Hamadab-
Bejrawiya demonstrate that sandūg can also cause trouble when someone tries to change or take advantage of the 
rotation sequence. 
455 Lewis 1991: 73. As Lewis notes, nafir, or nafir ‘āmm, is a “general” but fundamentally obligatory “call to arms.” 
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household contributes what it can and the contributions are recorded. The social obligation upon 
households to contribute to these schemes resonates with the Islamic duty to give alms (zakāt) to the 
destitute, the working poor and those who are unable to pay off their own debts.
456
 These informal 
credit systems have been evaluated as “small but effective”457 but neither they nor the formal loan 
systems provide enough liquidity for farmers and pastoralists to make longer-term investments; the 
traditional credit systems are not able to compensate for perpetual cash shortages either.  
The annual cycle of income and expenditure known to economists as the “capital circuit.”458 This 
phenomenon has been studied in the farming communities in the locality of Zeydab, 80km north of 
the case-study area. Scholars there found an annual ‘capital circuit’ made up of three economic 
periods each comprised of approximately four months (Table 2).
459
  
 
   
Surplus Period April to July Living off harvest sales; low expenditure, enough 
for subsistence but not investment. 
Balance Period August to November Living off savings and stored food; farm and off-
farm activities few. 
 
Deficit Period December to March Money low, fewer stored crops; selling off assets 
and animals; high expenditure on household needs. 
 
Table 2. Capital Circuit of main food crops in River Nile State (Source: created from data in Ahmed 2012: 324-
5). 
 
The ‘surplus’ period follows the harvest and runs from April to July as farmers sell most of their 
crops. The Zeydab study showed that farmers sold 77% of their crops of wheat, sorghum, legumes 
and vegetables immediately after harvest and 11% later in the year, keeping the remaining 12% for 
household consumption.
460
 Farmers are constrained to sell most of their crops immediately after 
harvest due to a lack of adequate storage facilities; low access to liquidity (harvest follows the ‘deficit’ 
period); and since loan repayments are oftentimes due at the start of the ‘surplus’ period. Farm-gate 
prices are driven down as most farmers sell the same crops at the same time, limiting their income.
461
 
April to July is, therefore, the only period in which households commonly experience a liquidity 
surplus, though this does not mean that they have cash to spare. Most households have enough money 
for living expenses but little for investment.  
                                                     
456 Toor and Nasar 2004. 
457 Abdalla 2013. 
458 Ahmed 2012; Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
459 Ahmed 2012; Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
460 Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
461 Ahmed 2012: 329. 
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The ‘balance’ period runs from August to November. During this time, households live off their 
diminishing savings and stored food, but cash reserves run low because there is little on-farm income 
until the next harvest. The ‘deficit’ period runs from December to March, during which households 
commonly face significant financial strain. Cash runs low but expenditure increases as food reserves 
deplete and households need to invest in seeds, fertilisers and fuel, preparing the land for the next 
harvest.
462
 These inputs are critical to crop yields and thus household incomes; yet, most households 
do not have enough cash at this point in the ‘capital circuit’ to purchase both food, which typically 
consumes most income,
463
 and production inputs. 
 
 
4.3 Strategies for Survival 
4.3.1 Networks 
To the detriment of the majority of the population, the Sudanese state is controlled by a minority 
which appears both unable and unwilling to evenly deliver services, including the means for socio-
economic development. The distribution of resources is controlled by networks of cronies linked to 
the ruling regime who favour their own familial, social and political circles, including (if not 
prioritizing) members of their own gabīla.464 These kinds of structural deficiencies have important 
consequences. For instance, apart from land scarcity and lack of credit, another outcome of the 
structural inequalities produced by the Sudanese state’s uneven provision of services and 
opportunities is a lack of social mobility (defined as an upward movement through socio-economic 
class). The parallel marginalization and patrimony of certain groups also produces a context in which, 
as Hänsch notes of the dār of the pastoral Manāsīr, “the state is virtually absent.”465  
The systematic shortcomings of the Sudanese state are widely recognized and long recorded. In 
1986, Gwado-Ayoker argued that “it is the hakuma [state] itself which brings hunger, poor education, 
illness, and creates unemployment.”466 In 1990, Woodward described Sudan as a “decaying” and 
“unstable state.”467 In 2011, Transparency International described Sudan as “extremely corrupt” and 
noted that “all available data and country reports indicate persistent, widespread and endemic forms 
                                                     
462 Ahmed et al. 2012: 326; CBS 2010: 28. 
463 CBS 2010: 27. 
464 Malwal 1991: 179. 
465  Hänsch 2012: 203. 
466 Gwado-Ayoker 1986: 156. 
467 Woodward 1990. 
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of corruption, permeating all levels of society”;468 indeed, the resolution of 80% of legal disputes is 
“influenced by local politics and alliances.”469  Salih has described how the state is incapable of 
adjudicating day-to-day disputes to the extent that there is no “full effective state intervention.”470 A 
corrupt judiciary and the lack of the rule of law have induced ordinary Sudanese to turn to cheaper 
and quicker “local” means of dispute resolution; in the cases reviewed by Salih, only 20% were 
resolved in civil courts.
471
 Past processes, such as the introduction of numerous and often 
contradictory land laws following the centralisation of government during Turco-Egyptian rule from 
1821 to 1885, worsened the situation by creating what Salih calls the problem of “legal pluralism.”472 
In this vein, Safwat notes the seemingly perpetual “unworkability of the state.”473 
As noted above in section 4.1.2, in a context where citizens cannot rely on the state, other 
actors/entities and/or social units, such as households and gabāīl, tend to assume a greater role in 
providing key services, including social security. As Salih aptly notes, “[t]his system which is based 
on reciprocity provides the ‘safety net’ that takes the place of state welfare.”474 Looking at it from the 
perspective of Wasserman and Faust’s (1994) social network analysis, within these collectives, there 
are individuals who have enhanced power and authority who might be termed ‘key players’. Some 
might be decision makers or people in “authoritative positions”, for example sheikhs475 and other 
village elders, judges and local politicians; others have power because of the knowledge, information 
or baraka (good fortune) they are perceived to possess (e.g. fakirs, imams, healers, elderly figures).
476
  
Still others may be proxies who derive influence from proximity to a patron with whom they may 
have a client relationship. In all of these cases, the “status and influence depends directly on their 
ability to mobilize followers.”477 Therefore, individuals “diversify their options by a multiplicity of 
clientage [sic] and straddling of their social networks.”478 Societies organized in this fashion are often 
referred to by scholars as ‘network societies’;479 the salience of this conceptualization was strongly 
suggested to the present researcher by the frequent complaints from respondents about a lack of 
contacts (wasta, from wastāni, lit. ‘middle’) to help them. Indeed, the importance of such networks in 
Sudan should not be underestimated. 
                                                     
468  Martini 2011: 2. 
469 Salih 1999: 242, 256. 
470 Salih 1999: 251.  
471 Salih 1999: 227. 
472 Salih 1999: 2; There are about 25 separate legislative acts related to land comprising more than 600 different 
sections (Salih 1999: 83). 
473  Safwat 1991: 188 
474 Salih 1999: 39. 
475  As described by Salih (1999) and others, shaykhs dispense informal advice and customary justice to people in their 
territory (sheikhāt). Even if their politics does not align with those of the central government—and it is common 
for state law, imposed from above, and uncodified customary law, developed from below, to clash—and although 
some of the roles are no longer actively political—many shaykhs continue to exercise influence through informal 
channels. 
476 Kerkvliet 2009: 231. 
477 Salih 1999: 256. 
478 Salih 1999: 252. Also see Abdalla 2013.  
479 Castells 1997.  
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Of note, some scholars posit that the structural inequalities produced by the state, and its absence 
and/or presence, may in fact be deliberate. Salmon notes that “the Sudanese government relies on 
apparent disorder as a means of maintaining comparative advantage over political rivals and keeping a 
step ahead of international pressure.”480 In this vein, Salmon argues that Sudan is “not a cohesive state 
or even a shadow-state, but rather… institutions subverted by multiple, competing clientelisitc and 
personal networks.”481 Importantly, his subsequent argument is that the competition among networks 
created by uneven distribution of resources does not “focus solely on the accumulation of 
resources…but more importantly on the distribution of positions, powers and reputations to allies.”482 
As such, the line of reasoning is that “conflicts create[s] disorder, disorder provoke[s] confusion, 
confusion obfuscate[s] responsibility and responsibility, for many actors, is much better left 
unclear.”483 
Regardless of whether political strategy underpins the Sudanese state’s performance, the broader 
outcome is clear: the ‘weakness’ or absence of the state coupled with its uneven delivery of services 
strengthens the salience of networks such as gabāīl, seemingly at the expense of the construction of 
inclusive nationhood. 
 
4.3.2 Livelihood Diversification 
Because few rural households are able to live solely on earnings from the land, whether from crops or 
livestock, household members must take other jobs to supplement income. Elmqvist, who has carried 
out research in Kordofan in western Sudan, calls this “livelihood diversification” and defines it as “the 
efforts of all family and household members to generate household income from a range of 
occupations.”484 When evaluating a household’s income, economists often distinguish between ‘on-
farm’ and ‘off-farm’ income: ‘on-farm’ income comes from crops and livestock produced for 
consumption and cash;
485
 ‘off-farm’ income derives from “wage employment, household 
entrepreneurship and/or multiple activities that span economic sectors.”486  
Household entrepreneurship includes the making of products for sale. Some farming households 
make mudbricks (jalūs) in large quantities in the courtyards of their compounds, some of which they 
sell to the pastoralists; other farmers manufacture red bricks by the Nile. Women often make beauty 
                                                     
480 Salmon 2005: 6. Also see Chabal and Daloz 1999. 
481 Salmon 2005: 6. 
482 Salmon 2005: 6.  
483 Salmon 2005: 6.  
484 Elmqvist 2006. Moen and Wethington (1992) similarly describe livelihood diversification as a ‘family adaptive 
strategy’. 
485 Netting 1993. 
486 Chen and Korinek 2010: 963. 
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products such as wax (halāwa), henna, incense (bakhūr) and traditional dresses (thuwūb) as well as 
practical items such as rope (habil), baskets (guffa), tea flappers (hababa), hand brooms (mūkshasha), 
food covers (tabaq) and mats (birīsh) for personal and family use and to save money, although the 
number of women with these skills seems to have declined since the 1970s.
487
 They further have the 
skills to use mobile and computer technologies, but access to these often consumes rather than 
stimulates household income. A number of women in the case-study area will offer services such as 
henna painting and hairdressing, but this carries with it the risk of gaining a reputation for being 
promiscuous. Homemade products are also occasionally sold to neighbours or at the market, and 
become part of household income. However, earnings from such sources are neither regular nor 
guaranteed.   
The pastoralists also undertake household entrepreneurship and undertake a range of activities 
separate to their livestock. One of the main ‘off-farm’ work undertaken is gold mining. Pastoralists 
seem to dominate the industry, which is predominantly made up of small-scale artisanal mining 
carried out by individuals or small groups of men who make seasonal migrations (kalla) to the north, 
where surface gold deposits are located.
488
 The miners often work in unsafe conditions (many are 
known to have lost their lives
489
) and their use of mercury for gold smelting is hazardous to both 
health and the environment. The Sudanese authorities estimate that in 2013, when the initial fieldwork 
for this study was undertaken, the industry employed close to one million workers (or 11% of total 
employment).
490
 
According to Elmqvist, “[d]iversified livelihoods are crucial for food security and risk 
management” in rural communities.491 Indeed, livelihood diversification is an example of making 
“choice under constraint”492 that begins with what economists term the ‘assumption of rationality’, 
namely the assumption that people at all times attempt to improve their economic circumstances. 
Livelihood diversification is not only a poor man’s strategy; observation shows that it transcends 
economic class. One of the wealthiest respondents in the case-study area generates income from crop 
farming, trading and transport. Furthermore, some households diversify so successfully that they can 
even change their primary source of income.  
 
                                                     
487 When discussing material culture with women, it became clear that those now in their 30s (and younger) often do 
not have the craftsmanship of their mothers and grandmothers.  
488 Salih 1999: 157. 
489 M. Gunn, ‘Sudan Gold Mine Disaster Kills at Least 60 People, Official Says’, Bloomberg, 2 May 2013. 
490 IMF 2014. 
491 Elmqvist 2006. 
492 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001. 
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4.4 Life in Hamadab and Bejrawiya 
4.4.1 A Riverine Environment  
The case-study area is centred upon the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya as well as their 
surroundings, located beside the Nile roughly 200km north-east of Khartoum, in the Shendi Reach 
region of River Nile State (see Chapter 3). The Shendi Reach is a stretch of the Nile that extends for 
some 75km north and south of the town of Shendi. The climate is extremely dry, hot and dusty for 
most of the year. The annual mean temperature is 31°C. From May to October the average high is 
42°C and the average low 27°C; from November to April the average high is 35°C and the average 
low 18°C. However, in summer, temperatures can spike to 47°C, and in winter they can fall as low as 
6°C, with a strong chilling wind. Average annual rainfall is under 60mm, all of which occurs during 
what might be called the ‘rainy season’, which runs from May to October; three-quarters of rain falls 
in the months of July and August. 
Ecologically, Hamadab-Bejrawiya lies almost at the northern limit of the nomadic and semi-
nomadic agricultural system indicated in Figure 3 (above). Along the Nile, there is a ribbon of 
cultivation 1-2km deep made up principally of small, pump-irrigated farms (Figure 4, below). East of 
the cultivated strip is a zone of scrubland and rough pasture roughly 1-2km deep that runs up to and 
beyond the railway line from Khartoum to Atbara. The western fringes of this zone, close to the Nile-
side farms, are used for the grazing of sheep and goats, and some camels. The scrubland zone is also 
the location of the clusters of houses linked by small tracks that make up the villages of Hamadab and 
Bejrawiya. Some 3km east of the railway line lies the major north-south asphalt highway between 
Khartoum and Atbara, and some 50km beyond that is the Butana, an extensive and fertile plain that 
lies between the Nile, the Blue Nile and the Atbara that provides grazing for large numbers of nomads 
and semi-nomads from across central Sudan. To the east of the highway, there are a number of state- 
and privately-managed agricultural schemes.
493
 
Apart from the narrow and strikingly green ribbon of irrigated land hugging the Nile, the Shendi 
Reach presents a rather bleak, desiccated, dusty and mostly flat landscape. The Khartoum-Atbara 
highway is a major landmark, being “much more than simply a strip of asphalt...[rather] as part of a 
larger technological regime carrying the potential for the reordering of the political economy of a 
whole region.”494 Brightly coloured Chinese-made coaches are frequently seen on the highway, as are 
                                                     
493 The agricultural projects near Hamadab and Bejrawiya include the el-Hassa and el-Mamum projects, which are run 
by the government; the Tala and Fanar projects, which are sponsored by Saudi Arabia; and the al-Kima project, 
sponsored by the UAE. The projects are large (al-Kima covers 30,000 faddān) and they are highly mechanized, 
employing few workers from the local area (see Nile Basin Initiative 2012). 
494 Beck 2017: 242. Beck is here describing the road known as ‘the Artery of the North’ which connects Omdurman to 
ed-Debba but the description matches that of the Khartoum-Atbara highway, too. 
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customised 1950s British Bedford trucks.
495
 Every few miles are small clusters of ramshackle road-
side shops and canteens selling tea, bread, plates of beans (fūl) and lentils ('addis) and maybe some 
sugared doughnuts (zallabiya). Soft drinks, sweets and crisps are also stocked here in large quantities. 
Against this backdrop, the pyramids of Bejrawiya, which lie in three sets, two east and one west of the 
highway, present a magnificent spectacle to the (Western) visitor. However, on the many occasions 
the present author travelled past the pyramids by coach, it was noticeable that none of the Sudanese 
passengers looked out of their windows to see them (see Chapter 5). 
Daily life in the villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya is largely self-contained; most activities take 
place within the village confines. Travelling from the highway towards the villages, groups of men, 
women and children grazing camels and livestock on whatever scrubby pasture they can find become 
an increasingly frequent sight. Modes of transport change dramatically. Most people move around on 
foot, on donkeys or riding donkey-carts (carūs). Occasionally there are crowded buses, small cars 
(mostly Hyundai Atoz
496
), and old converted Toyotas (būxis). In this context, the archaeologists’ 
travel in new 4x4 vehicles is very conspicuous (see Chapter 7). 
 
4.4.2 Farming Communities 
In this region of Sudan, the landowners and farmers are predominantly from the Ja’aliyīn gabīla, or 
have married into it, and regard the Shendi Reach as their ‘ancestral’ homeland. Hamadab-Bejrawiya 
therefore lie at the very core of Ja’alī territory. Most of the Ja’alī households here depend upon 
smallholder irrigated farming and minor animal husbandry for their primary source of income. The 
farms lie in the cultivated strip adjacent to the Nile or in the Wadi al-Hawad, which meets the Nile 
just south of Hamadab, where the town of Kabushiya has grown up. The farms are irrigated using 
diesel pumps whose ownership is often shared. Before the introduction of motorized pump-irrigation 
in the 1970s, farmers used wooden waterwheels (sagiyya) to lift water from the Nile onto their fields 
(hawashāt s. hōsh, lit. ‘allotments’ or ‘plots’); the sagiyya, like the pumps today, would have been co-
owned.
497
 The farms are privately owned but the owners are sometimes absent, working as merchants 
or professionals in the cities or abroad, although elderly landowners tend to stay close to their land. 
The farms are thus usually run by tenants who either farm for themselves or sharecrop with others, 
and this is a role that some members of the semi-pastoral Fadniyya have begun to take on. 
                                                     
495 See Hänsch 2009 “Sifinja: The Iron Bride”, Sudan/Germany 2009. 
496 The popularity of South Korean-manufactured Hyundai Atoz and the Japanese Toyota also attests to Sudan’s 
economic interest in the East. Many other African countries are similar. In the case-study area, it is commonly 
thought that people who own Atoz vehicles must have “struck gold” in the mines. 
497 Salih 1999. 
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The farms produce wheat (gamih), sorghum (durra), onions (basil), hibiscus (karkadi), okra 
(bāmiya), garlic (thūm) tomatoes, potatoes and citrus fruits; wheat is a particularly important crop in 
River Nile State, taking up 25% of all farmland.
498
 The crops are produced both for household 
consumption and for sale. Some Ja’alī farming households own poultry (chickens) and most own at 
least a couple of sheep or goats, which graze freely around the villages. Wealthier households may 
also own one or two cattle, which they keep close to the Nile since the animals need a great deal of 
water. Livestock are kept principally to supply milk, butter and meat for household consumption and 
for sale. The sale of crops, and to a lesser extent livestock, is the most common source of cash income 
for farming households. There are small local markets on the west bank of the Nile at Mekniya, Goz 
Burra and Keleh. However, Hamadab and Bejrawiya are well placed to access important regional 
agricultural markets in Kabushiya and Shendi, 4km and 45km respectively to the south, and ed-Damer 
and Atbara, 40km and 70km respectively to the north. Data collected through interviews and 
observations by the present author show that the lives of most small farmers in Hamadab-Bejrawiya 
are hard. Few households are able to survive on their produce. Most farming households are therefore 
obliged to diversify their livelihoods. Some men try to find employment on local projects to construct 
schools, houses, wells and sanitation facilities. Others migrate to the cities for work; many Ja’alī 
households have at least one relative who works in Khartoum or another city, such as el-Obeid in 
Northern Kordofan, where many Ja’alī households have relatives. A small number emigrate for work 
abroad.  
The large Ja’alī villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya may be thought of as four sub-villages: (n-s) 
Old Deraqab (evacuated, see below), Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South in Bejrawiya; and, Hamadab 
in Hamadab (Figure 4).
499
 These villages are home to around 320 Ja’alī households or around 2,240 
people (on the basis of households of c.seven individuals). The villages are made up of clusters of 
rectangular compounds (s. hōsh pl. hawashāt) near to their farms500 in which the Ja’alī households 
live all year round (Figure 5). The compounds are built of jalûs and covered with dung (zibāla) or, if 
the family is wealthy, of cement (ʾasmant). Entrances are adorned with shiny-metal front doors. 
Inside, each family has its own single-story square or rectangular house and, typically, a shared 
cooking area and a tap for cold water. The houses have between three and eight rooms. Each room 
usually has at least one rope bed (sirir; angarīb) against each wall, upon which visitors sit and 
household members sleep. Some houses may have a separate saloon for the men to host guests or 
other features, like a shelter for water jars or a small sauna room (dikka). 
                                                     
498 Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
499 Note that Garstang’s (1914) map calls Deraqab ‘Bejrawiya’, and Hinkel’s (2000) calls the whole area Bejrawiya. 
500 Some farms, however, are up to 3km away from the villages (Salih 1999) and conversations with famers in 
Hamadab revealed that some rent land even further away: several men who rent land in Hamadab live in Shendi 
(45km away).  
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Figure 4. Villages and neighbourhoods in the case-study area. The settled Ja’aliyīn and Fadniyya are marked in 
black; the nomadic-pastoral settlements are marked by red dots (Source: graphics added by the author to Google 
Earth, 2017). 
 
The village nuclei are densely packed with compounds, many of which share contiguous walls. 
The villages used to be located much closer to the Nile; they were moved east as Hamadab became 
more vulnerable to flooding from the Nile as well as from Wadi al-Hawad to the south, and Bejrawiya 
to flooding from Wadi Tarabil to the north. More specifically, residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya told 
the present researcher that the floods of 1946 and 1988 were catastrophic and destroyed a large 
number of houses, which caused the villagers to relocate to the east and build sand-bag walls on their 
western perimeter (Figure 7). Hamadab and Bejrawiya are now 1-2km east of the Nile and they have 
moved steadily eastwards as they have expanded; residents in Bejrawiya have even built new 
neighbourhoods such as (n-s) New Deraqab, Upper Kejeik and Upper Bejrawiya (see Chapter 7). For 
those in Hamadab, it has been harder to expand due to the settlements occupied by the increasingly 
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settled but still semi-pastoral Yazīd, Bawalīd, Jutab and Fadniyya; the latter in Dahwab and Fadniyya 
I, as well as in Mataris and Fadniyya II, although Fadniyya I and II are technically in the district of 
Kabushiya. Today, while some Hamadab residents have moved to the east of the railway, this is not a 
happy residential situation (see below). 
 
 
Figure 5. Typical mud-brick compounds belonging to the Ja’aliyīn in Bejrawiya; view south-west towards the 
Nile. (Source: photograph by the author, February 2015) 
 
4.4.3 Pastoral Settlers 
While Hamadab and Bejrawiya are broadly recognised as Ja’alī territory, a large number of 
pastoralists have settled to the east of the villages. Moreover, although, like the government, most 
Ja’aliyīn do not count pastoralists as part of the community proper (see below), the present author 
classes them as members of the now-extended villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya and thus the site-
community.
501
 Starting in the north-east of the case-study area, in Bejrawiya, around Wadi Tarabil, 
New Deraqab and opposite Meroe itself, are the newest groups of pastoralists belonging to the 
formerly-camel-herding Hassaniyya and pastoral Manāsīr. The presence of these groups on 
Bejrawiya’s eastern outskirts seems to have been seasonal up until the mid-1980s, when they began 
settling, although individual group members had been setting up temporary homes there since the 
1950s.  
Opposite Hamadab proper to the east are the now-settled Yazīd in Yazīd, the Fadniyya-Bawalīd 
in Bawalīd and the Jutab in Jutab. Below Hamadab proper, to the south in Mataris and south-east in 
                                                     
501 Of course, the following is not a complete list of all the people that live in the case-study area: conversations have 
been had with the camel-herding Hamamid branch of the Aliab Ja’aliyīn in the Wadi Hadjala; members of the 
Rubātāb, Rashāida, Shagiyya and Bijā as well as Fellata, a group originally from West Africa. 
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Dahwab, are the various branches of the Fadniyya. The Fadniyya also occupy the blocks of Fadniyya 
I and II in Kabushiya, just outside the case-study area. North of Hamadab is a small settlement of 
Yazīd, known as Zamarna. These groups (Yazīd, Aliab, Jutab, Fadniyya) seem to be inter-related, 
although the specifics were hard to obtain (the present author takes a significant liberty in gathering 
them under the broad name of ‘Fadniyya’). Broadly speaking, these groups began settling on 
Hamadab’s southern and eastern outskirts in the 1960s, and in earnest in the mid-1980s, following a 
notoriously bad drought in 1984-5. However, some individuals and their families have lived there 
seasonally since the 1930s.  
The livelihoods of these gabīla are based on livestock, mainly goats and sheep but in some cases 
camels; unlike the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, the Fadniyya also own or rent small parcels of land. Their 
diet is largely vegetarian and includes plenty of dairy products and fermented foods;
502
 only rarely 
does a family kill an animal for its own consumption. Male, and sometimes female, members of the 
pastoralist households spend the months during and after the July and August rains, usually until 
October and sometimes until December, migrating in search of pasture in the eastern hinterland 
(khāla'), which forms part of the Butana.  
Despite being forced east by drought and other man-made and environmental factors, the 
pastoralists generate cash or goods-in-kind from the sale or exchange of dairy products, live animals, 
meat, wool, hair and skins. One of the reasons that they were first attracted to Hamadab-Bejrawiya is 
that these villages are well situated for livestock trading, being located upon a long-established 
corridor through which livestock are moved to market (Figure 6). They are also within easy reach of 
the livestock markets of ed-Damer, 40km to the north, whose camel market is famous, and Kabushiya, 
2km to south, which is well-known for its market for small animals (behaim). From here, livestock 
are transported to other parts of Sudan, to Eritrea and Ethiopia, or to ports on the Red Sea coast for 
export to the Arab states of the Gulf. Pastoralists are also attracted by the river, road and railway and 
their concomitant micro-economies, and the proximity to the gold mines near Atbara. 
                                                     
502 While the Ja’aliyīn are also vegetarian, there was a noticeable difference in food consumption between farmers and 
pastoralists: Ja’aliyīn are far more likely to have powdered milk and fizzy drinks; the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya like 
to drink extremely hot goat milk. 
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Figure 6. The Northern Livestock Corridor. Note the traffic around Shendi (Source: adapted from Nile Basin 
Initiative 2012: 149). 
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However, the expansion of big commercial agricultural projects has disadvantaged the 
pastoralists in Hamadab and Bejrawiya by occupying their former grazing lands and blocking their 
traditional migration routes (masarāt). One agricultural project, belonging to a private Saudi Arabian 
company was said by a number of respondents in Hamadab-Bejrawiya as being a particular problem 
because of its great size (Figure 7) and the fact that its central-pivot irrigation (CPI) system blocked 
the pastoralists’ migration routes to the pastoral corridor and to the Butana. The pastoralists’ attempts 
to enter the boundaries of the scheme have resulted in the offending livestock being slaughtered or 
ransomed and the owners penalized. To appeal against the projects, indeed against any foreign 
investor, is forbidden by law.
503
 The customary rights of the pastoralists have therefore been usurped 
and handed to a foreign company with the full complicity of the Sudanese state.  
Whilst on migration, they live in tents (hajīr) made of dom-palm reeds (birīsh) and goat hair 
(shaar) built around a wooden Y-frame (Figure 8). Hajīr are designed to be assembled and dismantled 
with ease and thus suit a mobile lifestyle and would have been assembled to form camps in the 
open.
504
 Most Hassanī household members continue to make the journey to the Butana. Among the 
Manāsīr, only two or three household members complete the annual migration. Most Fadniyya no 
longer go on migration, though they continue to rely heavily for their livelihoods on their herds, large 
numbers of which can be seen inside their compounds. In recent decades, these seasonal settlements 
have become permanent residences where their wives, young children and the elderly live.
505
 The 
pastoralists who still migrate with their herds in the rainy season also maintain secondary residences 
in settlements in the hinterland, although increasingly the Fadniyya and Manāsīr are abandoning them.  
Of the three non-Ja’alī pastoral groups, it is the Fadniyya who were the first to arrive, and have 
settled most densely in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and assimilated some of the lifestyle of the 
agricultural Ja’aliyīn, numbering around 1,275 residents in c. 160 households in total (on the basis of 
households of c.eight individuals. As noted above, they have established a number of neighbourhoods, 
the biggest of which, made up of Jutab and Bawalīd, they refer to as a ‘line’ of houses (hi) known as 
Hī as-Salām (“of Peace”). Hī as-Salām is now a permanent home to over 300 people and has its own 
Local Committee; other Fadniyya villages have similar numbers and together they now make up 
about 36% of the local population. The still pastoral Manāsīr and Hassaniyya in Bejrawiya only 
number around 75 individuals in c. eight households (on the basis of households of c.nine individuals), 
and some of these inhabit the area on a seasonal basis. While the number of pastoralists living near 
                                                     
503 Gertel et al. 2014. 
504 Now, as in the past, the women of the household build these houses. Observations suggest that, in general, pastoral 
women are much more active in the manual tasks of their household than the farming women (see Chapter 5). 
505 UNDP 2006. The settlement of nomads and pastoralists is a complex issue but in Sudan it takes three main forms, 
distinguished by the level of governmental coercion involved: organic and voluntary settlement, settlement as part 
of a government scheme, and forced re-settlement. Government resettlement and rehoming schemes have a bad 
reputation among the pastoralists for a number of reasons: the services they purport to provide do not materialize, 
compensation is inadequate and hard to get, and new settlements can be used as sources of control. These 
understandably explain why agro-pastoral and nomadic groups sometimes reject attempts to be settled in schemes 
where the government provides the impetus. 
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Hamadab-Bejrawiya is growing, partly because they traditionally have larger families than their 
farming neighbours,
506
 they remain in the minority in the case-study area, making up c.2% of the local 
population. Exact data on the number of pastoralists at the local level is also hard to come by: the 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya Local Committees, which are dominated by Ja’alī farmers, tend not to record 
pastoralist numbers because they do not consider them to be part of (or living “inside”) the 
community proper (again, this is the same tendancy as seen at the national level). Nevertheless, 
information gathered from interviews with local residents and personal observation confirms that 
pastoralists are a large minority, yet even if calculated with the still-pastoral members of the Fadniyya, 
probably make up no more than 38% of the population in the case-study area.  
Since arriving in Hamadab and Bejrawiya, the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya have continued to live in 
hajīr but most are now set up within a mud-brick or cement hōsh,, similar to, but smaller than, those 
used by sedentary farmers.
507
 However, unlike the densely packed Ja’alī villages, the pastoralists’ 
compounds are widely spread to provide space for their livestock enclosures (zirība) and to minimise 
the mixing of herds. If a household has relatively few animals, an animal shelter (raqūba) might be 
set up abutting an outside wall of the hōsh. Although broken hajīr are still repaired, fewer new ones 
are being built; many pastoralists now choose to build in mud-brick. For the Hassaniyya, this is true 
of both their village residences and their residences in the Butana, though they may add an extra ring 
of reeds, known as a hassīr, to hold their livestock. In contrast, the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists build 
hajīr very rarely, preferring to build in mud-brick like the Ja’aliyīn. The differences in principal 
household location and domestic architecture are clearly concomitant with the relative importance of 
livestock rearing and farming to each of the groups, although it seems clear that as people continue to 
arrive and settle, they change and modify their habits and traditions to adapt to the culture of 
sedentary life. 
 
                                                     
506 Abdalla 2013.  Certainly, the pastoral residents which the present researcher spoke with were all part of large 
families (see Chapter 6). 
507 There are pros and cons to both types of architecture: the hajir often need repair, and birīsh reeds are expensive 
compared to jalûs mud-bricks. On the other hand, mud-brick compounds are less sturdy against floods. 
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Figure 7. Pressures on land in Hamadab and Bejrawiya. (L) The floods caused by rain overflow from the wadis 
cover a large part of the western side of the villages (Source: Google Earth, 2013); (R) Al-Rajhi’s CPI machines 
running parallel to the Nile and the Wadi al-Hawad (Source: Google Earth, 2015). 
 
 
Figure 8. A Hassanī family in front of their hajīr. Note the surrounding mud-brick wall. (Source: photograph by 
the author, February 2015.) 
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4.5 Everyday Politics 
4.5.1 Cooperation and Conflict 
Naturally, the sedentary Ja’aliyīn, semi-pastoralist Fadniyya and pastoralist Manāsīr and Hassaniyya 
find it “expedient to associate across kinship, residential and livelihood boundaries on the basis of 
mutual interests.”508 The most important, positive and long-standing element of these relationships is 
the exchange of goods and services. Ja’alī farmers pay pastoralists to take their sheep and goats (and 
sometimes camels) to graze in the Butana during the rainy season, running from May to October. 
During the dry season, the farmers employ pastoralists as labourers on farms by the Nile or in the 
Wadi al-Hawad for cash or in exchange for a share of the harvest.
509
 Farmers provide the pastoralists 
with staple foods, such as wheat and sorghum, as well as vegetables and fruit, while pastoralists 
provide the farmers with animals, meat and dairy products, and herbs and plant-based medicines 
sourced in the hinterland. Farming households have also traditionally provided cash loans to the 
pastoralists,
 510
 though in more recent times the farmers’ own need for liquidity to pay for farming 
inputs has decreased the amount of lending and borrowing between the groups.  
The relationships between farmers and pastoralists have, however, never been completely 
smooth.
511
 Historically, the migratory pastoralists have been both a threat and an annoyance to the 
settled farmers, with a reputation (not always deserved) for raiding villages, stealing crops and 
livestock and refusing to acknowledge the existence of boundaries. The farmers have long viewed the 
pastoralists as a nuisance, particularly when the pastoralists’ unruly herds damage crops by eating or 
trampling them; when this occurs, the farmers will detain the animals in Kabushiya until a payment 
(rumoured to be SDG10/goat or animal) has been made by the owner. For their part, the pastoralists 
have viewed the encroachment of farmers on their traditional grazing lands with similar anger and 
frustration. Today, their relationships are under increasing strain in four inter-related areas.  
First, the traditional economic exchanges between the sides have begun to break down. More and 
more, Ja’alī landowners or tenants are reducing their use of hired labour in order to cut production 
                                                     
508 Salih 1999: 50. 
509 Also recorded by Weschenfelder 2014. 
510 Warburg 1992. When the Ottomans began integrating Sudan into a monetised market economy in the 19th 
Century, traders (jallaba) would act as money-lenders to pastoralists who needed cash. Warburg also relates how, 
in the 1840s the export of cattle to Egypt was halted and this had a damaging effect on the cattle-herding nomadic 
groups such as the Baqqāra. The Ja’aliyīn and other Nile-based traders stepped in and organized a system whereby 
“the cattle were sold to the jallaba in cash, who in turn resold it to the Baqqāra in exchange for slaves.” (Warburg 
1992: 3). By the 1880s, the system had streamlined and there seem to have been ‘stations’ of traders: those in 
Kordofan paid the cash-taxes on behalf of the Baqqāra and received supplies of slaves in return; the traders in 
Kordofan then sent them on to their kin by the Nile, where they were used as labourers. 
511 Komey 2014. 
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costs.
512
 Slowly increasing mechanization, even on relatively small farms, also means that there is less 
of a need for seasonal labour from the pastoralists.  
Second, the establishment of permanent Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya settlements in 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya has brought them into increasing competition with the Ja’aliyīn over land. 
The Ja’aliyīn regard the land settled by the pastoralists as their property and as part of their ‘ancestral’ 
homeland. Although the land was not being used by the Ja’aliyīn for residential purposes at the time 
when it was settled by the pastoralists, they did see it as potential space for the future expansion of 
their own settlements. The Ja’aliyīn therefore see themselves as having been boxed in between the 
river and farmland to the west and the pastoralists’ settlements to the east. Indeed, a number of rifts 
have come about because of what the Ja’aliyīn see as residential pressures caused by slow nomadic 
encroachment. Important events date back to the 1960s when the Jutab and Fadniyya-Bawalīd first 
began building permanent houses near the fields in Hamadab (also close to the South Mound of 
Domat al-Hamadab). When diesel pumps were introduced in the 1970s, they were told by the 
Hamadab-Ja’aliyīn to move (this was so they could extend the width of their fields but the Jutab and 
Fadniyya-Bawalīd were told that it was illegal to build so close to the archaeological site); the groups 
were granted space to the east as compensation. The Jutab had thus begun construction in the east 
when the flash floods hit west Hamadab in 1988. By all accounts, some members of the Hamadab-
Ja’aliyīn tried to tell the Jutab to go, but because they had started building their houses, they were 
allowed to stay. To this day, the residents of Hamadab are split over the actions of their Local 
Committee, which allowed the Jutab to settle there or, as some phrase it, “gave our land away.” For 
their part, the Jutab and Fadniyya-Bawalīd seem to hold resentment only towards their neighbours in 
Mataris, who also had begun settling more permanently in the Nile-side areas of Hamadab, but were 
able to build and establish their village before the introduction of the diesel pumps.
513
 These details 
are highly relevant in a context that is already characterized by insecurity and land scarcity; in fact, it 
seems that for a number of reasons, the floods in 1946 and 1988 as well as the intervening drought in 
1984-5 are the most important moments in the history of Hamadab and Bejrawiya in the last 70 years. 
For the Ja’alī villages, both floods resulted in drastic changes to the social, political and physical 
landscape and set about an accelerated move of the Ja’aliyīn to the east. At the same time, the floods 
coincided with unprecedented numbers of pastoralists and semi-pastoralists moving into the eastern 
parts of the villages. 
                                                     
512 See Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012: 249-50. 
513 There are two stories of how Mataris (lit. ‘terrace’, ‘barricade’, ‘sand-bag wall’) received its name. The first was 
given by Manāra al-Fadl (who was told by “old people”), who said that “[i]n the past there was a woman who 
owned all the land but lived on her own. Other people came from Matamma [a Ja’aliyīn town on the west bank, 
opposite Shendi, and settled there. Her friends [?] said to her not to let the newcomers stay because they will take 
over her cultivation. But the woman said she would let them stay because she wanted protection [i.e. in the same 
was as a sand-bag wall]. So the hilla became known as Mataris, which is the plural of ‘terrace’.” The other story, 
which is closely related, is that the word mataris relates directly to the sand-bag wall that the Ja’aliyīn built as a 
safety measure after the flood of 1988. The latter is also recorded by Weschenfelder 2014. 
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Third, farmers and pastoralists are increasingly in competition for off-farm jobs. The pastoralists 
are under increasing economic strain from the appropriation of their grazing lands, the blocking of 
their migration routes by major mechanized agricultural projects, and the reduction in the amount of 
wage labour offered by the farmers. Their need for wage-labour employment elsewhere, including on 
the agricultural projects (and on archaeological digs, as will be explained in Chapter 5) has grown.
514
 
However, most farming families in Hamadab and Bejrawiya are also under economic strain because 
the income derived from ‘on-farm’ activities is rarely enough to support a household; most of them 
live under the poverty line or very close to it. The farmers, too, are therefore obliged to diversify their 
livelihoods by engaging in ‘off-farm’ activities. There is thus a direct and growing competition 
between farmers and pastoralists for unskilled seasonal work and casual wage labour as well as 
indeed all other scarce resources in this challenging economic environment. 
Fourth, and in addition to the economic competition with the pastoralists over land and off-farm 
jobs, the Ja’aliyīn also see them as a threat to their longstanding social and political dominance in the 
locality and perhaps, even, on a national scale. They seem to regard the creation by the Hamadab 
pastoralists of their own Local Committees as a particularly dangerous precedent.  
The economic relationships between the Ja’aliyīn on one side and the Hassaniyya, Manāsīr and 
Fadniyya on the other, are therefore partly co-operative and partly competitive. The mutually 
beneficial economic aspect of the relationships depends upon the sides being able to fulfil their 
complimentary economic roles: the settled agriculturalists need to produce crops, and the migratory 
pastoralists need to graze their animals. If these roles are not fulfilled, the expedient economic basis of 
the relationship is compromised, competition is likely to grow fierce and thus, the ground may be 
paved for an increase in the overall chance of tension. As Kerkvliet puts it, “[b]ehavior [sic] regarding 
producing, distributing, and using resources can range from cooperation and collaboration to 
discussions and debates to bargains and compromises to conflicts and violence.”515 
 
4.5.2 The Allocation of Services 
A key aspect of the competition between the Ja’alī farmers and the pastoralists relates to the allocation 
of basic services (khadamāt) through a political and administrative hierarchy that is dominated by the 
Ja’aliyīn, who are perhaps closest to the Sudanese state’s idealized Arab-Muslim ‘in-group’. At the 
top of the hierarchy is the office of the President, an office that has been held since 1989 by General 
Omar el-Bashir, who belongs to both the Ja’aliyīn and Shagiyya gabâīl. The president heads the 
                                                     
514 Umbadda 2014. 
515 Kerkvliet 2009: 227. 
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national government. Administrative and political authority is devolved to 18 states, each of which 
has a governor and a capital in which ministerial offices are located. The states are divided into 
Districts, and the Districts into Localities, both of which have administrative centres with government 
offices. Finally, authority is devolved from the Localities to Local Committees, which operate at the 
village level and are responsible for the adequate allocation of basic services such as education, water 
supply, public health, the environment and, as Hamza al-Ja’ali notes, “social cohesion and harmony.” 
Each committee numbers around ten men who are elected by the community members; women are 
theoretically eligible to stand for election but the present researcher has never observed this in 
practice. The Local Committees are the closest representatives of the state’s political power to the 
rural population and although they are the fifth rung of government below the presidency they 
nevertheless wield significant authority at the local level. Indeed, Local Committees are the rural 
support bases of many governmental ministers.  
The case-study area of Hamadab and Bejrawiya lies within the Locality of Kabushiya Rural, 
which comprises a number of villages around the town of Kabushiya which lies 4km to the south; 
Kabushiya itself is in the separate Locality of Kabushiya Urban. Kabushiya Rural falls within the 
District of Shendi, a town of 63,000 people with many ministry offices that lies 45km to the south, 
and in River Nile State, whose capital is at ed-Damer 40km to the north. Two of the Local 
Committees are based in Hamadab; one representing the Ja’aliyīn and one the Fadniyya; there is also 
one committee in each of the Bejrawiya villages. The Ja’alī committees are invariably made up of 
individuals from old and powerful Ja’alī families; former Head of the Hamadab Village Committee 
Hamza al-Ja’ali, one of the main respondents for this study, is a primary example of this (below). The 
Manāsīr and Hassaniyya are not eligible to vote in Local Committee elections and do not have a 
committee of their own. However, because of the length of time they have been settled in Hamadab 
and because of the growing size of their community, the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists were able to 
apply successfully to the government to establish their own Local Committee (above).  
One of the most important roles of the Local Committees is to administer the distribution of 
water (muya) and electricity (kharhaba), good access to which, in the Sudanese context, are 
comparative luxuries. Water in Hamadab and Bejrawiya comes from the water table 150m below the 
surface, which is electrically pumped to water tanks (sirīj) from which it is distributed to all Ja’alī, 
some Fadnī and few pastoral households by pipe, although both pipelines are now suffering from old 
age. Most Ja’alī and some Fadnī households are also connected to mains electricity (a network that 
was installed thanks to the Merowe dam), providing power for lighting, cooking, ceiling fans and 
telephone chargers. 
Although water and electricity were originally installed with government funds (after lengthy 
petitions), their extension and maintenance lies with the community residents. As Hamza al-Ja’ali 
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explained, “schools, mosques, water fixtures, clubs, kindergartens…they are all paid for and built by 
the local people.” For example, if a water pipe breaks, then the residents have to pay for its repair. 
The extension of the Hamadab water supply has been paid for by remittances from labour migrants, as 
was the clinic in Kabushiya. In a context in which the central government is absent, the local residents 
rely heavily upon worker remittances and acts of charity, including money directed by religious 
organisations based in Saudi Arabia and the Arab states of the Gulf into school- and mosque-building; 
they also provide teachers because as Hamza al-Ja’ali notes, there is very little government support: 
“[t]he responsibility of the government is to bring teachers, books, chairs, tables and desks. But it only 
supplies teachers and books” (see Chapter 8). Part of the electricity provision stems from a solar panel 
that was donated by Poland and the Netherlands.  
The Local Committees play a major role in managing these projects, sourcing materials, 
contracting labour and, of course, making key decisions as to which households get access to the 
services. However, in comparison with other areas in Sudan, the case-study area does not receive any 
significant outside relief. While the “international presence in Sudan”516 has largely revolved around 
interventions during the disasters of the civil wars throughout the 20
th
 Century, many aid relief 
schemes were, and still are, focused upon providing relief to the far west, Darfur, and to the south, 
and not to places such as Hamadab-Bejrawiya. This can be seen in economic terms, too:  
[t]here are significant regional differences in number of household receiving economic transfers from 
aid programs with as much as 41 percent of all households in Northern Darfur to less than 0.5 percent 
in several of the Northern and Central states.
517
  
The humanitarian aid and foreign NGO personnel are therefore present in far larger numbers in 
peripheral areas is due to conflict. In other words, the reason for a lack of NGO presence in the case-
study area is therefore attributable to the relative peace it experiences. 
The case-study area therefore boasts few services; those that it does are firmly in the hands of the 
Ja’aliyīn, as long-standing residents of the area. It is perhaps unsurprising, then, that the Ja’aliyīn seek 
to control their monopoly carefully. Indeed, although most Ja’alī households in Hamadab-Bejrawiya 
live either under the poverty line or very close to it, observation by this researcher suggests that the 
pastoralists are even less well off, and that the farmers have much better access to basic services than 
the pastoralists. In contrast to the Ja’aliyīn, most of the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya and many of the 
Fadniyya have no direct access to piped water or electricity.
518
 Although the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya 
have a water tank, they do not seem to have a network of pipes with which to access it; consequently 
they have to get their water from a man who delivers it by bicycle. The absence of possessions that 
                                                     
516 Large 2011. 
517 CBS 2010: 24.  
518 Access to electricity is clearly being used as a political tool on a national level, too, as described by one pastoralist: 
“The houses who do not have electricity were promised it in exchange for their votes in the election. [Our family] 
have voted for the [ruling] NCP many times but we still don’t have electricity.”  
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need electricity, for example televisions, cookers and electric fans, is one of the most conspicuous 
features of the pastoralists’ households. To charge their mobile telephones, the pastoralists must call 
upon friends in the Ja’alī villages, if they have them, or travel further afield.  
In conversation with the present researcher, Mansūrī, Hassanī and Fadnī respondents commonly 
described the Ja’aliyīn who monopolize basic local services as being “like those people who take the 
eggs and then kill the hen”. The comparative security enjoyed by the Ja’aliyīn is also explained by the 
pastoralists in terms of the Ja’alī ownership of land, better access to education, more profitable social 
networks and their political hegemony at the local, regional and national levels. As Layla Ahmed, a 
Hassanī woman, told the present researcher about the Ja’aliyīn in Hamadab: 
[They] all have a strip of land by the Nile, that they are all educated, that…people in Hamadab have 
their backs in [have people in] government and in education, so the government won’t take their land. 
Certainly from their perspective, the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya are ill-served by the Ja’alī-
dominated Local Committees. But from the Ja’aliyīn’s perspective, this is their dār, and only they 
have full rights to access the already strained services.  
 
4.5.3 The Discourse of Insecurity 
As noted above, normative social organisation is discursively expressed by a number of linguistic and 
historical signifiers, or ‘proofs of ethnicity’, namely ancestry, language, religion, homeland and 
livelihood. Therefore, insight into the social relationships in Hamadab and Bejrawiya can be gained 
by observing how the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya address one another as strangers, 
or refer to one another in the presence of an outsider such as the present researcher.  
In the first instance, despite the ongoing rhetoric about ‘Arab-ness’ and ‘Muslim-ness’ on a 
national scale, these topics were notably absent in local discourse. The Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and 
Fadniyya are inevitably denigrated as inferior by the Ja’aliyīn due to their perceived inter-
relationships with members of other ‘inferior’ groups of the south, such as the Nūba, but nevertheless 
they all recognize one another as descendants of immigrants from the Arabian Peninsula. The same 
can be said for religion: all of the Sudanese in Hamadab-Bejrawiya are self-identifying Muslims (as 
are 98% of the country’s population), and religion (although not ‘sect’ or ‘order’) is one of the few 
things that unites all the residents, regardless of age, livelihood and gabīla. This was partly by design: 
discussion of Islam was not pursued in conversation unless it was raised organically, which was rare 
even though on a day-to-day level, Islam shapes people’s lives: the hours of prayer structure their day, 
the associated Islamic architecture, particularly the mosque, provides (gendered) space as well as 
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social roles and hierarchies, guides life event celebrations, such as weddings, name days, circumcision 
days, and provides practical guides to the treatment of the dead. The issue of religion was most 
commonly raised by female respondents, and usually in relation to the present researcher’s own 
Judeo-Christian cultural background. More specifically, the latter was discussed in terms of women’s 
comparative relationship with men, and often in terms of marriage. Female respondents often asked 
the present researcher if she would “find a Sudanese man” and “convert to Islam.” Only one 
conversation was explicitly about religion, with an imam of the Ansar al-Sunna (lit. ‘Followers of the 
[Prophet’s] Tradition’), a Sudanese adaptation of a puritanical Salafist religious order established in 
the 1970s. Even in the personal and family histories of the respondents (presented in Chapter 5), the 
Islamic context or adherence of the protagonist to Islamic principles was quietly presented rather than 
emphasized. What is clear is that Islam underpins every aspect of life, but not in a conspicuous way.  
Therefore, while community residents are acutely aware of each other’s gabīla, and are familiar 
with the national discourse of identity, people at the local level refer to one another as much with 
reference to respective livelihoods and residences rather than their ancestry or religion. The 
pastoralists often refer to the Ja’aliyīn by their residence, “People of the Village” (nās al-hilla), 
“People from Hamadab” and so on. Pastoralists also often refer to farmers as “People of the River” 
(nās al-bahr). 519   Hilla, relates to the verb halla, which means ‘to settle down’. The Ja’aliyīn 
frequently describe the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya as “People of the Countryside” (nās al-
balad) or, far more commonly, “nomad” (’arab). Importantly, even though all of these groups claim 
Arab ancestry, in this context the word ‘arab does not signify a genealogical connection with the 
gabāīl of the Arabian Peninsula, who came to the Sudan in the 7th to 14th Centuries CE, when Islam 
spread across north and east Africa. Instead, because the Ja’aliyīn take pride in their history as farmers 
along the Nile and in their success as traders (jallaba, see Appendix 7) and professionals, the word 
‘arab is used to denigrate the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya lifestyle that requires them to move 
around the land and living with their animals. In separate conversations with three Ja’alī women, 
Awadiya Nassim explained that “they live in the open–there is no hōsh, no privacy, the animals can 
poo everywhere, the women can walk around without thuwūb”; Adira al-Sikina added that she did not 
“mind them” but did not like the fact that they are “dirty” and “eat and drink with their animals”; and 
Amna Suliman said, “The ‘arab here keep saying ‘we belong to the Ja’aliyīn’, but they don’t!” The 
Ja’aliyīn make fun of the pastoralists’ residences; some, including as Amna Suliman, told the present 
researcher that they were proud that “there have never been any buyūt al-birīsh” here. Even the 
reference to buyūt al-birīsh is derogatory: it literally means “Houses of Mats“ (birīsh is both the raw 
material and the product) and does not take into account the fact that, for the pastoralists, it is a hajīr. 
                                                     
519  Of note, bahr in Modern Standard Arabic generally refers to ‘sea’, with the Nile officially known as Nahr al-Nīl 
(for example River Nile State known as Wilâya Nahr al-Nīl). However, bahr is also used with reference to the Nile 
too; hence the White Nile is known as Bahr al-Jabal or Bahr al-Abyad, while the Blue Nile is also known as Bahr 
al-Azraq. 
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The Ja’alī denigration of the pastoral lifestyle could, however, be seen as ironic since they 
themselves were once semi-pastoralists (and some even fully nomadic). The Ja’alī neighbourhood of 
Kejeik in Bejrawiya, for example, is named after kajaīk, a large sun-dried split fish.520 Like many 
other fermented foods in Sudan, kajaīk was made for those who live far away from, rather than close 
to, the Nile. Moreover, according to a number of Ja’alī women, including Mariam al-Pasha, in the 
past mud-brick houses were built with animal shelters (raqūba) attached to it and crop storage 
facilities (guseiba) within the main house. It is noteworthy that the constructed link between 
livelihood and residence is assumed by everyone despite the fact that they have a questionable basis in 
reality: it is a stereotype.  
As much as their different livelihood and the overwhelming experience of living in alien territory 
might serve to unite them, the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and especially the Fadniyya do not see themselves 
as a unified group. Instead, and as with all identities, ‘Others’ are measured through sameness and 
difference. In conversations with the present researcher, Hamid al-Harun, a Mansūrī, noted that the 
Hassaniyya are “like us” because they “have animals” but denied living in the same area as them. 
Similarly, when asked about her family, Fadiya Mohammed, also a Mansūrī respondent, noted that 
they “came here before the [Merowe] dam [was established in 2008] and before the ‘arab who live 
above [Meroe; i.e. the Hassaniyya].” So, we can see that the Manāsīr here use the same scale of 
‘‘Arab-ness’ or ‘nomadic-ness’ as well as ‘new-ness’ and ‘old-ness,’ in other words the same 
hierarchy of values as the Ja’aliyīn when describing themselves in relation to the Hassaniyya.  
A more nuanced picture of what we might call the scale of ‘Arab-ness’ and connection to 
territory is shown with the Ja’alī perception of whom it is acceptable to marry. In conversation with 
the present researcher, Ja’alī respondents dispelled the idea of inter-marrying with the Manāsīr or 
Hassaniyya on the basis that they are ‘new’ to the area, and marry off their daughters at an early age. 
They might, however, marry the Fadniyya because some of them are ‘old’ (i.e. they have been living 
there for the requisite length of time). Yet inter-marriage with Fadniyya is still regarded by the 
Ja’aliyīn as far from ideal and likely only if the Fadniyya family is well-known and long-established 
in the area; Hamza al-Ja’ali told the present researcher that there was still a marriage barrier 
(“partition”) between them and that “while appearances can change because of nature and climate, 
ancestries cannot be changed.” 
Education is another signifier of sameness and difference. In Sudan, educational attainment is 
low all-round and even primary education in the site-communities in the case-study area is by no 
means universal. The monthly fee is around SDG35 ($5) for primary school and around SDG70 ($10) 
for secondary school, which are beyond the reach of most households, the vast majority of which have 
multiple children; in such circumstances, parents will often choose one or two children to be 
                                                     
520 Dirar 1993. 
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schooled.
521
 In the case-study area, a good number of Ja’aliyīn were educated at least to primary 
school level and a small number have university degrees, but few of the pastoralists go to school 
because attending school, particularly secondary school onwards, can be perceived as a migratory 
experience that takes otherwise economically useful children away from the household. This matters 
because the economic function of each household depends upon members’ presence therein; their 
‘entrances’ and ‘exits’ to and from the household are significant events.522 This was shown to be true 
for both the sedentary farmers and the pastoralists. Pastoralists tend to have more children (though 
again this is not shown in the data samples collected for this research) and on aggregate leave school 
to go to work much earlier than sedentary agriculturalists (that is if they have attended school at all). 
Farming families seem to have fewer children but expend more of their gross income on these 
children, particularly their education. Children play a strong economic role in the chores of the 
pastoral household, such as collecting wood or disbursing animal fodder. While the Ja’alī children and 
young adults go to school and ideally into employment, for the Mansūrī and Hassanī men, education 
rather involves a series of movements to and from the hinterland as one grows with age. This is 
changing of course, and the number of pastoral-nomadic children attending school is high in 
comparison to other areas of Sudan. Thus, while notions of ‘education’ are different, the economic 
salience is that both include ‘leaving the home’ for periods of time. This is of course one of the 
reasons school attendance remains low. Completing university is a ‘social indicator’ of independent 
family wealth and/or external patronage: incomes rarely provide the surplus for the lofty heights of 
university education, and the poor provision of education makes it equally out of reach for many. 
Fadiya Mohammed, one of the Mansūrī respondents, commented, “I cannot read or write as there 
were no schools in al-khāla' [the hinterland]…But we know that this is different in comparison with 
life at al-bahr [the Nile].” 
A final popular slur against the pastoralists is to comment that, by becoming sedentary, they are 
attempting to become “like citizens” (medaninîn, from ‘medīnā’ lit. ‘city’). By implying that the 
pastoralists are not citizens already, the Ja’aliyīn are echoing the categorization of pastoralists on the 
national level. As noted above this insult finds its parallel in the law: Anglo-Egyptian land laws in the 
1940s stated that farming rights trump pastoral rights and the CBS’ 2009 NBHS (CBS 2010) did not 
even count nomadic homes as proper households, a point which foreshadows another made in Chapter 
5 regarding Anderson’s (1991) theorem that censuses are undertaken by new states as part of the 
ideological organization of their territory.  
                                                     
521 There are some who are exempt from paying, such as orphans, the very poor, and the children of shahīd (‘martyrs’: 
army officers who died in the war). The state also subsidizes brothers from the same family (apparently on a ‘two 
for the price of one’ basis) and the sons of teachers. These decisions are made on the advice of a ‘Council of 
Fathers’ who know the children and their families well and who advise the Local Committee about their 
circumstances. 
522 Chen and Korinek 2010. 
  
136 
5. THE IMPACTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY ON IDENTITY FORMATION 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.1 Nubian Archaeology as Sudan’s ‘Authorized Heritage Discourse’ 
One of the raisons d'être of archaeology is that it increases knowledge and understanding about the 
past. Not all scholars agree that it reveals ‘truth’; social archaeologists and archaeological 
ethnographers prefer to discuss temporally-situated ‘interpretations’ of material culture, as discussed 
in Chapter 2. Yet most scholars agree that specialized archaeological activities such as excavation are, 
at least partially, about creating new knowledge referred to as ‘history’.  
The early history of Sudan is to a large extent the history of what archaeologists refer to as 
‘ancient Nubia’, a territory that stretched along the Middle Nile roughly from the First Cataract at 
Aswan in modern Egypt to Khartoum in modern Sudan, and is sometimes split into ‘Lower Nubia’ 
and ‘Upper Nubia’ (Figure 9, and see Appendix 5 for a historical timeline). ‘Ancient Nubia’ was 
much larger than the territory that is at present conventionally referred to as ‘Nubia’; the latter extends 
roughly from Aswan in Egypt to Dongola in Sudan. However, it was much smaller than modern 
Sudan which, even after the secession of South Sudan in 2011, includes regions that are not regarded 
as part of ‘ancient Nubia’, such as Darfur and Kordofan.  
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From at least 5000 BCE, ‘ancient Nubia’ was occupied by a number of distinct cultures or 
polities; archaeologists thus generally use it as an umbrella term to refer to the cultural and political 
entities that for millennia existed along the Middle Nile, including the Kerma culture (c. third 
millennium BCE), the Kingdoms of Kush (c. 9
th
 Century BCE to 4
th
 Century CE), and the three 
Christian kingdoms that arose after the fall of Kush (c. 6
th
 to 9
th
 Centuries CE). As Adams (1977) 
notes, the links between these cultural and political entities are complex and by no means direct or 
linear. However, their co-location along the Nile and the continuities in some cultural debris have led 
archaeologists to place them all under the heading of ‘ancient Nubia’, making archaeology in Sudan 
‘Nubian archaeology’. Indeed, ‘ancient Nubian’ history is the period and area of Sudan’s past that 
archaeologists have been most interested in excavating and writing about; this interest has been 
pursued almost to the exclusion of other time periods and places.
523
 In 2015, there were over 40 multi-
national archaeological teams working in Sudan, most of them working on ‘ancient Nubian’ sites in 
the Nile Valley.
524
 Such narrow focus can also be attributed to the interests of funding bodies; the 
attraction of monumental sites; and the popularity of ‘Nubian’ history amongst the (mostly Western) 
interest groups who help fund archaeological magazines and TV shows. The strong and enduring 
Western public interest in, and consumption of, popular archaeology is important because “the wider 
public…although [they] often do not know it, are footing the bill” for archaeological research.525  
At first glance, this focus appears to be part of the creation of an ‘alternative history’ (see 
Chapter 2), whereby Sudan-as-Nubia emerges from the shadow of its overbearing Egyptian neighbour: 
interest in this area has arguably shifted since the time at which fascination derived almost wholly 
from the monumental Pharaonic cultures of ‘ancient Egypt’, of which Sudan was seen to be an 
extension; Egyptologists such as Budge (1907) came south from Egypt to investigate Nubia not for its 
own sake, but to explore its connections to ancient Egypt,
526
 as did travellers and proto-archaeologists 
such as Burckhardt (Travels in Nubia, 1819) and Emery (Nubian Treasure, 1948).   
  
                                                     
523 Edwards 2003. 
524 Jakob and Ali 2011: 517. 
525 Drewett 2012: 2. 
526 Trigger 1994. Trigger also talks about the differing conceptions of ‘Nubia’ by early European archaeologists, who 
considered Nubia to be ‘Hamitic’ and ‘civilized’ in comparison with ‘black Africa’ but no less backward in 
comparison with Egypt (Trigger 1994: 322). Also see Edwards 2003. We might note that J-F. Champollion and 
others “concluded that the ruins of Meroe and other sites in the Sudan marked the “primitive home” of ancient 
Egyptian civilization, which had been carried north into Egypt by Sudanese colonists” (Bernal 1987, quoted in 
Trigger 1994: 325), but this was an exceptional view 
  
138 
 
Figure 9. Map of ‘ancient Nubia’ (Source: Mohammed and Welsby 2011: 27, Map 3.1) 
 
However upon further inspection it seems that while it may have started as a form of ‘alternative 
history’, ‘ancient Nubia’ (and the pursuit of Nubian archaeology) has now become Sudan’s 
hegemonic and exclusive authorized heritage discourse. Indeed for most archaeologists, far-reaching 
developments such as the slow but continuous arrival of Arabs from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula, 
and the emergence in the early 16
th
 Century of the non-Arab and non-Muslim Fūnj, who established 
the Sultanate of Sennar and converted to Islam, are not regarded as part of their remit (Appendix 6 for 
a historical timeline). Although their excavation licences, issued by NCAM (§1 IVc), require them 
to “excavate and record all ancient sites within the concession area irrespective of period”,527 and 
                                                     
527 NCAM Excavation Licence, n.d. 
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although there are some important exceptions, such as the work on Islamic archaeology by El-Zein 
(2000, 2010), archaeologists “seem to be rather indifferent to the region’s history after the 
introduction of Islam in c.1500 AD.”528  This “unevenly distributed” 529  attention might partly be 
explained by the fact that written sources have been relatively abundant since the 16
th
 Century; 
archaeologists might argue that this places the period in the realm of historians. However, the written 
sources are not complete, leaving plenty of scope for archaeological analyses of the material record.  
That ‘ancient Nubia’ is Sudan’s authorized heritage discourse is further demonstrated by the 
titles of seminal publications dealing with Sudanese archaeology, such as Adams’ Nubia: Corridor to 
Africa (1977), Bonnet and Valbelle’s (2008) The Nubian Pharaohs: Black Kings on the Nile and 
Fisher’s Ancient Nubia: African Kingdoms on the Nile (2012).530 The most prominent Sudan-focused 
archaeological organizations also carry the term ‘Nubia’ in their titles, such as the International 
Society for Nubian Studies (ISNS):
531
 one consequence of this tendency to designate pre-Islamic 
Sudanese sites as ‘Nubian’ is that it creates the impression that all pre-Islamic Sudanese history is 
‘ancient Nubian’ history, and that ‘Nubia’ is synonymous with ‘Sudan’ even though the latter 
stretches far beyond the Middle Nile Valley. There has moreover been a sharp increase in 
archaeological activity to excavate and restore ‘Nubian’ royal cities and necropoleis; establish 
‘Nubian’ royal chronologies; assess the extent and density of ‘Nubian’ settlement; and conduct large-
scale salvage archaeology of ‘Nubian’ sites. Investment in ‘ancient Nubia’ has also grown: in 2011, 
ICOMOS noted that “1.5m euros [c. $1.7m] has been pledged by the Italian government towards the 
preservation of Nubian heritage” 532  and since 2013, the Nubian Archaeology and Development 
Organisation (NADO), funded by the state of Qatar, has spent $135m supporting ‘Nubian’ 
archaeology (see Chapter 8).
533
 
Furthermore, ‘ancient Nubia’ is not only Sudan’s hegemonic and exclusive authorized heritage 
discourse but has been made by archaeologists into ‘World Heritage’. UNESCO’s intervention in 
Sudan from 1960 to 1980 in the wake of the Aswan High Dam, requested by archaeologists, was 
termed the ‘International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia’;534 funds were also raised to 
establish an International Museum of Nubia, which opened in Aswan in 1997.
535
 Of course, 
international attention and ‘World Heritage’ designations have not always been for positive reasons, 
nor has they always had positive results. Critics condemned the attention and money lavished by 
UNESCO and other Western bodies on the rescue of ancient monuments amid floods while allowing 
                                                     
528 Hafsaas-Tsakos 2011: 60.  
529 Edwards 2003: 33. 
530 Also see Török’s seminal volume on ‘Meroitic’ and ‘Kushite’ art (2002), which subsumes such art under the 
heading of ‘Nubian art’. 
531 See the ISNS website. Trigger reports that the ISNS began as an association to promote the investigation of 
‘Christian Nubia’ (Trigger 1994: 342). 
532 ICOMOS 2011: 108. 
533  See the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website. 
534 Säve-Söderbergh 1987.  
535  Hopkins and Mehanna 2010. 
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the very same floods to displace thousands of Nubians in both Egypt and Sudan. Moreover, the 
UNESCO campaign focused on the rescue of Egyptian monuments from the rising waters of Lake 
Nasser while hundreds of other archaeological sites from the ‘Nubian’ Kushite period were destroyed. 
However, as one NCAM staff member would later say of the construction at the Fourth Cataract of 
the Merowe Dam, completed in 2008, which flooded hundreds of Kushite archaeological sites, “[t]he 
paradox is that, yes, an entire area is being wiped off the map but thanks to the rescue project, 
Sudanese archaeology is being put on the map.”536 This has proved to be true, although not under the 
heading of ‘Sudanese’; rather there are ‘Nubian’ collections in most major museums in the world.537  
* 
Archaeologists’ preferences have over time created an ‘authorized heritage discourse’ (Chapter 2), 
which values the archaeology of ‘ancient Egypt’ above ‘ancient Nubia’, and in turn, that of Islamic 
Sudan. In a context where the history of ‘ancient Egypt’ is ‘dominant’ (most valued) and ‘ancient 
Nubia’ is ‘subaltern’ (less valued), the recognition by archaeologists that ‘ancient Nubia’ is worthy of 
study other than as a footnote to ‘ancient Egypt’, has been something of a triumph over prejudice.538 
Yet, the focus on ‘ancient Nubia’ over other histories in Sudan has turned it into a powerful historical 
construct, co-created by international communities of archaeologists and their public audiences, and 
one which, like ‘ancient Egypt’ before it, has become hegemonic in Sudan. Indeed it is possible to 
argue that the dominance of ‘ancient Nubian’ history over that of Islamic Sudan seems to have turned 
‘ancient Nubia’ and Nubian archaeology from a burgeoning counter-hegemonic ‘alternative 
archaeology’ into a hegemonic authorized heritage discourse. 
 
 
5.2 The Rejection of Nubian Archaeology by the Modern Arab-Muslim State 
5.2.1 ‘Discourse Institutionalization’ in State Rhetoric 
Sudan’s nationalist movements and governments have since independence have tried to forge a sense 
of nationhood in a country that is made up of a mosaic of ethnic, linguistic and cultural groups 
(Chapter 4). However, unlike states such as Egypt and Iran (noted in Chapter 2), they have not drawn 
                                                     
536  Salah Eldin Mohammed Ahmed, speaking in 2007 and referring to the Merowe Dam Archaeological Salvage 
Project (MDASP) organised by NCAM which, in 2002, issued an ‘Appeal for rescuing a piece of Man’s cultural 
heritage’. 
537 De Simone 2014, Annex IV: 277-82, ‘Nubian Collections Worldwide’. The listed collections give examples from 
Egypt, Ghana, the U.S., Canada, India, Europe and Australia. 
538 Edwards 1998: 175; Török 2002: 8-9.  
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upon the country’s ancient past; ‘ancient Nubians’ are absent from the Sudanese state’s discourse (or 
what we might call the state’s ‘authorized heritage discourse’) despite the iconicity and spectacle of 
their monuments and, indeed, some evidence of cultural continuity with modern Sudan (see below). 
Of course there is some measure of what Hajer (1993) calls ‘discourse institutionalization’, due in part 
to the measures taken by the Anglo-Egyptian government (see Chapter 7). For example at present, the 
view that land occupied by archaeological sites is important cultural heritage is common in state 
rhetoric and archaeological ‘heritage’ has been used as a tool in peace-building endeavours (see 
Leturcq’s (2011) discourse analysis of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (2005) and the Joint 
Assessment Mission (2008)). The state financially supports—at least to some extent—an antiquities 
ministry (NCAM)
539
 and at least nominally upholds its law, the Ordinance for the Protection of 
Antiquities (OPA). 
Stemming from the same academic milieu as Western archaeologists, NCAM’s commitment to 
the principle that archaeological sites are important on a global scale since they help tell the story of 
mankind and need to be protected “for future generations” 540 is also apparent: two Sudanese site 
complexes have been inscribed onto UNESCO’s World Heritage list (Jebel Barkal and the Island of 
Meroe), and the rhetoric of its former Director-General, Hassan Hussein Idris, also demonstrates this:  
It has become clear to us that increased public knowledge of ancient Sudanese cultures could play a 
very important role not only in unifying the Sudanese but also in enriching contemporary civilization 
on a global scale.
541
 
Furthermore the central government has named such sites as as ‘national’ sites542 and has even 
deemed Meroe and the pyramids to the east so important that they were “confiscated” by a 
presidential decree in 2003, which declared that they should be managed as a “national reserve”.543  
However, as Deng (1995), Lesch (1998), Elamin (1999), Adar (2001) and Idris (2005) have 
shown, the main nationalist movements and post-independence governments have looked to Arabism 
and Islam as the foundation of the modern Sudanese ‘nation’ and have instituted this through the law. 
‘Acceptable’ national identity is thus based on a blend of purported Arab ancestry and Islamic culture, 
military prowess and aspirations for modern economic and technological progress: state ideology thus 
works as a 'friction' or 'dysjuncture’ that prevents this rhetoric from operationalizing in reality. 
                                                     
539 “NCAM’s budget is allocated on a yearly basis by the Ministry of Finance…” (El-Masri 2010: 162), although a 
meeting of the Sudan Archaeological Research Society (SARS) at the British Museum in London in May 2015 
suggested that there were only c.20 NCAM inspectors in Sudan vs. 5,000 in Egypt. 
540  ICOMOS 1999, ‘8th Draft of the International Cultural Tourism Charter, Managing Tourism at Places of Heritage 
Significance’. 
541  Kendall 1998. 
542 NCAM’s UNESCO World Heritage Management Plan notes, for example, the sites of Meroe have been designated 
as “national” sites (El-Masri 2010: 182, 198). 
543  ICOMOS 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is ‘Presidential Decision/Decree no.162 for the year 2003: The 
Confiscation of the Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National 
Reserve within this Region and managing it.’ The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the Nomination 
File for UNESCO World Heritage status was being written.  
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5.2.2 ‘Logoizing’ the State Image 
As Anderson (1991) has shown, a state’s political and cultural ideology is symbolised by the words of 
its national anthem and the imagery of its flag, coins and banknotes. In Anderson’s words, these offer 
a “pictorial census of the state’s patrimony”; the “logoization” of the state’s ideology.544 In Sudan, 
these ‘logos’ are dominated by Arab, Islamic and military symbols alongside other symbols 
promoting technological advancement; representing the state’s idealized vision of the ‘nation’. 
The national anthem, adopted immediately after independence in 1956, was originally that of the 
armed forces, and is entitled ‘We Are the Army of God and of Our Land’.545 The army is also 
commemorated and celebrated in the names of major roads and bridges in Khartoum.
546
 When Jaafar 
Nimeiri assumed the presidency in 1969, the national flag was changed from three horizontal stripes 
of blue, yellow and green to three horizontal stripes of red, white and black with a green triangle; 
based on the Arab Liberation Flag, the new design was intended to underline Sudan’s status as an 
Arab country.
547
 The flag’s central motif is a secretary bird bearing a shield from the time of the 
Mahdi, who some regard as Sudan’s first nationalist (Chapter 4).548 
Coinage is dominated by Arabic numbers, English words (such as ‘Central Bank of Sudan’ and 
‘twenty piasters’) and symbols including an eagle, a cow and a generic pottery vessel. Only very 
rarely do pre-Islamic symbols appear; for example, a Meroitic (late Kushite) pyramid and tomb 
chapel appear on the 2006 ten-piaster coin. Banknotes issued in 2006 and 2011 feature both wild and 
domesticated animals (pigeons, camels, cattle, buffalo) alongside images of the People’s Palace in 
Khartoum (reverse of the SDG10 note), the Central Bank of Sudan in Khartoum (obverse of the 
SDG1 note); and ceramic pots and musical instruments (obverse and reverse of the SDG2 note). 
However, by far the most striking of the banknote images are the representations of Sudan’s 
modernist project, which appear on the higher value banknotes: satellites and hydroelectric dams 
(obverse and reverse of the SDG5 note) and machinery, oil rigs, factories and radio antennae (obverse 
and reverse of the SDG20 note). Sudan’s national symbols, therefore, idealise its Arab and Islamic 
past, its military capability and its economic and technological development and modernization.  
Anderson further suggests that newly independent states need three things to establish a sense of 
nationhood: a ‘census’ to decide who is a citizen (see Chapter 4); a ‘map’ with which to ideologically 
                                                     
544 Anderson 1991: 182. 
545 Willis 2011. 
546 Examples include ‘Armed Forces Bridge’ connecting Khartoum to Khartoum North across the Blue Nile; ‘Victory 
Bridge’ leading to Omdurman across the White Nile; and ‘Army Avenue’ which runs parallel to the Khartoum 
railway. Sudan has also cemented its ‘Arab’ and ‘Islamic’ identity through its membership of the Arab League and 
the Organization of Islamic Countries. It materially supported Arab countries during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-
Israeli wars and was the only country in sub-Saharan Africa to support Iraq in the 1991-2 Gulf War. 
547 Willis 2011. 
548 Also see Kevane (2008) who in a study of Sudan’s stamps notes the Mahdi’s appearance on them and that the Arab 
League was featured in 1962, 1967 and 1972. 
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organize the nation’s territory; and a ‘museum’ to display the archaeological and historical evidence 
of the nation’s attachment to the land, build a national identity by creating a collective memory, and 
project the unity of the state. As shown in Chapter 4, post-independence governments have conducted 
five censuses, all of which have been criticised for omitting minority groups such as the Rashāida 
gypsies and the Kababish and Baqqāra nomads. However, when it comes to museums, Anderson’s 
conceptualization appears to fall short in the Sudanese context. Although pre-Islamic Sudan is largely 
absent from state discourse, the most comprehensive exhibits in the National Museum in Khartoum (f. 
1904
549) are those of ‘ancient Nubia’s’ pre-historic, Kerma, Egyptian, Kushite and Christian periods. 
The explanation for this apparent contradiction is that the museum was “the incidental by-product of 
the construction of the Aswan High Dam in the 1960s”550 and was paid for by UNESCO and Western 
donors. The museum is thus arguably not an attempt to identify with ‘ancient Nubia’ but an outcome 
of the Sudanese state’s desire to modernize and their use of dam building as a tool for such a 
programme.
551
 Therefore, while: 
the material remains of…earlier states are well represented in the [museum]…and dominate the 
landscape with their monumental form throughout the Nile Valley, official culture in Sudan makes 
little of them: there are no roads named for them, nor public celebration of the long history of state 
formation in the Nile Valley that they represent.
552
  
‘Ancient Nubia’ therefore presents a fundamental conceptual problem for Sudan’s Arab-Muslim 
elite, partly due to the conflation of being ‘Nubian’ with being ‘African’, ‘Christian’ or ‘pagan’. 
According to Abd al-Rahim:  
the African past of the Sudanese…was not regarded as an object of glorification or seen as a source of 
self-gratification…Their non-Islamic past, like their pre-Islamic past, was for them a part of the 
Jahiliyya, i.e. the ‘Age of Ignorance’ or ‘World of Darkness’, and they could not, therefore, identify 
themselves with either.
553
 
Sudan’s Arab-Muslim elites widely perceive African cultures to be inferior, a deeply engrained 
prejudice that has been reinforced by centuries of the slave trade (Chapter 4 and below). Indeed, 
nationalists and most post-independence governments have actively downplayed Sudan’s African and 
pre-Islamic features in their logoization of the state image. 
 
                                                     
549 Jakob and Ali 2011: 514. 
550 Willis 2011: 54. 
551 The particular importance of dam-building projects to the government is illustrated in the fact that the Dam 
Implementation Unit (DIU) was put under the direct authority of the Presidency in 1999, and augmented into a 
separate ministry in 2005 and finally into a Presidential department in 2007 by Presidential Decree No. 217. The 
head of the DIU is directly answerable to President Bashir (see Hänsch 2012: 219-20). 
552 Willis 2011: 54. 
553 Abd al-Rahim 1971: 234-5. 
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5.2.3 Teaching the State Ideology 
Sudan’s Ministry of Education, like many of its international counterparts, is “officially responsible 
for disseminating historical and cultural information”554 and it has been used by post-independence 
governments to embed the state’s Arab-Muslim ideology. In 1969, the National Conference of 
Education added overtly nationalistic aims to education policy; for example, that textbooks should 
include “national features” and that students should all master the “national language, Arabic” 
because it is a “factor of unity.”555 In the Conference on the Curriculum held at Bakht al-Rudah (the 
Institute of Education) in 1973, the importance of Arabic was once again emphasized as was 
“[r]einforcing the national unity among the people.”556 At the time, according to Hurreiz (1977), a 
number of schoolbooks published by the Ministry of Education were compiled by Abdullah al-Tayyib, 
a prominent member of the powerful Arab-Muslim Ja’aliyīn, to whom the current president and many 
Arab-Muslim elites belong.
557
 
In 1990, President Bashir and the NIF-led government instituted more educational reforms, 
influenced by leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood and Islamic teachers and administrators.
558
 The 
curriculum which was created consisted of two parts: an obligatory and an optional course. The 
elements of the obligatory course were drawn from the Quran and the hadith (sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad), and English was halted as a language of instruction.
559
 Alongside these reforms, 
membership of the Popular Defence Force (a paramilitary body allied to the NIF) became a 
requirement for university admission.
560
 
There are of course some exceptions. For example, the first principle of the 1958 ‘13-Principles 
Report of the Educational Objectives in the Sudan’ states that education should include 
“[t]ransmitting the national and international human heritage”,561 although this may be because the 
committee that drew up the report was chaired by a UNESCO staff member and at a time when the 
political system had not yet been fully decolonized. President Nimeiri’s ‘New Education Ladder’ 
allocated space for pre-Islamic and ‘Nubian’ Sudan in the syllabus, meaning that those Sudanese who 
attended school in the 1970s and 1980s had some exposure to pre-Islamic history. However, the 
current primary-level syllabus, introduced by Bashir’s hardline Islamist government and to which 
school-attending Sudanese under the age of 40 have been exposed, contains little on the pre-Islamic 
past, concentrating instead upon modules in Islam, mathematics and the natural sciences. Although 
                                                     
554 M’Bow 1992: 13. 
555 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979. 
556 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979. 
557 Also see Hofheinz 1992. 
558 Metz 1992. 
559 Metz 1992.  
560 Metz 1992. At the time, Bashir dismissed around 70 faculty members at the University of Khartoum who opposed 
his reforms. 
561 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979. 
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the ‘Comprehensive National Strategy 1991-2002’ included the directive of “[d]eveloping the 
national sense of belonging and taking care with the constituents of the Sudanese civilization”,562 the 
changes that have taken place under Bashir have resulted in the demotion of history and geography at 
the primary school level, both of which were dispersed into modules such as ‘We [the Sudanese] and 
the Islamic World’ (Year 7) and ‘We [the Sudanese] and the Contemporary World’ (Year 8). 
However, it should be noted that lack of emphasis on the past applies to all periods of history, perhaps 
relating to the state’s discursive focus on modernism and technological advancement.  
The present researcher examined the translated content of a kindergarten (rawḍa) administrative 
booklet (Appendix 8) and two primary-school history textbooks (Appendix 9). Kindergarten begins 
when children are 3-4 years old and lasts two years; the administrative booklet contains tick-boxes 
with which teachers assess a child’s progress in eight areas. The first area is ‘religious morals’, for 
which there are 14 goals for the child to attain including “1/ [The child] calls to God when he eats and 
drinks and at the start of each piece of work”; “2/ [The child] knows that God is God, knows the 
Prophet Muhammad and his book, the Quran”; “4/ [The child] exercises some dū'ā (supplications) 
and Islamic morals” and “10/ [The child] has knowledge of wūḍū (ablution).” Others are ‘social 
growth’, ‘self-growth’, ‘language’, ‘mental and cognitive skills’, ‘emotional intelligence’, ‘physical 
movement’ and ‘skills and creativity’. However, it is clear that of the eight categories, religious 
education is the most important.  
The textbook for the Year 7 module ‘We and the Islamic World’ contains one unit on the ancient 
world, including a brief mention of the Kingdom of Kush, and eight on the development of Islam and 
the Arab world. The textbook for the Year 8 module ‘We and the ancient World’ devotes only two 
brief paragraphs to ‘ancient Nubia’; most of the limited space refers to the Kingdom of Kush while 
there is only passing reference to the three Christian kingdoms that followed its demise. There is no 
mention of the word ‘Christian’; ‘Nubia’ is used only twice. ‘Kush’ may have been given space due to 
its relative neutrality; the ‘Christian kingdoms’ and their African and non-Muslim nature may have 
been the cause of their limited representation.  
The age at which children are taught about pre-Islamic history is crucial to their exposure to it. 
At present, the modules above are taught only in Years 7 and 8; however, this is a level that most rural 
children never reach. Furthermore, in the first three years of secondary school, students must choose 
either a course in ‘Humanities’, which contains modules on the past, including pre-Islamic history, or 
one in ‘Science’: a large majority of students choose Science. Relatively few Sudanese attend 
university and fewer choose to pursue archaeology. 
 
                                                     
562 Tawatheig Atrbawi 1979. 
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5.3 The Ownership of Nubian Archaeology by the Nubian Descendant Community 
Modern Nubia is divided between Egypt and Sudan, with the slightly larger section situated in the 
latter. Egyptian Nubia stretches roughly between the First to the Second Cataracts, from Aswan to the 
Sudan border, and comprises most of the Aswan Governorate. Most Egyptian Nubians were displaced 
to other parts of Aswan Governorate by the completion of the Aswan High Dam in 1970 and the 
creation of Lake Nasser. Sudanese Nubia stretches from the Egyptian border to Dongola and falls 
within Northern State. The size of the Sudanese Nubian population is hard to gauge, but could be as 
high as 750,000, excluding the significant number of Nubians living in Sudanese urban centers and 
the diaspora.
563
  
Sudanese Nubians tend to identify as members of one of four gabāīl: going from north to south, 
the Halfāwīn occupied the Nile Valley south of the Second Cataract, around the town of Wadi Halfa, 
until most of them were displaced by Lake Nasser, which reached full capacity in 1975; the Sukōt and 
Mahās occupy the Nile Valley between the Second and Third Cataracts; and the Danaglā occupy the 
region around Dongola (Figure 2, above). Most Nubians speak Nile Nubian, which comprises two 
umbrella languages, Nobiin and Dongolawi.
564
 Nobiin includes the dialects of (from north to south) 
Fadikka spoken in Egyptian Nubia, Halfaawi, spoken in Halfa, and Sukōt, spoken in Sukōt and Mahas. 
Dongolawi is spoken in Dongola and also by the Kenūz gabīla of Egyptian Nubia, who live over 
500km to the north.  
Like most other rural Sudanese, Nubians in northern Sudan are poor. Yet the Danaglā are one of 
the three most powerful groups in post-independence Sudan, the other two being the Shaygiyya and 
the Ja’aliyīn (which claim Arab-Muslim ancestry).565 The Danaglā are a prime example of what Hale 
(1973, 1979) points out is a Nubian ‘contradiction’: being marginalized by and yet successful within 
the Arab-dominated state. Indeed, many among the Halfāwīn, Sukōt and Mahās claim that the 
Danaglā are not ‘real’ Nubians, referring to them as ‘Arabized Nubians’ for having intermarried and 
politically collaborated with the Shaygiyya and the Ja’aliyīn, who are deemed to be anti-Nubian Arab 
“settlers”.566 
                                                     
563 Poeschke (1996) cites sources that suggest that in 1963 only half of all Nubians were actually living in Nubia; the 
others were living elsewhere as a result of labour migration that can be dated back to  the 19th Century (Hopkins 
and Mehanna 2010), if not the 17th Century. 
564 The language spoken in the Nūba Mountains in Southern Kordofan in south-west Sudan is known as Hill Nubian.  
565 See Wikileaks website. The relevant statement cited is in section 3C: “Members of just three tribes hold the 
balance of power in Khartoum. The ethnic Arab Ja'aliyin, Shaiqiya, and Dunqulah tribes come from the Nile valley 
north and south of Khartoum. Members of these three tribes, which account for only a small percentage of Sudan's 
total population, dominate the ruling National Congress Party (NCP), as they have previous governments…This 
long-term concentration of power is extraordinary, and it will not change in the near term.” 
566 See Hashim 2007. Interestingly, according to Edwards (2003), material culture with more blended Arab-Nubian 
characteristics seems to confirm that the area around Dongola was more ‘mixed’ than those places to the north or 
south.  
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Such fracture lines apart, Nubian gabāīl have a strong sense of shared identity.567 Unlike groups 
such as the Ja’aliyīn, Nubians do not claim Arab ancestry, even if, given the ethnic complexity of 
Sudan, some such links likely exist. Instead, most Nubians see themselves as a distinct social and 
linguistic group within a specific territory, and with a history that goes back to ‘ancient Nubia’ and 
evidenced by Sudan’s archaeological sites and by archaeologists who have formally designated the 
Sudanese as being ‘Arabized Nubians’;568 Nubians being the original, most authentic and ultimately 
first people of the Sudan from whom all others—incluing the ‘Arab’ gabāīl such as the Shagiyya and 
Ja’aliyīn—are descended.  For example Holt writes that,  
In spite…of the anxiety of the geneaologists to provide the Ja’ali group with a common Arab ancestor, 
it would be more realistic to regard the submerged Nubian sub-stratum as the common ethnic element 
among these tribes. This hypothesis does not, of course, reject the undoubted historical fact of Arab 
ancestry as such: the result of intermarriage between Arab immigrants and the older Nubian 
population.
569
 (Italics added by the author.) 
Indeed although modern Nubia is much smaller than ‘ancient Nubia’, which extended south 
beyond Khartoum (Chapter 4); Nubian nationalists claim the whole of Sudan’s Nile Valley as their 
ancestral homeland, again pointing to archaeological sites and archaeological history as confirmation 
of this fact. This connection to the ancient past is evident in Nubian theatre, literature, poetry and 
music, and widely noted in the extant literature and in interviews conducted by the present researcher 
with Nubians who live both inside and outside Nubia throughout 2013-15. If communities that 
strongly associate with archaeological history are commonly termed ‘descent’ or ‘descendant’ 
communities, and those which inhabit their claimed ancestral homeland are termed ‘indigenous 
descendant communities’ (Chapter 2), then the Nubians in Sudan are therefore seen as and claim to 
be ‘indigenous descendant communities’ and take ownership of ‘archaeology’ as their cultural and 
patrimonial ‘heritage’.  
However, the Nubian claim to a linear genealogical link with the peoples of ‘ancient Nubia’ is 
difficult to substantiate; as Edwards (2003) has pointed out, archaeology has been unable to precisely 
establish the language or ethnic ancestry of the ‘ancient Nubians’. The linguistic connections between 
‘ancient Nubia’ and modern Nubians are uncertain; groups such as those of the Kerma culture, who 
established a powerful state in the region in the third millennium BCE, spoke an Afro-Asiatic 
                                                     
567 Poeschke 1996. 
568 In Maliński’s words, the Sudanese are the result of “mixed marriages between Arab men migrating to the Middle 
Nile Valley in 9th to 16th centuries and women from local Nubian communities.” (Maliński 2014: 79). H. 
MacMichael, an administrator-historian in the Sudan Political Service under the British administration, was the 
first to use the term ‘Arabized Nubians’ (1922: 235). It was also used by Adams (1977: 557). Poeschke (1996) 
considers ‘Arab’ gabāīl such as the Shagiyya and Ja’aliyīn to be formerly Nubian-speaking but notes that they 
were Arabized 300-400 years ago. The historian Yusuf Fadl Hassan uses the term ‘Arabized Nubians’ (1967: 10). 
Trimingham (1949) uses the term ‘Semitized Hamites’. 
569  Holt 1961: 6. 
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language, as did the ‘ancient Egyptians’ and, most probably, the ‘ancient Nubians’.570  However, 
groups such as the Noba, who seem to have infiltrated Meroitic Kush from the 2
nd
 Century CE and 
may have established the kingdoms of Nobatia, Makuria and Alwa which succeeded Meroe in the 6
th
 
Century, spoke a Nilo-Saharan language distantly related to the tongues presently spoken in South 
Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Chad, Niger and Mali.
571
 This language is believed to be the pre-cursor of Old 
Nubian, in that there are written texts dating back to the 8
th
 Century CE, and thus the ancestor of 
Nobiin and Dongolawi.
572
 However, this language does not seem to have been widely spoken in 
Nubia until around 300 CE. The languages of modern Nubians are therefore unlikely to be related to 
those of ‘ancient Nubia’.573  
Moreover, any possible biological link between the peoples of ‘ancient Nubia’ and modern 
Nubians would likely have been heavily diluted by millennia of population movements, including the 
migration of the Noba and other groups into Meroitic Kush; the migration of nomadic groups into 
Nubia from Egypt and the Arabian Peninsula from the 9
th
 Century CE onwards, and especially from 
the 15
th
 Century; and, the importation of large numbers of Africans as slaves. Poeschke (1996) notes 
that Turco-Egyptian control of northern Sudan from the 16
th
 Century brought Hungarian, Bosnian, 
Kurdish and Circassian troops to the fortresses at Aswan, Qasr Ibrim and Sai Island, where they 
proceeded to intermarry with locals.
574
 In c.1500, the non-Arab Fūnj arrived from the Upper Nile and 
imposed their rule as far as the Third Cataract, adding another unquantifiable component to Nubian 
ethnicity. Modern Nubians, therefore, have a complicated ancestry which includes indigenous groups 
and immigrants from Egypt and the Mediterranean, the Red Sea coast and Arabia, the Sahara and sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Furthermore, Nubians are not even mentioned in the historical record until the 3
rd
 Century BCE, 
when the Greek scholar Eratosthenes writes of the Nubae tribe living west of the Nile,
575
 and even this 
is etymologically uncertain: the origin of the word ‘Nubia’ is uncertain though some scholars suggest 
that it stems from the ‘Noba’, who were recorded by Eratosthenes in the 3rd Century BCE as living 
west of the Nile and seem to have migrated into the Middle Nile region after the 2
nd
 Century CE “and 
ultimately filled the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Kushite state” in the 4th Century CE.576 
The ‘Noba’ spoke a Nilo-Saharan language that was the ancestor of Old Nubian and thus of the 
various present-day Nubian languages. The ancient Egyptians referred to that part of ‘ancient Nubia’, 
                                                     
570 The uncertainty stems largely from the fact that the ancient Kushite texts are largely undeciphered. 
571 Satzinger 2010.  
572 Satzinger 2010.  
573 Although the language spoken by the Hamitic Bijā of Sudan’s eastern desert may be. 
574 Also see Edwards (2003) and Hopkins and Mehanna (2010). Poeschke notes that the descendants of these soldiers 
can be identified by their surnames, such as ‘Kurdi’, but which have adopted local traditions and languages. 
Poeschke also assembles evidence from Emery (1948) who recorded that the Nubians living Qasr Ibrim in Egypt 
“spoke ‘of themselves with pride as Turks’” (1996: 23). 
575 Edwards 2004. 
576  Welsby 1996: 8. 
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from the First to the Second Cataracts, as ‘Wawat’;577 the part from the Second Cataract to modern-
day Khartoum was referred to as Kush or, more commonly, ‘wretched Kush’.578 Kush does not appear 
to be an Egyptian word but rather a name given to their land by Kushites themselves.
579
 The ancient 
Greeks and Romans knew the land as part of a much vaster region they referred to as ‘Ethiopia’.  
The ethnicity of the Kushites and their relationship to the people of the earlier Kerma culture is 
unclear. Welsby notes that artistic representations of Kushites, many of them members of the ruling 
house, show that “many had markedly negroid features and dark skins” and cites the 1st Century BCE 
Greek historian Diodorus as writing that the ‘Ethiopians’ of the Nile were “black in colour, with flat 
noses and woolly hair.”580 Welsby also notes that during the life of the Kushite state, “there was a 
gradual assimilation of peoples from the east and west into the Nile valley, most notably the Noba.”581 
Whether the Kushite language was linked to the languages spoken by the Kerma peoples is not known 
“as no inscriptions in Kerman have come to light”;582 however, scholars agree that it was not the 
precursor of Old Nubian, the ancestor of modern Nubian languages. The language was written down 
using hieroglyphs borrowed from Egypt, but used in a different way. The Meroites later developed 
their own cursive script, but their texts have not yet been fully deciphered.
583
 
According to Welsby, it is assumed that the three kingdoms that emerged from the Kushite state, 
Nobadia, Makuria and Alwa, were established by those groups, such as the ‘Noba’, who had arrived 
over a period of centuries. The size of their populations is unclear; some scholars believe that the 
‘invaders’ were essentially warrior aristocracies who came to rule over the Meroitic population. 
Edwards notes that “[d]uring this period the Meroitic language seems to have disappeared as the 
language of state,” to be replaced by varieties of Nile Nubian.584 Edwards adds, “[w]hile their origins 
still remain obscure, the dominance of Nubian languages was a key element in the creation of new 
Nubian identities, social and political.”585 
While cultural continuity over time in some form is plausible, it would be erroneous to claim, as 
do some Nubian diaspora activists, that a distinctive Nubian identity has existed since the “Nubian 
enslavement by the ancient Egyptians” and which is characterized by Nubia’s resistance against 
“Egyptian conquests, Roman conquests, Muslim and Christian reforms” and modern-day dams.586 
Even archaeologists such as Haynes (1992) and De Simone (2014) have made similar claims and 
                                                     
577 The Egyptian pharaohs used the Sudanese mines extensively; nbw is the hieroglyphic ideogram for ‘gold’. (See 
Gardiner’s sign S12 in Gardiner 1957: 546.) 
578 Smith 2003. 
579  Welsby 1996. 
580  Welsby 1996: 50. 
581  Welsby 1996: 203. 
582  Welsby 1996: 190. 
583  Welsby 1996. 
584  Edwards 2004: 182. 
585  Edwards 2004: 182. 
586 Nuraddin Abdulmannan edits the Nubia Project website on which this, and rhetoric like it, appears. See any one of 
their bulletins on the Nubia Project website. 
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written at length about the parallels between ‘ancient Nubian’ and modern Sudanese culture (see 
Appendix 10
587
); they see continuity in contemporary pottery; leather sandals; headrests; gold 
jewellery; hairstyles; shaved heads; scarification; tattooing; the habit of covering graves with white 
and/or green pebbles; stools “like those in Kerma graves”; ‘Nūba’ wrestling matches; fertility rituals; 
substances such as henna, perfumes and herbs, and ornaments used at weddings (jīrtig); and, the 
ubiquitous rope beds (angarīb) which are in turn often used in the jīrtig ceremonies (Figure 10).588 
Babiker (2010) gives other examples of supposed continuity between ‘ancient Nubian’ and modern 
Sudanese culture, including irrigation techniques and the so-called Nubian ‘Coptic Months’ by which 
the agricultural year was organised in the ancient world); iron making; weaving techniques; and, 
textiles. However, Edwards concludes that “a meaningful relationship…between these ancient 
‘Nubians’ and those of more recent times remains speculative at best.”589  
What is clear, then, is that the modern Nubian communities have a strong sense of identity that is 
largely based on their claims to the past and their ‘ownership’ of ‘Nubian’ archaeology (claims that 
are heuristic in function and motivated by a host of contemporary factors). An additional element to 
note, however, is that archaeologists have themselves (wittingly or unwittingly) strengthened and 
legitimized the Nubians’ claims not only through 1) writing exclusively ‘Nubian’ history; but also 2) 
testifying to material (read: verifiable) links between ‘ancient Nubians’ and ‘modern Nubians’. Both 
phenomena have undoubtedly led to increased international awareness and recognition of a Nubian 
people, which in turn likely served to strengthen a Nubian sense of identity.
590
 As Shinnie notes, 
“[t]he sense of history is probably most developed amongst [modern] Nubians because of the 
comparatively well-known history of their homeland from Pharaonic Egyptian times”,591 a history that 
is well-known because of archaeologists. This foregrounds an argument made in Chapter 8 (and 
which echoes those made by Meskell in Chapter 2), that the assignation of a modern ethnicity to 
ancient identities (and vice versa) via archaeology is dangerous and caution should be used when 
utilizing these terms: Nubian ownership of the past is a claim, not a fact.  
 
                                                     
587 Appendix 10.1 is an extract from Haynes (1992) given in De Simone (2014) as Annex 1 (pp. 272-3); Appendix 
10.2 is De Simone’s own Annex VII (285-6) entitled ‘Table of Nubian artifacts displayed at Sudan National 
Museum which are still in use in modern Nubian society’. 
588  Jīrtig are used to deter evil spirits and assuring reproductive safety and plenty. It is believed that those who do not 
undergo it become infertile. The colour red symbolizes fertility, so in the jīrtig ceremony, the angarīb will be 
covered in a red blanket, the bride herself will be in red, and she and her groom will have red bracelets, necklaces 
and gold ornaments. See Abusharaf 2002. 
589 Edwards 2003 51. 
590 Poeschke 1996. 
591 Shinnie 1981: 29. 
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Figure 10. Jīrtig (left) and Angarīb (right). (Source: photograph by the author, Feb. 2015). 
 
Nubian identity has been greatly impacted by the shared experience of ‘victimhood’ in the wake 
of the construction of Nile dams that have displaced Nubian communities and threatened others.
592
 
The most important of these is the Aswan High Dam, completed in 1970, which was built in Egypt’s 
interest to store water for irrigation, generate electricity and prevent floods and droughts by equalizing 
the otherwise cyclical flow of the Nile.
593
 Lake Nasser reached full capacity in 1975 and stretches for 
400km south from Aswan. 
594
 The lake flooded most of Egyptian Nubia and almost one-quarter of 
Sudanese Nubia, displacing c.50,000 people from the former and c.80,000 people from the latter.
595
 
Before the beginning of construction of the Aswan High Dam in 1960, a UNESCO appeal led to 
the International Campaign to Save the Monuments of Nubia, which lasted until 1980. Around 22 
important archaeological monuments, including the Ptolemaic temple of Philae and the Temple of 
Abu Simbel built by Rameses II (19
th
 Dynasty, 1279-1212 BCE), were saved by being moved to the 
                                                     
592  Poeschke 1996; Hopkins and Mehanna 2010.  
593  Waterbury 1979. 
594  Hopkins and Mehanna 2010. 
595  Most Egyptian Nubians were moved to new settlements 45km downstream from Aswan, an area dubbed ‘New 
Nubia’, where they were provided with irrigated land. Sudanese Nubians were moved from the old town of Wadi 
Halfa and its surroundings; some to New Wadi Halfa, on the shores of Lake Nasser. However, some 60,000 people 
were moved 800km south-east to Kassala State, where they were resettled in planned villages on the New Halfa 
Agricultural Development Scheme. Each household received a tenancy, but the land, though irrigated, was 
generally poor and yields were low and variable. By 1978-79, incomes were so low that 80% of the households 
would have been living below the official poverty line without additional sources of income, including mostly paid 
labour (World Bank1980). The hardship faced in New Halfa added to the deep sense of grievance felt among many 
Nubians over being uprooted. See Kennedy 1977, 2005. 
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shores of Lake Nasser or donated to countries that financially assisted the rescue work. But hundreds 
of sites, including the important fortress of Buhen (12
th
 Dynasty, 1860 BCE), were flooded. Few 
Kushite archaeological remains were saved, fuelling sentiment among many Nubians that their 
cultural heritage was being deliberately targeted.  
The plans to build the Dal and Kajbar dams have provoked outrage among Sudan’s Nubian 
communities as well as in the diaspora,
596
 whose homes and archaeological sites are threatened with 
submergence. If built, the Dal dam will displace 5,000-10,000 people while the Kajbar dam will 
displace over 10,000 people and submerge 90 villages and around 500 archaeological sites. Popular 
protests against the two dams have been violently suppressed by the Sudanese authorities; in 2007, 
four anti-Kajbar protesters were killed and 20 injured.
597
 For many Nubians, the uprooting of their 
communities and the submergence of archaeological sites which they regard as their heritage are part 
of an ongoing campaign to erase their culture, tantamount to a form of cultural genocide. The 
campaign also strengthened ties between Nubian communities in Sudan and the Nubian diaspora, 
which also came to regard the archaeological sites as their own ancestral heritage.
598
 Nubian diaspora 
activists,
599
 many of whom were born abroad and do not speak Nubian, have been very supportive of 
their home communities and have been amongst the most vocal in condemning the loss through dam 
building of what they call their “archaeological heritage”,600 a phenomenon described by Poeschke as 
a “reactionary coping mechanism under threat”.601  
Dam-building has thus helped cement Nubian identity and foster Nubian nationalism. The 
Nubians are suspected by both the Egyptian and Sudanese governments of harbouring separatist 
ambitions. The Nubian flag is sometimes seen in Nubian villages (Figure 11) and in the Sudanese 
diaspora; there is rhetoric of Egyptian and Sudanese Nubians uniting in a Nubian nation-state and that 
accords have already been signed to this effect.
602
 Indeed, while most stakeholders understand ‘Nubia’ 
as the regions in Egypt and Sudan inhabited by modern Nubian communities, it is significant that 
neither Egypt nor Sudan use the term ‘Nubia’ to identify a political or administrative entity; perhaps 
to decline legitimacy for Nubian demands for autonomy or even independence. In this vein, Nubian 
languages are not taught in schools. Indeed, as their claims to a connection with the ancient past 
clashes with state ideology, Nubians have become both a ‘dissent’ and ‘descent’ community, and thus 
subject to repression by the Sudanese and Egyptian states. 
 
                                                     
596  See the Save Nubia website, run by Manu Ampim and others; see also Gamal 1998. 
597 D. Morrison, ‘Four Killed over Nile Dam Project that Threatens Nubian Towns’, National Geographic News, 15 
June 2007. 
598 Poeschke 1996: 26; Adams 1977. 
599 ‘Diaspora-activist’ describes a member of a specific group who lives abroad but actively campaigns on 
problematic issues on behalf of their compatriots. 
600 Scheffer 2003. 
601 Poeshke 1996. 
602  Interview with Ali Askouri, August 2013. Also see Askouri 2004a, 2004b and 2008. 
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Figure 11. Nubian flags painted on houses in Mahas near the Third Cataract. (Source: photograph kindly lent by 
Prof. Nicholas Hopkins, October 2013) 
 
In sum, Nubians are an ‘indigenous descendant community’ given the common sense in the 
community of a strong ancestral connection with ‘ancient Nubia’. Even though the modern Nubians’ 
claim to descent from ‘ancient Nubians’ is strongly contested, the idea has nonetheless been 
encouraged by the culture of archaeology in Sudan, which has generated a wealth of information 
about ‘ancient Nubia’ and significantly less about Islamic Sudan. In the eyes of many Nubians, 
archaeologists have provided scientific evidence of their longstanding presence on their land; their 
‘right’ to that land; and, for some, even a ‘right’ to statehood; rights that are seen by the Sudanese 
state as a threat to national unity and political stability. The Nubians’ sense of identity has also been 
strengthened by what they see as the Sudanese state’s attempt to extinguish their ‘heritage’ via dam 
construction, displacing them from their homes and forcing them to settle in other areas. Alongside 
the excavation of ancient Nubian sites in Sudan, this has assisted the emergence and consolidation of 
a Nubian identity that is widely recognized and accepted by others (as discussed by Lane (2011), 
Chapter 2). Thus, as Hopkins and Mehanna (2010) put it, archaeological history in Sudan is a ‘people-
making’ history. 
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5.4 The Irrelevance of Nubian Archaeology to a Non-Descendant Community 
In sharp contrast to the ownership of Nubian archaeology by Sudan’s Nubian populations, a claim to 
be connected to ‘ancient Nubia’ does not appear to be common among most of Sudan’s other gabāīl, 
including those who live on and around the many ancient Nubian archaeological sites; these groups 
may thus broadly be termed ‘indigenous non-descendant communities’. To illuminate the relationship 
between Nubian archaeology and indigneous non-descendant communities in Sudan, the present 
researcher conducted a case-study of the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya gabāīl living in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya, who, while living amidst celebrated ‘Nubian’ archaeological sites in the Nile 
Valley, claim Arab-Muslim descent.     
 
5.4.1 Archaeology in the Case-Study Area 
To archaeologists, the case-study area is one of the most important archaeological locations in Sudan. 
Situated within a vast archaeological landscape to the north-east of Khartoum, it is enclosed by the 
Nile, Blue Nile and Atbara rivers. It has been dubbed part of the ‘Island of Meroe’ by scholars and 
was in 2011 designated as one of Sudan’s two UNESCO World Heritage sites.603 There are two 
archaeological sites in the case-study area: Domat al-Hamadab in Hamadab and Meroe in Bejrawiya. 
Both date predominantly to the second, Meroitic, phase of the Kingdom of Kush (350 BCE-350 CE). 
Although not a royal residence, Domat al-Hamadab (Figure 12) has relinquished some important finds, 
such as the so-called Hamadab Stelae, which was found by Garstang in 1914 and attests to the 
Meroites’ unique written language.604 The site was also one of a chain of Meroitic-Kushite settlements 
with religious significance: these settlements all lie on the east bank of the Nile, are of similar size 
(15-20ha) and spaced roughly 15km-20km apart.
605
 Findings such as these have changed how 
archaeologists see settlement in Meroitic Kush, demonstrating denser settlement in this area (ancient 
‘Upper Nubia’) than previously thought.606 
                                                     
603 The full name for the site is the ‘Archaeological Sites of the Island of Meroe’. As noted by Welsby and Ahmed, 
the first known mention of Meroe was in the 5th Century BCE, when “…Herodotus was informed while on a visit 
to Egypt of a fabled city of the Ethiopians, ‘the burnt faced ones,’ lying far to the south (II,29)…Referred to in the 
Graeco-Roman world as Meroe, its Kushite name was variously spelt Bedewi, Medewi, and Bedewe” (Welsby and 
Ahmed 2010: 34; also see Török 2014). 
604 Garstang writes of the discovery: “One other site was examined, an isolated mound lying some two or three 
kilometres to the south, not far from the village of Hamadab. We were led to this spot by results of our casual 
examinations in previous years, and of some intelligent experiments made by one of our Arab foremen…the most 
immediate result was the discovery of two giant stelae, inscribed in Meroitic cursive characters, both apparently 
historical narratives” (Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914). Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997. 
605 Baud 2008. 
606 Edwards 1989; Edwards 2004. 
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Meroe (Figure 13) was the capital of Meroitic Kush,
607
 housing the main royal residence and 
acting as an important administrative hub and religious centre. Meroe consists of ruined sandstone 
temples and palaces as well as features such as the so-called Royal Baths, which enjoy particular fame 
amongst archaeologists given the ‘Hellenistic’ style adopted in crafting the interior sculptural 
decoration.
608
 The discovery of a bronze head of Augustus Caesar in 1910 underneath the threshold of 
Meroe’s Temple of Victory also sparked interest in the otherwise little known wars between Meroitic 
Kush and Roman Egypt in the late 1
st
 Century BCE.
609
 Although most central to village life, Domat 
al-Hamadab and Meroe are not the only sites in the area (Chapter 3). Moving eastwards, one 
encounters the Apedemak Temple, the Sun Temple, and next to it, the reservoir (hafir). Ancient 
mounds of iron slag as well as spoil heaps generated by archaeologists characterize the landscape here. 
Finally, three sets of monumental pyramids, the burial grounds of the Kushite-Meroitic rulers, lie 
some 4-5km to the east of the case-study area; as such, this part of the ‘Island of Meroe’ can be 
charaterized as an interconnected archaeological landscape.  
Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe have been under periodic investigation by explorers and 
archaeologists for the past 100 years. Published accounts about Meroe include those written by Bruce 
and Shaw (1782
610
), Burckhardt (1813), Cailliaud (1826
611
), Hoskins (1835), Ferlini (in the 1830s, 
also noted in Budge 1907), Crowfoot (1911), Garstang, Sayce and Griffith (1911), Garstang, Phytian 
and Sayce (1914), Reisner (1918, 1923), Crawford (1953), Dunham (1957, 1963) and Arkell (1961). 
Shinnie began work at Meroe with the University of Ghana in the 1960s and returned throughout the 
1970s as Project Director of the multi-national University of Calgary-University of Khartoum team, 
and led their last excavation season at Meroe in 1983-4.
612
 A brief Sudanese-German expedition 
arrived in 1992 and then again in 2002.
613
 Thereafter, excavations at Meroe were renewed by the 
Royal Ontario Museum and University of Khartoum, which ran from 2002 to 2004 and again in 
2007,
614
 and by the German Archaeological Institute (DAI), which has been investigating the Royal 
Baths since 1999. The University of Khartoum has also spent numerous seasons there running 
fieldschools and conducting excavations.  
At Domat al-Hamadab, the early work of Garstang in the early 1900s was resumed in 2001 by a 
mission from the DAI in collaboration with the University of Shendi and, since 2013, with the Qatar-
                                                     
607 Welsby 1996. 
608 S. Wolf and Onasch 2003; S. Wolf et al. 2008. 
609 Török 2009. The head seems to have been rendered in the Prima Porta type that was typical of the 1st Century 
BCE. See Walker 1995 for additional stylistic analyses. 
610 Bruce 1790. 
611 Cailliaud 1826. 
612 Shinnie 1967, 1984; Shinnie and Bradley 1980; Shinnie and Anderson 2004. 
613 Hinkel and Sievertsen 2002. 
614 The project co-directors, Grzymski and Osman, were both students of Shinnie. The 2002 and 2003 seasons are 
published in Grzymski 2003; the January to March 2004 season in Grzymski 2005; the November to December 
2007 season in Grzymski and Grzymska 2008. 
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Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP).
615
 Both Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe are also being 
investigated by UCLQ, whose team has been studying the development of metallurgy since 2012.
616
 
Both sites contain evidence of a significant iron smelting industry from the Meroitic period; the 
mounds of iron slag that litter the landscape have earned Meroe the nickname of “the Birmingham of 
Africa.”617 
Located at the centre of agricultural and residential spaces, both sites take up great space. 
However, one key difference is that while many of Meroe’s ancient buildings and townscape are not 
only exposed but still standing and may be traversed, Domat al-Hamadab is a mound that is 
seasonally excavated and backfilled. This raises the question of whether the larger, more conspicuous 
and thus more ‘busy’ archaeological sites have a greater phenomenological effect upon site-
communities. Certainly, such a hypothesis may be reasonably posited since conspicuous sites have 
historically attracted more archaeological attention. However, as Shankland notes, even if residents 
“have absolutely no idea of the existence of the site they may have developed different and perhaps 
complex ways of integrating the same material remains into their own conceptions of history.”618 
 
                                                     
615 P. Wolf et al. 2008; P. Wolf et al. 2014. 
616 Humphris 2014; Humphris and Carey 2016.  
617 Sayce 1912: 55. 
618  Shankland 1999: 140. 
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Figure 12. Domat al-Hamadab. Top: the site as seen from above (Source: Google Earth, 2016); bottom left: 
Domat al-Hamadab’s upper town (top) and suburbs (bottom) on the North Mound (Source: P. Wolf 2014: 105, 
Fig. 2); bottom right: an active excavation trench in the North Mound (Source: author’s photograph, Feb. 2015). 
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Figure 13. Meroe. Top: the site as seen from above (Source: Google Earth, 2016); bottom left: Meroe and the 
Bejrawiya pyramids (Source: Edwards 2004: 146, Fig. 6.2); bottom right: rams statues lining the Amun 
Temple’s processional way (Source: author’s photograph, Feb. 2015). 
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5.4.2 Disconnections from Archaeology 
5.4.2.1 Language 
To examine the impact of archaeology on the ‘non-descendant’ site-community of Hamadab-
Bejrawiya, the present researcher collected data on how Ja’alī farmers, Mansūrī and Hassanī 
pastoralists as well as the Fadnī semi-pastoralists view archaeology. As mentioned in Chapter 3, 
Sacks et al.’s (1995) linguistic analyses involved coding, lexical searches, looking for in vivo codes 
for single words such as ‘archaeology’, ‘heritage’, ‘culture’, ‘archaeologists’, the ‘sites’ and so on. An 
immediate finding from interviews and conversations with the Ja’aliyīn was that Western terms 
associated with the archaeological endeavour were largely absent from local discourse. It could be 
that one fundamental reason for this is the absence of a direct Arabic word for ‘archaeology’; the 
closest Arabic word for ‘archaeological sites’ or ‘materials’ is ‘antiquities’ (’athār), and the closest 
phrase to ‘archaeology’ (the discipline) is“science of antiquities” ('ilm al-’athār). Of note, the state 
body responsible for archaeology in Sudan is called the National Corporation for Antiquities and 
Museums (NCAM). Of course these concepts are not wholly dissimilar; ‘antiquities’ is not very far, 
conceptually, from ‘archaeological sites’. ‘Antiquities’, as old or ancient materials, are part of the 
jigsaw of the archaeological endeavour, and both terms share a connotative reference to the actual 
words used by residents to describe the sites: a “thing” (hāja) from some time that is “old” (gadīm/a) 
or “from the past” (min zamān; or min ba'īdā, lit. ‘from far away’). However, most respondents did 
not use the word ‘athār in interviews and conversations with the present researcher. Therefore, since 
no hybrid word for ‘archaeology’ has emerged (unlike ‘geophysics’ (geophysia) or ‘anthropology’ 
(anthropologia), it clearly functions as a limited concept in the case-study area—neither quite what 
archaeologists think of as ‘archaeology’ nor quite what the Sudanese think of as ‘antiquities’. There 
was also a noticeable absence in local discourse about archaeology of the words ‘culture’ (thagafa) 
and ‘heritage’ (turāth), with even fewer respondents ever speaking about their ‘identity’ (hawiyya), 
‘civilization’ (haḍara), ‘ancient monuments’ (ma'alīn qadīma), ‘restoration’ (tarmīm), ‘conservation’ 
(himāya), ‘artefacts’ (mathūrāt) or ‘art’ (fann). Instead, one UCLQ employee, when asked if he had 
learned any new words from his interactions with the archaeologists, replied, “Yes, I’ve learned 
‘come’, ‘brush’, ‘quickly’, ‘no’ and ‘yes’.” The word used most frequently in conversations with both 
farmers and pastoralists, then, was not ‘archaeology’ or even ‘antiquities’ but something more 
personal: ‘history’ (tarīkh) (see below).  
The present researcher also investigated how the members of the site-communities specifically 
referred to the sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe, which, by default also shows how they refer to 
archaeologists. Place-names in Sudan are highly significant and can refer simultaneously to a people, 
language, notable features of the landscape and even, subtly, to a way of life (Chapter 4). Indeed, 
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elsewhere, a number of archaeological sites seem to be named ‘Hōsh el-Khwāja’ or ‘Hōsh al-Kafir’ 
(the latter is a Meroitic site 15km north of Hamadab; there is also a Hōsh al-Kafir near Hobagi, a 
Ja’alī village on the west bank of the Nile). A Sudanese colleague offered the explanation that the 
hōsh is recognised to be something from the deep past and will therefore be known to “be of interest 
to the kafir, or even made by the kāfīr (lit. ‘infidel’).”619 While the present researcher has not heard 
archaeologists referred to as kafir, they are occasionally referred to as duktūr/a; very rarely are they 
referred to as ‘archaeologists’ (ʿūlāma al-'athār, lit. ‘scholars of antiquities’). By and large, however, 
archaeologists are simply ‘khwāja’ or ‘khwajāt’.620 Indeed, if the archaeologists were known, their 
compounds were individually referred to as ‘bayt khwajāt’, those who know the Ja’alī owners of the 
compounds refer to them by the latter’s names; UCLQ’s compound is owned by one of the village 
patriarchs, Mohammed Hassan al-Shaykh Kuku, and thus referred to as ‘bayt Mohammed Kuku’. 
In interviews and conversations with the Ja’aliyīn, the few respondents who had worked on the 
sites as employees sometimes referred to Meroe as “the Royal City” (al-madīna al-mālikīyya), the 
name that appears on a sign at the site entrance (Figure 14); other, older Ja’aliyīn referred to the Late 
Meroitic temple, Building M750, as the “prison” (sijin)621 and the altar as the “church” (kenisa), from 
the way the exposed buildings look.
622
 Young men and women referred to a location near the altar in 
the middle temple on the main road as the “slaughterhouse” (salakhāna). Only Mariam al-Pasha noted 
that Bejrawiya received its name from a past king, known as Bedjir, who had built Meroe and the 
pyramids. However, most respondents referred to Meroe vaguely as the “area” (muntiga) or “station” 
(muwgīf) of antiquities. Something almost mechanical is implied in this name; the word muwgīf is 
most often used for a place at which vehicles stop, and is thus used to describe car parks (muwgīf al-
'arabiyya), bus stations (muwgīf al-hāfilāt) and taxi ranks (muwgīf al-taksī). The reference is as much 
to Meroe’s location, along one of the main thoroughfares, as for its monumental archaeological 
remains. These findings offer insights into how the Ja’aliyīn view Meroe as part of the landscape 
which, essentially, is that it  recognized to be a meaningful (if utilitarian) part of the landscape but 
independently of its designation as an ancient ‘Nubian’ archaeological site. 
 
                                                     
619 Conversation with University of Shendi archaeology lecturer, 2015. The Director of the ed-Damer Museum and 
the Director of Tourism for River Nile State were conducting fieldwork here at the time of writing. 
620  Christie (1946), Mallowan (1977) and many other archaeologists have also noted being called this. 
621 Grzymski (2005) notes that this may be connected to the fact that Garstang himself had noted that the building 
looked very geometric and that the small square rooms were like cells. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997. 
622 The local reference to the altar as the ‘church’ is also recorded in Garstang, Phytian and Sayce (1914: 57 (under 
the section, ‘A preliminary note on an expedition to Meroe in Ethiopia’)). Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 
1997. 
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Figure 14. The entrance to Meroe as seen from the east. The sign reads, “al-Madīna al-Mālikīyya”, The Royal 
City. (Source: author’s photograph, Feb. 2015) 
 
Domat al-Hamadab, located farther away from the villages, and with no standing buildings above 
the ground level, is less well known to locals than Meroe. Even in Hamadab, the only terms the 
present researcher heard the Ja’aliyīn use to describe it were “mound” (gōz or kom; akin to ‘tell’ in the 
Middle East). Hamza al-Ja’ali referred to it as the “castle” (gasūr), “because it is very high.” The 
name Domat al-Hamadab (Figure 15) recalls neither its Meroitic-Kushite origins nor its elite status in 
‘Ancient Nubia’. Instead, it refers to the nearby village (Hamadab) and the dom-palm trees (hyphaene 
thebaica) that scatter the site. Who chose the name is not clear (despite the author’s attempts to find 
out!), but it seems to relate to the first name of the area, which was Domat al-Kharbana “the ruined 
doma [tree]”, referring to the Ja’aliyīn’s settlement history (below). The naming of the site after a tree 
species is wholly in keeping with the “strong relationship between beliefs of the local people in the 
importance of traditional use and the availability of such trees in the area”;623 the dom-palm is, like 
many other trees in Sudan, deeply symbolic
624
 and associated with specific prosperity and peopleas 
well as devils (shayātīn s. shaytān) and spirits (jinn, zayrān).625  Indeed, Adil Moukib, a Ja’alī tenant 
farmer whose field is near the South Mound said that jinn live in the tundoop and lalob trees there.
626
 
But the name of the archaeological site also suggests an overt claim of ownership by the Hamadab 
                                                     
623 Taha et al. 2014: 48-9.  
624 The celebrated Sudanese author Tayeb Salih often referred to popular Islamic beliefs in his writing, one example 
of which is entitled ‘The Dom Tree of Wad Hamid’ (see Nasr 1980).  
625 Taha et al. 2014: 50. 
626 Adil even advised the green-fingered translator of the present researcher not to plant a dom-tree by the UCL Qatar 
dig-house because of the jinn, citing evidence that every household that had done so had later been abandoned. 
Apparently Tamarindus indica, Prosopis juliflora, and Ziziphus spina-christi (sidir) trees are also associated with 
jinn (Taha et al. 2014: 50). 
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family of the Ja’aliyīn, who are named after the village’s founder, Hamad (see below). As such, the 
naming of the site seems to have far more significance when seen as part of the Ja’alī claim to the 
land rather than specific recognition of the site as part of ancient ‘Nubia’. 
 
 
Figure 15. The sign for Domat al-Hamadab, as seen from the approach to the South Mound (Source: author’s 
photograph, Feb. 2015). 
 
The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and the Fadniyya semi-pastoralists used different 
terminology for Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe. The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, who live only a few 
hundred metres from Meroe and use it for grazing, do not see it as an archaeological site. The 
pastoralists described Domat al-Hamadab with reference to the village of Hamadab and Meroe with 
reference to the acacia trees (“the place in the acacia”, see Chapter 7) or with reference to the 
archaeologists (khwajāt). It was clear that female members of the pastoral groups used none of the 
Ja’alī terminology at all: neither athâr nor muwgīf, and certainly not al-madīna al-mālikīyya; perhaps 
because of their lesser exposure to the archaeologists or the archaeological sites. Indeed there seems 
to be a deeper misunderstanding of ‘archaeology’ by pastoalists than farmers: the author was 
frequently told that the archaeologists come to Sudan to “look for gold” or to “dig up their ancestors”. 
627
 Outside the case-study area, even the small new settlement of Wadi Tarabil (lit. ‘wadi of the 
                                                     
627 The idea is not irrational: there are many battle sites in the area, such as Abu Telih (also known to the British as 
Abu Klea) on the west bank of the Nile, which was the location of a battle between the Anglo-Egyptian and 
Mahdist forces in 1885. 
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pyramids’), near which some of the pastoralists live, is not overtly connected to the ancient ‘Nubian’ 
monuments after which it was named.  
However, perhaps due to their size, the pyramids do incite more explanations than Domat al-
Hamadab or Meroe; although the explanations are still not connected to Nubian archaeology proper. 
One common explanation from respondents from all communities was that the pyramids were 
constructed by the “Anaj”, a semi-mythical people from the Gezira and the south-east, because they 
were “tall”; as Ali al-Hassani explained, “You couldn’t make the pyramids with scaffolding, even 
now.”628 The myth of the Anaj seems strong in the lands in which they had power, even centuries later; 
semantic usage suggests that although the designation ‘Anaj’ is not always scientifically constituted, it 
is nevertheless given as an explanation for many pre-Islamic and ultimately unknown phenomena. 
* 
In sum, almost all respondents displayed a high level of linguistic and conceptual disconnection from 
Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe as archaeological sites and with archaeology in general, regardless of 
age, gender, livelihood and gabīla. In addition to the obvious linguistic and conceptual barriers, other 
reasons for the absence of archaeological terminology from local discourse include an educational 
syllabus that is almost devoid of ‘ancient Nubian’ history and the lack of educational outreach by 
archaeologists in the case-study area, despite their long-term presence (see Chapter 8). Even so, the 
dissonance between the archaeologists’ and the site-community residents’ concept of archaeology, 
and of the meaning of the archaeological sites, was striking.  
  
5.4.2.2 Antiquities  
Among others, Meskell (1999, 2002, 2005b) and Hodder (2012) have theorized the fundamentally 
‘enmeshed’ or ‘entangled’ relationship between humans and objects, whereby material culture does 
not only construct and express identity but also constitutes part of the experience of ‘being in the 
world’ and negotiating one’s place within it. 629 Thus, to examine the relationship between residents 
of Hamadab and Bejrawiya and the archaeological ‘antiquities’ that surround them, the present 
                                                     
628 Scholars posit that the Anaj were a people who lived far to the south-east of the case-study area, and whose little-
known kingdom was overrun by the Fūnj Sultanate of Sennar in the early 1500s. Musa (2010) records that oral 
tradition in the Gezira and in the east portrays the Anaj as being “extremely tall, well built warriors, skilled in 
riding horses and camels” and to whom many people attributed things of ancient age. The Anaj are alternatively 
referred to as ‘Hamage’, which Musa records were the nephews of the defeated Anaj absorbed into the Fūnj 
administration. In a similar account, Holt (1961) records that the successors of the Fūnj Sultan Badi IV Abu 
Shulukh, who ruled from 1724 to 1762 and was overthrown in a rebellion by Fūnj aristocrats, became the puppets 
of powerful hereditary viziers drawn from the Hamaj, a group that probably consisted of Arabized and Islamized 
members of the non-Arab pre-Fūnj population. These viziers ran the declining Sultanate until its total collapse in 
the face of the Turco-Egyptian invasion in 1821. These narratives echo what Rodriguez was told about giants 
building the mounds in Yucatán (see Rodriguez 2006: 165). 
629 Also see Lane 2006 for an examination of household assemblages in Mali. 
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researcher asked respondents to show examples of their own ‘antiquities’. Significantly, few referred 
to the nearby archaeological sites and none to their official ‘ancient Nubian’ character.  
Two of the most common items shown by Ja’alī respondents and some of the older Fadniyya 
respondents was their family’s wooden plough (mihrāth) and waterwheel (sagiyya), both of which 
represent a clear historical and material link with the past and to their livelihoods. In response to a 
question about the Ja’aliyīn’s traditional crafts, Hamza al-Ja’ali replied:  
There were not crafts, exactly, but skills around them…these crafts of hats [tagiya], handkerchiefs 
[manadīl], ceramics [fukhâr], water containers [azyār s. zīr]…[But mostly], all the things to do with the 
sagiyya. They also manufacture sagiyya here. We were sagiyya specialists.  
Some Ja’alī respondents directed the present researcher to their mechanized pumps (modern 
sagiyya) and older pumps if they were of British manufacture; others to sources of water such as jugs 
used for ablution and toilette (abārîg pl. ibrîg) in their clay form. Most importantly, in Hamadab, the 
source of water was the Well of Wagy Al’a630 (Figure 16) and in Bejrawiya South, this was the Well 
of Osman al-Fajaali. Both wells are said to be linked directly to the Nile, and have been named after 
the men who dug them (see below). Although the wells are now non-functioning, the water is 
described as having been ‘sweet’ (meaning ‘clean’, nadif), and it was emphasized that all houses in 
this area were made using the wells’ water. In Bejrawiya South, Amna Suliman was also keen to 
show the present author an old acacia tree with extensive branches, under which they said they eat 
corn and congregate during winter. Pre-prepared adzuki beans (balīla; a bean dish eaten to break fast 
at Ramadan) were also offered as an example of their culinary traditions. 
                                                     
630 The official story of Wagy Al’a narrates that when, at the beginning of construction, work was stopped by some 
rocks blocking the well shaft, women brought sacks [būrma] full of simīn [milk whey], poured it over the rocks 
and lit a match: the blockage broke. Two halves of a big rock, said to be the original, now lie next to the well. The 
date of this sign is quietly debated by the Ja’aliyīn intelligentsia and ranges from 1707 [on the sign] to the Turco-
Egyptian period in the 1860s [in conversation]. This story and the debate about the date is also recorded in 
Weschenfelder (2014). 
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Figure 16. The Well of Wagy Al’a in Hamadab. The sign reads: “Wagy Al’a Well al-Hamadab; It was dug in 
1707 [CE] and is attributed to Wagy Al’a Suliman Zeyd Arman Hassan Hamad Abdalbagi Bedawi Abdalbagi.” 
The sign was made by Osman Ahmed Suleiman Waqi-Allah Hamid Hamad.” (Source: author’s photograph, Feb. 
2015.) 
 
The ‘antiquities’ presented by the newer Fadniyya semi-pastoralists and the Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya pastoralists included their goat skin water sacks (girba); smaller animal-skin sacks used to 
make yoghurt and butter (sazin); and, gourds to keep butter in (gara‘), which hang from the beams of 
the roofs of their tents (hajīr); when hung in the shade, the contents are cooled. Camel saddles, 
cowbells, swords, pieces of gold from the mines, hijab necklaces (leather pouches with Quranic 
verses in them that serve the symbolic purpose of the head-covering hijab and which are often worn 
by pastoralist women who cannot do manual work in a covered dress), and shells (wadi‘) used by 
women to predict the future, were also presented as ‘antiquities’. Most respondents greatly desired to 
show the present author a number of wells in the hinterland that they value (regrettably, visits could 
not be arranged); Ali al-Hassani, for example, wanted to show a well nearby that had the depth of 
“fifty-five men” (see below), and Nasir Muawad, who still spends up to half his year in the hinterland, 
desired to show the grass called ghrabash, which “stays” for one year and “even after it has grown, it 
just keeps growing.” He said this as he noted that every snake and insect hides in the shade of the 
grass, and that when the goats, sheep and camels come to graze, the snakes bite them and they die.  
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* 
Clearly, the material culture that is important to the residents, and which they displayed to the present 
author: the water-lifting devices, wells, cowbells, saddles and so on, relates predominantly to their 
livelihoods as farmers and pastoralists. The contexts in which the Ja’alī farmers displayed their 
‘antiquities’ suggests that they may have on some level symbolised a claim to authenticity and 
connection to the land in the present; for the Fadniyya, Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, their 
displays appeared to show far more nostalgia for the past.  
The displays of ‘antiquities’ are a further demonstration of the disconnection of the site-
communities from ‘ancient Nubia’. Even the cultural phenomena which Haynes (1992) and De 
Simone (2014) posit derive from the ‘ancient Nubian’ past (the jīrtig, angarîb) and have been 
incorporated into the culture of the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya are not recognized as 
such; when respondents were asked to explain their origin, they either claimed not to know or told 
stories about a time or a person located in their own histories. 
 
5.4.2.3 Histories 
To establish whether the site-communities sensed a historical link to the ancient peoples amid whose 
remains they lived, the present researcher asked senior members of the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya 
and Fadniyya to recount their own gabīla’s history. The purpose of this was to establish whether the 
respondents would, unprompted, make any reference to ‘ancient Nubia’ or the sites which arguably 
evidence its existence. A loose version of Brooks’ (2012) narrative analysis and Fairclough’s (2003) 
discourse analysis has been used here. 
A number of histories have been written about Sudan’s main gabāīl, all with shortcomings (e.g. 
MacMichael 1922). Thus, the oral histories (tarīkh shifâhī) gathered and presented here by this author 
are of interest in their own right. Oral histories are defined here as cultural as well as historical 
memories and knowledge transmitted from one generation to another in spoken stories, songs and 
other mediums.
631
 The oral histories were recounted to the present researcher in interviews and 
informal conversations principally with older respondents, who were much more aware of their 
communities’ histories, genealogies, land ownership, past livelihoods and claims over resources than 
the younger respondents. Many of the latter said that they “did not know anything” about their history 
and referred the present researcher to their elders (termed “grandparents”). As in many parts of the 
world, this tendency was bemoaned by the elderly, who asserted that the younger generation is “not 
interested in history.” 
                                                     
631 Leavey 2011. 
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The present researcher was thus regularly referred to older people regarded as keepers of the 
communities’ histories. While this role is still alive, the number of people who possess this 
information is declining; oral traditions have clearly diminished among the communities in the case-
study area, as they have elsewhere across the globe.
632
 Indeed, Hurreiz (1977) as well as Al-Shahi and 
Moore (1978), who carried out ethnographic fieldwork among the Ja’aliyīn of the Shendi Reach and 
the Shaygiyya of the Fourth Cataract respectively, describe scenes in which an elder tells stories with 
dramatic intensity to an enraptured audience. Yet, the present researcher never encountered such 
story-telling in the case-study area or elsewhere in Sudan. The causes of the decline of oral tradition 
are many and include increasing literacy, use of mobile technologies and the growing accessibility of 
radio and television. Nevertheless, it is still possible to find and hear the histories of different groups, 
be them “…clans, lineages or craft specialists”, and highlights the extent to which it is “…necessary 
to think in terms of multiple histories rather than history.”633   
Broadly speaking, the main Ja’alī respondent, Hamza al-Ja’ali, narrated the history of the Ja’alī 
farmers with a focus upon the gabīla’s ancestral links to the land. Medowi al-Mansūrī, the main 
Manāsīr respondent, Ali al-Hassani, the main Hassaniyya respondent, and Mohammed al-Fadni, the 
main Fadniyya respondent, all characterized their history with narratives about leaving their ancestral 
homelands, arriving in this new place and losing livelihoods in the process. The material gathered 
from the interviews has been synthesised with extant literature to clarify the meaning and significance 
of the references that were made. This task has been easier with reference to the dominant Ja’aliyīn, 
about whom more has been written and from whom it was easier to get a coherent chronological 
narrative.  
The Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya in the case-study area all claim Arab-Muslim 
ancestry, which may be one reason for why Sudanese and Western scholars alike oftentimes conflate 
these groups; MacMichael (1922) and Maliński (2014), following the Ja’alī historian Ibrahim (1988), 
subsume the Manāsīr under the heading of ‘Greater’ Ja’aliyīn and the Ja’aliyīn of the Shendi Reach 
the Ja’aliyīn ‘proper’. However, the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya of Hamadab and 
Bejrawiya made it very clear to the present researcher that they see themselves as separate groups.  
 
5.4.2.3.1 The Hamadab-Ja’aliyīn in Hamadab 
Hamza al-Ja’ali traces the ancestry of the Ja’aliyīn to al-‘Abbas ibn ‘Abd al-Muttalib,634 the uncle of 
Prophet Muhammad and a member of the Quraysh gabīla, through a semi-mythical character, Ibrahim 
Ibn Idris, commonly known as Ibrahim Ja’al (from whom the Ja’aliyīn take their name). According to 
                                                     
632 For a case-study example in Iraqi Kurdistan, see Allison 2001. 
633    Reid and Lane 2003: 10. 
634  Abbas (568-653 CE) was a paternal uncle of Prophet Muhammad. His descendants founded the Abbasid Caliphate 
in 750 CE. 
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Hamza, Ja’al migrated at an “early” date from modern-day Iraq to Bara, some 200km south-west of 
modern Khartoum, in what is now the state of North Kordofan. Hamza further narrated how the 
nickname ‘Ja’al’ was gained:    
[When the wars between the groups in Kordofan] became worse…[the] weak gabāīl who couldn’t fight 
in the war, they came to him [for help], and he told them, ‘you belong to us now.’ This, in Arabic, is 
where ja’alī came from.
635
  
Hamza described how, in the 16
th
 Century, one of Ja’al’s descendants, Arman, travelled from 
Bara to settle in the Shendi Reach, which is now claimed as the Ja’alī ancestral dār.636 His dozen sons 
founded the Ja’alī towns that now line the Nile, such as Zeydab near ed-Damer, established by one of 
Arman’s 12 sons, Zeyd.637 One of Zeyd’s descendants, Hamad, left Zeydab to come south to present-
day Hamadab.
638
 Finding the space “empty” (a claim made vigorously by all groups in the case-study 
area about their ancestral homelands), Hamad settled “under a dom-palm tree and had many sons and 
cattle.” When Hamad arrived, he “brought with him the tradition of butān [male flagellation].” As 
Hamza explained:   
The origin of our music is from war, [and] we use drums [daluka] to encourage people to go to war. So 
when it comes to the wedding, this type of music [inspires] men to try to express their courage to others 
[by being lashed with whips]. Everyone wants to show that he is a man.  
Hamad’s brothers, Hamid, Abu Shura and al-Arabi, are later said to have come to settle and as a 
group, ‘the Hamadab’, began cultivating lands in Wadi al-Hawad and further east in the Butana, 
eventually making a seasonal centre at Basa. Over time, the space under the dom-palm tree became 
too small, so they moved east “to the sand mounds [goz].” Then, “between 200 and 180 years ago [i.e. 
early 19
th
 Century]” the Hamadab moved again, this time “from the goz to Hamadab” (i.e. the modern 
village of Hamadab), 500m to the east. According to Hamza, “The first thing [the Hamadab] did here, 
of course, was build the well [bi'r]. It’s called ‘the well of Wagy Al’a’”639 (see above). “The first 
shaykh was Mohammed Elamin Ba’ashom,” one of Hamza al-Ja’ali’s maternal great-grandfathers. 
“Then they built the Islamic school [khalwa]. There was no education at that time, but the khalwa 
[provided some] education.” When Fūnj power declined in the 18th Century, the Ja’aliyīn were among 
                                                     
635 Interestingly MacMichael records a similar account, but instead of war it was Ja’al’s “munificent charity” in 
feeding the starving at a time of famine. He is said to have said to the recipients, “ga’al nakum” (lit. ‘we have 
made you’) (1922: 197). However, conversations with other non-Ja’alī respondents suggested that the name 
deliberately (and arrogantly) implied courage and military prowess. 
636 MacMichael also records that the Ja’aliyīn ‘proper’ (Arman’s sons) go back twelve generations (i.e c.400 years 
from 1922) to the Arab-Fūnj movement before Sennar. 
637  The ‘-ab’ at the end of the gabīla and town names is a possessive suffix used widely in Sudan: the people whose 
ancestor is Ali are the Aliab; descendants of Omer are the Omerab, and so on.  
638  Later, Hamza recalls the whole genealogy: “Hamad ibn Bedowi, ibn al-Arabi, ibn Abdelbagi, ibn Yazid, ibn 
Dawab, ibn Graanim, ibn Himidan, ibn Sobh Abu Markha, ibn Masaar, ibn Serarr, ibn Hassan Kerdem, ibn 
Ghada’a, ibn Haraan, ibn Masrook, ibn Ahmed, ibn Ibrahim al Ja’ali, ibn Idriss, ibn Geyyis, ibn Yemen, ibn Adi, 
ibn Hassass, ibn Karab, ibn Haatil, ibn Yaatel, ibn Zelklaa’, ibn Saad, ibn al-Fadl, ibn Abdullah, ibn al-Abbas.” 
639  Also, P. Wolf (2015) confirms that Domat al-Hamadab’s South Mound was occupied during the medieval period 
and that there was a much larger occupation on the North Mound between the 15th and 19th Centuries, thereby 
confirming that there has been continuous occupation of the area since the Meroitic period. 
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a number of collectives strong enough to assert their independence; records translated by Warburg 
(1992) tell of a Ja’alī ‘king’ (mek) seated at Shendi (see Appendix 7), and certainly they spearheaded 
many revolts against the Turco-Egyptian administration in the 1820s and 1840s. Notably, Hamza’s 
narrative acknowledges only one of these, and that is that “Hamadab participated in the ruling and the 
administrative system of the Turkish. At this time there were administrative…districts and for some 
reason, we participated in this.” He concluded by stating that “[the residents of Hamadab] registered 
this land in 1901. Officially.” 
 
5.4.2.3.2 The Manāsīr al-Badiyah in Bejrawiya 
According to Medowi al-Mansouri, the Manāsīr, like the Ja’aliyīn, descend from Abbas of the 
Quraysh through Ibrahim Ja’al.640 However, while the Ja’aliyīn claim ancestry through Arman (see 
above), the Manāsīr claim ancestry through a descendant called Mansour. Medowi also claimed 
kinship with the Manāsīr of Yemen, from whom we may presume they split to migrate west. However, 
Medowi preferred to focus on the Manāsīr’s history during the past 50 years, which he characterised 
as a series of voluntary and involuntary moves and transitions, each broken down into “befores” and 
“afters” and “departures from” and “arrivals at.”  
Medowi explained that the dār of the Manāsīr used to comprise a 100km stretch of the Nile 
above the Fourth Cataract together with the northern parts of the Bayuda Desert. To the north-west 
were the Shaygiyya and to the south were the Rubātāb and Ja’aliyīn. Like most gabīla, the Manāsīr 
included both pastoralists and settled farmers (Chapters 2 and 4). The former, the Manāsīr al-Badiyya, 
were nomadic pastoralists who migrated with their herds around the volcanic fields
641
 of the northern 
Bayuda Desert,
642
 while the latter, the Manāsīr al-Nil (or al-Bahr), had farmland along the river. 
However, the Manāsīr al-Badiyah and the Manāsīr al-Nil have been almost entirely displaced from 
their claimed ancestral dār. The Manāsīr al-Badiyah have moved away over the past 50 years because 
of the drying up of the Bayuda Desert, a slow and ongoing process that has put pressure on land, 
water and animals.
643
 The Manāsīr al-Nil were displaced when their land was flooded by the Merowe 
dam in 2007-8.
644
 The Sudanese state has provided a number of resettlement sites for the displaced; 
one of the biggest is near Mukabrab, some 35km from the case-study area. Some of the Manāsīr al-
                                                     
640 Also see Maliński 2014: 79, who points to Lorimer 1936: 162.  
641 Interestingly, the man who gave the first detailed description of the volcanic field was the same H.C. Jackson 
whose work is quoted in the first pages of Chapter 2. (Noted in Maliński 2014: 81). 
642 Maliński 201 4; cf. Beck 2008. 
594 Some of these pastoralists form part of the over 220,000 families in Sudan estimated to be at risk due to climate 
change (UNDP 2015b). 
644 See Hänsch 2012. Her account of the way they were unceremoniously uprooted can be found in both her 
documentary (“Manasirland – Development Refugees” (Hänsch 2009)) and in her publications. As the water of the 
Merowe Dam rose, she describes people grabbing their possessions and saying, “Nihna muhâjirîn” (“We are 
refugees”) and commenting that life is “’hayya mujahjaha’” (“a mess.”) (2012: 186-7).  
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Nil have opted to live in the new settlements but others have settled elsewhere in the region. Indeed, 
as Medowi explained, both Manāsīr al-Badiyah and Manāsīr al-Nil have settled in the Shendi Reach.  
Medowi’s family, which belongs to the Manāsīr al-Badiyah, settled on the outskirts of Hamadab 
and Bejrawiya because of its “good grazing land and…[being] half way between the khāla' [the 
hinterland] and al-bahr [the Nile]”, but that “now [they] have no animals and have had to learn about 
how to farm.” However Medowi added that “in the past, our fathers came from the north border at 
Atbara to this land for grazing and getting birsîm and gesh, so they knew it was cultivatable, quiet and 
clean with good top soil.” (This echoes the Fadniyya that came from the west bank, who, according to 
Mohammed al-Fadni, left because “even though the land there is good for agriculture the eastern bank 
is better for animals—the water is better”) 
According to Medowi, it was justifiable for the Manâsîr al-Badiyah to move from their dār 
because of the drought and desiccation of their grazing lands in the Bayuda. However, he insisted that 
the flooding of Manāsīr lands by the Merowe dam was not an acceptable or excusable reason for the 
Manāsīr al-Nil to leave their dār and that those who have done so, specifying those who have moved 
to Mukabrab, are “not true Manâsîr.” This reflects the view widely held by the Manāsīr al-Badiyah 
that the Manâsîr al-Nil did not put up sufficient resistance to the construction of the Merowe dam.  
Medowi‘s narrative shows that displacement has had a deep emotional and psychological impact 
upon the Manāsīr, which mirrors the findings of other studies of displaced groups, 645  and also 
suggests the fragmentation of the older, more solid gabīla designations and sense of belonging. 
 
5.4.2.3.3 The Hassaniyya in Bejrawiya 
Ali al-Hassani described the Hassaniyya as descending from immigrants from Arabia but, unlike 
Hamza al-Ja’ali did not provide further details, or an explanation of how the Hassaniyya received 
their name. He did not acknowledge the Hassaniyya’s traditional designation as part of the Kawāhla 
gabīla, who claim descent from Zubeir ibn el-Awwam of the Kusai of Arabia through a certain Kahil, 
and whose dār stretches west from the White Nile into Kordofan. According to Ali, the Hassaniyya 
dār includes farmland by the White Nile south of Khartoum and grazing lands that run north, parallel 
to the Nile, up to the southern Bayuda Desert (a distance of some 500km). Their migration routes, he 
explained, meant that the Hassaniyya who now live on the outskirts of Bejrawiya knew the Shendi 
Reach long before they settled there (see above).
646
  
                                                     
645 Studies of dam-induced displacement have been carried out by Scudder who coined the term “development 
refugee/s” (1993: 124). Also see Ruppert 1988. 
646 Indeed even in 1837, the traveller Holroyd recalled that on the west bank of Khartoum, there was “a small 
settlement of Hasaniyeh Arabs”. 
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However, Ali emphasised that the Hassaniyya did not move from their dār to Bejrawiya out of 
choice. He claimed that although the sedentary Hassaniyya had originally been displaced by the 
construction of the Jebel Aulia dam on the White Nile in 1937, the pastoralist members of the gabīla 
had not.
647
 He also said that in the past, the grazing available to the Hassaniyya had been perfectly 
adequate, but that since migration routes were “getting shorter” (i.e. they were travelling shorter 
distances than in the past) and “the climate changed”, they moved near the Nile. Nevertheless, when 
showing his ‘antiquities’ (see above), Hassan stressed that the family still goes very regularly to Wadi 
Sukkara and Rojbab (extended family homes in the hinterland, unknown to the present author but 
likely in or near Wadi Muqqadam on the west bank). Indeed, from the way Ali spoke about them, it 
seems that the nomadic Hassaniyya see themselves as apart from their former sedentary neighbours, 
whom he termed ‘Arab al-Bahr’,648 and noted the latter’s keeping of cows in comparison with the 
camels of the Hassaniyya. Again, this suggests the breaking down of the older, more solid gabīla 
designations. 
Yet, or perhaps indeed, Ali also went some way to obscuring the dimensions of the Hassaniyya’s 
history by speaking at equal length about being part of Bejrawiya’s “original people”, whilst 
emphasizing that the Hassaniyya and the Ja’aliyīn are “all one” (kūlu wahīd). He later explained that 
he was born there and that his family were there “early”; implicitly hinting at ‘early’ equating to 
‘authenticity’ and ‘late’ with ‘inauthenticity’, whilst adding that because he and his family and the 
Ja’aliyīn are the “original people” and “have more rights to the land than the people from Wadi 
Tarabil”, who “only came here 15 years ago”: “our relationship is better.” 
 
5.4.2.3.4 The Fadniyya in Hamadab 
The Fadniyya who live on the south and south-eastern outskirts of Hamadab include both sedentary 
farmers and semi-pastoralists (Chapter 4). Some Fadniyya, such as Mohammed al-Fadni, have lived 
outside Hamadab for a number of decades, having been pushed east to Hamadab by drought, 
intermarried with the Ja’aliyīn, become well-established tenant farmers and formed Local Committees 
to represent themselves politically (see Chapter 4). Other members of the Fadniyya are more recent 
arrivals who live as semi-pastoralists. The groups do not speak on behalf of one another; the status of 
the semi-pastoral Fadniyya in the Local Committee of Hi al-Salaam (part of Jutab), the village where 
they live, for example, was impossible to ascertain, but the sedentarised Fadniyya are clearly resentful 
of the “still-pastoral” Fadniyya, perhaps because the former were successfully integrating into the 
                                                     
647 According to Harries-Jones (1972), in 1938 the Anglo-Egyptian government brought Hassaniyya tenants affected 
by the dam from the White Nile to part of the Gezira's main canal, known as the Abdel Majid block, ostensibly to 
provide them with alternative means of livelihood. 
648 Trilsbach (1983) reported that the Nile-side Hassaniyya referred to the semi-pastoral Hassaniyya as arab al-
dhariya (Arabs of the Clay Plain) and the nomadic Hassaniyya as ‘arab al-behaim (Arabs of the Animals), but, 
perhaps predictably, Ali al-Hassani did not refer to himself in these ways. 
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Ja’aliyīn riverine community and see the arrival of the latter as potentially damaging to their 
newfound status.  
However, any rift between the established and recently arrived Fadniyya is closely guarded from 
the other gabāīl, and when Mohammed al-Fadni recounted their history, he spoke as if for all 
Fadniyya in Hamadab. In his account of Fadniyya history, he rejected the idea that the Fadniyya were 
newcomers by explaining that they had known “this place” (specifically Hamadab, but also the area 
more generally) for a long time, having had their dār and river-irrigated fields in the Wadi al-Hawad 
some 50km to the east. To substantiate this claim, he spoke about the tomb of a Bafadni holy man 
(faqīh pl. fuqahā, lit. ‘Islamic jurist’, expert in fīqh), which he described as being a major landmark in 
Basa, the wadi’s main town.649 As if to consolidate their place in Sudan’s elite, Mohammed also 
spoke with pride about Amer al-Zeen al-Hassan, a Fadnī Lieutenent General in the Sudanese air force 
who was born in nearby Kabushiya. The latter has been awarded one of Sudan’s highest military 
honours, the Medal of Courage, which makes the local Fadniyya especially proud of him. 
Other pastoralist Fadniyya who recounted their history to the present author described a much 
more ancient and extensive dār, centred on the southern Gezira and extending south towards to 
Sennar and north into the Butana and Wadi al-Hawad. Their descriptions centre around a number of 
wells in the hinterland. For example, the Fadniyya in Mataris talk about a well called Bir Gabush 
(well of changing colors); other Fadniyya talk about Bir Abu Najma which is “55 men” (c.105m) 
deep (also see ‘Antiquities’, above). 650 
* 
The narratives recounted to the present researcher are significant not only for what they include but 
also for what they leave out. Significantly, considering the discourse of social relations on the national 
level, the narratives make little mention of the important role all four gabāīl played in the slave trade. 
It is well known for example that Ja’aliyīn and Manāsīr traders (jallaba) were deeply involved in the 
slave trade. And, while the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya were never as deeply entrenched as the Ja’aliyīn, 
the “big men” of the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya “regional elite”651 did engage in the trade until at least 
1928,
652
 much later than the Ja’aliyīn and Manāsīr, though for most of them it remained “simple in 
organization and small in scale.”653 From the perspective of the present study, however, the most 
                                                     
649 MacMichael also notes this tomb, writing that it is a “well-known sanctuary” (1922: 250, n.1). 
650 Also recorded in Weschenfelder 2014. 
651 Spaulding 1988: 26. 
652 Spaulding (1988) writes that even when the commercial slave trade officially stopped, domestic slavery continued 
for some decades. He suggests that slavery eventually died out as the increasing use of machinery produced a 
surplus of wage labourers. Spaulding also notes that in the late 1920s, A. J. Arkell counted 392 slaves who had 
been acquired during the years 1910-1927. (The Arkell Papers are kept in the SOAS University of London library.) 
653 Spaulding 1988: 41. Ordinarily, the slaving activity of the Hassaniyya and Fadniyya involved wealthy men 
travelling to slave farms in north-western Ethiopia to buy small numbers of slaves (usually young women) for 
domestic help. On other occasions, however, it would involve small, organised expeditions to enslave women, girls 
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important and striking thing about all the narratives is the complete absence of any connection to 
‘ancient Nubia’ or to the archaeological sites upon and around which they live.  
The author hastens to add that this is striking not because there should be connections but rather 
because such connections would be expedient for the respondents to claim in this context. Such a 
constructivist view of people’s (dis)connection to archaeology is supported by the ways in which 
residents such as those in the case-study area respond to dam building plans. Comparing the protests 
made by the Nubian groups against the Aswan dams (Chapter 5) and those made by the Manāsīr, 
Shagiyya and the Rubātāb against the Merowe dam (Chapter 2) it is clear that they use two different 
aspects of archaeology to support their cause.
654
 The Nubian groups use their ‘ancient’ connection to 
the archaeological landscape: archaeological sites have played a great role in anti-dam community 
mobilization and the forging of modern ‘Nubian’ identity with a distinct link to the ancient past. 
These dynamics are distinctly different from that among Manāsīr, Shagiyya and the Rubātāb Arab-
Muslim groups, who display greater concern about the submerging of their lands rather than of the 
Nubian sites (with which they sense little ‘ancestral’ connection) and instead use the presence of 
archaeologists to mobilize support. The latter strategy has also been used by the Arab, predominantly 
Ja’aliyīn, communities to plans to build the Shereik Dam at the Fifth Cataract, though this has been 
far less studied by scholars. The residents of towns such as Abidiya, upstream from the Fifth Cataract, 
have tried to stop archaeologists from working in the area,
655
 and when the fieldwork for this project 
began in 2013, little salvage archaeology had taken place. Therefore, as at Merowe, local opposition 
to the dam was based upon attachment to the land and not the archaeological sites, and rather focused 
on making political use of the archaeologists even though the precedent set by Nubians suggests that 
the claim of connection with the ancient ‘Nubian’ past is perhaps the most expedient course to take if 
international attention is to be paid to the cause. 
 
5.4.3 Connections to Archaeology 
Despite the summary above, it is clear that the archaeological sites have more impact and importance 
than the evidence so far suggests; after all, Domat al-Hamadab plays a vital role in the Hamadab-
Ja’aliyīn’s settlement history even if it is not conceptually connected to or important via ‘archaeology’ 
or ‘ancient Nubia’. Moreover the findings of scholars such as Shankland (1996, 1999), Gomes (2006) 
and others discussed in Chapter 2 had led the present author to expect that, even if the residents of 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya perceived no ancestral connection with ‘ancient Nubia’ and its 
                                                                                                                                                        
and boys. According to Spaulding, few men were sought or brought back as slaves by the Hassaniyya and 
Fadniyya.   
654  For a further comparison of the Aswan and Merowe dam cases see De Simone 2008. 
655  Pers. comm., Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Head of Fieldwork NCAM, Nov. 2013. 
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archaeological history, the physical sites would still hold some meaning and be represented within 
local culture as places “delineated by the outcome of interrelations and the existence of multiplicity, 
continually transformed and under construction.”656  Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe are, after all, 
significant elements of the local landscape, located amid residential and agricultural spaces. Local 
residents move through the sites to get to the Nile or to the villages, and the pastoralists use them for 
grazing their animals and as a source of wood for fuel (despite the fences constructed by 
archaeologists for site management, see Chapter 7). Indeed, following Gomes again, it is arguable that 
the geographical ‘space/s’ taken up by sites are made into ‘place/s’ by the myriad interactions that 
take place between the people who move within them. ‘Place-making’, in this view, is thus action-
orientated and cumulative; human experiences may be subtle or fleeting, but they nonetheless gain 
meaning as they build up over time.  
The data collected for this research confirms that this has been the case at the archaeological sites 
of Domat al-Hamadab and Bejrawiya, and still is to a certain extent. What little literature exists on 
this theme has also been marshalled to act as supplementary sources about other archaeological sites 
in the Nile Valley. For ease of analysis, the meaningful beliefs, practices and interactions have been 
grouped into a) the existence of spirits; b) beliefs about fertility; and c) the sacredness of cemeteries. 
Academically speaking, all of these may be considered to be the dynamic result of the long-term 
interplay between pre-Islamic and Islamic ideas.
657
 Ethnographically speaking, they are rarely seen to 
be so. The aim here is less to pinpoint the exact origin of previously recorded practices but rather to 
see if they are still being practiced in the case-study area, and what they currently mean. 
 
5.4.3.1 Spirits (jinn)  
Jinn are immaterial beings, or spirits, that inhabit the liminal space between the physical and 
metaphysical worlds. In the human world, they are said to inhabit empty or ruined houses (kharaba, 
from kharhābāt), open spaces (fasahāt), rubbish dumps (nifayāt) and cemeteries (maqābir) as well as 
in trees (above). The presence of jinn is thus often predicated upon the absence of humans, whether 
humans are wholly absent (as in open spaces) or were formerly present (as in ruined houses). While 
jinn are regarded as essentially benign, they are also seen as protective of their space, disliking the 
movement of humans within their territories. Encountering jinn is thus believed to be dangerous to a 
person’s bodily integrity. To counter the potential risks of such interactions, locals utter the phrase 
‘Bismillah’ (‘In the name of God’) or, less commonly, recite verses from the Quran when entering 
                                                     
656 Gertel et al. 2014: 9. 
657  Zabek 2005. 
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spaces where jinn might be.
658
 Certainly, the prospect of encountering jinn seems to tap into a deep-
rooted fear of emptiness and openness, and the importance of the endogamous social unit (in 
producing children) and the safety of enclosure.
659
 This line of thinking may itself be causally related 
to a number of other aspects of Sudanese life, such as the habit of building increasingly high 
compound walls and the practice of female genital mutilation (FGM, khifāḍ), a rampant practice in 
rural Sudan and one that directly reflects the safety and purity believed to be inherent in a closed and 
protected space and thus fundamentally connected with female fertility (see below).
660
 In a connected 
note, the oldest and most severe form of FGM in Sudan is thought to trace back to ‘ancient Egyptian’ 
Pharaonic culture and is locally known as ‘Pharaonic circumcision’ (khifāḍ fir'ūi), although no 
respondent explained that FGM is undertaken because of this.
661
   
Archaeological sites which have buildings exposed, such as Meroe, are fundamentally associated 
with jinn because they fall into the category of places where humans were formerly present but have 
since abandoned. Subterranean sites, such as Domat al-Hamadab, seem to be associated with jinn for 
their status as a mound and the presence of trees, although the distinction is not always clean cut. 
Cailliaud, one of the first European explorers to visit Sudan in the 17
th
 Century, recalled being told 
that “every mound [site] is enchanted [haunted by spirits]” (kul gōz maskūn), testifying to the time-
depth of this association (and use of the word ‘gōz’ to describe subterranean sites like Domat al-
Hamadab).
662
 
Interviews and conversations between the present researcher and residents of Hamadab and 
Bejrawiya suggested that belief in jinn is still present in its Quranic form, but diminishing as part of 
an active culture around archaeological sites. Indeed, only a small number of people spoke about jinn 
in serious terms, most of them in Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab (presumably because they are 
closest to the site). Moreover, it was always a topic that the present researcher enquired about rather 
                                                     
658   The present researcher’s translator, Hana Ahmed, commented that jinn “hate living with other people” and advised 
her to recite the Sura al-Falaq (113:1-5), Sura an-Nas (114:1-6), and Ayat al-Kursi (2:55). Shankland similarly 
notes that “[u]sually on encountering the devil, some protection would be afforded by calling the name of God, 
Bismillah” (Shankland 1999: 149). 
659  Indeed, this fear may also have been shared by the ancient Nubian-Kushites, who also put high importance on the 
ordering of space to ensure a balance of energy and control over chaos (Török 1995, 1997, 2002), but this is 
speculative at best. Although we know that the importance of matrilineality—tracing one's ancestry back through 
the female line—is very low in this, and indeed most, parts of Sudan. This is despite the apparent vitality of 
matrilineality of ancient and Christian Nubia (see Welsby 1996). 
660  Boddy 1989. UNFPA (2012) suggests that the FGM rate in Sudan is at 65%. 
661 Khifāḍ fir'ūi is the World Health Organization’s ‘Type III’ category of FGM (ironicallt known in Egypt as 
‘Sudanese circumcision) and involves “excision of part or all of the external genitalia [clitoris, labia minora, and 
labia majora] and stitching/narrowing of the vaginal opening (infibulation)” leaving a small hole for urine and 
menstrual flow (WHO 1995: 6). In 2014, a midwife in Sai Island explained the Pharaonic origin and contemporary 
persistence of FGM to the present researcher, noting that it is “a tradition in a society that values tradition very 
highly.” The most common form of FGM in Sudan is WHO’s ‘Type I’ category known as ‘sunna’ (tradition, 
duty). Sunna involves the “excision of the prepuce [clitoral hood] with or without the excision of part or all of the 
clitoris” (WHO 1995: 6). WHO’s Type II, known in Sudan as ‘matwasat’, was not mentioned to the present 
researcher in interviews, but is described as the “excision of the prepuce and clitoris together with partial or total 
excision of the labia minora” (WHO 1995: 6) (also see Kheir et al. 1991). 
662  Cailliaud 1826. This finding was recently corroborated by wide-ranging interviews conducted at the early royal 
Napatan-Kushite site of el-Kurru by a student at the University of Kareima, Tohamy Abul Gasim Khalifa. 
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than wa spontaneously told. Upon asking, the (mostly pastoral) employees of UCLQ whether they 
knew any stories about jinn, only Zubeir Rahma, a Ja’alī farmer from Kejeik, knew of any and clearly 
found the question anachronistic. He recalled a story about a guard who worked at Meroe and a 
“female Muslim jinn” who appeared and spoke to him. In another story, set in Meroe in 2012, he said 
that a policeman was manning the police station on the west side of the site when:  
He heard the sound of daluka [Ja’aliyīn drumming]...so he went [to the source of the music,] took his 
gun and shot at it, but it turned out to be nothing. The policeman [nevertheless] moved his station to the 
eastern side of the city.  
Zubeir said he had heard the gun himself and therefore concluded, “this proves that the area 
[Meroe] is inhabited by jinn.” Of the others that the present researcher asked about jinn, men tended 
to tease and only a few women spoke about them with any seriousness. 
The few stories about jinn recounted to the present author often featured subterranean spaces 
with secret caches of riches, particularly gold (dhahab),
663
 protected by jinn. This is perhaps due to 
the association of jinn with places in a state of ruin or disrepair. In other tellings, living close to jinn 
was said to have damaged people’s mental health. Even though she herself lives in Kejeik, in close 
proximity to the site, Adira al-Sikina alleged that the people who lived in Old Deraqab (the now-
abandoned village that is built directly over the northern edge of Meroe) were “crazy” (majānīn s. 
majnūn). Indeed Amna Suliman said that fear of madness was the reason the people of Old Deraqab 
had moved to New Deraqab, and added that there was a house in the centre of Old Deraqab for the 
guard (ghaffir), but that he refused to live in it. Jinn are thought by some to be present at Domat al-
Hamadab, too, but crucially, this is because they are believed to inhabit the dom-palm trees there, 
rather than the ancient site (see above). 
Yet, again, the idea of jinn living on the sites was either shrugged off or laughed at by most 
respondents. Hamza al-Ja’ali, Ali al-Hassani and Medowi al-Mansouri all said that the stories were 
not true; in Medowi’s words, “the people who say there are jinn here [do it] to scare people to stop 
them touching the site, [unless] the government [NCAM] is here.” Jinn are perhaps more meaningful 
as tropes in cautionary messages such as those used by parents, teachers, elders and other authority 
figures who wish to prevent behaviours or habits that are seen to be dangerous or illegal.  
Perhaps because of its presence in Islam, there was no correlation between the gender, age or 
level of education of the few respondents who believed that jinn live on archaeological sites; even 
members of the intelligentsia could not be discounted. The one major demographic difference 
between the respondents was their gabīla and/or livelihood. The very few stories about jinn told by 
the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya pastoralists were set in caves and not archaeological sites. 
                                                     
663  Osman describes a similar story about snakes guarding gold at an Egyptian inscription of Seti I (1315-1295 BCE) 
in Nawri in Third Cataract (1992: 32-3). 
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Those of the Hassaniyya were located in Wad Hassauna, a wadi on the opposite bank of the Nile. One 
reason for this may be that since they are relatively new to the area, they have not built into their own 
traditions the cautionary tales told by the Ja’aliyīn about jinn on the sites. A related reason is perhaps 
that, as noted above, their histories are located elsewhere and connected to different parts of Sudan.  
Yet, or perhaps because of the lack of seriousness behind the concept, the presence of jinn and 
the effects they can have on human behaviour is not incompatible with spending time at the sites. 
Meroe in particular is said by the Ja’aliyīn to have been popular in the past as a shady space for 
outings (rihāl s. rihla), parties (hafla) and festivals (mahrajāt s. mahrajān). One male respondent said 
that it used to be the perfect place for a daily rest (magīl). During Eid, Meroe’s “slaughterhouse” 
(above) does actually seem to have doubled as a place to slaughter sheep, although this testimony 
came exclusively from residents of Old Deraqab and Lower Kejeik and according to respondents has 
now been banned by the site guard. On aggregate, the pyramids are rarely visited by the residents of 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya, for whom 5km is quite a long way to travel, given that most either walk or 
use donkeys for transportation. However Meroe and the pyramids still act as spaces for the Ja’aliyīn 
to celebrate New Year’s Eve parties.   
 
5.4.3.2 Fertility (khusūba) 
“In the past”, it also seems that women would go to Meroe alone during the day, seeking shade to talk 
in, in the same way that they go alone to visit friends and family (these trips are referred to as ‘marga’, 
trips without male supervision). Women also seem to have gone there at night, for different, although 
related, reasons to do with women’s fertility. As the practice of FGM (above) suggests, a woman’s 
fertility, and the power, vulnerability and danger it simultaneously represents, is a matter of great 
concern in Sudan and is seen to be in need of protection. Birth is seen as a time of potential peril for a 
household; the opening of the woman’s body, the inevitability of bleeding and the high chance of 
mortality stir powerful emotions and tap into the most extreme depths of fear. This extends even post-
birth: congratulations are never offered to the new parents because it is thought that this, either 
deliberately or accidentally, draws the attention of the evil eye. Infertility (agir) is seen to be a severe 
and pitiful condition, and one that ultimately threatens the entire social order. Of course, concern for 
personal and societal welfare exists everywhere, not just in Sudan, and it may be assumed that most 
people take steps to minimize the risks that come with having children and/or optimize the chances of 
conception. However, Western society has mostly abandoned non-scientific means of controlling 
fertility to embrace medical remedies. In Sudan, Western medicine is used alongside other, less 
scientifically verifiable means. And, as Shankland has noted, because of women’s general exclusion 
from public Islamic praxis, they seek alternative channels through which they can express their 
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religious feelings; for instance, “[t]hough men visit tombs, women do so even more…They are also 
more likely to practice alternative healing methods.”664  
Outside the case-study area, in the Third Cataract region in Nubia, ethnographic data (albeit scant) 
suggest that archaeological sites often feature in rituals designed to improve fertility, although such 
data are largely unpublished. Accounts have been given to the present author from Kawa by one of 
the site’s long-standing Sudanese NCAM inspectors. He recalled that the women would light a fire 
and interact with the Kushite statues to become fertile.
665
 He also recalled another account from the 
quarries at Tombos, where a collapsed Kushite-Napatan statue is known locally as ‘oginondi’ (which 
apparently means ‘man’ in Dongolawi Nubian). In his 1992 work Hinkel also mentioned this as the 
Tombos “oginondi”, and remarked that it needed re-housing in a shelter to “stop the mischief to 
which the statue is exposed by the local women, who pounded and crushed certain parts with stones 
and urinated on the statue…to obtain fertility”.666  
This phenomenon can be found even outside Nubia. One early account comes from Budge, who 
noted that Sudanese women would rub themselves against the monuments to ensure they created a 
strong and large family.
667
 In 2013, a fellow archaeologist gave the present researcher unpublished 
fieldnotes about a female fertility rite (referred to here by the umbrella term ‘rites’ (taqūs) at the 
archaeological site of Jebel Barkal, about which a woman had given him details.
668
 According to his 
female respondent, a woman seeking a remedy for infertility or stillbirth would make a secret journey 
at night in the company of an older woman who had had many children. The women would proceed 
to the cemetery where the older woman would cut the younger woman’s right leg and let it bleed. 
They would then cross a short stretch of empty desert to the Napatan-Kushite Amun temple complex 
that sits at the foot of the cobra-shaped mountain of Jebel Barkal. Proceeding to the ram statues which 
line the approach to the temple complex, which the informant referred to as not “rams” (kharūf) but as 
as “lions” ('usūd), the elder woman would cut the left leg of the younger woman and allow it to bleed. 
The younger woman would then jump over a ram
669
 and the older woman would walk around to meet 
her. They would then go to the Nile to wash. The younger woman was then required to stay indoors 
for three days. The point of the ritual was to remove the affliction that was preventing her from 
motherhood. In this example, the archaeological site provides both the ritual context and the fetish 
object for childless women seeking a solution for their predicament. 
A related fertility ritual involves zayrān (s. zār), spirits that belong to the metaphysical world 
shared by jinn. And, like jinn, scholars such as Zabek (2005), see zār as cultural survivors of ancient 
                                                     
664  Shankland 1999: 154. 
665   Conversation with NCAM Antiquities Inspector, Nov. 2015. 
666   Hinkel 1992: 172.  
667   Budge 1907: 70. 
668  Interview Notes from December 2000, written by T. Kendall, received by the present researcher in November 
2013. 
669   Kendall’s notes say that the woman may also urinate upon the ram. 
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Nubian-Kushite rituals. Coincidentally, in 1989, Boddy scholarly addressed spirit possession in one of 
the Ja’alī villages within the case-study area.670 Boddy showed that spirit possession is typically 
undergone by women who have suffered trauma to the womb (such as bleeding, miscarriage) or failed 
to conceive, which suggests that the womb is somehow under ill favour. Bleeding and barrenness are 
powerful experiences that violate bodily integrity; they are the ultimate examples of when the pure 
and safe centres of enclosure are breached. However, Boddy also shows that the zār events are 
actually moments of strategy through which a woman may address her problem through 
empowerment. The emancipatory acts are inherent in the woman’s adoption of zār personalities, each 
of which represents a contrast to who she is in society. In key parts of the ceremony, which on some 
occasions may last for days, she is ‘diagnosed’. In Sudanese practice, there are seven zār personalities: 
Darawish (Sufis), Pashawāt (Turks), Khawajāt (Europeans), Habashi (Ethiopians), Blacks (Africans), 
Arabs (nomads) and Sitat (women) and to discover which one she is involves a ritual called “opening 
the box” ('ifta al-'ilba).671 After her diagnosis, spirit chants (khuyūt lit. ‘threads’) are sung (“pulled”) 
to draw the zār out, and the possessed woman is given all the material tropes she needs to transform 
herself into that zār. Crucially for the present study, one of the khwāja spirits revealed to Boddy was 
‘Mr Prinze’, who represented a British archaeologist. Women who, during their trance, are possessed 
by the archaeologist’s zār wear men’s clothes and smoke cigarettes, illustrating very neatly how the 
image of the archaeologist was materialized.  
On the surface, little seems to have changed. In the case-study area, site-community residents 
often encounter archaeologists buying cigarettes from local shops; and the female archaeologists’ use 
of trousers and other male attire defies and blurs gender roles. Furthermore, non-Sudanese 
archaeologists continue to be known as khwajāt. Boddy’s detailed descriptions thus illustrate the 
archaeologists’ impact over time and serves to highlight that the local residents “are writing us 
[archaeologists] as we are writing them.” 672  However, while the zār rituals were a vibrant 
phenomenon in 1989, as evidenced by Boddy, the fieldwork carried out by the present researcher in 
2015 suggests that they are little practiced today. Even taking into account those women who may 
practice but not disclose that as such to the researcher, the evidence shows that it is only the older 
generation of Ja’aliyīn women in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, and sometimes the older men, who still know 
about them. These people were surprised to find that the present author also knew of them, but as with 
the jinn and fertility rituals, they dismissed them as “old wives’ tales.” During this author’s time in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya, only Mariam al-Pasha of the Ja’aliyīn explained more about it, and sang a song 
that lists the different zayrān and their trappings: 
                                                     
670   Boddy gave the village a pseudonym to protect the identity of her respondents, so the name has not been revealed 
here. The present author does note, however, that Boddy chose to name the village ‘Hofriyāt’, from the word 
‘hofra’, ‘hole’ and related to the verb ‘to dig’. 
671   See Messing 1958 for Ethiopia; Hadidi 2016 for Egypt. 
672  Quoted above, Meskell 2005: 90. 
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Khwāja is wonderful, he has a cross,673 
Luliba al-'Arabiyya, she loves her shabal;
674
 
Dudu, yā Jebel Lādu, Habashī orders jabana!675  
Mariam’s zār was a Turkish nobleman (Pashā, hence her pseudonym), and she sang her own 
thread:  
Hakīm Pashā went to his garden for a tour, yā salām!676 
But the singing ended abruptly when she confessed, “I don't remember the rest.” It was also 
noticeable that when she was singing, few of the other ladies sung with her, and not many of them 
knew the words, which were in any case brief. Women were also far less boisterous regarding the zār 
songs after the present researcher brought out an audio recorder.  
Overall, the extant ethnographic data offer rich accounts of the ways in which archaeological 
sites and archaeologists are intertwined with traditions surrounding the culture of (in)fertility both 
inside and outside ‘Nubia’. However, this author’s interviews and informal conversations in the case-
study area showed that while such traditions still exist among the Ja’aliyīn, they are greatly 
diminished. The present researcher did not see or hear of fetishist use of archaeological materials by 
infertile women, nor were they described or spoken about by most of the women who took part in the 
research. Rather the details of such events were related to this author mostly by men, in brief 
anecdotes that lacked detail and were located in the past. Knowledge of the zār rituals was also fading 
and their actual practice was rare. The practice of khifāḍ fir'ūi FGM was the most widespread in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya, but the female participants of this research did not link its practice to the 
Pharaohs. It is also clear that links between the archaeological sites and jinn or fertility rituals do not 
seem to be part of the traditions of the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya or Fadniyya pastoral women in Hamadab-
Bejrawiya either now or in the past, perhaps because these gabāīl are new to the site-community. This 
does not mean that such rituals are not practiced; rather they do not seem to be linked with the 
archaeological sites in the case-study area. 
 
                                                     
673   European foreigners, or khwajāt, are assumed to be Christian. 
674  ‘Shabal’ seems to refer to a hairstyle that looks like a straw mat (birīsh); this is a reference to the building 
materials nomads and pastoralists use to make their houses. 
675   ‘Habashi’ represents an Ethiopian woman of loose morals (the Sudanese think of the Ethiopians as “prostitutes”, 
often referring to them as sharmūta (lit. ‘dried meat’). To adopt that personality, the afflicted woman will receive 
jabana (very strong coffee, made from Ethiopian zigay coffee beans; the word also refers to the once-ceramic 
now-tin coffee jug) and a red dress that is cut off at the knee. 
676  A ‘Pashā’ represents an Ottoman Turkish dignitary or nobleman. Like the British, the Turks were seen to be very 
orderly and to have a preference for manicured gardens. 
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5.4.3.3 Cemeteries (muqābîr) 
Up and down the Nile Valley, Islamic cemeteries are often located in the same area, if not on the 
same place, as pre-Islamic cemeteries. Like the association between archaeological sites and jinn, this 
phenomenon is long-standing and evident from the scholarly literature. Osman recalls being told a 
story about the cemetery at the monumental Kushite site of Nawri in modern ‘Nubia’, near the Third 
Cataract. Apparently, local people had reported that gold sometimes emerged suddenly from the 
ground, but could only be gathered if the finders prayed before collecting it. If they did not, it would 
disappear.
677
 This appears to be another cautionary tale, perhaps designed to encourage piety. 
Outside modern ‘Nubia’, when visiting Jebel Barkal in the 1920s, Griffith noted that the burials 
(madfān) of local sheikhs traditionally took pace near or on top of ancient graves. 678  Kendall’s 
fieldnotes are also useful here as they record his interview with Saad Karsani Mohamed Karsani, the 
great-great grandson of the saint Ahmed Karsani of Shiba Village (c.1840-1897), who became a high-
ranking Sufi (wālī pl. awliyā, lit. ‘custodian’, ‘friend’ but commonly used to indicate an Islamic saint), 
the patron of a Quranic school and an “intermediary between God and the people” who could do 
“abnormal things.”679 A native of another major archaeological site, Nuri, Ahmed Karsani moved to, 
and died in, Shiba, and was buried in a trapezoidal gubba about 90m west of the south corner of Jebel 
Barkal. Regarding the location, Saad recounts that at his funeral, his shrouded body is said to have 
risen up and flown away by itself, to Jebel Barkal, where it came down beside the mountain; “they 
buried him there just where it landed.” As Kendall himself notes:  
[The gubba’s] ancient historical interest derives from the fact that it is almost entirely built of stones 
gathered from the ancient ruins of Jebel Barkal. A few of these [stones] bear traces of ancient relief 
and/or inscription, and many of the stones appear to be of ‘talatat’ dimensions…Reused Egyptian 
stones, some inscribed with the cartouches of Ramses II, appear throughout the walls inside the shrine. 
Saad also noted that women “do” fertility rituals here “and…the men come to ask [for] his help 
in getting married; they put money inside the tomb chamber, and poor people come and take it.” 
In the case-study area, residents were keen to talk about how, in the past, the primary cemetery 
for Hamadab residents was near the South Mound of Domat al-Hamadab, known as Galad Faqi al-
Saki, although it is no longer in use or apparently even visible. Residents of Bejrawiya bury their dead 
in the Muqābîr al-Jabry north of Deraqab, named after Jabir, the ancestor of the Juwabra, and a third 
cemetery is used by residents from both Hamadab and Bejrawiya; known as the Wad al-Ar, it is 
located in Upper Bejrawiya. Yet only Galad Faqi al-Saki was associated with an archaeological site, 
although it appears to have been chosen for its proximity to the village of Hamadab at that time rather 
                                                     
677 Osman 1992: 32-3. Also see Kurcz 2002. 
678 Griffith 1929. 
679 Kendall’s fieldnotes from Jebel Barkal in 2000, given to the present author in 2013. 
  
182 
than with the subterranean archaeology. This leads one to reassess the importance of the placement of 
Gubba Ahmed Karsani in Jebel Barkal, and re-emphasize how its location near the mountain is not 
untypical. As Saad himself explained, Sufis have long since found symbolic capital with mountains 
and their perceived role as the physical buttress between the earth and the universe. 
Indeed, not only are cemeteries not typically associated with archaeological sites, but also they 
are lessening as places of activity. With reference to Muqābîr al-Jabry, Abbas Saad explained:  
15-20 years ago, the women would go if they didn’t have babies, or for weddings, but they didn’t know 
exactly which one was his grave. People might also go and bury money if they want a baby; old people 
still believe [in] this. 
In interviews and conversations with the present author, explanations of why these places had 
been chosen as cemeteries, and speculations of their meaning, were not usually forthcoming at all, let 
alone with reference to ancient Nubian archaeological sites. It was harder, even, to ascertain where 
exactly the pastoralists bury their dead; Ali al-Hassani explained that they use the Wad el-Ar 
cemetery because it is close to their homes. Perhaps inevitably, then, on the few occasions where 
respondents did elaborate on the topic, it was always the Ja’aliyīn who noted that the cemetery was 
“theirs”, and that they did not “share it with the ’arab”, by which they meant the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya 
and Fadniyya pastoralists. The historical resonance of cemeteries thus seems to have been drawn into 
the conflict about residential purity and contamination (Chapter 4). 
 
5.4.3.4 Openness and Enclosure 
It is clear from these findings that the cultural connections of the pastoralists of Hamadab and 
Bejrawiya to the archaeological sites are far weaker than the sedentary Ja’aliyīn. There are arguably 
several interrelated reasons for this. First, they do not have the same concepts of openness and 
enclosure as the Ja’aliyīn, preferring openness to the closely built houses of the Ja’alī villages and, by 
default, the densely packed ancient settlement sites in Meroe and Domat al-Hamadab. The pastoralists’ 
grazing lands are traditionally open and women still work outdoors, often uncovered; and, as Oxby 
notes, since pastoralists plan their activities with reference to the stars, they thus place great store by 
what Oxby terms “natural visual beacons.” 680  Testimony from Kalil Karim, a UCLQ employee, 
confirms this: he spoke at length about an angarīb shape in the sky made by the stars, and another set 
of stars shaped like Ragul al-Yamanī (lit. ‘man from Yemen’; Kalil is Mansūrī). Furthermore, 
pastoralists have great “attachment to the open spaces where [their] animals thrive.”681 While the 
                                                     
680 Oxby 1999: 55. 
681 Oxby 1999: 62. 
  
183 
pastoralists live in the hinterland, their hajīr and animal pens are spread out across the land, a habit 
they have continued as much as possible in Hamadab and Bejrawiya (Chapter 4). The pastoralists who 
have come from the hinterland in more recent times told the present researcher that they found the 
close-knit Ja’alī villages unattractive. When asked to describe her home, Manāra al-Fadl, noted that 
“it used to be wide (wāsi‘) and beautiful (samīh) but now…[it is not].”  
The pastoralists’ difference sense of architecture and the built form may also be relevant. The 
Ja’alī compound, the hōsh, is a reflection of the concept of enclosure; in contrast, the pastoralists still 
use the hajīr. Although less common, some pastoralists in Hamadab-Bejrawiya have chosen to retain 
and incorporate the hajīr into a hōsh. The description of ‘antiquities’ above also showed that the 
pastoralists’ need for mobility has also fostered different uses of material culture and thus different 
cultural equipment. Therefore, while day-to-day life is a continual process of adjustment, is clear that 
pastoralists’ notions of materiality are—or were—quite differently conceived to those of sedentary 
populations (here the Ja’aliyīn) and, more so, to those of the ‘ancient Nubians’, whose penchant for 
settlement and monumentality is paradigmatically illustrated by the buildings of Meroe. As Oxby 
writes, this is not necessarily indicative of a wholly different “pastoral worldview”; she has argued 
against seeing pastoralists as “social isolates” in this way. 682  However, it does show that the 
pastoralists experience and value the landscape in different ways from the Ja’aliyīn. 
* 
Chapter 5 has aimed to explore the intersections of archaeology, identity and culture in the Sudan, 
with particular emphasis on ‘the invention of ancient Nubia’ and how this construct relates to 
constructs of the Sudan as a modern Arab-Muslim state (and particularly its lack of connection with 
the archaeology of ancient Nubian civilization, which dominates foreign archaeological interest), 
contemporary notions of Nubian identity, and the oral histories concerning the origins of the four 
communities that currently reside in proximity of the archaeological landscapes of Meroe and Domat 
al-Hamadab. This important chapter also discussed the author’s distinction between ‘descendant’ and 
‘non-descendant’ communities, and the continuing primary affiliation of people with their gabāīl, 
which in the case study area is strongly divided between Ja’aliyīn (sedentary farmers, who identify the 
case study area as their dār or ‘homeland’) and what are identified as incoming groups such as 
Hassaniyya and Manāsīr (identified as pastoralists). Neither identify culturally with the ancient 
Nubian archaeological sites (unlike the modern Nubian population, who identify strongly with them 
and assert continuity with them despite the absence of evidence to support this). The chapter has also 
reviewed the various cultural connections some of these communities have with the archaeological 
sites, and the reasons for the ongoing weakening of these ties, the implications of which will be 
picked up on in subsequent chapters.  
                                                     
682 Oxby 1999: 62. 
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6. THE IMPACTS OF ARCHAEOLOGY ON LOCAL ECONOMIES AND SOCIETY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Archaeology’s perceived failure to provide economic dividends was introduced into most 
conversations this author had with residents in the case-study area. Mansūrī, Hassanī and Fadnī 
pastoralists were keen to secure the economic support of archaeologists, particularly given their 
struggles in the face of governmental and foreign agricultural development schemes that block their 
livestock routes (Chapter 4); the Ja’aliyīn farmers were often quick to describe archaeology’s failure 
to provide their village with services (khadamāt): for example to build a dispensary, club or school. A 
few older Ja’alī respondents noted how, in the past, archaeologists had contributed to the construction 
of a water tower
683
 and helped lobby for the installation of electricity in the Bejrawiya area, but they 
nonetheless decried the lack of provisions more recently.
684
 The severely limited discourse on 
archaeology’s historical and cultural aspects (Chapter 5) was striking in contrast with the ever present 
question: “but what is its fāida (lit. benefit)?” 
                                                     
683 Apparently in collaboration with a group of archaeologists, the German Development Bank installed a water tower 
in Bejrawiya South that now provides water to some of this part of the Bejrawiya area. 
684 Other efforts that have been made by archaeologists, most notably by the UCLQ project director since 2012, were 
not mentioned by respondents. Observations have shown that the UCLQ project director takes members of the 
local community to the hospital (some 40km away) when needed; frequently makes karāma (from karīm, lit. 
‘generous’: the charitable act of buying meat and sharing it amongst the poorest in the community, as thanks for 
God’s generosity); purchased and donated 50 chairs to the Hamadab club; and, recently paid for one of her 
employee’s considerable medical expenses. The DAI Hamadab project director also helped the community by 
providing hoses to residents when the water pipes burst, and may very well have done more that was not observed 
by the present author. 
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6.1 The Negligible Impact of Tourism 
The topic of tourism was a key part of the discussions that followed on from this question. Many local 
respondents asked this author if any progress was being made to expand the industry “behind the 
scenes”, whilst pointedly describing it as an “overdue” prospect and making it clear that tourism 
remains an aspiration rather than a reality. The paucity of tourists and the lack of tourism 
infrastructure was one of the few topics all of the diverse respondents agreed upon; this includes 
interviews and conversations with members of a range of socio-economic groups, from farmers and 
pastoralists to community leaders, women and the few traders who work at the Bejrawiya pyramids.  
Somewhat ironically, although rather predictably considering the rhetoric used in extant literature 
(Chapter 2), making sites tourist-friendly has figured heavily in archaeologists’ plans for the sites they 
work on in Sudan. The emphasis on tourism grew particularly strong when Meroe (including the 
pyramids), Musawwarat es-Sufra and Naga were granted ‘World Heritage’ status by UNESCO in 
2011. (The status was established under the joint heading of the ‘Island of Meroe’, meaning that while 
the three sites all possess World Heritage status, they constitute one World Heritage Site.) Following 
a call for public and private investors to open up the tourism sector by the Sudanese Minister of 
Tourism in the same year,
685
 there have been several tourism developments, including the Wadi 
Tarabil Museum, the Muzan Hotel and the Italian Camp near the pyramids; additionally, a number of 
tourist compounds in the case-study area are being constructed by local residents, such as the site 
guard of Meroe. The emphasis on developing sites for tourism grew again when the archaeological 
teams working in the Nile Valley received funding from the Qatar-sponsored Nubian Archaeological 
Development Organization (NADO) in 2013. Since then, a large complex, named Dohat Meroe with 
high barb-wire fences, a gym, high-speed internet and other mod cons, has also been built by 
NADO’s managing body, the Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP), to accommodate the 
increased needs of archaeologists and other professionals associated with the tourism industry.  
Despite these efforts, official data confirm that Sudan lacks a significant tourism industry. In 
1997, only 29 tourists visited the Island of Meroe UNESCO World Heritage Sites. In 2005, “the 
number had increased to more than 4,000 foreigners and about 2,500 national visitors”,686 but this 
decreased to a total of fewer than 6,000 tourists in 2010 and 2011.
687
 World Heritage status was 
intended to boost tourist numbers, but in 2013, Sudan had only 390,000 recreational visitors (as 
opposed to business visitors).
688
 There was nothing to suggest that tourist numbers were any higher 
during the fieldwork period (2015) or at the time of writing (2016-17).  
                                                     
685  Heierland 2009: 26. 
686 El-Masri 2010: 205. 
687 ICOMOS 2011: 104. 
688 UNWTO 2015. 
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Furthermore, the International Council on Monuments and Sites’s (ICOMOS) 2011 UNESCO 
evaluation report noted that “River Nile State has no comprehensive tourist plans” and that even at 
Meroe and the pyramids, Sudan’s most famous sites, “there is no central ticketing office, information 
centre, adequate and functioning toilets, interpretative panels and brochures, trained guides or 
established trails”.689 The UNESCO Management Plan, written by NCAM and supported by Western 
and British consultants as part of the UNESCO Nomination File, also acknowledges that buildings 
such as the Wadi Tarabil Museum is “incomplete for lack of money.”690 None of this has changed in 
the period under study, and observations by the present author suggest that the Muzan Hotel and the 
Italian Camp remain empty for most of the year. Moreover, as international arrivals appear to mostly 
originate from Saudi Arabia, the Gulf, and the wider Middle East,
691
 regions that are home to a large 
number of Sudanese expatriate workers, it is possible to presume that at least a portion of these 
visitors have kinship ties in the area and come to engage in family and community events rather than 
(solely) in archaeological tourism.  
The small amount of revenue that is generated from tourism, such as the US$10 site entrance 
fees charged to foreign tourists, also may not be trickling down to local economies: while income 
from the sites should be shared between the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums 
(NCAM) and the Department of Tourism in River Nile State,
692
 there is evidence to suggest that there 
is conflict over management of this allocation.
693
  
The Sudanese state’s continued international pariah status, the perceived lack of security694 and 
the real lack of tourism infrastructure mean that for the foreseeable future, tourism in Sudan is likely 
to remain small scale. Indeed, no matter the external input, the Sudanese government seems resistant 
to opening up the country to mass tourism, and ideological barriers between Sudan’s predominantly 
‘Nubian’ archaeology and the state (see Chapter 5) has meant that NCAM’s budget, allocated by the 
Sudanese Ministry of Finance, is not sufficient to support the tourism industry at a foundational 
level.
695
   
                                                     
689 ICOMOS 2011: 104. 
690 El-Masri 2010: 162. 
691 UNWTO 2015. 
692 ICOMOS 2011: 104. 
693 NCAM’s UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File notes that “[t]he Transitional Constitution of the Sudan 
(2005) contains some contradictory articles related to tourism that have given rise to tension between the local 
administration (State/Province level) and the Central Government” (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 56). In short, 
because the sites of Meroe have been designated as “national” sites, the revenue coming from them apparently 
cannot be directed to the state body (i.e. River Nile State) as would usually be the case with other, ostensibly less 
important, non-national sites. Instead, because Meroe is a national site, revenue should go to the Treasury, leading 
to “[c]onflicts of interest between the national level and the state level and the differing interpretations of 
constitutional and institutional mandate texts, which has sometimes led to situations of competition over the use of 
the cultural resources of the State and their exploitation” (El-Masri 2010: 182, 198). 
694 Several Western governments, including those of the UK and US, advise against all travel to west and south Sudan 
and warn of a general threat from terrorism in the rest of the country.  
695 El-Masri 2010: 162. El-Masri continues to explain: “NCAM’s budget is allocated on a yearly basis by the Ministry 
of Finance. The reluctance of the Ministry of Finance to approve budgetary increases and funding requests for 
‘Development Projects’ is seriously affecting NCAM’s performance and the ability to fulfill its mandate and plans. 
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Given the macro-level situation, it was thus not surprising that respondents in the case-study area 
of Hamadab-Bejrawiya evaluated archaeology’s benefit in micro-scale economic terms: whether or 
not archaeology financially contributes to their households via archaeological employment, referred to 
as shaqūl yomiyya (lit. daily work). Indeed broadly speaking, respondents deemed archaeology to be 
beneficial if they or a member of their household worked as an archaeological employee; conversely, 
it was regarded to be unbeneficial if they did not. Of course employment is not the only way in which 
archaeology has an economic impact: the ad hoc provision of services (above) is important, as is the 
effect of site management plans on agricultural yields (Chapters 2 and 7) and the dividends wrought 
in the informal economy by ‘looting’ (Chapters 2 and 8). However, respondent valuations make it 
clear that of the few ways in which archaeology financially contributes to (rather than detracts from) 
individual households, employment is generally perceived as the most impactful. Observations seem 
to support this: men queue up each season to sign on for work with the archaeologists (the present 
author has counted groups of up to 50); and, throughout the season, men and women can be seen 
approaching the archaeologists in the hope of being offered work.  
But the situation is more complex than this. Ali al-Hassani, who worked with Peter Shinnie (in 
the 1970s) and Fredrich Hinkel (in the 1990s), and who has three nephews that are currently 
employed by UCLQ, evaluated the overall benefit of archaeological work to be poor. Upon being 
asked what economic impact archaeology has had, he responded “nothing!”, and laughed. When 
asked if he had questions about archaeology, UCLQ employee Kalil Karim told the present researcher 
that the employees consistently ask one another, “what is the benefit?” Abdel Hakim, another UCLQ 
employee went even further, saying, “we want to deliver this message [to the archaeologists]: all the 
people here don't get fāida [from archaeology].” 
Given that a) the economic impact of archaeological employment is one of the least studied areas 
within academic scholarship on the discipline, b) there are major flaws in the literature that does 
examine it (see Chapter 2), and c) there is clear dissonance among respondent testimonies about the 
scale of its effect, there is an urgent need to examine and explicate the dimensions of this significant 
phenomenon. As noted in Chapters 3 and 5, several archaeological teams have worked in the case-
study area in recent years: two teams from the DAI, one in collaboration with the University of 
Shendi; one team from UCLQ; and teams from the University of Khartoum, which often collaborate 
with a team from the Royal Ontario Museum, Canada. The DAI and UCLQ teams were active during 
the field research for the present study, but most of the data that follows relates to the UCLQ mission.   
                                                                                                                                                        
In an attempt to address the financial deadlock which is seriously undermining NCAM's activities, and the ability 
to respond to urgent needs, a proposal was made to the government in order to transform the Corporation from a 
fully dependent government institution into a semi-governmental, semi-independent ‘Authority’…The Ministry of 
Finance rejected this proposal permitting only an immediate shift to semi-financial independency or maintaining 
the present status quo” (El-Masri 2010: 204). Yet see NCAM’s World Heritage Nomination File, which states that 
“NCAM is attached to the Ministry of Culture, Youth and Sport. Although its Director is responsible to the 
Minister, NCAM has its own independent budget and administration” (Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 80). 
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6.2 The Positive, if Limited, Impact of Employment 
6.2.1 Categories of Archaeological Work with UCLQ 
To conduct fieldwork, archaeologists live near the archaeological sites for a certain number of weeks 
or months per year, staying in one of the four dig houses in the case-study area. Three dig houses 
(referred to as ‘compounds’ by the archaeologists) are next to one another in Hamadab. Two 
compounds are leased to the DAI missions by local residents and one compound was purpose-built on 
rented land by the UCLQ mission. The fourth compound, located within Meroe itself, was constructed 
by Shinnie’s team in the 1960s, augmented by the Royal Ontario Museum team in the 2000s, and is 
now used mostly by teams from the University of Khartoum (who were absent during the period of 
fieldwork for this study, as mentioned above).  
There are two categories of employment related to archaeology on offer to residents in Hamadab-
Bejrawiya (Figure 17): permanent jobs in archaeological site protection, paid for by NCAM, and 
seasonal jobs with the archaeologists. In the first category are jobs with the Tourism and Antiquities 
Police. At Meroe, three residents are employed as policemen (dabid) to guard the site, although they 
work on rotation with men from other areas, and guard the Bejrawiya pyramids, too.
696
 Also in the 
first category are the two residents employed by NCAM as site guards to provide year-round 
protection for the archaeological sites in the area. One site guard works to protect Domat al-Hamadab, 
and has been employed for the past 20 years. The other site guard works to protect Meroe, a position 
which has been filled since 1939.
697
 These men receive an annual salary from NCAM and another 
seasonal salary from the archaeologists working at the sites they are charged with protecting. The 
amount of money which is injected into the local economy via these positions is unknown, although 
official data suggests that it is not much: the 2011 UNESCO Management Plan estimates that between 
NCAM and the project directors, c.US$220,000 is spent annually on “salaries of the employees 
engaged in guarding and administrative work on the property; archaeological research; and protection 
and restoration works” for all three World Heritage status sites in the region.698 
 
                                                     
696  NCAM additionally employs a number of staff in its regional office in Shendi, the nearest urban centre c.45km to 
the south. In 2011, the office had one inspector, four technical staff and over 20 permanent and temporary guards 
(ICOMOS 2011: 108). However, their distance from the sites and the irregularity of their interventions mean that 
they are rarely active in the case-study area. NCAM’s national office in Khartoum also assigns antiquities 
inspectors on rotation to oversee and monitor the activities of foreign archaeological teams, and their presence is 
mandatory during fieldwork. While the inspectors and other Sudanese team members, such as scientific specialists, 
university lecturers and students, are often paid by the archaeological team—in US dollars—they are not included 
in this study because they are invariably from Khartoum or elsewhere in Sudan, and spend only small amounts of 
money in Hamadab and Bejrawiya. 
697 The inauguration of this post is also noted in Arkell 1939. 
698 Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 78. 
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Figure 17. Categories of archaeological work in the case-study area. 
 
The second category of archaeological employment encompasses the seasonal wage labour jobs 
on offer from archaeologists. These jobs can be divided into three types: domestic help in the 
archaeologists’ dig houses, e.g. cooking and cleaning; off-site archaeological assistance; and work on 
archaeological excavations. Although other members of the communities can also be hired (e.g. bus 
drivers, builders), they are not included in this study because the use of their services is usually 
infrequent. The number of seasonal jobs on offer differs from team to team, depending on the plans of 
the project directors, who are responsible for recruiting teams (see below). In Hamadab-Bejrawiya, 
the UCLQ project director has hired residents for two archaeological seasons per year since the 
project began in 2012. In the November-December 2015 season, for instance, UCLQ and the DAI 
mission working at Domat al-Hamadab hired one man to cook and clean the kitchen on a daily basis 
and one woman to launder clothes each week. Three female residents were also hired as 
archaeological assistants to help with community engagement at one of UCLQ’s social events, and 
two female residents to wash pottery (see below, ‘The Impacts of this Research’). However, the main 
employment offered by UCLQ, and indeed the other missions in the area, is seasonal wage labour on 
archaeological excavations. Since 2013, UCLQ has employed 35 different men from Hamadab-
Bejrawiya (Table 3).
699
 The number of employees employed each season varied from 11 to 18, 
averaging 15 employees per season. The nature of the employee group has changed over time (see 
below), but from late 2014/early 2015 to 2016, 16 men worked for three seasons or more, signalling 
the annual re-hiring of a regular working group. These employees dig up sand and debris, move it to 
spoil heaps, brush surfaces, clean trench sections and collect and bag finds; sometimes they help with 
construction and other labour-intensive tasks. 
                                                     
699 It was not possible to attain reliable employment data for UCLQ’s inaugural 2012 season. 
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1 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 
2 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 5 
3 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 4 
4 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 4 
5 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 4 
6 ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 4 
7 - ✓ ✓ ✓ - ✓ 4 
8 ✓ ✓ - ✓ ✓ - 4 
9 ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 4 
10 ✓ ✓ - - ✓ ✓ 4 
11 - - ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 4 
12 ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - 3 
13 ✓ ✓ ✓ - - - 3 
14 - ✓ ✓ ✓ - - 3 
15 - ✓ ✓ - ✓ - 3 
16 ✓ ✓ - - - ✓ 3 
17 ✓ - ✓ - - - 2 
18 ✓ - ✓ - - - 2 
19 - - ✓ ✓ - - 2 
20 - - ✓ ✓ - - 2 
21 - - - ✓ - ✓ 2 
22 - - - - ✓ ✓ 2 
23 ✓ - - - - - 1 
24 - ✓ - - - - 1 
25 - - ✓ - - - 1 
26 - - ✓ - - - 1 
27 - - - ✓ - - 1 
28 - - - ✓ - - 1 
29 - - - ✓ - - 1 
30 - - - ✓ - - 1 
31 - - - - ✓ - 1 
32 - - - - ✓ - 1 
33 - - - - ✓ - 1 
34 - - - - - ✓ 1 
35 - - - - - ✓ 1 
Table 3. UCLQ employees, 2013-16. 
  
191 
6.2.2 Measuring Incomes from Archaeological Work with UCLQ  
As noted in Chapter 3, project directors commonly keep the finer financial details of their 
employment records private. But in order to allow this author to evaluate archaeology’s economic 
impact on site-communities in the case-study area, the UCLQ project director explained to the present 
researcher the basic wages given to the employees; provided anonymized data about the number of 
people she had employed (also see above) as well as the number of seasons each employee had 
worked; and supported the present author’s request to gather wage and employment data via her own 
semi-structured interviews with the 11 excavation employees who worked on the site in February 
2015 (see Chapter 3). 
Combined, this data has made it possible to calculate the incomes from wage labour on 
excavations from the November-December 2015 season (Table 4) and the March 2016 season (Table 
5). During both seasons, the basic wage was SDG60 per six-hour work day (US$9.8 at the average 
official exchange rate recorded between November 2015 and March 2016). On the occasions when 
the men were required by the project director to work longer or shorter shifts, the pay was adjusted on 
a pro-rata basis. In addition to the basic wage, the UCLQ project director sometimes pays each 
employee a one-time sum at the end of the season, typically SDG60-120 (US$10-20), equivalent to 
one or two days’ work.  
As clarified in Tables 4 and 5, in the November-December 2015 season, which lasted for 35 days, 
16 employees earned a collective total of SDG30,200 (US$4,950.8). On an individual basis, 
employees earned from SDG720 (US$118) to SDG2,260 (US$370.5). The average individual earning 
for this season was SDG1,887.5 (US$309.4).  
In the March 2016 season, which lasted for 18 days, 15 employees collectively earned a total of 
SDG17,195 (US$2,729.4). Individually, each employee earned from SDG360 (US$59) to SDG1,385 
(US$227). The average individual earning was SDG1146.3 (US$187.9).  
Of the 12 UCLQ employees who were employed both seasons (for 53 days over the five-month 
period from 2 November 2015 to 20 March 2016), individual combined earnings from both seasons 
ranged from SDG1,260 (US$206.6) to SDG3,525 (US$577.9). The average total individual earning 
for these 12 employees was SDG3,042.5 (US$498.77). Excluding the one individual who earned 
SDG1,260 (US$206.6) over both seasons—far less than the other 11 employees—the average pay for 
those who were employed over the 53-day period rises to SDG3,204.5 (US$525.3).   
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1 1,080 1,980 3,060 
2 1,385 2,140 3,525 
3 1,155 2,260 3,415 
4 1,215 2,200 3,415 
5 1,215 2,200 3,415 
6 1,385 2,140 3,525 
7  - 2,020 2,020 
8 1,145 2,260 3,405 
9 890 1,980 2,870 
10 360 900 1,260 
11  - - - 
12 1,275 2,080 3,355 
13 1,095 940 2,035 
14  - 2,200 2,200 
15  - 2,140 2,140 
16 1,190 2,040 3,230 
17 1,155 - 1,155 
18 1,265 - 1,265 
19 - - - 
20 - - - 
21 - - - 
22 - - - 
23 1,385 - 1,385 
24 - 720 720 
25 - - - 
26 - - - 
27 - - - 
28 - - - 
29 - - - 
30 - - - 
31 - - - 
32 - - - 
33 - - - 
34 - - - 
35 - - - 
Table 4. Wage data for UCLQ employees, Nov-Dec 2015 and March 2016. 
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Total Earnings (SDG) 1,7195  30,200  47,395  
Total Earnings (US$) 2,729.4 4,950.8 
 
7,769.7 
Average Earnings/Employee (SDG) 1,146.3 1,887.5   
Average Earnings/Employee (US$) 187.9 309.4  
Table 5. Total and average earnings for UCLQ employees, Nov-Dec 2015 and March 2016. 
 
6.2.2.1 The Scale of Archaeological Employment’s Local Impact   
The question now arises as to what these wages mean in real terms, for the individual employees and 
their households, and for the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya more broadly. 
 
6.2.2.1.1 Households 
In Sudan, as elsewhere, wages earned from employment have an economic impact beyond the 
individual employee because they augment the income of their household (see Chapter 4). Of course, 
household members are not solely wage consumers, nor are the employees only wage generators: in 
the interviews with this author, the UCLQ employees revealed that they spend an average of 20% of 
their wages on personal items such as mobile phone credit, clothes and cigarettes. However, in the 
cultural context of the case-study area, most of the cash income earned by household members is 
invested back into the household, meaning that archaeological employment has an automatic impact 
upon households as well as individuals. Furthermore, the demographic and employment data 
abstracted from the interviews conducted with the 11 UCLQ excavation employees in February 2015 
(Table 7, below) show that all employees contribute to households made up of between seven and 10 
people—just under nine on average—which is much higher than the national average of 6.1.700 Their 
dependency ratio is also high: there are on average 5.7 persons of dependent age (under 15 and over 
65 years) for every local resident of working age; the national average ratio is 4:1.
701
 It might thus be 
posited that archaeological employment has a particularly significant economic impact upon the 
employees and their households.  
                                                     
700 CBS 2010: 14. 
701 UNFPA 2012. 
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It may also be reasonably presumed that the value of archaeological income is high because 
while the livelihoods of all of the employees’ households are founded principally upon farming or 
livestock rearing (whether husbandry at home or grazing in the hinterland) or a mixture of the two, 
they all undertake some form of wage labour in agriculture or archaeology in order to meet the needs 
of their household. Archaeological employment thus figures in both farming and pastoral households’ 
strategy of off-farm livelihood diversification in a tough and variable economic climate. 
Since 2013, income from seasonal wage employment generated by the archaeological activities 
of UCLQ has therefore directly benefited 35 households in the case-study area, or 7.14% of the c.490 
households in the case-study area (see Chapter 4 and below). While seemingly small, this figure is in 
fact rather high given that this is an economic context in which most households are severely pressed 
financially and some endure periods with no non-agricultural income at all,
702
 their incomes have a 
real impact. Indeed, it should not be overlooked that 32% of the population of River Nile State live 
below the poverty line, defined in 2011 as US$1.9 per day or some US$693 per year. This figure rises 
above 40% in relation to the rural inhabitants of River Nile State. Combined with the information 
gained about the employees’ above-average household size and high dependency ratios, 
archaeological employment seems to be a very impactful economic phenomenon. 
 
6.2.2.1.2 Site-Communities 
Evidence also suggests that the income generated by archaeological employment produces indirect 
benefits for site-community residents not directly employed in archaeology. Data gathered from 
observations indicate that much of the income earned from employment with UCLQ is spent locally: 
in markets, on locally-produced goods and food (food expenditure as part of income is estimated by 
Salih as being as high as 60%
703
); social commitments (12%
704
); and other goods or services available 
within the case-study area such as medicine, clothing and travel (26%
705
). Therefore if, as Salih 
suggests, “the life of the individual…is a series of social connections and commitments, knitted kin, 
friendship and neighbourhood”, 706  this research might posit that by boosting household income, 
archaeological employment also provides valuable indirect economic benefits for the broader site-
community. 
Archaeology’s economic impact upon the site-community may also be roughly scaled up, going 
beyond the households of the UCLQ employees, because there have been at least two other 
                                                     
702 According to the CBS’ National Baseline Household Survey, “for non-agricultural based income, 19 percent [sic] 
of all households reported no income last month prior to the survey and similar [sic] 13 percent [sic] of the 
households for the last 12 months” (CBS 2010: 29). 
703   Salih 1999: 52.  
704   Salih 1999: 52. 
705   Salih 1999: 52. 
706 Salih 1999: 123. 
  
195 
archaeological teams at work there for the past 15 years. Observation by this author shows that the 
DAI Domat al-Hamadab project employed at least 18 employees in the spring of 2015 and, by 
common agreement, paid the same wage as UCLQ, namely SDG60 for a six-hour day. Data provided 
to this author by the DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director also show that this number has been 
even higher in the past: in 2013-14, the mission employed 30 different employees from Hamadab and 
Bejrawiya.  Some of these employees have also been working with one or other of the archaeological 
teams (listed above) for many years now. In addition, the Qatar Mission to the Pyramids of Sudan 
(QMPS), a Qatar-sponsored team based at the pyramids, employed at least 40 men from the case-
study area to conduct excavations in late 2015; their compound at Dohat Meroe (above) has also 
provided some graduates in the case-study area with jobs in security or at reception. 
Taking a historic view on archaeology’s economic impact in the case-study area, one might also 
note that archaeological employment has been on offer at various times for over 100 years. Earlier 
archaeologists even seem to have employed many times the number of employees hired by 
contemporary missions. In the early 20
th
 Century, for example, John Garstang’s University of 
Livepool team hired between 300 and 500 men from Hamadab-Bejrawiya to work at Domat al-
Hamadab and Meroe.
707
 Later, in 1971, Shinnie hired 100 men to work for him as he excavated at 
Meroe.
708
 Conservative estimates, based on the number of teams working in Sudan (from over 60 
between 1960 and 1969
709
 to at least 40 in 2015), suggest that during more than a century of 
archaeology in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, archaeologists have provided seasonal employment for 
thousands of residents, benefiting the whole site-community as well as their individual households.  
 
6.2.2.2 Archaeological Income vs. the Official Minimum Wage 
Relating earnings from archaeological employment more specifically to total household incomes in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya is not straightforward, not least because of the paucity and unreliability of 
official data, and especially at the local level. Estimates of Sudan’s per-capita gross national income 
(GNI), for example, can vary because estimates of both gross national income and population size are 
                                                     
707 Garstang notes that he brought an Egyptian man named Saleh abd el-Nebi to act as head foreman, and that in 
1910-11, “under [Saleh abd el-Nebi’s] charge forty of our trained Arabs came from their homes in Egypt to take 
part in the work…each overlooking a gang of native labourers, of whom some three to five hundred were more or 
less constantly employed” (Garstang, Phytian and Sayce 1914: 46). In the third season, Garstang reports that the 
number of local workers was cut down given the construction and use of a cable-way (Garstang, Phytian and 
Sayce 1914, in the section entitled “Third interim report on the excavations at to Meroe in Ethiopia”). Garstang’s 
colleague, Mond, noted the following season that “it saves a remarkable proportion in wages, doing the work of 
100 carrier boys” (this extract is taken from, “Note on a ropeway carrier for use in excavations” from the “Third 
interim report”, above). However, even with the loss of 100 employees, the numbers would have been much higher 
than they are today. Also see Török, Hofman and Nagy 1997. 
708  Email interview with John Robertson, October 2016. 
709 Jakob and Ali 2011: 516. 
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inconsistent. Thus, according to the World Bank, per-capita GNI in 2015 was US$1,740 
(SDG10,614).
710
 In contrast, the UN puts the figure at US$2,100 (SDG12,810).
711
 Moreover, these 
kinds of national averages conceal significant variations between genders, occupational groups and 
places of residence, among other factors to consider. As a general principle, incomes in Sudan’s rural 
areas are lower than in urban areas; the incomes of farmers and livestock herders are also lower than 
those working in industry. In the absence of detailed and official date, the per-capita incomes of the 
farmers and pastoralists of Hamadab-Bejrawiya can thus be plausibly assumed to be below the 
national average. 
A perhaps more meaningful exercise to grasp the contextual dimensions of wages earned from 
archaeological work is to compare them with the official minimum wage. Until 2014, the minimum 
wage was SDG165 (US$29 at the average 2014 official exchange rate of US$1=SDG5.7) per month 
or SDG1,980 (US$347.3) per year. In that year, it was raised by 250% by a presidential decree to 
SDG425 (US$74.5) per month, equivalent to SDG5,100 (US$894.7) per year. However, the official 
minimum wage applies mostly in industry and in urban areas; elsewhere, it is widely ignored, and 
especially in rural areas, where job opportunities are in short supply and casual labourers often have 
to accept what they can get.  
Nevertheless, the official minimum wage offers a useful benchmark against which income from 
archaeology can be evaluated. Indeed, those who were employed by UCLQ over the 53-day period 
spanning between November 2015 and March 2016 on average earned 60% of the annual minimum 
wage. The highest paid employee (SDG3,525) earned 69% of the annual minimum wage over the 
aforementioned 53-day period alone; even the lowest paid (SDG1,260) earned 24.7% of the annual 
minimum wage during the same period.  
The real value of archaeological wages becomes ever more apparent when considering that 
unskilled labour, especially in agriculture, is often paid well below the official minimum wage, if paid 
at all. Indeed, daily wages in agriculture are considerably lower than in any other sector; at a national 
level, one quarter of all agricultural workers earn below US$3.2 (SDG20) per day, and almost half 
receive no income at all.
712
 When compared to the official minimum wage, archaeological 
employment therefore appears to be a very lucrative occupation for households. 
 
                                                     
710 World Bank 2015b. 
711 UN DESA 2015. 
712 World Bank Group 2015a. 
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6.2.2.3 Archaeological Income vs. Rural Household Consumption 
Another approach to quantitatively evaluate the value of the employee’s income from archaeology is 
to compare it against household consumption. A limitation of this method is that the data, from the 
National Baseline Household Survey (CBS 2010), are available only at the national and state levels 
and are out-of-date (see Chapter 3). An attempt is nonetheless worthwhile. 
In 2009, average monthly total rural household consumption was estimated at SDG122 (US$53 
at the average 2009 official exchange rate of US$1=SDG2.3).
713
 Correcting for the steep annual 
increases in consumer prices between 2009 and 2016, which was on average 23.4% during this period 
according to the World Bank,
714
 would significantly raise this amount. Assuming constant 
consumption moving in line with—and unaffected by—consumer price rises, and without fully 
correcting for significant currency devaluation, average monthly total rural household consumption 
would, in early 2017, in this author’s estimation, be SDG640 ($97 at the official exchange rate in 
January 2017) or SDG7,680 (US$1,163.6) per year at the national level. Although hard data is not 
available, observation, interviews and anecdotal evidence, in addition to the socio-economic trends 
noted above, point to average household consumption in the relatively poor locality of Hamadab-
Bejrawiya being significantly lower than the state and national averages for rural areas.  
Nonetheless, assuming household consumption in line with the national average for rural areas, 
the average earnings of those who worked for UCLQ in the 53-day period between November 2015 
and March 2016 equated to 39% of annual rural household consumption. In other words, for the 
employees in the case-study area, earnings from archaeological employment alone could sustain 
household consumption for approximately five months of the year. 
The value of average earnings from archaeological work relative to average rural household 
consumption rises to 103.2% for the 140-day period between the beginning of the November 2015 
season and the end of the March 2016 season. 
Again, ethnographic data combined with a quantitative comparison to average monthly rural 
household consumption suggests that, at a household level, the wages made from archaeological 
employment are significant. 
 
                                                     
713 CBS 2010: 27. 
714  World Bank 2017. 
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6.2.2.4 Archaeological vs. Non-Archaeological Income 
An additional route to measure the impact of archaeological income is to compare it with the 
employees’ other incomes. World Bank data (above) showed that archaeological wages compares 
favourably with the official minimum wage for unskilled labour and agriculture, and that daily wages 
in agriculture are considerably lower than in any other sector; at a national level, one-quarter of all 
agricultural workers earn below SGD20 (US$3.2) per day, with almost half receiving no income at 
all.
715
 However, although the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and Ja’aliyīn farmers alike regard 
archaeological employment in the form of excavation jobs as the most beneficial aspect of 
archaeology, and while the results above suggest that archaeological employment is a valuable source 
of household income, all of the 11 UCLQ employees who were interviewed for this research 
perceived archaeological employment as paying poorly in comparison with other unskilled wage-
labour occupations. Indeed, each employee described their pay of SDG60 (US$9.8) for a six-hour day 
in 2015-16 (SDG10/hour) as “low” or “not enough”, noting that they pay for breakfast on rotation at a 
cost of SDG8/day. 
Of the UCLQ employees interviewed for this study, the Ja’alī farmers, Bashir Kamal, Abdel 
Hakim and Zubeir Rahma, who diversify their incomes by doing farm work for other landowners or 
tenant farmers, reported that such seasonal agricultural labour paid SDG70-SDG100 (US$11.5-16.4) 
for a ten-hour day (SDG7-SDG10/hour) of threshing, harvesting and clearing fields. Ten hours of 
work from 8am to 6pm or sunset at a government-sponsored agricultural project to the north at 
Mahmia paid SDG90 (US$14.8), equivalent to SDG9/hour. Meanwhile, planting onions for local 
farmers from 2pm to 6.30pm earned them SDG50-SDG60 (US$8.2-9.8), equivalent to SDG11-
SDG13/hour.  
The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, Jabir Malik, Kalil Karim, Jahid Latif, Nasir Muawad, 
Faisal Kazim, Halil Masoud, Azim Rafiq and Hamid al-Harun, who predominantly diversify their 
incomes with artisanal gold mining, also perceive the potential income from the latter to be much 
higher then archaeological employment. In the interviews with the present author, they claimed that 
five weeks’ work at mines could yield gold worth anywhere from SDG3,000 to SDG9,000 
(US$491.8-US$1,475.4) when sold at the markets in ed-Damer and Berber. If true, that would equate 
to SDG600-SDG1,800 (US$98.4-295.1) per week against the SDG420 (US$68.9) per week from 
archaeological work. These perceptions persist even though returns at the higher end of the scale are 
rare. Indeed, the pastoralists explained to this author that some trips to the gold mines yield little or 
nothing; the work is dangerous and potentially damaging to health; is far from home; and involves 
significant expenses, such as transportation, equipment, food and water. Faisal Kazim, who 
abandoned school to go to the gold mines, reported his expenses as being SDG35 (US$5.7) for one 
                                                     
715 World Bank Group 2015a. 
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amphora (zir) of water and upwards of SDG750 (US$ 123) for a phone with a good GPS, referred to 
as “magellān” (Magellan®). Speaking about the monetary gains of gold mining, using a hypothetical 
‘find’ worth SDG9,000 (US$1,475.4), Jabir Malik explained to this author that after necessary 
division of revenue with the providers of the transportation and of the mining equipment, he might be 
left with SDG3,000 (US$491.8). This is then subject to further reductions of SDG300 (US$49.1) for 
the cost of food and at least SDG300 (US$49.1) for water, noting that the latter rises exponentially 
during the summer. Nevertheless, Faisal, Jabir and the other pastoral employees are attracted to the 
gold mines by the chance of a big pay-day.  
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  Table 6. UCLQ Employees’ Employment Profiles, February 2015. 
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6.2.2.5 Impact of Inflation and Devaluation on Archaeological Income 
Alongside the dissonance noted at the start of this chapter, there is clearly a tension between the 
quantitative assessments above and the evaluations presented by the qualitative data, and sometimes 
within the qualitative data itself. While the present author was not expecting a blemish-free report on 
the wages provided by archaeologists, employee evaluations were nonetheless surprising and 
signalled the need for further investigation. Indeed, upon inspection, one reason why archaeological 
wages are perceived to be low in comparison with other wage labour may be because they have not 
kept pace with the high rate of inflation that has afflicted Sudan in recent years, which puts “upward 
pressure on food prices and…aggravates the poverty situation.”716  
Although the daily wages offered by UCLQ (and DAI) were increased from SDG30 in 2013 to 
SDG50 in early 2014, and then SDG60 in late 2015—thus doubling in nominal terms between 2013 
and 2015—they barely kept pace with inflation, which was 30%, 37% and 17% in 2013, 2014 and 
2015 respectively, according to the World Bank.
717
 To have kept pace with inflation (of 19% in 
2016
718
), the daily wage would have had to rise to at least SDG65 by the March 2016 season, 
suggesting an approximate 10% decline in real wages since 2013, despite the doubling of wages. This 
is an oversight and shows that the employees’ claim that archaeological employment is less 
remunerative than other off-farm options is clearly not unfounded and cannot be ignored (see Chapter 
8
719
). 
In this vein, the severe devaluation of the Sudanese pound in recent years should be also 
considered. Shortages of hard currency due to US sanctions and reduced oil export revenues has given 
rise to parallel currency markets; foreigners typically convert currency to Sudanese pounds at the 
black market rate, which is widely available in markets and shops. In November 2016, the Central 
Bank of Sudan introduced “an incentive policy” which allowed commercial banks to adopt much 
higher conversion rates, close to the black market rate (see Chapter 4).
720
  
In March 2013, the black market rate for the US dollar was SDG6.3-5 while the official 
exchange rate was approximately 30% lower, at SDG4.4.
721
 At the end of the UCLQ mission’s March 
2016 season, the US dollar black market rate had risen to 13SDG;
722
 the official exchange rate was 
half as high, at SDG6.4. This trend has continued: in early 2017, the US dollar traded for as high as 
                                                     
716 UNDP 2016a. 
717  World Bank 2017. 
718  World Bank 2017. 
719  This issue was fortunately resolved at the time of discovery: upon being told this result by the present author, the 
UCLQ project director immediately approached her colleagues at the DAI to coordinate an increase of the wage 
for the subsequent seasons (see below, ‘The Impacts of this Research’). 
720  Reuters, ‘Sudan offers its citizens broad incentive to sell dollars to banks’, 5 November 2016. 
721  Sudan Tribune, ‘US dollar losing ground to Sudanese pound on black market: traders’, 16 March 2013. 
722  Reuters, ‘UPDATE 1-Sudanese pound falls sharply against dollar on black market’, 12 April 2016. 
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SDG19.4 while the official exchange rate was SDG 6.8.
723
 Assuming that the official exchange rate 
has been used as the method of currency conversion by archaeologists, budgets in local currency 
would have expanded by 45% over 2013-16 solely due to devaluation. If the black market rate is used, 
the latter figure rises to 106%, meaning that local currency budgets would have doubled, easily 
covering the wage increases without a need for larger budgets in the original (foreign) currencies.  
The scale of the impact of local currency devaluation on the purchasing power of archaeological 
missions should not be underestimated, particularly given the combination of the Central Bank of 
Sudan’s recent 'incentive policy’ amid the ongoing devaluation. For instance, the US dollar black 
market rate in early 2017 was more than quadruple that of the official exchange rate in 2013. It is 
unclear whether this potential significant boost in the purchasing power of foreign archaeological 
mission will translate into higher local spending, including on wages. The latter is a poignant point to 
bear in mind given that the inflation which has been eroding the purchasing power of local households 
is partly driven by currency devaluation.          
 
6.2.2.6 Non-Monetary Benefits of Archaeological Work  
Despite UCLQ’s local employees’ concerns about the rate of pay, they value their jobs and come back 
each year to work. One of the farming Ja’alī employees, Bashir Kamal, explicitly stated to this author 
that his employment with the archaeologists has been long term and that he has anxiety about being 
re-employed and thus not losing his job to others (see below). This is not just about paucity of 
employment elsewhere: when asked about their reasons for choosing to work for the archaeologists, it 
became clear that the UCLQ employees conceptually offset their perceptions of poor rates of pay with 
six main perceived non-monetary benefits. Indeed, interview evidence show that the employees 
evaluate their off-farm employment options, including archaeology, against a broad range of criteria. 
This shows that when “making choices in the context of constraint”724 occupational options are not 
evaluated solely by their monetary value. For example, when given the hypothetical choice of “going 
to the gold” or working in archaeology, Jabir Malik replied with a representative answer: 
I would choose working in archaeology because it’s closer to my home, and I can go back to my home 
easily… The money [is OK], I guess, [and] it’s not too far, like [the gold mines]; [I don’t] have to pay 
travel… We only work for a few hours, from 7[am] to 1[pm]. After [work we] can come back to the 
goats and sheep and feed them.  
                                                     
723  Sudan Tribune, ‘U.S. dollar inches up against Sudanese pound on black market’, 20 February 2017. 
724 Neugeboren and Jacobson 2001: 1. 
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Jabir’s reply shows that proximity to the household and short working hours are two perceived 
benefits of archaeological employment. Bashir’s statement (above) shows that a third perceived 
benefit is its regularity; in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the availability of opportunities for wage labour on 
local farms is irregular and uncertain.  
Other conversational data suggest that the relative physical safety of archaeological employment 
is a fourth reason why the men, and their families, prefer it to artisanal gold mining; the wives and 
mothers of the men who mine for gold frequently expressed relief at their husbands’ or sons’ 
decisions to work for the archaeologists. Another important (fifth) perceived benefit of archaeological 
employment to household incomes in Hamadab-Bejrawiya is that the employees are paid in cash 
(garūsh) for each week’s work every Thursday afternoon rather than given payment-in-kind. Cash is 
scarce in rural Sudan and is preferred to payment-in-kind, which is widespread; for example, 
pastoralists who assist farmers with their harvests are often paid in animal fodder, which is welcome 
because the encroachment of large-scale farming has reduced their grazing land (see Chapter 4). 
However, payment-in-kind limits the receiver’s purchasing power because of its relative inflexibility 
as an illiquid commodity. Inputs, or ‘factors of production’, such as seeds, fertilizers, livestock, 
vaccines and fuel, are needed by both farmers and livestock herders and can only be purchased with 
cash. If farmers cannot buy the inputs they need, crop and livestock yields suffer. Of course, cash 
income from other off-farm activities could fulfil this function; however, they are arguably less 
dependable. Gold mining and even the sporadic migration of Ja’aliyīn youth to the cities can be 
undertaken year-round and in spontaneous ways to fill gaps between other seasonal jobs. Although 
both have the appeal of being flexible, neither source provides guaranteed income. The scarcity of 
cash was frequently mentioned in discussions with residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya more generally, 
and if a job is spoken about, however briefly, the speaker always tends to note if it does or does not 
pay in cash; in interviews with employees, cash was thus highlighted as another non-monetary benefit.  
Moreover, while particular to the Ja’aliyīn farmers, a sixth non-monetary benefit is the fact that 
opportunities for archaeological employment is on offer twice during the ‘annual deficit period’ 
(December-March), when households are most economically strained and find themselves obliged to 
seek credit (Table 6, also see Chapter 4). Credit is hard to come by and rarely amounts to little more 
than 5% of the total cost of inputs to crop production; borrowers often default on their loans, which 
can create tension and even conflict. It should thus be stressed that the typical arrival of the 
archaeologists in November-December, at the start of the ‘deficit’ period, and once again in the New 
Year, until March, at which point the ‘deficit period’ ends, is especially useful to the Ja’alī farmers. 
Data suggests that the cash earned in March is particularly advantageous to those households that 
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have taken out loans, since the government usually requires repayment during the ‘surplus’ period 
(April-July).
725
  
 
    
 Surplus Period April to July Living off harvest sales; low expenditure, 
enough for subsistence but not investment. 
Balance Period August to 
November 
Living off savings and stored food; farm and 
off-farm activities few. 
 
Archaeological 
Employment 
 
Deficit Period December to 
March 
Money low, fewer stored crops; high 
expenditure on household. 
Archaeological 
Employment 
Table 7. The Capital Circuit and the Archaeological Seasons (adapted from Ahmed 2012: 324-5). 
 
A seventh, but no less important, non-monetary benefit of working for archaeologists is the 
concomitant increase in one’s social capital and thus social networks. Over time, and because of the 
archaeologists’ access to economic capital, perceived power and relative influence—aided in no small 
part by the archaeologists’ cooperation with the Sudanese state (see Chapter 7)—archaeological 
employment is perceived to act as a conduit for social mobility and access to resources. Each 
employee also has a certain amount of economic influence by virtue of enjoying first refusal for 
additional paid work, and futher, being more likely to have other relatives in archaeological 
employment. The UCLQ employees also mention how, if one of them is ill, the archaeologists allow 
him to send another household member as a substitute, which is important to maintain the household’s 
earning power (again, see below). Indeed, eight of the 11 employees interviewed in February 2015 
had relatives in employment with one or other of the archaeological teams (Table 7, above; also see 
below), and each employee described hearing about the archaeologists’ arrival each season via one of 
their family members. Furthermore, in looking at the site-community residents’ relative degree of 
closeness to the archaeologists, who are perceived to be rather elusive, it is noteworthy that apart from 
the site guards, the excavation employees spend the most time with archaeologists. This can elicit 
further personal favours and establish relationships of quasi-economic significance such as tokens of 
friendship, wedding gifts, and donations of leftover equipment and so on, although this is hard to 
quantify. 
* 
                                                     
725 Ahmed 2012: 326, Table 4. Also see Ahmed, Sulaiman and Mohd 2012. 
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On aggregate, the wages earned from the seasonal work offered by archaeologists generates a 
palpable and positive economic impact for the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya and its 
households. In contrast, and despite being used by archaeologists and other heritage professionals to 
justify their interventions, tourism offers negligible economic dividends to these residents and indeed 
to the whole of Sudan. With a number of hurdles to overcome, the time at which tourism will produce 
impactful sums for the residents seems far off.  
More specific results of this economic investigation show that, while a limited proportion of site-
community households are impacted by archaeological employment (members of 7.14% of the 
households in the case-study area worked for the UCLQ mission between 2013 and 2016), the above-
average household size of the employees and their high dependency ratios mean that the earnings 
from archaeology go further than they might do elsewhere. Furthermore, undertaking archaeological 
employment provides both pastoralists and farmers with an opportunity to diversify their livelihoods 
and income streams to minimize insecurity in an environment of scarcity and economic uncertainty. 
Given the above-average number of archaeological teams which work in the case-study area, and the 
years over which archaeological employment has been on offer, these findings can also be scaled up.  
Very close examination of wage data suggested that earnings from archaeological work were 
even more impressive; in just 53 working days over the November 2015-March 2016 period, the 
UCLQ excavation employees earned on average 60% of the annual official minimum wage; or, 39% 
of the average annual rural household consumption.  
Yet there was also a tension between the types of data under examination. While quantitative 
data clearly show the positive economic impact of archaeology, qualitative data provided by UCLQ 
employees showed they were largely of the opinion that their compensation was low compared with 
other wage labour occupations. This perception may be related to the impact of high inflation in 
recent years, which includes an approximate 10% decline in real wages for archaeological work over 
2013-15, despite UCLQ’s doubling of wages during this period.  
Nevertheless, the employees were keen to secure employment with the archaeologists, as were 
other residents of the case-study area. This is because overall, archaeological employment provides 
not only a wage but also carries important non-monetary benefits including: proximity to home; safety 
and regularity; payments in cash, which is scarce and which arrives at a convenient point in the capital 
cycle; and, perhaps most importantly, unlike other jobs in the region, offers new channels through 
which social, economic and political networks can be expanded.  
The implications of these results for archaeological practice are discussed in depth in Chapter 8, 
but essentially discuss the author’s opinion that in contexts such as this, archaeology’s economic 
impact via employment needs to be considered alongside, if not in preference to, its impact via 
tourism. As part of this recommendation, the present author reiterates the conclusion that while 
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employment produces good economic dividends and is thus positive overall, the UCLQ and DAI 
Domat al-Hamadab wage still did not keep in line with the devaluation of the SDG or reflect the high 
rate of inflation. The economic context therefore needs to be carefully considered by project directors 
when deciding on wages. 
 
 
6.3 Archaeology’s Social Ramifications 
6.3.1 An Unexpected Reaction 
Through the collection of data for this economic examination, it became clear to the present author 
that archaeology’s impact upon the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya is not limited to the 
money that employment contributes to households and site-communities: archaeological employment 
has social ramifications, too. One of the times that this was most apparent was during an interview 
with two of UCLQ’s Ja’alī employees, Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal.726 As with the structured 
interviews with the other nine UCLQ employees, once the formal questions about their economic 
status had been answered, they were asked: “Is there any information you want to give me or think I 
should know?” In contrast to the Manāsīr employees, who had tended to ask questions about the 
present author, Abdel Hakim immediately responded:   
The people in our neighbourhood keep saying to us, “Why are the ‘arab [pastoralists] who work with 
[the archaeologists] more [in number] than you?” We don’t have money or resources, just [work at] 
school, agriculture and construction. Even the students on holiday [cannot] find work. 
Bashir Kamal then, unprompted, told this author:  
This is our land and our archaeology. Why does [the archaeological project director] let them [the 
pastoralists] work with us? We have educated people but they are jobless. 
The end of the interview was thus dominated by the question of why the pastoralists are hired by 
UCLQ in greater numbers than the Ja’aliyīn, a situation that Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal perceive 
as a great injustice. Although both have relatives in archaeological employment (they are both related 
to Meroe's site guard; Bashir Kamal’s brother is employed by UCLQ, as is Abdel Hakim’s father), 
Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were indeed working in a team in which eight of the 11 employees 
were pastoralists and only three were Ja’alī farmers (Table 7, above). And, as noted in Chapter 4, the 
                                                     
726  Interview with Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal, February 2015. As it was a recorded interview, it has also been 
possible to quote the text and analyze the use of language more carefully. 
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Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya pastoralists are relative newcomers to the case-study area and 
herald a new, more diverse and less certain future for the Ja’aliyīn. There are wide differences 
between their lifestyle and that of the predominantly Ja’alī sedentary farmers, and these differences 
are drawn out by Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal in the interview to make and substantiate their 
claim that the allocation of jobs in this way is unfair. 
First, both men refer to their fellow Manāsīr and Hassaniyya employees as ‘arab, a word they 
used as a derogatory reference to nomads or people who move around the landscape and live with 
their animals; not to signify a genealogical link with the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula (although as 
noted in Chapter 4, such a link exists). The word ‘arab is deliberately used by Abdel Hakim, and later 
Bashir Kamal, and indeed by most Ja’aliyīn, in a pejorative way because they consider pastoral and 
nomadic lifestyles to be inferior to their own agricultural livelihood and settled community. Despite 
the increase in livelihood diversification, which undoubtedly blurs the lines between farmers and 
pastoralists, they directly contrast being a pastoralist with their own (normative) identity as educated 
farmers and the respectable jobs that farming families do. Clearly the Ja’aliyīn feel they strengthen 
their claim to archaeological jobs by narrating the ‘backwardness’ of pastoralist livelihoods and land 
uses. 
Their use of the word ‘arab was particularly striking because it contrasted with the semi-
structured part of the interview in which the questions referred to the other employees as “Manāsīr” 
and “Hassaniyya” and Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal had followed suit: they only used the word 
‘arab during the unstructured discussion at the end of the semi-structured interview. To the present 
author, this demonstrated very clearly that they see the allocation of jobs by the UCLQ archaeologists 
to the pastoralists as sufficiently unfair to tap into their insecurity and lead them to speak of their co-
workers in stereotypical and disparaging ways.  
From the Ja’alī perspective, the pastoralists’ nomadic lifestyle also presupposes the lack of an 
ancestral connection to the land and consequently a lack of rights to the resources it bears. It is clear 
that Abdel Hakim believes that his gabīla, the Ja’aliyīn, own the land along with the archaeological 
sites, and thus, the jobs ‘their’ land generates. This demonstrates that archaeological sites are seen as 
an integral part of the land; part and parcel of, rather than separate to, the Ja’alī site-community 
residents’ property. Indeed, Bashir Kamal asserted a sentiment that goes some way to justifying this 
view of ownership of land (and rights over archaeology’s benefits) when he stated to this author:  
We are the original citizens…This is not their hometown; they just came for water and agriculture; they 
are ‘arab… We have a saying here, ‘the chicken of al-khala [the hinterland] comes to the house and 
kicks out the chicken of al-bahr [the Nile].’ 
Bashir’s claim to ‘originality’ here refers to the Ja’aliyīn’s claims to have been the people who 
first settled in the area and thus the group with the most legitimate claim on the land. The Manāsīr and 
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Hassaniyya’s perceived lack of long-term investment in the land that this implies is also hinted here. 
Their origin thus justifies their prior claim to resources, as does their status as “citizens” 
(remembering from Chapter 4 that the Local Committees do not register the pastoral settlers as part of 
the community, and that they did not appear even in the Sudan government’s most recent national 
census in 2008). 
In his first statement (above), Bashir Kamal also makes overt reference to the Ja’aliyīn in his 
neighbourhood of Bejrawiya being “educated,” which implies that, by contrast, the pastoralists are 
less educated. He further states that the pastoralists are “jobless.” In this context, ‘being jobless’ is 
better understood to mean ‘they have no profession’ since to acquire a profession one needs formal 
education. Formal education in the school system is not a large part of the pastoral life experience and 
identity, even though ‘nomadic school attendance’ is increasing as part of a broader national initiative 
to settle nomads and pastoralists (see Chapter 4). For the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya, education rather 
involves a series of movements to and from the hinterland as one grows with age. Value is put on 
experience and the things one sees in the hinterland, and how to utilize natural resources. For example, 
the skill of avoiding snakes, and awareness of how to treat their bites, were extremely common topics 
of conversation, as was knowledge of grass, trees, water and other natural resources. Therefore, while 
for a variety of logistical as well as cultural reasons the pastoralists continue to have low school 
attendance rates, Bashir Kamal notes that when the UCLQ archaeologists arrived in 2012,  
We were busy with studying. That is why the people in our area keep telling us we should be more 
[involved in archaeological work] than them…[They say:] ‘We have a lot of graduated people without 
work and need the basic services. We should have something from this money.’ 
Clearly, a formal education is perceived by both men to make them and their Ja’alī neighbours 
more deserving of archaeological employment than the pastoralists. The importance of possessing a 
formal education is key to the Ja’aliyīn’s identity construction in this context. Six further statements 
along the same lines show that there is a perception that the ‘arab only work with the archaeologists 
because they were available for work when the archaeologists arrived in Hamadab-Bejrawiya and 
began to hire people. According to Abdel Hakim, the pastoralists were available for work because 
“they don’t go to school and just go to al-dhahab [gold-mining] and al-khala [hinterland, for grazing 
animals].” In contrast, Bashir Kamal contends that they, the Ja’aliyīn, “were at school and busy with 
the agriculture”, allowing the “‘arab [to come] first, before us.” In the view of the Ja’aliyīn, their 
educational attributes justify why it is wrong that archaeological work, which should be theirs to take 
or reject, has been given to poorly educated newcomers, whose attachment to the land is perceived to 
be temporary and superficial. If anything, the following exchange made their position clear: 
 B: [The Domat al-Hamadab site guard] brought a lot of workers from his people. 
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A: All of them work with [the archaeologists]…[They] should be equal and choose five from each 
place, including from Hamadab... When [the project director tells the Domat al-Hamadab site guard to] 
bring workers, he chooses his relatives.  
* 
The unstructured discussion with Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim at the end of an otherwise 
structured interview, of which these excerpts are only a part, strongly suggested that UCLQ’s 
disproportional employment of Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists causes concern for Bashir Kamal 
and Abdel Hakim, who see themselves and their community as well-established owners of the land, 
thus making it self-evident that they deserve the seasonal jobs offered by archaeology. The perceived 
unfairness of this situation was the first topic they raised when given the chance to speak freely. The 
language they used to define their livelihood, ‘original’ and educational identities were also 
emphasised with the intention of strengthening their own group’s claims to the land and its resources 
(including archaeological employment) and weaken those of the pastoralists. It was shown in Chapter 
4 how derogatory stereotypes—albethem different in content—are used in the discourse of 
competition over resources at the national level: they must therefore not be dismissed here.  
Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were not alone in their sentiment; many other respondents in the 
Ja’alī community pointed this out to the present researcher. Mariam al-Pasha made a representative 
comment: 
All the workers are from other [non-Ja’alī] villages except one guy and he is my cousin…I am so 
happy and proud of him, I was too angry with this problem…He is the only one from Hamadab [to 
work with the archaeologists]…when he says that no one there is from Hamadab, I get very angry and 
disappointed and I want to get my work clothes and carry my tools and go with him. There are people 
who want or have a desire to work but didn’t get a chance. Also, I think the khwāja always hire specific 
people. They choose them by name. Am I right? Tell her [the present author] that [this] happens every 
season. 
Indeed, as fieldwork progressed, it became clear that Bashir and Abdel Hakim’s interview is 
representative of Ja’alī sentiments more broadly, with many more respondents using harsher language 
than that described above. A smaller category of Ja’alī respondents addressed the topic of “unfair” 
employment, but were more philosophical about it. Amna Suliman, for example, acknowledged that 
pastoralists are employed disproportionate to their numbers in the area, but nonetheless justified this, 
curiously using the same criteria as Bashir and Abdel Hakim, “The ‘arab do not go to school and they 
do not have farms: we [do]. Also they accept a small salary.” Amna was in the minority, however, and 
other Ja’aliyīn not only criticised “unfair” employment strategies but also explicitly linked 
employment to site protection. In this vein, Adira al-Sikina told the author that the archaeologists 
should employ  
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people from Kejeik as the workers; not the ‘arab, because the people from Kejeik will protect and 
guard the site, and because everyone knows each other. With the khwāja we would be one team: we 
know the khwāja, and even though we have work as farmers, we can leave it for some time because it’s 
only a small season. The ‘arab are strangers and now they know our precious things.  
Mariam, too, believed that this was critical, insisting to this author, “[y]ou must have confidence 
in the workers and leaders...They should be honest.” This was further echoed by the Tourism Police, 
who explained that in the wake of any ‘looting’ incident, the guard and employees are the first people 
under suspicion. 
* 
Two important points must be taken away from this section. First, and as the reader will recall from 
Chapter 5, this possessive rhetoric was otherwise absent from local discourse: there it was shown that 
archaeology, archaeological history and archaeological sites play a negligible part in contemporary 
identity construction in the case-study area. Here, however, archaeology clearly does have an impact 
on identity construction, but because of its economic dimensions rather than its ideational meaning; 
this is discussed in Chapter 8. Second, these claims required investigating to fully explicate the social 
impact of archaeology in the case-study area. At length, it was possible to substantiate and also 
qualify the Ja’aliyīn’s statements about how UCLQ chooses to allocate jobs to site-community 
residents.  
 
6.3.2 The Allocation of Jobs 
As noted above, at the time of the interview (February 2015), Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal were 
indeed working in a team in which eight of the 11 employees identified as Manāsīr or Hassaniyya 
pastoralists and only three as Ja’alī farmers (see Table 7, above). Moreover, of the 16 men employed 
by UCL Qatar for more than three seasons, i.e. half of the total (six) seasons under review (2013-16), 
12 were Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and four were Ja’alī farmers. These 16 employees 
belonged to at least four extended family groups (spread over different households): two Mansūrī 
families, one Hassanī family and one Ja’alī family (the extended family of Bashir and Abdel Hakim, 
above). Members of the other (semi-)pastoral group under consideration here, the Fadniyya, made up 
one-third of UCLQ local employees in the 2013-14 seasons of fieldwork; however, their numbers 
significantly dropped over subsequent years: in November-December 2015, only one was employed, 
while UCLQ hired three in the March 2016 season. The latter may have been due to that the UCLQ 
mission was 2013-14 based at Domat al-Hamadab. 
  
211 
The employment figures are certainly disproportional to the relative size of these communities at 
the local level (Figure 18). And, as we saw in Chapter 4, while estimates of the number of pastoralists 
nationwide vary wildly, the present author’s observations in the case-study area suggests that the 
Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists account for only 2% of the populace, and even with the pastoral 
members of the Fadiyya make up no more than 10% of the inhabitants. It is clear, therefore, that the 
number of pastoralists hired by the archaeologists is out of proportion with their weight in the local 
population. As shown in Figure 19, the proportion of pastoralists in the employ of UCLQ is striking; 
among the ‘regular’ employees, namely those who worked with the mission for at least three seasons, 
75% belong to the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya. In comparison, the Ja’aliyīn make up over 60% of the 
population of the case-study area (Figure 18) but only a quarter of ‘regular’ UCLQ employees as per 
the definition above (Figure 19). Lastly, and even more significantly, in the November-December 
2015 and March 2016 seasons, Mansūrī and Hassanī employees of UCLQ accounted for 70% of 
archaeological income (Figure 20). Indeed, given their simultaneously small numbers and 
overrepresentation among UCLQ’s employees, it seems that at least 16% of Manāsīr and Hassaniyya 
pastoralists (combined) were in archaeological employment in 2015-16. If examined from a historic 
perspective, this number may even increase exponentially considering that these same employees also 
had been themselves or had relatives that had worked with Shinnie’s teams throughout the 1960s, 
1970s and finally in the 1980s (see below), and/or with Hinkel at the Bejrawiya pyramids in the 1990s 
(such as Medowi al-Mansouri and Ali al-Hassani, who has three nephews in archaeological 
employment).  
  
 
Figure 18. Population by gabīla in the case-study area. 
Fadniyya 
1,275 people; 
160 households  
= 36% pop. 
Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya  
75 people; 
8 households 
= 2% pop. 
Ja’aliyīn 
2,240 people; 
320 households 
= 62% pop. 
Case-Study Area Population (est.) 
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Figure 19. Gabīla affiliation of local employees who’ve worked with UCLQ for at least three seasons, 2013-16. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20. Earnings from archaeological work with UCLQ by gabīla affiliation, Nov-Dec 2015 to March 2016. 
 
Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya  
= 75% of employees 
Ja’aliyīn 
= 25% of employees 
Gabīla Affiliation of UCLQ Employees 
(employees who have worked 3+ seasons with UCLQ) 
Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya  
SDG33,320  
= 70% of earnings 
Ja’aliyīn 
SDG12,780  
= 27% of earnings 
Fadniyya 
SDG1,385 
= 3% of earnings 
UCLQ Employees' Income  
(total SDG earned during Nov-Dec 2015 and March 2016 seasons) 
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If past trends are an indicator of future performance, empirical evidence suggests that pastoralists 
could maintain income from archaeological employment. All of UCLQ’s employees in February 2015 
had relatives in archaeological employment, either now or in the past, and not only with UCLQ but 
also with missions from both DAI teams, the University of Khartoum and Royal Ontario Museum 
teams. As such, the pastoralists in the case-study area are in a prime position to maintain or even 
expand access to a valued source of income. Futhermore, given the socio-economic conditions of 
rural Sudan (see above on the local dependency ratio, estimates incomes etc.), and particularly those 
faced by pastoralists, it should be noted that archaeological income could reasonably be assumed to 
constitute a significant financial boost to these parts of the site-community.    
 
6.3.3 The Mechanics of Archaeological Employment 
Qualitative and quantitative employment data thus appear to substantiate the Ja’alī perception that 
earnings from seasonal employment with the UCLQ archaeologists, earnings which the site-
community residents perceive to be the main economic benefit of archaeology, flows 
disproportionally to the pastoralists, the smallest and newest segment of local society. The question 
now is, how does this happen? Are pastoralists over-employed due to an accident of archaeological 
‘disciplinary culture’, 727  or is it done deliberately? Change to a more egalitarian system of job 
allocation, if indeed such change is sought (see Chapter 8), can only be successfully implemented if 
the conditions that produce this result are understood.  
 
6.3.3.1 The Project Director as Decision-Maker 
Starting at the top, the job of the NCAM antiquities inspector is to safeguard the Sudanese state’s 
interests at each site by monitoring excavations and submitting reports to the Director-General of 
NCAM in Khartoum at the close of each season; officially, they take no part in the recruitment of 
employees (although they have been known to wield influence). Rather the project directors of 
archaeological missions are in charge of employment. Yet, neither the OPA (1999) nor the excavation 
licence issued by NCAM set out regulations on how archaeologists should recruit employees, how 
much should be paid, or how to resolve conflicts; indeed, the OPA provides no guidance regarding 
working behaviour at all (see Chapter 7). Observation shows that the NCAM antiquities inspector can 
provide some of this information to the archaeological project directors on an ad hoc basis, but there 
                                                     
727  Moser 2007. 
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is no formal requirement for them to do so. The archaeological mission is thus under the effective 
control of the project director, who is the creator of the project; the generator and distributor of its 
funds; and the manager of its team. While de jure under the supervision of the NCAM antiquities 
inspector and required to take instruction from them, she is de facto the main authority for the 
execution of the project. The project director chooses the employees, decides their jobs, instructs them 
on when to work, determines wages (in collaboration with her DAI colleagues) and pays them in cash 
every week. The greater proportion of pastoral employees thus seems to have been her choice.  
However, interview data further qualifies this evaluation. When asked about her employment 
strategy, the UCLQ project director explained to this author that she “used to hire the same men [as 
the longer established DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director]”, with whom she shares a compound 
and staff, but added that now that she is based at Meroe, she has an almost entirely different 
workforce, chosen with the help of the Meroe site guard.
728
 When asked about his employment 
strategy in turn, the project director of the DAI Domat al-Hamadab mission explained to this author, 
“…from the very beginning [i.e. since the 1990s], we always discussed with [the pastoral Domat al-
Hamadab site guard] who to choose as excavation employees.”729 Alongside the project director, then, 
the site guards seem to play a pivotal role in the mechanics of archaeological employment. 
 
6.3.3.2 The Site Guards as Brokers 
The primary responsibility of the NCAM-employed site guards is to protect the archaeological sites 
from man-made threats and to take care of the archaeologists’ dig houses while they are away (see 
Chapter 7). However, during each archaeological season, the site guards are also present from the 
moment employees are chosen and every day throughout the season, mediating between the project 
director, the archaeological team and the local employees. As most archaeologists lack Arabic skills 
(see Chapter 8) and few local employees speak English, the site guards are therefore needed as 
facilitators and mediators because they are able to communicate with both groups: although usually 
fluent in English, the NCAM inspector is able to choose the extent to which he or she participates in 
field activities and his or her presence to translate cannot be relied upon. The language of archaeology 
here is mostly broken Arabic and English and quite specific in content: trowel (mustarīn), string 
(khayt), nails (musmār), brush (fursha), mattock ('azma), and shovel (maqrifa) are most commonly 
heard. Fluency in this language, and well-considered handling of archaeological machinery and 
objects, shows that the site guards have long-since picked up a sense for what the archaeologists want. 
Indeed, while the site guards are appointed by NCAM and derive their authority from this link with 
                                                     
728  Email interview with UCLQ project director, September 2015. 
729  Email interview with DAI Domat al-Hamadab project director, August 2016. 
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the Sudanese state, they also enjoy delegated authority from the project directors. Because they are 
the first layer of authority and those most familiar with the sites, NCAM even endows site guards who 
“with police powers to arrest without prior legal authorisation in relation to their assigned duties.”730   
The most important consequence of the above for the current examination is that the site guard is 
able to make decisions on the project director’s behalf and to influence how things get done. More 
specifically, the site guards are likely able to help direct who gets the jobs in archaeological 
employment; they are, after all, the first to know about the arrival of the archaeologists and their plans 
for the season, and they are therefore the ones who choose which people to call to say that work is 
available. The interview data from Abdel Hakim and Bashir Kamal, the Ja’ali employees, certainly 
seems to confirm this regarding the Domat al-Hamadab site guard (who, it was later discovered, is 
himself related by marriage to the Meroe site guard). Thus, in this instance, observation suggests that 
the disproportionate allocation of archaeological work appears to be the result of the UCLQ project 
director’s decision to rely on the guidance of the site guard as well as fellow project directors in 
recruiting local employees. The motivations behind the site guards’ actions must not be seen wholly 
with regard to nepotism, however. It is important to note, for example, that Shinnie, who worked in 
Meroe in the 1960s and 1970s, had a strict policy of hiring pastoralists, perhaps due to his great 
friendship with the leader of the Manāsīr at the time, and with the Manāsīr man he chose as the 
excavation’s foreman.731 The Meroe and Domat al-Hamadab site guards may thus be assuming that 
this is the archaeologists’ preference. 
The present author collected much more data about the ways in which project directors, site 
guards and indeed other actors such as NCAM inspectors and even employees contribute to the status 
quo; there is much more to be developed on these points. However a number of factors have stopped 
this author from doing so, not least the guarantees made to respondents about what would and would 
not be included in the present thesis. Happily for now this suffices to give some indication of the 
complex nature of archaeology’s chaîne opératoire in Sudan. 
* 
Archaeological employment is an economically beneficial but contested resource in the site-
community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. Indeed the positive impact of the archaeological wage is limited 
by its unequal allocation by the UCLQ project director: 75% of regular employees (those that worked 
for three or more seasons between 2013 and 2016) are pastoralists, who make up only 2% of the local 
population; 25% regular employees are farmers, who make up 60% of the local population; and, 
perhaps most importantly, during the November to December 2015 and March 2016 seasons, 70% of 
                                                     
730  OPA 1999: 24. 
731  Email interview with John Robertson, October 2016. 
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the earnings from archaeological employment went to the pastoralists. Evidence gathered from other 
projects directors both now and in the past indicates that this is a historic trend.  
This unequal allocation causes social tension, as evidenced by the reactions given in interviews 
and conversations with other Ja’aliyin and well as with Ja’ali employees. Yet while there seems to be 
good economic reasons for the Ja’alī claim to jobs, their tangible displeasure it is based, at least in 
part, on their community’s claim to the land, of which the archaeological site is an integral part. In 
other words, the main thrust of the Ja’alī argument taps in to their broader experience of and narrative 
about the injustice of their land being taken over by ‘outsiders’, whether agricultural investors or 
pastoralists. Of course, insecurity also characterizes the pastoral way of life in Sudan, arguably to an 
even greater degree than the Ja’aliyīn, and this is clear from the language they use about the Ja’aliyīn 
when discussing their unjust hegemony over basic services (Chapter 4). However, as the segment of 
society that receives most economic benefit from archaeological employment, discontent was not 
expressed by them in this context.  
Collected data about the mechanics of archaeological employment demonstrate that while they 
are not the sole movers in the culture that conditions the distribution of jobs, the project directors and 
the site guards are the main decision-makers and brokers. 
* 
Overall, Chapter 6 has examined in some detail the socio-economic impacts of archaeology on 
individuals and different communities in the case study area, from both monetary and livelihood 
perspectives, and more sociologically. In the absence of promised economic development through 
tourism, this is largely concerned with employment, as guards, or casual labourers by visiting 
archaeological teams, and sought to examine the value of this income in real terms. It has identified 
the social ramifications of recruitment practices and in doing so identified several fracture lines and 
existing rivalries between the communities, particularly the attitudes of the sedentary farming 
Ja’aliyīn to the more mobile, pastoralism-oriented Hassaniyya and Manāsīr, and the seemingly 
preferential access the latter have to waged-employment on archaeological projects. There has also 
been some exploration of the social composition of the archaeological projects themselves, and the 
roles of key actors on the archaeological side in potentially shaping relationships with these different 
communities (both wittingly and unwittingly).  
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7. THE IMPACT OF ARCHAEOLOGICAL MANAGEMENT ON LOCAL LANDSCAPES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Archaeological site management is another way in which archaeology economically impacts site-
communities in the case-study area. Here, the processes going back over 100 years are looked at in 
light of Chapter 4, which discussed at length the challenges posed to the equitable consumption of the 
landscape’s resources by dam building and large-scale commercial farming, and well as Chapter 6, 
which demonstrated that there is a contestation over archaeological employment, one that taps into the 
Ja’aliyīn residents’ insecurity regarding their socio-political hegemony in the case-study area. 
In this chapter, site management processes in the case-study area are described before the 
Ja’aliyīn residents’ narratives are presented to show the experience of site management processes 
from their perspective. It is clear that they are recounted as highly disruptive events, perhaps because 
archaeologists, both Sudanese and Western, have not taken the fact that the land is already used for 
agriculture, livestock-raising, and as a source for fuel, sufficiently into account. NCAM’s UNESCO 
Management Plan (2010) for the archaeological sites in the case-study area is then evaluated to show 
how it is potentially detrimental to the livelihoods of the site-communities. The findings pertain 
mostly to the Ja’aliyīn, Manāsīr and Hassaniyya living around the site of Meroe. Although plenthy of 
evidence for similar processes at work has been collected for the Ja’aliyīn and Fadniyya living around 
the site of Domat al-Hamadab, it is not included here because the present author was not technically 
given permission to study the DAI team’s work. 
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7.1 Identifying Threats to Archaeological Sites 
The protection of archaeological sites, monuments and materials is a concern that is shared by 
archaeological professionals, descendant communities as well as the wider public. The question for 
these groups is not whether or not to protect, and thereafter preserve, conserve and restore, but what to 
protect (see Chapter 2). For Hinkel (1992), a German architect who worked at Meroe and the 
Bejrawiya pyramids in the 1970s to the 1990s, the key question is to identify which sites, materials 
and monuments are important enough to preserve. For the archaeologists Renfrew and Bahn the key 
question is efficacy of conservation: they argue that there are “two principal stages in archaeological 
conservation: 1. Gathering of information, so that relevant sites and areas may be recognized and 
properly recorded; 2. Conservation of those sites/areas that can be effectively protected.”732 Assessing 
risks and controlling threats to ancient archaeological sites and site preservation, conservation and 
management are clearly central to the archaeological discipline. Protecting the integrity and longevity 
of ancient sites, monuments and materials ‘for future generations’ is addressed by fields that have 
developed out of the expanding archaeological discipline, such as site management and conservation 
science; and the practical tasks of preservation, conservation and restoration are often undertaken with 
the curation and public display of sites, monuments and materials in mind (linking the whole 
endeavour to, and justifying it through, the development of tourism, above).  
Threats to archaeological sites are numerous and include “[c]limate, rain…changes in 
temperature…catastrophes like inundation, lightning strike and tectonic effects…as well as vegetation 
and insect attacks…[to] new agricultural areas, the foundation and extension of settlement, the 
extraction of mineral wealth, and…martial and ideological hostilities”.733 Hinkel divided the causes of 
deterioration of ancient Sudanese monuments into “intrinsic” causes that are “connected with the 
conception and genesis of the building;” and “extrinsic” causes both natural and human (Table 8).734 
Hinkel subdivided the ‘intrinsic’ causes of deterioration into those that are “related to the site” and 
those that are “inherent in the structure”.735 Those related to the site include “proximity to the…river 
[or] hafir [man-made reservoirs]”, “orientation [with regard to] wind” and “the building ground, its 
quality and load capacity.”736 Those that are inherent in the structure include “the material used in the 
construction” and “the faults in the design [such as] incorrect roof formation.”737  
 
 
                                                     
732  Renfrew and Bahn 2008: 558. 
733  Hinkel 1992: 147. 
734  Hinkel 1992: 150. 
735  Hinkel 1992: 151. 
736  Hinkel 1992: 151. 
737  Hinkel 1992: 151. 
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Causes of Deterioration 
A. Intrinsic to the building B. Extrinsic to the building 
A.1 
Related to the site 
A.2 
Inherent in the structure 
B.1 
Natural Agents 
B.2 
Human Activity 
A.1.a 
Geo-
topographical, 
climate and 
orientation 
A.1.b 
Ground-
carrying 
foundations 
A.2.a 
Building 
materials 
A.2.b 
Building 
concept and its 
execution 
B.1.a 
Long-term 
action 
B.1.b 
Occasional 
action 
B.2.a 
Alteration, neglect, 
excavation, treatment 
 
Table 8. Causes of deterioration of ancient buildings. (Source: Hinkel (1992: 151, Figure 1) who modified G. de 
Angelis d’Ossat (1982: 13).) 
 
Hinkel further subdivided the extrinsic causes of deterioration into “natural agents” and “human 
activity”. As extrinsic threats, natural agents include “long-term action” such as “physical actions 
[and] stresses” by “water…wind…[and] sand” as well as “chemical…botanical…[and] biological 
causes” including bacterial damage, and “occasional action” such as “earthquakes, volcanic 
eruptions…and floods.”738 For example, in 2011, ICOMOS noted that the “abrasive effect of the wind 
has almost completely faded the reliefs of the Sun Temple at Meroe” and that a “small section of the 
Meroe town site on the western boundary of the property…has flooded four times in the past 60 
years.”739 As ‘natural agents’ herds of animals have also long been seen as a particular threat to Meroe:  
[s]everal hundred goats browse inside the fence of the MEROE [sic] Town site. They destroy stones and 
walls by rubbing their backs against the walls, walking over fallen stones, climbing and standing on 
stones in order to reach higher branches of trees and by urinating.
740
  
‘Human activity’ is by far the largest of Hinkel’s categories, and ranges from “alterations during 
time of use, unpredictable damage in war time, defacing and demolition…to a complete abandonment 
and lack of maintenance.”741 Threats from human activity also include deliberate vandalism, looting, 
the plundering of ancient monuments for building materials, the extension of agriculture, the spread of 
settlement, road-, pipeline- and dam-building. For example, the villages of Lower Kejeik and Old 
Deraqab were built on top of the southern and northern parts of Meroe; the Anglo-Egyptian 
government built the Khartoum-Atbara railway across the outskirts of Meroe in 1899;
742
 the Sun 
Temple was damaged by the installation of a modern pipeline; and graffiti covers almost all 
upstanding remains. 
                                                     
738  Hinkel 1992: 152. 
739  ICOMOS 2011: 105. 
740  Hinkel 1992: 152, n.33. 
741  Hinkel 1992: 153. 
742  Hinkel 1992: 148. 
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7.2 Site Protection as Stewardship 
7.2.1 The OPA 
Of course, “[o]nly some of the natural causes described as being of prolonged activity can normally 
be brought under control.”743 It is, for example, hard to prevent the effects of desertification and wind 
erosion, which are considered by ICOMOS to be the biggest threats,
744
 without building protective 
shields, which is not possible, or acceptable, in most locations. It is even harder to prevent damage 
from earthquakes. However, threats deriving from human activity can, hypothetically, be controlled 
through legislation, regulation and the management of access to sites. Indeed, ICOMOS “notes that 
physical protection [of archaeological sites] relies on the power of the formal laws”.745 In Sudan the 
most important of these laws is the Ordinance for the Protection of Antiquities (henceforth ‘OPA’) 
(1999
746
), which constitutes the first layer of protection for the archaeological sites of Domat al-
Hamadab and Meroe. The OPA defines ‘antiquities’ as, 
anything surviving from the ancient civilisations or past generations and has been discovered or 
excavated whether the object is fixed or mobile and is a hundred years or more old…[including] 
documents, prints, some human, animal or botanical remains…  
The OPA defines archaeological land as “the land which accommodates the site of 
archaeological interest, or a historical building”747 and states that “[t]he limits of [such] land shall be 
defined by [NCAM]”748 and that “[a]ll relics or objects of archaeological interest, whether buried deep 
in the earth or found on the surface, are considered the property of the State.”749 As noted in Chapter 5, 
Meroe and the pyramids to the east, although not Domat al-Hamadab, have been deemed so important 
that they were “confiscated” by a presidential decree in 2003, which declared that they should be 
managed as a “national reserve”.750 
The OPA regulates against potential threats from commercial development (clause §2.10-
2.10.1);
751
 prohibits ‘looting’; and outlaws the trade in antiquities (clause §2.14).752 Significantly, the 
                                                     
743  Hinkel 1992: 153. 
744  ICOMOS 2011: 105. 
745  ICOMOS 2011: 106. 
746  Crowfoot, then-Director of Education in the Anglo-Egyptian administration, was the author of the first OPA, 
published in 1905 followed by Shinnie in the same post in 1952 (Hinkel 1992: 168; Jakob and Ali 2011: 513-4, 
518). 
747  OPA 1999: 13. Both excerpts are from §I.3. 
748  OPA 1999: 13. 
749  OPA 1999: 16. 
750  ICOMOS 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is ‘Presidential Decision/Decree no.162 for the year 2003: The 
Confiscation of the Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National 
Reserve within this Region and managing it.’ The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the Nomination 
File for UNESCO World Heritage status was being written.  
751  OPA 1999: 17. 
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OPA implies that the main threats to archaeological sites come from the site-community residents. 
Thus clause §2.6.1 rules that landowners or landusers are not allowed to “dispose of” or “excavate” 
without prior approval
753
 and clause §2.9 states that “[b]oth the planting of trees and their cutting on 
such land is forbidden without prior permission from [NCAM].”754 “[A]ny modification to historical 
buildings”755 by the landowner is also prohibited. “Fines for graffiti are about USD90 for a first 
offence, which is high for most Sudanese.”756 From an archaeological point of view, identifying site-
communities as the main threat to the archaeological sites is not, in fact, unfounded: apart from 
‘looting’ and graffiti, both of which are evidence of what archaeologists call ‘destruction’, the 
preferred areas for farming in the Nile Valley are along the levees of paleo-channels that were settled 
heavily during the Kerma and Kushite periods; archaeological sites have traditionally been used for 
the grazing of animals; local communities have customarily used archaeological sites as sources of 
building materials; and local farmers have long engaged in the practice of removing material from 
ancient sites and spreading it on their fields to increase soil fertility.
757
 However, the question tacitly 
asked here is whether archaeologists are justified in framing residents in such a way, considering the 
broad socio-economic conditions of the context. 
 
7.2.2 NCAM 
As the legal owner of all archaeological sites, materials and relics in Sudan, the state has 
responsibility for their preservation, conservation, management and presentation (although see 
Chapter 5 and below), but under clauses §2.4.2 and §2.12 of the OPA (1999), the state devolves these 
responsibilities to NCAM.
758
 Other governmental bodies also intervene on archaeological matters,
759
 
but NCAM’s 400-plus employees have responsibility for the practical implementation of the OPA. 
NCAM therefore constitutes the second layer of protection for Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe.  
                                                                                                                                                        
752  “The sale or donation of registered antiquities owned by the State is prohibited. These shall be kept in museums 
and shall not be removed from the sphere of influence of the Corporation, except through legitimate ways 
according to the terms of this law.” (OPA 1999: 18). Also §2.21, 19: “[i]mitation and falsification or trading in 
transportable antiquities is prohibited.” 
753  OPA 1999: 17. 
754  OPA 1999: 17, §2.9. 
755  The examples given are “to demolish the building concerned or make any modification that may change the 
historical shape of the structure or its artistic character.” (OPA 1999, §2.8.1: 17.) 
756  ICOMOS 2011: 106. 
757  Welsby and Davies 2001. 
758  OPA 1999: 15. “[NCAM] is responsible for the preservation of antiquities and for assessing the archaeological 
value of objects, historical buildings, the archaeological sites and recording such information and is also 
responsible for the implementation of the terms of this law.” (Italics added by the author.) Also see §2.13.1: 18. 
759  For example the attendees of the conference on ‘Safeguarding the Cultural Heritage: Issues, Challenges and 
Opportunities in the Sudanese Context’ held on 29 November 2015 in Khartoum, included the Minister of 
Education, the Sudanese National Commission for Education, Science and Culture, the Minister of Culture, the 
General Director of Islamic High Academy, the head of the Dam Construction Unit, the Ministry of Water 
Resources and Electricity and the Dams Implementation Unit. 
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The first basic survey of the sites was made in around 1905 by the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan 
Antiquities Service (SAS), which had been set up in 1903 not long after the establishment of the 
condominium. In 1911, following Garstang’s ‘rediscovery’ of the sites, a roof was constructed over 
the Royal Baths.
760
 In 1939, the SAS moved to protect Meroe by providing it with a full-time salaried 
site guard “with police powers to arrest without prior legal authorisation…to combat illegitimate 
trading in antiquities and their smuggling and to combat damages against…archaeological sites”.761 
Meroe was one of the first sites in Sudan to be given this type of protection
762
 and the post is still 
occupied today (Chapter 6). In 1946 Meroe, the Apademek temple and the Sun Temple were enclosed 
with low barbed-wire fences by the then Commissioner of Archaeology under the Anglo-Egyptian 
Condominium, A.J. Arkell, apparently using war surplus materials.
763
 In the 1970s, the government 
deemed the sites so important that the first regional archaeological office in Sudan was established in 
Shendi, some 45km from the case-study area; the second such office, in Dongola, was not established 
until the 1980s. It was at this time that Meroe was also given its own Tourism Police station, manned 
by full-time salaried officers who work for and represent the interests of the central government, 
although there is evidence to suggest this arrangement is not always productive.
764
 
However, from an archaeological point of view, the Sudanese state does not fund NCAM (which 
is a restructured version of the SAS, made so in 1991
765
) well enough to allow it to provide adequate 
protection for the archaeological sites. NCAM salaries are low and most employees have to take 
second jobs to make ends meet.
766
 Experience shows that most NCAM employees have a genuine 
commitment towards archaeology but are frustrated at the limited funding that NCAM has to do its 
work and the close control of its activities by other government bodies.
767
  
Indeed in 2010, under the guidance of Western and Egyptian archaeologists, NCAM applied for 
UNESCO World Heritage status for the Island of Meroe (Meroe, Musawwarat es-Sufra and Naqa), 
                                                     
760  Hinkel 1992: 169. “On ‘the 26th January 1911…the Financial Secretary, Sudan Government, approved the sum of 
£E 60 to be spent for a roof of corrugated iron over the ‘painted chamber’ [i.e. the Royal Baths] in Meroe”; roofs 
were put over other buildings sporadically in the 1930s and 1960s. 
761  OPA 1999: 24. These powers are extended to “inspectors of antiquities, museum curators and guards of 
museums…” 
762  Hinkel 1992: 169 using Arkell 1939: 9. The number of guards at sites seems to have expanded during the office of 
A.J. Arkell as CfA (Hinkel 1992: 169). Alongside Meroe, ‘Buhen, Abdel Gadir Church, Semna, Soleb, el-Kurru, 
Barkal, Nuri and Naga/Musawwarat’ were also given guards by the Antiquities Service. Mirgissa, Amara West and 
Kawa were given guards but they were paid for by their missions (Hinkel 1992: 169 using Arkell 1939: 9). The 
missions were the Harvard Boston Expedition, the EES and Oxford University Excavations in Nubia. 
763  Arkell 1946.  
764  NCAM’s Management Plan (2010) notes that the police constructed a guard station "within the Royal City 
immediately on top of the unexcavated portion of the site. […] The presence of armed guards on the site, while 
welcome in terms of security, poses also a threat with the police seemingly unaccountable to the antiquities 
authorities and erecting structures within the antiquities area" (NCAM’s Management Plan 2010: 149). 
765  Hinkel 1992: 168; Jakob and Ali 2011: 513-4, 518. 
766  ICOMOS 2011: 109. According to this dossier there is a “great need to develop the status of NCAM and the 
importance of its work in managing the cultural resources of the country…” 
767  “The general policy of NCAM is set by a board of nine members on the basis of the proposals of its Director and is 
approved by the Council of Ministers. The members of the board are the Director himself, “a representative of the 
employees, and seven individuals representing other disciplines and functions related to the mandate of NCAM”. 
(Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 80). 
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which they hoped would help to generate revenue to be re-invested into site protection. However, 
World Heritage status gives UNESCO the right to monitor designated sites and to call for 
improvements where appropriate. UNESCO’s has high standards of protection and conservation that 
are expensive to maintain and require a level of logistics, coordination, infrastructure and investment 
that the state cannot provide.
768
 World Heritage status has thus placed an even heavier burden of 
responsibility for site protection on NCAM, which it is ill-equipped to meet.
769
  
Moreover, in an environment where corruption is rife, thefts from, or damage to, archaeological 
sites are not always followed up. In the late 1980s Trigger recorded that the antiquities service was 
engaged in political manoeuvring
770
 and in 1992 Hinkel noted that government administrators 
sometimes “close their eyes” 771  to damage done to archaeological sites by their colleagues. An 
additional problem on the ground is that members of site-communities tend to mistrust NCAM and 
archaeologists, both Sudanese and Western archaeologists, because of their association with the state. 
In a political climate where there is heavy state surveillance of the population, respondents in the 
case-study area often asked the present researcher if the Sudanese translators she was working with 
were members of the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS, the secret police, or 
Mukhābarāt). From an archaeological point of view, such suspicions clearly challenge NCAM in its 
efforts to protect archaeological sites. 
 
7.2.3 Project Directors  
Day-to-day responsibility for protecting the archaeological sites is shared between NCAM and the 
archaeologists working on them. This sharing is well-recognised by all involved and is formalised in 
clause §1.IVb of the official excavation licence, which states that “[d]uring the term of the licence 
[the licensee must] have the site guarded to the satisfaction of the Government.”772 Clause §1.IVg also 
places responsibility for the preservation and conservation of materials upon the archaeologists.773 The 
archaeologists working on the archaeological sites thus constitute a third layer of protection. During 
field seasons their very presence probably helps to limit damage to the sites. However, their 
                                                     
768  The UNESCO documents show that the state party (NCAM) is repeatedly asked for reports and additional pieces 
of information but does not comply. 
769  This is also true of Sudan’s only other UNESCO World Heritage Site, ‘Jebel Barkal and the sites of the Napatan 
Region’. 
770   Trigger noted that the Sudan antiquities services was “subject to partisan political intrigue, as exemplified by the 
recent imprisonment [in 1990] of its director general, Osama El Nur” (Trigger 1994: 345). 
771  Hinkel 1992: 149. 
772  NCAM Excavation Licence, n.d. In 2011 the licence cost $1,000 with a renewal fee of $500 and additional $250 
payable to NCAM for subsequent years (Jakob and Ali 2011: 518). Also see Gillot 2010: 6-7. 
773  “[T]he Excavation team must include specialist [sic] in conservation and restoration, by the type of excepted 
material, with at least 5 years of experience. All proposed Conservation/Restoration works for sites…should be 
implemented by specialist [sic] with a resume of relevant conservation project… Although OPA §2.20 notes that 
NCAM’s approval and supervision are compulsory. 
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effectiveness at protecting, preserving and conserving the sites depends to a large extent upon the 
ability of the archaeological project directors to raise sufficient funds to carry out these duties as 
licensees. 
In the case-study area, most recent conservation efforts have been directed at the Bejrawiya 
pyramids; made of friable sandstone and filled with rubble, the pyramids have become ruinous. 
However, much of the work done so far to ‘conserve’ the pyramids has actually involved their 
reconstruction using both ancient and modern materials.
774
 Between 1975 and 1999, “a number of 
structures [in the Bejrawiya pyramid field] were dismantled and rebuilt” and 14 pyramids were 
“restored and roofed using the original blocks or prefabricated replacements.”775 The archaeological 
team from the Royal Ontario Museum, whose long-time Sudan archaeologist, Grzymski, collaborates 
with the University of Khartoum, plans a “partial reconstruction” of the Temple of Amun.776 And 
according to their website, QSAP-QMPS are aiming for the “restoration and conservation of the over-
230 pyramids”.777 Since 2013 the two DAI teams and the UCLQ team working in the case-study area 
have received funding from NADO-QSAP, which donated US$135m to protect and conserve 
archaeological sites in the Nile Valley.
778
 The DAI Royal Baths team has used its funding to enclose 
the bath complex with a protective shelter,
779
 while the DAI Domat al-Hamadab team decided to 
demarcate site boundaries with concrete posts to stop agricultural encroachment. There are ongoing 
site management works at the pyramids also.
780
  However, while the archaeological teams preserve 
archaeological materials on an ad hoc basis, they do not have a holistic programme to preserve and 
conserve the sites because they choose to dedicate their funding to the costs of excavation. 
 
7.2.4 UNESCO 
A fourth layer of protection for Meroe and the pyramids to the east is their status since 2011 as part of 
the UNESCO World Heritage site of the ‘Island of Meroe’ (Domat al-Hamadab is not part of the 
World Heritage site). NCAM’s UNESCO World Heritage Nomination File and Management Plan 
conceptualizes Meroe as a falling into two core zones, one around Meroe (the ‘Meroe town site’) and 
the second around the Bejrawiya pyramids (the ‘pyramids site’) (Figure 21, in red). The town site and 
                                                     
774   ICOMOS 2011: 99. 
775  ICOMOS notes that “Conservation works to the pyramids and temples have involved more reconstruction (in the 
Burra Charter sense of introducing new material)…” (ICOMOS 2011: 102.) See Hinkel’s own description in 
Hinkel 2000. 
776  ICOMOS 2011: 107. 
777  Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website. 
778  G. Gibbon, ‘Qatar invests $135m in archaeological heritage of Sudan’, Arabianindustry.com, 24 March 2014; M-
B. Griggs, ‘Qatar Gives $135 Million to Sudan for Archaeological Projects’, Smithsonianmag.com, 27 March 
2014. 
779   Wolf, S., Onash, H-U., Kere Architecture, 2016. 
780   Riedel et al. 2017. 
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the pyramids site, which are linked by an ancient processional way, are enclosed by a buffer zone 
(Figure 21, in blue) and are thus seen as one ancient landscape. The UNESCO plan refers to the two 
core areas as ‘Greater Meroe’.  
 
 
Figure 21. UNESCO’s ‘Greater Meroe’. Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids are outlined in red and their shared 
buffer zone is outlined in blue. (Source: adapted from Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 12, Fig. 3.) ‘Bejrawiya’ refers 
the broad Bejrawiya area. 
 
NCAM’s UNESCO World Heritage Management Plan has two key strategies to protect Meroe 
and the pyramids (“protecting humanity’s achievements”781). The first plan is to extend the boundaries 
of Meroe to include “the archaeological remains of the northern part of the Royal City” which are 
currently underneath the modern, but now evacuated, village of Old Deraqab (Figure 22).
782
 ICOMOS 
agreed that the “unexcavated part of [Meroe] beneath [Old Deraqab]…should be included [within the 
property boundary] because it has future research potential to contribute to the understanding of the 
property”.783 The expansion of Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South are also described as “a potential 
                                                     
781  Bernbeck and Pollock 2004: 337. 
782  ICOMOS 2011: 100. The plan also proposes to include other areas including “the southern flanks of the northern 
hills within the buffer zone of Meroe” and the port site of Wad Ben Naga. 
783  ICOMOS 2011: 101. 
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threat to [Meroe’s] integrity”.784 An extended version of this idea is also on the agenda of QSAP: 
detailed plans have not yet been revealed, but in January 2014 QSAP and QMPS held a workshop in 
Khartoum on their plans to include the “demarcation (and possible enlargement) of [Meroe]”; the 
construction of a fence around it; and the promotion of Old Deraqab as a “traditional Sudanese 
community”.785  
The second UNESCO plan is to build a fence around the merged core zones of Greater Meroe, 
which extend to some 1,718ha,
786
 and to ban all development inside the buffer zone. These measures 
are designed specifically to protect the sites from “encroachment, looting and damage caused by local 
herdsmen”787 and from the expansion of local settlement.  Hinkel recommended fencing in 1992 as 
“the only way of controlling access”788 and fencing also figures heavily in QSAP’s plans to make 
“drastic transformations of the [Bejrawiya pyramids] site”.789 However, fencing off the sites in this 
way could have serious consequences for hundreds of local residents.  
At the time of writing the implementation of the UNECSO plans does not seem to be imminent 
largely, it appears, because of a shortage of funding. [[It is clear that “…in order to guard the sites 
adequately [the sites] would currently need more guards.”790  
In 2010 NCAM noted that “It is not explained how the additional staff will be funded”791 and in 
2011 ICOMOS reported that “the Management Plan is yet to be implemented. It awaits funding and 
staff.” 792  Although neither plan has been implemented, preparatory work has taken place. 
Consultation meetings have taken place with stakeholders including the Tourism Office in Shendi, the 
State Tourism Police, the NCAM Office in Shendi and, representing the residents of the case-study 
area, “the Popular Committee of Bejrawiya North [Kejeik and Deraqab] and the Popular Committee 
of Bejrawiya South”.793 According to the NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan all the stakeholders 
had agreed to the plans (although the narratives of the Ja’aliyīn in Hamadab and Bejrawiya (below) 
contradict any suggestion that the site-communities are happy with them). QSAP-QMPS have also 
taken steps to impose greater control over the area by building an archaeological research facility, 
Dohat Meroe, just outside the buffer zone. 
 
                                                     
784  ICOMOS 2011: 104. 
785  Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website. 
786  ICOMOS 2011: 96. Meroe town site measures roughly 612ha and the pyramids roughly 1,106ha. 
787  ICOMOS 2011: 105. 
788  Hinkel 1992: 169. 
789  Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project website. 
790  ICOMOS 2011: 104. 
791  El-Masri 2010: 147. 
792  ICOMOS 2011: 108. 
793  El-Masri 2010: 192. 
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Figure 22. Bejrawiya Villages (close-up). To show current living arrangements in this area of the Core and 
Buffer Zones. Ja’aliyīn villages are in bold; the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya settlements are in italics. (Source: 
adaptation of Welsby and Ahmed 2010: 13, Fig. 4). 
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Despite these measures, however, many issues still remain unsolved when looked at from an 
archaeological point of view. Observations show that the pastoralists continue to graze their goats on 
the scrub within the boundaries of Greater Meroe and on the Meroe acacia, and to a lesser extent, to 
cut the acacia for firewood and building timber. There has in fact been an increase in acacia growth 
over the past ten years, because of the increase in animal droppings. There have also been an 
increasing number of thefts from the sites, which is the result of the absence of a sense of stewardship 
towards the archaeological sites among the site-communities (discussed in Chapter 5); a thriving 
black market in antiquities channelled through Khartoum’s Souk al-Arabi; and extreme economic 
hardship. In 1992 a statue in the Royal Baths at Meroe, known to some Ja’aliyīn as the Bride of the 
Nile (arûz al-Nil), was stolen although later recovered;
 
in 2000 three faience plaques were stolen;
794
 
and, also in 2000, a number of statues were looted from a newly restored pyramid in Bejrawiya.
795
 
There were also illegal excavations in an uninvestigated cemetery in the south mound of Domat al-
Hamadab in the weeks prior to the arrival of the present author in January 2015.
796
 
 
 
7.3 Site Protection as Dispossession 
The historical development of site management, as well as the significant plans for the future, are now 
presented from the perspective of the residents of the site-communities. 
7.3.1 The Ja’aliyīn sedentary farmers   
7.3.1.1 Space and Housing 
Members of the Ja’aliyīn gabīla have been resident in the case–study area since at least the 16th 
Century (Chapter 5). The villages of Hamadab and Bejrawiya are long-established and elderly 
Ja’aliyīn have memories of what has happened at the sites since the archaeologists arrived. Residents 
of Old Deraqab, Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya South narrated their memories as a set of notable events 
that caused the trajectory of their lives to change, and not always to good affect. Most narratives 
clustered around five main events: the establishment of a permanent site guard; the erection of a 
                                                     
794  Also reported in El-Masri 2010: 168. 
795  The Courier ACP-EU 2001. 
796  Also reported in P. Wolf 2015. 
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barbed-wire fence; the return of the archaeologists; the gradual abandonment of Old Deraqab from the 
1960s; and the recent UNESCO consultations over the future of the sites. 
 
1) 1939: The establishment of a site guard: “First, he told them they couldn’t use the bricks.” 
When asked to recount their earliest recollections about the sites and the archaeologists elderly 
Ja’aliyīn residents began with what they were told by their parents. The most common recollections 
related to the establishment of a permanent site guard at Meroe in 1939; that had been a pivotal event 
because they were afterwards forbidden by the guard to use the archaeological site to collect stone and 
fired red bricks from the remains for building. The bricks from Meroe were specifically mentioned 
because they were highly valued house building; new red bricks are expensive and hard to make.
797 
 
 
2) 1946: The erection of the barbed-wire fence: “Then they made the wire thing.” 
Most narratives then recalled the erection in 1946 of the barbed-wire fence (referred to as “the wire 
thing” (silik siyaaj)) around Meroe, although no one knew the name of the man who ordered it to be 
built (it was A.J. Arkell, as noted above). The event was notable for the respondents for several 
reasons. The fence physically intruded into the property of residents in Lower Kejeik and Old 
Deraqab (Figure 23); it stopped the villages from expanding; it impeded the cutting of the acacia, 
which, at this point had re-established itself within Meroe’s perimeter; and it prevented the grazing of 
livestock on the site.  
 
3) 1965: The arrival of the archaeologists: “Then the khwāja came.” 
Most of the Ja’aliyīn respondents recalled the arrival of modern archaeologists in the 1960s; the name 
of “Shinnie” is still remembered by some of his former employees and neighbours (Chapter 5). While 
most residents in the case-study area had no clear recollection of the sequence of archaeological 
missions that followed, or of the key discoveries made, the comings and goings of the 
archaeologists—and the perception that the site was being detached from them a little bit more with 
each encounter—were part of the residents’ personal memories. 
 
                                                     
797   The abundance of ancient red bricks were noted 200 years ago by Burckhardt who reported that “low mounds 
consisting of rubbish and red burnt bricks…extended quite across the arable soil, for at least one mile…” 
(Burckhardt 1819: 275). It is very significant that the notes record, “Sa’ad’s father told him that when Ahmed 
Karsani died and they wanted to bury him near the mountain, they wanted to bring some stones [from the temple 
ruins] to put on the grave, but some Englishmen there at the time prevented them from taking the stones.  So they 
took stones from the mountain itself (which suggests that the saint was buried sometime after 1897).” 
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4) 1960s: The abandonment of Old Deraqab: “The houses became ruins.” 
The best-remembered event was the Ja’aliyīn’s evacuation of Old Deraqab. From the 1960s to the 
2000s its residents moved to a new site to the east, which became the village of New Deraqab; 
‘Deraqab’ came to be known as ‘Old Deraqab’ and quickly became, in the respondents’ words, a 
collection of ruins (kharaba). Most of the New Deraqab residents interviewed for the present study 
claimed that the move was caused by pressure from archaeologists and NCAM
 
who, among other 
things, forbade them to build more houses or connect their home to mains electricity. Some even 
described being intimidated by government officials who forced them to leave by cutting their water 
supply. 
 
5) 2000s: UNESCO Consultations: “And now they’ve come back.” 
The consultation process over UNESCO’s plans, noted above, was the final event to be narrated by all 
of the respondents in the case-study area. Some narratives were angry, others less concerned. The 
residents of New Deraqab talked about NCAM’s “broken promises”; they dismissed rosy predictions 
of more jobs and a boost for tourism (“[the authorities] always say that”); and they described 
NCAM’s pledge to treat them equitably as “rubbish”. The residents of Lower Kejeik and Bejrawiya 
South were less concerned by the UNESCO plans. The former are slowly moving to Upper Kejeik, 
which they began to leave after floods in 1988 and the latter are gradually moving to Upper Bejrawiya 
for more space; neither group blamed the development of the archaeological sites for the pressure on 
space.   
* 
Of course, these narratives are not fully shared by all of the respondents; there is also a counter-
narrative to consider. This was provided by a minority of Ja’aliyīn respondents from Hamadab, even 
though they too gave similar narratives to the present researcher about the DAI work at Domat al-
Hamadab.
798
 Nevertheles these respondents agreed that pressure from archaeologists, NCAM
 
and 
government officials was an important reason why the residents of Old Deraqab began to move to 
New Deraqab and they acknowledge that the process began after the arrival of the archaeologists led 
by Shinnie in the mid-1960s. However, they say that Old Deraqab was also abandoned for practical 
reasons including the risk of flooding, poor drainage, the lack of an electricity supply and the lack of 
space to expand because the village was hemmed in by farmland. In their narrative of events, the 
decision made by Shendi Development Council in 1962 to allocate space for new settlements to the 
east, the establishment of a primary school there in the 1970s, and the severe Nile floods of 1988 were 
                                                     
798   Key events for the included the start of excavations under a British archaeologist, Garstang, in the 1910s; the visit 
of a site guard and a ban on building upon the site in the early 1950s; and the prohibition on grazing livestock on 
the site in the 1990s 
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more important ‘push’ factors than pressure from archaeologists. Some respondents who provided this 
‘counter-narrative’ said that Old Deraqab was probably an illegal settlement anyway; Ali al-Hassani 
claimed that the Deraqabians had built their houses on top of the archaeological site even though they 
knew that it was a regulated site and that building was prohibited, and added, somewhat ironically 
(see below), that “if you deliberately build on top of the sites you should not receive compensation”. 
 
 
Figure 23. Northern parts of Meroe as seen from an abandoned house in Old Deraqab. Note the close proximity 
of the fence (Source: author’s photograph, February 2015). 
 
7.3.1.2 The impact of archaeological site-management 
The narratives show that archaeological site-management has had a significant impact on the Ja’aliyīn 
site-communities of the case-study area over the past 80 years or so. For many residents, particularly 
those in Lower Kejeik, Bejrawiya South and New Deraqab, it has meant the steady encroachment of 
site boundaries into their residential and agricultural space and has reduced their access to the Meroe 
acacia. For the residents of New Deraqab it has also entailed the evacuation of their homes and what 
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they see as outright dispossession of their land. The narratives demonstrate that in a context in which 
land is perceived to be extremely scarce the loss of land, such as installing a site guard or erecting a 
fence, can have important detrimental consequences for the site-communities. This explains why 
UNESCO’s plans for Greater Meroe are a cause of concern and insecurity for the residents of the 
case-study area.  
When the language used by these respondents is carefully analyzed, the narratives also show that, 
in the eyes of the site-community residents, the loss of land as a result of archaeological site 
management is no different from the loss of land to commercial agricultural schemes, mining or 
industrial development (discussed in Chapter 4), which also involve the state-sanctioned confiscation 
of land for foreign-run enterprises that, like archaeology, also dig holes (hofra) and take things away. 
Thus, the narratives frequently included phrases such as, “we know you are looking for gold and 
treasure”, “we are used to khwāja coming in and taking things”, and “does the state [hukūma] direct 
these things?” The new Qatari-sponsored archaeological research facility at Dohat Meroe was also 
highlighted as evidence of state influence because of the presence of ministers and “big cars”.  
In most narratives the move from Old to New Deraqab was presented as a divisive issue. The 
older generation was said to have wanted to stay put and clashed with the younger residents and even 
the Local Committee on the matter. The Local Committee reportedly went to great lengths to 
persuade the ‘remainers’ to move, building extra-large compounds supplied with electricity in the new 
settlements to the east. Most narratives agreed, however, that whatever the reason for their move from 
Old to New Deraqab, the empty and now ruined houses in Old Deraqab are still belong to the 
residents of New Deraqab. Indeed, residents of all three Bejrawiya villages (Old Deraqab, Lower 
Kejeik and Bejrawiya South) stressed the continuing value of the remains of Old Deraqab, such as 
bricks, doors and window frames. While mud bricks are relatively easy to come by and make, and are 
often left if a household moves elsewhere. However, they continue to serve an important purpose as 
evidence of prior occupation and ownership, which explains the existence of many empty and half-
ruined houses in the village. There are also a number of large animal shelters on the north side of the 
abandoned village, which are still in use. The key message is that the land on both sides of the railway 
still belonged to them and they could move back and forth if they wished to do so. As noted in 
Chapter 4 land is socially and economically precious and is “not idle, even when not in use.”799 
Archaeological site management has thus become a key ingredient in site-respondents’ narratives 
of village foundation, expansion and abandonment, which emerged as lists of key events that have 
taken place in the past. Archaeology is therefore placed alongside collective memories of floods, the 
coming of piped water and electricity and the establishment of commercial agricultural projects that 
have shaped the dynamics of the site-communities. From an archaeological point of view, NCAM’s 
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UNESCO Management Plan proposals to extend the boundaries of Meroe town site further into the 
villages of Bejrawiya South, Lower Kejeik and Old Deraqab might seem to offer an effective means 
of protecting the site. However, the evidence collected by the present researcher suggests that, if 
implemented, they will have potentially damaging and divisive effects for the site-communities.  
NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan of 2010 acknowledges the potentially damaging effects of 
its implementation upon the site-communities and refers to the need to “resolve the situation” of some 
of the inhabitants affected by the extension of site boundaries and buffer zones.
800
 NCAM’s UNESCO 
World Heritage Nomination File (2010) reported that there were 80 residents, primarily from Old 
Deraqab, in the core zone around Meroe town site and 1,500 residents, primarily from Lower Kejeik 
and Bejrawiya South, in the buffer zone. ICOMOS noted in 2011 that “there are sufficient means to 
control [damaging impacts] as long as the Antiquities authority (NCAM), the local authorities and 
local communities hold regular meetings to discuss development plans”801 (though it was striking that 
the claim made in NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan (2010) that all the stakeholders invited to 
consultation meetings, including representatives of local residents, had agreed to the plan, was 
contradicted by the residents’ own narratives. There is also a glaring absence in the Management Plan 
of any reference to the abandonment of Old Deraqab).    
The justification for making and suggesting such radical changes to the landscape is that, if 
NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan was implemented, it could provide more jobs for members of 
the site-communities. The Management Plan recommends  
a Site Manager for each of the three component sites, two assistant managers and two technical 
assistants for each site, a ticket office operator and 10 guards for each site…[and] the systematic 
integration of the local population into the archaeological, conservation, and tourist site management 
(e.g. by training them as guards and restorers).
802
 
The clear paradox is that if these plans materialize, and if archaeology and tourism really do 
develop, more land confiscations are likely to take place and the more restrictions are likely to be 
imposed on the land to which the site-communities feel a right of ownership and an ancestral 
connection, both of which are important despite the fact that they do not align with official 
archaeological priorities. 
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7.3.2 The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists   
The Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists of the case-study area rely heavily on the Meroe acacia for 
grazing, fuel, lighting, building materials and a range of other uses and use ‘Greater Meroe’ for 
settlement and for grazing their herds. The key respondents from the pastoralist gabāīl, Medowi al-
Mansouri and Ali al-Hassani, were reluctant to talk to the present researcher about their use of Meroe 
for grazing and acacia cutting because those activities are, in fact, illegal (although they did admit to 
collecting deadwood). This reluctance was shared by most of the respondents from the Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya gabāīl and those pastoralists who were asked about it directly usually denied using the 
sites in those ways. Evidence of those activities was, therefore, gathered through personal 
observation, supplemented by conversations with two local charcoal makers, Jaffar Hussein of the 
Manāsīr and Amadi Farran of the Hassaniyya. Their testimonies showed that those activities are very 
important to the pastoralists. Herds of goats routinely enter the site of Meroe through the main 
entrance and troop past the site-guard’s office on their way to the acacia groves; and the pastoralists 
were occasionally observed by the present researcher carrying off bundles of acacia.
803
 The 
pastoralists appear to have an unspoken agreement with the site guard that their use of Meroe’s acacia 
should go undisturbed. 
 
7.3.2.1 Space and Grazing 
Acacia nilotica is economically and socially important in Sudan, playing many roles, including 
providing “…fodder…fuel wood [and] charcoal” and construction materials for “shelter…sand 
stabilisation and dune fixation”.804 Some 70% of rural households in northern Sudan use firewood for 
cooking and acacia is widely used for that purpose.
805
 For the many households that live without 
electricity acacia also provides light. Acacia also has a traditional social role, as an ingredient in 
women’s toiletries and cosmetics and in events such as “[child] delivery, marriage, circumcision, 
death and festivals…”806 Acacia is adept at surviving hot and dry summers and droughts but it is in 
decline in Sudan because of over-cutting as the population has grown and demand has increased. 
Charcoal prices increased four- to five-fold between 2010 and 2015 as acacia has become scarcer. The 
problem has made worse by Sudan Forestry Commission’s control of forest and woodland areas, 
                                                     
803  Kennenni and van der Maarl 1990: 419. Walsh, Hulme and Campbell (1988) also write about the importance of 
acacia to Hassaniyya in the White Nile region. 
804  Kennenni and van der Maarl 1990: 419. 
805  CBS 2010: 22; Taha et al. 2014: 48.  
806  Taha et al. 2014: 48. 
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including Meroe,
807
 and by the government’s monopoly since 2015 over charcoal manufacture; at this 
time Hamza and Hamedi were ordered to sell their remaining charcoal and not to produce any more.  
Acacia is still abundant in Meroe in a region where the trees are otherwise scarce. Ironically, its 
abundance is the result of archaeological site-management. Meroe’s acacia can be traced back to the 
early 20
th
 Century when acacia trees “naturally re-establish[ed]” themselves in and around the then-
unfenced ruins of Meroe.
808
 As desertification and over-exploitation both degraded acacia supplies 
elsewhere, local Ja’aliyīn farmers and the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists who came seasonally 
to the area began to use the Meroe acacia for grazing, fuel and building materials. After archaeologists 
enclosed Meroe with a barbed-wire fence in 1946 the acacia flourished.
809
 The fence did not, however, 
prevent people from gaining access to the site, particularly as it became increasingly dilapidated, but 
it remained effective enough to prevent the acacia from being over-grazed and over-cut. 
The Meroe acacia is used by the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists as an important source of 
animal fodder and for fuel, lighting and building materials.
810
 The grazing provided by the acacia has 
become even more important to the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya because their pastures have been reduced 
by the extension of big commercial agricultural projects (Chapter 4). The pastoralists have been 
obliged to buy increasing amounts of fodder just as rising international demand has pushed up fodder 
prices to levels the cash-poor pastoralists find it hard to afford. Meroe is therefore a rare and 
important repository of acacia, which provides the pastoralists with vital resources. Archaeological 
site management has helped to create that resource, but it has the potential to dispossess them of it in 
future.  
Furthermore, Greater Meroe encompasses the land upon which the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya 
pastoralists in the case-study area have settled since their families arrived in Bejrawiya, some fifty 
years or almost three generations ago. It is upon the scrubby pasture of this area that they have built 
their relatively low-density villages and that they graze their flocks. And it is from Greater Meroe that 
they embark in the rainy season on their long-distance migrations with their herds of sheep, goats and 
camels deep into the Butana. This is the area that, as discussed above, UNESCO proposes to fence 
and ring with a buffer zone within which no development would be allowed.  
 
                                                     
807  A Forestry Commission licence is needed to fell trees and only one man in the case-study area has one of these 
licences. 
808  ICOMOS 2011: 105. 
809  ICOMOS 2011: 105. 
810  Humphris (2014) demonstrates that acacia nilotica was favoured by the ancient Meroitic iron smelters who used it 
for over 1,000 years. 
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7.3.2.2 The impact of archaeological site-management 
While NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan of 2010 acknowledges the potentially damaging effects 
of its implementation upon the Ja’aliyīn sedentary farmers in Bejrawiya, it fails to consider its impact 
on the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists. With regard to acacia, the Management Plan notes the 
following:  
An acacia plantation to the north-east of the Northern Cemetery at Meroe is being considered, but it is 
doubtful whether such a plantation would be sufficient. The complete Meroe property may need to be 
fenced in order to allow ecological recovery such as that which can be observed in the Royal City.
811
  
However, a) the plantation is being considered for reasons unconnected with the the Manāsīr and 
Hassaniyya pastoralists and b) does not signify a concern with how the local population would be able 
to use the acacia (if at all) or how they would react to further limitations on their current usage. This 
omission is glaring and puzzling since the Management Plan identifies the grazing of animals as one 
of the main threats to the archaeological sites of Greater Meroe, alongside wind erosion, 
desertification and village expansion. However, it might be explained by the Sudanese authorities’ 
long habit (which goes back to the Anglo-Egyptian Condominium) of failing to consider the interests 
of nomadic and pastoral groups and refusing to recognize their customary rights to land (see Chapter 
4).  
UNESCO’s plans would affect the pastoralists on three counts. First, the extension and fencing 
of Meroe would end their access the Meroe acacia and cut them off from their immediate grazing 
grounds inside the Greater Meroe site, which would reduce their ability to feed the herds upon whose 
well-being they rely. Second, extending and fencing the site of Greater Meroe would probably oblige 
them to uproot their current settlements and move, which is a traumatic process they have already 
been through (Chapter 5). And third, it would block their traditional migration routes (masarāt) to the 
east, which are vital to their near-subsistence economy. These effects would clearly be very damaging 
to the livelihoods of the local Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists, so damaging, in fact, that it seems 
unlikely that they would be able to comply. A fence around Greater Meroe would almost certainly be 
resisted by the pastoralists and, if built, quickly breached; it therefore not an equiable or realistic 
proposal. 
Indeed a lesson may be learned from a report by the UN Development Programme which noted 
that Sudanese pastoralists faced with the “depletion of natural pastures…shortage of water resources, 
exhaustion of crop residues…and damaged grass” encroached upon crops belonging to big 
commercial agricultural schemes in order to feed their herds.
812
 If pastoralists are willing in extremis 
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to encroach upon commercial agricultural land and come head-to-head with government-backed 
commercial interests (see Chapter 4), they seem certain to try to breach any fence that stopped them 
grazing their herds on land that they consider they have customary rights to, even one patrolled by site 
guards. A new fence around Greater Meroe therefore seems likely at best to result in an increase in 
tension between the pastoralists and the authorities and at worst to conflict.  
* 
Chapter 7 has explored some of the logical consequences of the socio-economic dynamics that have 
emerged from the long history, spanning over a century, of archaeological projects in the region, and 
the current situation with reference to the efforts of the various agencies involved aimed at site 
conservation and protection. Particularly key issues to emerge are how the fencing-off of the 
monuments is understood by different communities, crucially the perception by Ja’aliyīn communities 
in particular of site ‘protection’ as a form of expropriation (the land being fenced off and appropriated 
by either the ‘state’ or ‘archaeologists’), how this affects their daily practice and livelihoods and how 
measures introduced with purely archaeological objectives in mind may result in increased conflict 
and contestation between the state, foreign archaeological missions and the different resident 
communities.  
  
238 
8. CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
 
 
8.1 Impacts and their Implications 
8.1.1 The Impacts of Archaeology on Identity Formation 
As shown in Chapter 2, official archaeological histories, or ‘authorized heritage discourses’, have 
been used by states to forge a sense of nationhood because they provide objects, images and symbols 
rooted in a distant past and that can be interpreted as an ‘authentic’ ideational framework for a 
unifying collective identity. Like European states before them, archaeological symbols have been 
used by post-colonial nationalist movements in places such as Egypt and Iran to legitimize power and 
cement national identity; usually expressed via what Anderson (1991) terms the ‘logoization’ of 
narratives of archaeological history and iconic images of sites, typically representing moments of 
achievement.  
 In Sudan, successive post-independence governments have chosen to ignore its ‘ancient Nubian’ 
history—once an ‘alternative archaeology’ but now its authorized heritage discourse—as the focus of 
nation-building, favouring emphasis on Arab and Islamic identity. Rather than utilizing carefully 
calibrated re-interpretations of archaeology, the Sudanese state has preferred to ‘invent [their] 
traditions’813 and ‘imagine [their] communities’814 to cement legitimacy and forge nationhood through 
a version of Arabism and Islamism which, instead of looking back at a ‘golden age’, focuses on a 
modernist path to achieving a golden future. The vision of the state as not merely Arab-Muslim, but a 
modern and forward-looking Arab-Muslim entity, has been promoted via imagery and through 
education. Indeed, historicism in itself is a notably small component of the state’s identity 
construction (see below). Alternative visions of the state have been repressed, along with minority 
groups, and especially those, such as the modern ‘Nubians’, who are suspected of having separatist 
tendencies. 
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Although many Sudanese continue to self-identify with their gabīla over their nation or state 
(due to the failure of the former and the weakness of the latter), it should be noted that a significant 
portion of the main gabāīl in the Nile Valley appear to have accepted the state’s Arab-Muslim 
ideology; perhaps since it does not diverge, or more importantly does not clash with, their self-
identification as Arab-Muslim. As data collected for this study indicates, a connection to ‘ancient 
Nubia’ is rare(ly claimed) among the non-Nubian gabāīl, even though most scholars posit that the 
modern Sudanese are fundamentally ‘Arabized Nubians’. 
The most important exception to this inclination are the modern Nubians. While the Sudanese 
state has decline to acknowledge or utilize ‘ancient Nubia’ as the foundation, or even a component, of 
state identity, the Nubians have embraced it, even though their ancestral, linguistic, material and 
etymological links to ‘ancient Nubia’ are hard to substantiate. The claims held by modern Nubians 
thus make them a ‘descendant community’; moreover, they are an ‘indigenous descendant community’ 
because they still live upon the land and amidst the archaeological remains of their claimed ancient 
forebears. To echo the phrasing of Gillot (2010) as well as Jacobs and Porter (2009), for the Nubians, 
‘archaeology’ ('athār) is ‘heritage’ (turāth). 
* 
Archaeology has thus long been used in the service of identity construction. However, this has not 
been limited to states.
815
 Indeed, in ‘revisionist’ or ‘alternative’ histories, the archaeological record as 
well as other cultural and historical evidence, both tangible and intangible, has also been used by 
marginalized people and their supporters to show the ‘real’ story of the nation to counter the 
hegemony of official state histories. In the Sudanese context, the question thus arises of whether 
‘Nubian’ archaeology is the creation of an ‘alternative history’, or even ‘indigenous archaeology’. 
Identity construction among Nubians, a marginalized ‘indigenous descendant community’, is, in many 
ways, echoing the empowerment processes emanating from alternative histories, for example with 
reference to the ‘Khoisans’ noted by Lane (2011). Indeed, particularly given the impact of dam 
building on Nubian sites and communities, it is clear that archaeology in Sudan has served to 
reinforce group boundaries rather than provide a unifying historical framework. Therefore while 
‘Nubian’ archaeology may have initiated as an ‘alternative history’, (see the comment about Nubia’s 
‘triumph’ over Egypt’s hegemonic image, in Chapter 5), it has transcended the marginalization of 
those who claim it as their heritage to become the hegemonic authorized heritage discourse in Sudan, 
even if this has not directly translated into an ‘indigenous archaeology’ (see 8.2, ‘Collaborative 
Archaeologies’).  
* 
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The residents of the case-study area also live upon the land and amidst the archaeological remains of 
‘ancient Nubia’, and this thesis sought to examine how they react to or use this hegemonic discourse. 
Empirical evidence gathered for the present study via interviews, conversations and observations 
demonstrate that, unlike Nubians, the residents of the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya do not 
sense or claim descent from, or cultural affiliation with, ‘ancient Nubia’ or related sites. Scholarly 
contention that the Sudanese are ‘Arabized Nubians’ does not appear to be known about let alone 
accepted by most of the Ja’alī, Mansūrī, Hassanī or Fadnī gabāīl in the case-study area; neither is it 
accepted by Ja’alī historian Ibrahim, who questions the basis on which scholars have come to this 
conclusion, arguing that the idea of Arab-Muslim Sudanese having a ‘Nubian substratum’ (Holt’s 
words, above) is “misguided.”816 Indeed, in terms of identity formation, analyses of language and 
‘antiquities’ as well as collection of oral histories indicate that the residents are disconnected from 
‘Nubian’ archaeology; it is virtually irrelevant to and certainly not claimed by residents of the case-
study area, who may thus be termed ‘non-descendant’ communities.  
The findings also revealed that although many among the site-communites feel no ancestral 
connection to the ‘ancient Nubians’ and no connection to the archaeological sites-as-archaeological-
sites, they do feel a strong sense of connection to the land. Analysis of respondent language showed 
that many saw the sites as an element of the landscape and that many of the terms they used to 
describe them, such as “station” (muwgīf), were strikingly utilitarian. The displays of ‘antiquities’ to 
this author, such as ploughs, waterwheels, wells and water sacks demonstrated the centrality of their 
connection to farming and pastoralism and thus to the land itself. Moreover, the oral histories showed 
that although the sedentary Ja’alī farmers reject an ancestral connection with the ‘ancient Nubian’ 
sites, they do claim an ancestral relationship with the land; the presence of ‘ancient Nubian’ 
archaeological sites in the local landscapes is wholly incidental. Hamza al-Ja’ali’s narrative is the 
most striking example of this, because while the archaeological site of Domat al-Hamadab is central 
to his story of Ja’aliyīn development—the establishment of the Ja’alī dār in Kordofan; the move of 
Hamad and his family to the Shendi Reach; the foundation of the settlement, Hamadab, which bears 
Hamad’s name; the spread of the village to the east; and the establishment of the well and the Islamic 
school—it is not manifest in its archaeological guise. This thesis has thus corroborated the findings of 
Shankland (1996, 1999) and others in Chapter 2 that the historical impact of archaeology upon 
identity here is rigourously ‘unarchaeological’.  
This result is further supported by the analyses of the site-community resident’s connections to 
archaeology, which suggested that the archaeological sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe were 
important parts of the cultural and symbolic landscape for the Ja’aliyīn, and especially Ja’alī women. 
They thus compare favourably with the descriptions of archaeological connections offered by scholars 
in Chapter 2 and confirm Roseberry’s well-known argument that “cultural production is not limited to 
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those who control the means of cultural production”.817 Past descriptions of the beliefs and practices 
associated with spirits, fertility rituals and cemeteries suggest a lively and rich set of traditions, of 
which sites and even archaeologists were a part, and serves as an important reminder that the 
distinction between ‘connections’ and ‘disconnections’ with a phenomenon are not always clear cut. 
Nevertheless it is still possible to argue that in the case of connections, archaeology was again valued 
for being part of the landscape and not for its archaeological resonance. The data also suggest that 
such practices are diminishing, along with the sense of ‘place’ with which the sites used to be 
endowed (below). 
The findings additionally demonstrated that the Ja’aliyīn have a different sense of connection to 
the land compared to the Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya. This may be primarily because the two 
livelihood groups in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, farmers and pastoralists, have different world-views; it is 
almost certainly due to the pastoralists having spent less time in the area. Whatever the precise 
reason/s, data suggest that while sites retain a utilitarian value for the pastoralists in the case-study 
area, archaeological history is even less relevant to them than to the sedentary farmers. In a context 
where the site-communities are themselves are transforming—from Ja’aliyīn farming villages to 
heterogeneous towns—the variety of (dis)connections to archaeology will surely only increase. 
In sum, many of the residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya perceive no link with the ancient ‘Nubian’ 
inhabitants of the land on which they live, and do not see the ‘ancient Nubian’ archaeology ('athār) as 
part of their heritage (turāth). This is not the same as arguing, as Loosley (2005) does, that the idea of 
archaeology is unknown to an ‘Arab Muslim’ societies; NCAM employees, archaeology students and 
professionals, and the many engaged members of Sudanese civil society in Khartoum are themselves 
evidence of this. In the site-community, however, the disconnection to archaeology was clear. Again 
this contrasts heavily with modern Nubians, who appear to have adopted the authorized heritage 
discourse of the archaeologists. If nothing else this is also shown by the difference between the 
approach to dam building by the ‘Nubians’ under threat from the Dal and Kajbar dams at the Second 
and Third Cataracts and the ‘Arabs’ under threat from the Merowe Dam at the Fourth and the Shereik 
Dam at the Fifth Cataract: the modern Nubians have a strong cultural attachment to the ancient 
Nubian archaeological sites and the international support for the rescue of such sites before their 
submergence by Lake Nasser helped to reinforce their sense of Nubian identity. However, the 
Manāsīr and Ja’aliyīn do not have a close cultural attachment to the archaeological sites and their 
opposition to the Merowe and Shereik dams is based on the loss of land and the political use of 
archaeologists themselves.  
In 1994, Trigger asked:  
                                                     
817  Trigger 1994: 345. Roseberry 1989: 45 
  
242 
[d]o studies of the pre-Islamic period have any attraction to the many Sudanese who trace their descent 
from Arabs who settled in the Sudan centuries ago or to Islamic fundamentalists who regard pre-
Islamic times as an Age of Ignorance? 
In Hamadab-Bejrawiya, the research findings point to a clear ‘no’. Collected data thus also agree 
with Trigger’s conclusion that “the time when the findings of archaeology will be of interest to most 
Sudanese seems far off.”818  
* 
Many questions arise from these findings. The first is, ‘why do the site-community residents feel no 
archaeological connection with the archaeological sites?’ To answer this question it is necessary to 
look, at least in part, to the state. Respondents in the case-study area had little formal knowledge 
about pre-Islamic Sudan, in part because of its absence from state imagery and the educational 
syllabus. Such is the state’s weakness that in order for families to make ends meet, many children in 
the case-study area leave school early to work, and do not even reach the level of school wherein 
ancient ‘Nubian’ history is taught. The members of the site-communities thus do not see themselves 
as an ‘ancient Nubian’ descendant community, and are encouraged not to by the state. Modern 
‘Nubians’ are, of course, subject to the same state imagery and education system. However, as 
described above, their sense of connection to ‘ancient Nubia’ has been cultivated by the shared group 
experience of marginalization and by ‘Nubian’ nationalists who have used the sense of such a link as 
a focus of political opposition to the dam construction that has displaced so many, and threatens to 
displace many more. 
Identifying the channels through which Sudanese site-community residents acquire 
archaeological and/or historical information, where they might find information if they wished to, and 
additionally how the information is distributed, it is clear that the various forms of media (television, 
newspapers, radios, the Internet) and mobile technologies are all low-impact sources of information, 
likely because they too are controlled by the state. While both men and women in both groups own 
mobile telephones, the pastoralists will often share one phone between a household or group of 
working men (kalla), and it will be an old model rather than a smartphone, clearly reducing its ability 
to be used as a vehicle for historical information. This medium of communication is hampered also 
because there are very few accessible, coherent and reliable Arabic sources about archaeology online. 
Television programmes and newspaper articles about archaeology and history can certainly be found, 
but they are often badly produced (from the point of view of an archaeologist), and they are infrequent. 
In the case-study area, daily and weekly newspapers can be found in the market town of Kabushiya, 
but they do not seem to be sold much in the villages. Many houses have short-wave radios, but 
televisions are far less common, being an element of the Ja’aliyīn and some Fadniyya houses and not 
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of the Manāsīr or Hassaniyya houses. The same can be said for books: not only is their provision low 
to start with (the nearest library is in Shendi, 45km away), but those who could profitably utilize them 
are proportionally low in number.  
Alongside what we know about the state’s controle of education and sources of information, it is 
thus perhaps unsurprising that statements about “not know[ing]” about archaeology were common. 
Indeed the most common source of information seems to be local discourse, a catch-all phrase used 
here to refer to what respondents have ‘heard’ and ‘seen’ as a result of living in the site-community. 
The importance of rumour and the residents’ observations, more specifically, what they “see” or “do 
not see”, to their understanding of archaeology also shows how archaeologists are not seen as a source 
of historical information. Lack of encounters—mentioned above—limits more ‘educational’ or 
‘historical’ talk between archaeologists and site-community residents, and automatically restricts the 
potential scope of archaeologists as sources of information. Thus the urgency of archaeological work 
and the inherent time-money limits put on archaeologists to complete work quickly often silences the 
discourse of archaeology within site-communities (see below).  
A fundamental reason for the site-communities’ disconnection from ‘ancient Nubia’ thus lies in 
the value system and ideology of the Arab-Muslim groups that dominate the state, evidenced by the 
state’s imagery and educational syllabus, compounded by its control of the media, and exacerbated by 
a lack of information provided by archaeologists. Behind this is a reluctance to acknowledge a 
connection to anything ‘Nubian’ since, like perhaps most Arab-Muslim Sudanese, there is a broad 
belief in that ‘Nubians’ fall short in the three most important ‘proofs of (acceptable) identity’ (as 
discussed in Chapter 4): ancestry, language and religion. Thus, modern ‘Nubians’ are disparaged for 
their African ancestry and for being the descendants of slaves; Nubian languages are denigrated as 
‘gobbledygook’ (rutāna); and, while the modern ‘Nubians’ are strict adherents to Islam, they were 
once Christian (and pagan before that). For all these reasons, the ‘Nubians’ are stigmatized as an 
inferior ‘out-group’ by the Arab-Muslim residents of Hamadab and Bejrawiya. 
The biggest question of all, then, is whether or not the idea of a shared ‘heritage’, and certainly a 
shared ‘Nubian’ heritage, is possible in a failed nation run by a weak state. Starting first with the 
problem of ‘nation’, it could certainly be argued that a broad social connection with the ancient past is 
impossible in a tribal society like Sudan; it even seems to have been proven. This question is not 
limited to failed nations in the global south: Lilley (2000) has asked similar questions about Australia 
and remarks on the number of scholars that, operating in combative societies, stress the importance of 
reconciliation between societal groups before moving on to positive self-identification with the 
ancient past. The result there, as seems to be the case in Sudan, is that subscription to ideas of 
‘archaeology’, ‘Nubia’, and ‘World Heritage’ will not be possible until there is a nation. Such 
‘national myth-making’, or construction of a ‘mythscape’, commonly requires the backing of the state; 
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archaeology alone is unlikely to act as a focus of nationhood, without a coherent national programme 
to steer it.  
This is not an impossible outcome for Sudan: a government’s ideational connection to 
archaeological history is not set in stone but is rather dependent upon what its members perceive to be 
the most expedient form of identity. Although civil war has prevented the full development of a 
nation and national ideology, the South Sudanese government, for example, which split from the 
north in 2011, claimed a link to ‘ancient Nubia’ through their national anthem, entitled ‘Land of 
Cush’,819 showing that the narratives behind ‘nation’ can change.  However, in Sudan, this would 
inevitably mean that the state would have to want to modify the fundamental components of its own 
image. As has been noted in Chapter 5 and above, the state cultivates an Arab-Muslim ideology, and 
staunchly rejects the ‘Nubian’ component of Sudan’s history and thus archaeology’s current focus. 
Even when South Sudan claimed a link to ‘ancient Nubia’, Sudan still did not try and counter-claim it 
ideologically; the succession may have even precipitated a stronger relationship between Sudan and 
its Arab neighbours in the Gulf.820  Indeed such is Khartoum’s disinterest that looking to the future it 
may be that if ‘Nubian’ archaeological history continues to be used in the identity construction of the 
South Sudanese nation, that there will then be a different question about, or even conflict between, the 
ownership of such history and monuments by South Sudanese and the Nubians.  
Meanwhile the Sudanese state also promotes a modern image of itself, evidenced at least in part 
in its simultaneous pursuit of development projects and neglect of archaeology its policies of ‘heritage 
distancing’ and ‘excluding the past’.821 Ideationally, the state’s pursuit of modernity provides an 
equally big challenge for any practice of archaeology because it points to the state’s broader 
conceptual problem with historicity; the idea of ‘modern Sudan’ is as much a driving factor in the 
state image and policy as the ‘Arab-Muslim’ elements that seem to monopolize it. Because of this we 
may confidently say that it is not just ‘ancient Nubia’ that presents a problem for the state, but all 
history. Indeed even though they may seem the most relevant to such an image, the medieval Islamic 
kingdoms of Darfur and Sennar (the Funj) are equally as absent in state rhetoric (although this would 
require study in its own right). Of course in terms of the proofs of identity (Chapter 4), the medieval 
Islamic kingdoms of Darfur and Sennar are also ‘problematic’ because of their presumed ethnicities: 
the Funj are viewed as having been ‘black’, and the government and militias in Darfur are still 
                                                     
819 Martell 2011. 
820   Indeed the impact of the succession of South Sudan on the relationship between the Sudanese state and 
archaeology seems to have been indirect and economic in nature: first, the loss of land and revenues therefrom has 
increased the amount of land the government is willing to lease to foreign nations, which aggravates the level of 
insecurity felt by residents and thus has knock-on effects for the results in Chapters 6 and 7 about tourism, 
employment and site management. Second, and as part of the land leasing phenomenon, the succession seems to 
have precipitated an intensified relationship with the GCC, which itself prompted the unprecedented QSAP 
funding. This may have intensified an ideational relationship with the GCC, currently it is hard to assess because 
of Bashir’s recent visit to meet President Putin of Russia. Otherwise, the succession of South Sudan seems to have 
had little ideological impact on the government, certainly none that has affected its strategy to exclude swathes of 
society that do not meet with modern Arab-Muslim national identity. 
821 McAnanay and Parks 2012 and Stone and MacKenzie 1990 respectively. 
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engaged in civil war over such stereotypes made about the ethnic identity of the Fur. However even if 
we ask whether the state would be more invested in archaeology if Islamic subjects were investigated, 
the answer is still ‘no’, because it is modernity that the state seeks, as much as being ‘Arab’ and 
‘Muslim’. For historical activities to blossom, be they archaeology or any form of historical enquiry, 
the state would have to be willing to downplay or de-emphasize the modernist element of their image. 
Under the current state, it does not seem likely that forays into the past will be pursued unless there is 
political and/or economic capital to be gained (as was the case with the ‘donation’ of Qatar). 
Questions might also be asked about the weak state and the effect relative poverty has on 
producing the results presented in this thesis. Certainly poverty is an important factor in the creation 
and maintenance of sub-national ‘tribal’ identities which, in turn, produce and sustain the residents’ 
lack of connection with ‘ancient Nubia’ (above). The poverty level and low standard of living also 
obviously effects the importance of tourism, employment (Chapter 6) and site management (Chapter 7) 
to local livelihoods; such developments (or lack thereof) may not have such critical impact upon the 
residents if their living standard was higher. However, poverty is just one of the conditions that 
contribute to this outcome: it does not inherently prohibit a people’s ideological connection with the 
‘Nubian’ past. Rather it is the combination of a failure to unite via ‘nation’ and the failure to provide 
via the ‘state’ that produces the disconnection, plus the ideological leanings of government that 
aggravates the disconnection and renders it not simply an irrelevant history but an inexpedient one. 
If, as Wendt (1992) argues, “identities are the basis of interests”, it could be understood that in a 
tribal society in which gabīla identification remains strong, it is not in the interest of members of non-
Nubian communities, including those in the case-study area, to identify with ‘ancient Nubia’, even if 
they did know more about it. Indeed the interview with Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim provides 
strong evidence of this: even when trying to argue for greater access to archaeological jobs with 
someone they identify as a khwāja (the present researcher), at no point do they make reference to the 
archaeological sites or to ‘Nubia’. As Gomes (2006) notes about the Parauá, they have a choice (albeit 
limited) about how to present themselves and have chosen not to (re)fashion themselves as 
descendants of the ancient ‘pre-Islamic’ Nubians. Instead, they justify their request for broader 
Ja’aliyīn access upon their connection to the land and its produce (its ‘benefits’). Indeed to identify 
with ‘ancient Nubia’ or Nubians would fundamentally contradict their own ancestral narratives, which 
are based upon claimed descent from Arab immigrants and be tantamount to celebrating a Sudanese 
history in which they, and their gabīla, are absent. If nothing else, identifying with the construction of 
‘ancient Nubia’ would undermine their status as members of the Arab-Muslim ‘in-group’, at the top 
of the national identity value-system, and, connect them with ‘out-groups’ linked to Africans and 
slaves.   
* 
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Of course other evidence gathered in Hamadab-Bejrawiya by the present researcher also showed that 
the main cultural connections between the site-communities and the sites had been through the latter’s 
association with spirits, fertility rituals and cemeteries. These findings this align in particular with 
those of Shankland (1999). However, the data additionally suggested that these connections have 
diminished. There are two main explanations for this decline: the palpable increase in conservative 
values and orthodoxy across Sudanese society, and the simultaneous and increasing segregation of 
residents from the sites by archaeological site management processes. 
The growing conservatism of society is reflected, amongst other things, in changes to what are 
considered to be acceptable behaviours and dress for women, who seem increasingly expected to 
remain indoors. Over the past 40 years, scholars such as Grzymski (pers. comm) have noted that 
women living in riverine settlements are far less often seen outside the hōsh than before. Women 
themselves expressed to the present researcher how household technologies such as room fans and 
indoor taps have enabled them to remain inside the hōsh year-round, rather than face the air outside 
during the hottest parts of the year or collect water from a well or outside tap. Indeed for Amna 
Suliman, nostalgia for the women’s sanctioned solo trips outside the home (marga, trips without male 
supervision) was the main motivation for her to show the present researcher the Well of Osman al-
Fajaali; she herself spent time there when she was little with her mother and noted it as a ‘mixing spot’ 
(abuj biyha). Simultaneously, there has been a change in the architecture of the homes, or hōsh, in the 
riverine farming households; the walls of the hōsh have grown higher, a back door added (natadj), 
through which women can enter and exit hidden from view, as well as a ‘turn’ in the front so that 
outsiders cannot look directly inside. This was referred to by Mariam al-Pasha as a “new style” called 
‘turn’ (wiranda lāfa). Interestingly enough, Shankland (1996) notes the same increase of orthodoxy in 
rural Turkey, and similarly connects it with the fact that in Küçükköy, houses are all surrounded by 
increasingly tall walls. 
Echoing the ‘enclosing qualities’ of the walls of the hōsh, there also increasingly strict 
expectations about what women should wear outside the home.  The introduction of the niqab, a veil 
for the face that leaves the eyes clear and is worn with an accompanying headscarf, has also been a 
gradual process over the past four decades years or so, but the present researcher recorded a notable 
increase in its use while conducting fieldwork in Sudanese riverine communities over a five-year 
period. It is significant that the 1997 Labour Law states that women should not wear trousers unless 
their work specifically requires it; there are even restrictions on women taking such jobs. Indeed one 
female Sudanese archaeologist commented that,  
Once, at a site near Shendi, we [archaeologists] were wearing trousers. Everyone sees us and asks what 
we are doing, in a curious way. I tell them I’m working with antiquities and they say, ‘you’re working 
here?! You’re wearing trousers?!’ ‘It’s better to work inside!’. The people who saw me were very 
confused.  
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These more conservative behaviours have been widely adopted by women in riverine farming 
communities, such as the Ja’aliyīn of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, but less so by women of the pastoralist 
gabāīl. Indeed, the former now find it offensive, and almost indecent, that pastoralist women still 
labour outside the home.  
One of the catalysts for this increasing conservatism is the radical Islamist stance of the central 
government, whose Salafist orientation is entrenched in the constitution, the law and the educational 
system. In this vein, it should be noted that Sudan has long been religiously divided; in addition 
Muslim-Christian confrontations, Arab-Muslim allegiances are split between the Sufi orders (tariqa) 
that emerged in the 19
th
 Century; the enmity between the Khatmiya and Ansar is the most famous 
example of Sufism’s fracture lines. The Mahdiya, the uprising led by the Mahdi at the end of the 19th 
Century, was based, in part, on a desire to sweep away corrupt religious practices and return to a purer 
form of Islam; however, it did not produce the extreme religious conservatism widely seen today. The 
latter is rather the result of the growing influence in Sudan of forms of Wahhabi Salafism, an austere 
branch of Islam imported from Saudi Arabia (in part through returnee labour migrants) and 
propagated by Saudi-funded imams in Saudi-funded mosques and schools: at least two schools and a 
mosque here have been sponsored in such a way (also see Chapter 4). 
Unlike the Taliban in Afghanistan and the so-called Islamic State, Salafists have not seriously 
threatened archaeological sites or archaeologists in Sudan. However, some radicals have attempted to 
arouse suspicion of the archaeological sites themselves, and are known to be intolerant of pre-Islamic 
as well as Sufi rituals and material culture.
822
 The belief in zār, for example, is seen as a practice that 
contaminates ‘true Islam’, and has long been the focus of a government crackdown; today, citizens 
need a permit in order to undertake the ritual activities. Men, who often sourced the trappings needed 
for possession to take place, are strictly forbidden by law from taking part since it is believed to 
encourage homosexual tendencies. Medowi al-Mansouri, for example, narrated a story to this author 
of a “big stone” with an indentation that had come to be seen as the footprint of the Prophet 
Muhammad. Tradition followed that after the signing of the marriage contract ('agid), grooms would 
take their brides to this stone and say prayers and receive blessings. However, Medowi reported that 
members of an ultra-orthodox Salafist group known as Ansar al-Sunna had eventually removed the 
stone and placed it face-down in the mosque. 
Zooming out, if you will, from the specifities of the site-community, it is possible to see 
archaeology and Salafism as opposing forces both of which are attempting to ‘recruit’ or ‘assimilate’ 
people into their worldview. Certainly both archaeology and Salafism seem to be the result of Sudan 
                                                     
822   Asad Abdelrahman (of the Ministry of Culture’s Documentation Folk Life Centre) has given a paper on ‘The Risk 
of Religious Extremism on the Archaeological Sites (Islamic Domes Models [sic])’ paper delivered at the 
‘Safeguarding the Cultural Heritage: Issues, Challenges and Opportunities in the Sudanese Context’ held on 29 
November 2015 in Khartoum. There have also been reports by NCAM staff of attempts by the ultra-orthodox 
Salafist group Ansar al-Sunna to destroy Christian relics in Dongola and orders “not to work with the ‘infidels’”. 
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trying to make its way in the global economy (archaeology through cultural economy and relations 
with the West; Salafism through the religious economy and relations with the Gulf and Arab world) 
but the result on the ground is more complex and dynamic than this description suggests. There are, of 
course, other forces at play here, but it nevertheless seems that, in an extreme case, the future of 
archaeology here will depend on the acquiescene of residents who are liberal minded if not openly 
pro-Western.
823
 
Increasing orthodoxy is therefore one reason for diminished connections to the archaeological 
sites. And, as noted above, a second reason seems to be because of the increasing segregation of the 
sites by boundary fences and stricter site management; it is significant that many of the stories told 
about the sites were about the setting up of fences or being told off by guards. As Amir Walid, a Ja’alī 
respondent from Deraqab, noted: “[t]he guard stopped [us] going into [Meroe]—[we] used to have 
festivals there”. Adira Nassim also commented,  
In the past, it was difficult to go there [to the site] unless by the door. When I was younger I made 
many journeys there with my mother, but [the guard] screamed at us. 
They was not alone: many more respondents noted that in the past residents had used the 
archaeological sites as social spaces: a shady location for outings, parties, rituals and festivals; women 
could go to Meroe alone during the day; at night, sites were seemingly frequented for fertility rituals. 
Again, however, these appear to be dying practices. For riverine women, this is partly because of their 
increasing seclusion in the home, as discussed above, but it is also the result of the creation of tangible 
and intangible barriers to the site.  
Thus, in addition to the ideational disconnect, physical barriers now segregate the communities 
in Hamadab and Bejrawiya from the archaeological sites. For many, these barriers imply that the site 
is in danger from the site-communities and needs to be protected from them; in consequence, the site-
communities seem to have lost all sense of ownership over the sites. When asked, ‘who does the 
archaeological site belong to?’, most respondents replied either “the government” or “the khwajāt 
[archaeologists]”. For the site-communities, the loss of the archaeological sites in this manner could 
thus arguably be conceived of as paralleling the loss of farming and grazing land to government-
sponsored commercial agricultural projects (see Chapter 7 and below). 
 
                                                     
823  For Gillot, “Christian populations and Alawis communities seem more favourable towards the presence of the 
western archaeologists (in particular women archaeologists) than Sunni populations, who disapprove of some 
attitudes (alcohol consumption, clothing, shared accommodation etc.)” (Gillot 2010: 13). 
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8.1.1.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice 
So what do these results mean for archaeological practice? Along with, or perhaps as part of 
excavating ‘Nubia’, are archaeologists also excavating differences? Are they providing modern 
rivalries with an ancient language, through with contestation occurs? If so, what can archaeologists do 
to ameliorate the consequences of their work?  
In the view of the present author, the answer is yes: in writing ‘Nubian’ history, and in promoting 
‘Nubia’ as the authorized heritage discourse, archaeologists such as Haynes (1992), Bonnet and 
Valbelle (2008), De Simone (2014) and others risk exacerbating tribalism because it reinforces group 
boundaries and attributes to the Nubians a more important and, importantly, a more ‘authentic’ claim 
to Sudanese territory rather than providing a unifying historical framework. As shown in Chapter 2, 
several authors, not least Meskell (2005), have already highlighted this risk. (Indeed see below for the 
way in which archaeological employment also exacerbates difference.) Therefore, in a society where 
gabīla is the primary mode of identification, what archaeologists of ‘Nubia’ end up doing is catering 
for only one of these groups, the Nubians. Once again, Trigger anticipates the key issue when he 
writes that: 
[a]rchaeological research in the northern Sudan has helped to promote the pride of Nubian intellectuals 
in their history and culture, which some of them maintain is the essence of the Sudanese culture. Other 
Sudanese regard such an attitude among Nubians as threatening the unity of their country.
824
 
Indeed, as Silverman notes, “[t]he emphasis on certain messages and stories of archaeological 
material can increase social and cultural capital for some interest groups, but decrease it for others”.825 
An example of this is clear from many archaeologists’ desire to preserve ‘Nubian’ antiquities using 
rules, site guards and fences, but at the cost of reduced cultural intimacy (and economic benefit, 
below) for the residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya. The affection for ‘ancient Nubia’, the principle of 
site preservation at any cost and the concomitantly inevitable site management processes therefore 
have cultural (and economic, below) knock-on effects for the Arab-Muslim residents of Hamadab-
Bejrawiya.  
So how can archaeologists actively address these problems? They can recognise that the state is a 
very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which modern populations connect 
with archaeology. Writing about England, Schlanger (2016) suggests that the nation state should be 
understood as an archaeological context in much the way excavations operate via context. In his 
example, the English state is understood to be an institution that incubates and helps the archeological 
                                                     
824  Trigger 1994: 345. 
825  Silverman 2002. 
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endeavour: "Without the state, instilling regulations, procedures and common purpose, archaeology 
will not really thrive.”826  
Without such care in place, and with the state’s current ideological and economic orientation 
firmly in place, a further implication is that archaeologists should stop writing exclusively ‘Nubian’ 
history, and be careful in how they present such histories to the public. In practice this would mean 
concentrating their intellectual efforts on a range of sites from different historical periods and in areas 
outside the Nile Valley, both ‘Nubian’ and non-‘Nubian’, for example the Ottoman port of Suakin on 
the Red Sea coast and the 18
th
 Century mosque and palace associated with Sultan Mohammed Tayrub 
at Old Shoba in northern Darfur (see Chapter 1). Although 
for foreign archaeologists, the ultimate decolonization is the realization that they have little, if any, 
direct control over the use that is made, or not made, of their findings by the Sudanese people,
827 
archaeologists also need to begin highlighting the erroneous nature of a connection between ‘ancient’ 
and ‘modern’ Nubians. As Gomes rightly points out about the Parauá caboclos, the issue here is that 
without thinking of the ramifications, archaeologists are perpetuating “the idea of historical continuity 
between past and present populations.”828 Archaeologists should simultaneously distribute their own 
findings to the local residents in a more meaningful way so that the knowledge created even by more 
traditional archeological work is not monopolized. 
Second, site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between 
modern populations and the sites so that the cultural and economic impacts of fencing and other 
exclusive methods might be mitigated. Interestingly, it seems that the authors of NCAM’s UNESCO 
Management Plan do not consider this to be a problem: the Plan’s authors’ claim that a layer of 
protection for the sites also derives from  
traditional and popular interest in the sites and their cultural heritage…organised under popular 
committees or cultural clubs operating from the localities surrounding the sites…such as at Shendi, 
Kabbushiyya, Begraweya, Ba Naqa and al-Awatei.
829
  
Not only does ICOMOS doubt whether “traditional and popular interest in the sites and their 
cultural heritage exists”, but also none was observed by the present writer during extensive fieldwork 
in the case-study area. The Management Plan’s erroneous claim may be based on the fact that most 
archaeologists working in Sudan (commonly British, French, German, Polish and American) come 
from cultural backgrounds that encourage them to see archaeological sites as part of a shared 
‘heritage,’ which in turn fosters an innate desire to protect them. Functioning states with a sense of 
shared heritage also tend to produce organizations such as English Heritage and the National Trust 
                                                     
826  Schlanger 2016: 48. 
827  Trigger 1994: 345. 
828  Gomes 2006: 156. 
829  ICOMOS 2011. 
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designed to preserve and protect that heritage. However, the historical disconnection between the 
residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya and archaeological sites, and the physical and legal barriers that now 
separate the two, means that they have little sense of sense of ownership over the sites or of 
stewardship towards them. As Miller (1980) noted, there are difficulties in implanting a European 
construction in a foreign setting: 
Where archaeology is employed in societies very different from those in which it originally developed, 
it may not be able to reproduce itself in its old image and expect all the familiar sets of relationships 
that define it to follow.
830
 
These disconnections, and the low chance of archaeologists being able to ‘recruit’ and ‘assimilate’ 
residents into their view of ‘archaeology as (world) heritage’, therefore have implications for the 
stewardship of Sudan’s archaeological sites. Part of the amelioration of these issues will therefore 
inevitably require archaeologists to stop assuming that archaeology is of importance to residents in the 
way it is important to them; as has been shown, pristine ‘archaeology’ is not necessarily perceived to 
be untouchable ‘heritage’, and it is only when this is appreciated that archaeologists may better 
understand the ways in which such (dis)connections are produced and address them effectively.  
Finally, then, we must ask: in a tribal society, and under the conditions jut described, can 
archaeology be made relevant for residents of site-communities such as Hamadab-Bejrawiya? If so, 
how? Like many scholars before (such as Smith and Waterton 2009), the present author stresses the 
need for archaeologists to have more egalitarian views of what constitutes ‘archaeology’ and 
‘heritage’, and to make time during the season (and space in their budget) for such collaborative 
explorations.  
A key problem to overcome will be archaeologists’ dismissal of the residents’ history as folklore. 
Indeed returning to the issue of the Sudanese as ‘Arabized Nubians’, it is clear that there is an 
epistemological gulf between the two that can sometimes manifest itself in contempt. Ibrahim quite 
rightly notes that, “[c]ontemporary research on the ethnic identity of the Ja’aliyīn in Sudan directly 
challenges the indigenous genealogical tradition”831 and that archaeologists unfairly dismiss these 
traditions as ‘folklore’ if not outright falsifications. Naturally, questioning the veracity of local 
narratives reflects, in Cunnison’s words, “justifiable scepticism”,832 but Ibrahim is also right to argue 
that there is a clear “[i]ntolerance of the ambiguities and indeterminacies” surrounding indigenous 
histories and a tendency for scholars to dismiss them for the analytical challenges they present.
833
 
Ibrahim rightly argues for less criticism of the story-tellers and more integration of their narratives 
into historical accounts of the past: while oral histories have more recently been recognized by 
                                                     
830   Miller 1980. 
831 Ibrahim 1988: 217. 
832 Cunnison 1971: 188. 
833 Ibrahim 1988: 219. No doubt Ibrahim is referring to scholars such as Lowie (1915) who notoriously wrote about 
the redundancy of oral tradition. 
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archaeologists as valid sources of information,
834
 and they are still regarded as a subsidiary to the 
archaeological record.
835
 Indeed, this is why the present researcher has circumvented the debate about 
the usefulness of myth and folklore to the historical record.
836
  
Archaeologists in Sudan therefore need to amend the culture of knowledge production in two 
ways: first, they need to invest more in the production and serious recording of the archaeologies and 
knowledges of the local residents, even if this proves tricky in practice; second, they need to distribute 
the archaeologies and knowledges they produce themselves more equally.
837
 
 
8.1.2 The Impacts of Archaeology on Local Economics and Society 
Leaving aside the failure of tourism to provide economic benefits for the site-communities, there are 
mixed findings when it comes to the economic impact of archaeological employment. Chapter 6 
shows that while the archaeological wage itself is comparatively low from the perspective of many 
local employees, they also see it as having worthwhile non-monetary benefits and a nature that 
justifies seasonal pursuit. Those who are not employed by archaeologists also see jobs in archaeology 
as an important economic opportunity; one to which they desire more access. For many among the 
sedentary agricultural Ja’aliyīn, the view—whether directly employed or not—is that the resource of 
archaeological employment is unfairly allocated to non-Ja’alī pastoralists. As the ‘original’, settled, 
farming and educated members of local society, the Ja’aliyīn perceive any resource to emerge from 
their land to be their property. The pastoralists are seen, quite frankly, as interlopers to a resource to 
which they have no legal, biological or historical right. The competition for resources is already 
increasing tensions between farmers and pastoralists (Chapter 4) and we may reasonably conclude 
that the disproportionate allocation of jobs to the pastoralists exacerbates this tension. However, there 
are several other dimensions of the matter to consider, too. 
First, and to emphasize a point already made above, while it is perhaps predictable that those 
who perceive marginalization in the present context, i.e. Ja’alī perceptions of work with UCLQ’s 
mission, would make the case for increased access to employment for fellow members of their 
community—in this instance, by forging a historical reason for their ‘right’ to the jobs on offer—one 
must take into account that the aspect of archaeology that they claim a historical link to is the land 
                                                     
834 See Carruthers (2008) on the stability of memory. 
835 Zimmerman 2001: 173. 
836  Sudanese folklore was widely studied under the heading of ‘myths and legends of primitive people’ by early 
anthropologists in Sudan who, like the early archaeologists, arrived with the colonial administration. This trend 
continued and many of the fullest compendia of Sudanese folklore are from this period and the subsequent heyday 
of folklore studies in the 1960s and 1970s. 
837  Scholars such as Popa believe that archaeologists have a duty to disseminate to the public so that damaging forms 
of information do not gain currency: "the ideas of pseudoarchaeologists and re-enactors have greater visibility and 
circulation in the public sphere than those of archaeologists.” (Popa 2016: 34). 
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and not the archaeological site or what they believe it represents historically. In this vein, the absence 
of any mention of Nubia in Ja’alī reactions to the disproportional allocation of archaeological 
employment thus strengthens the argument from Chapter 5. The salient point here is that it is these 
markers that were used, based upon agreed hierarchies, by the employees and others. A large amount 
of value is therefore ascribed to the identities or stereotypes which appear in their speech, because 
these are clearly the identities that they feel serve them in this context. 
Second, there is, of course, another major ‘disproportion’ on the local job market to note, namely 
the disproportionate allocation of jobs between men and women. As we have seen, if the 
archaeologists employ local women, it is for house-based work such as laundering clothes or washing 
pottery, and these tasks require far fewer employees than excavation. Moreover, when archaeological 
teams work alongside each other, as in Hamadab, such house-based tasks are often shared, which 
means that the number of women employed is even smaller than it may otherwise have been.  
In an attempt to address women’s frequent requests for work, some archaeologists have tried to 
increase the number of women they employ, notably the UCLQ project director after she was 
informed of the requests by the present author. But their scope to do so is limited: this disproportional 
scenario is, in a sense, un-actionable. Archaeological excavation is strenuous and dirty in nature, and 
the cultural and social constraints about female exposure (which, elsewhere, Chen and Korinek (2010) 
call “life course traditions” and Abdalla (1987) “limiting factors”), mean that only men are employed 
to do this work. The jobs offered by UCLQ are gender-segregated in conformity with the norms of 
Sudanese society.
838
 As we have seen in Chapter 5, cultural factors mean that women come into 
contact with the archaeologists and the archaeological sites in far fewer numbers than men.  
We might say that in this case, while gender norms are extremely important “life course 
traditions”, they also act as a “limiting factor” to the socio-cultural impacts of archaeology in Sudan. 
Thus, for cultural reasons, most of those earning cash wages from the archaeologists, and all of those 
employed on excavations, are men. This does not necessarily have an effect on archaeology’s 
economic impact: we saw above that most of the men’s earnings are channelled into their households, 
meaning that women—wives, mothers, sisters and daughters—share the economic benefits of 
archaeology.  
Nonetheless, as excavations are the main way in which archaeologists and local residents interact, 
and are thus the main “opportunity” residents have to spend time with archaeologists 839  female 
respondents’ broad framing of their relationship to archaeology as providing them with “no benefit” 
from the archaeological site (via tourism) or from the archaeologists’ activities (via archaeological 
                                                     
838 The Sudan Labour Law (1997) has restricted rules about the times and ways women are allowed to be employed, 
including making specific allowances for their break times and keeping them from doing “works which 
are…exceeding the reasonable limits women can withstand.” (§19, Sudan Labour Law 1997: 7.)  
839   Gillot 2010: 11. 
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employment) becomes clearer. “Not seeing” the archaeologists, and the latter’s absence from their 
homes for visits for tea, were also common topics of conversation with female interviewees, as were 
frequent declarations that they have “no relationship” with the archaeologists or the archaeological 
site. The finding above with reference to the seeming demise of the tradition of fertility rituals at the 
archaeological sites (Chapter 5) adds weight to this perspective. 
However, in the wake of the issues raised by the Ja’aliyīn with reference to demographic 
disproportionality in the allocation of archaeological work with UCLQ, the culture which produces 
this very discourse also needs to be evaluated for its potential as a driver of conflict risk. Indeed, 
multiple questions arose as this author encountered the delineation of in-groups and out-groups in 
interviews with the employees: is the Ja’alī rhetoric about encroaching outsiders appropriating their 
‘rights’ merely rhetoric? Do they really want the jobs they are asking for? If no, what are the 
conditions which drive and may exacerbate such sentiment? Is the predominant allocation of jobs to 
pastoralists likely to empower the latter, thereby impacting local power dynamics and perhaps even 
inducing social conflict in Hamadab-Bejrawiya in the long term? 
If past experience is an indicator of future performance, precedent suggests that the primary 
allocation of archaeological jobs to pastoralists will have little impact on the status quo. In this 
viewing, the Ja’alī expressions of discontent are no more than rhetoric. First, the unequal distribution 
of money and material resources, and wide disparity of wealth and the extreme insecurity it fosters, is 
not new in Sudan but rather a grim reality of contemporary Sudanese society (Chapter 4). In the case-
study area of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, economic and political power is dominated by the Ja’aliyīn. The 
Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists and the semi-pastoralist Fadniyya are not only in the minority in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya but they have traditionally held less power and influence than the sedentary 
Ja’alī farmers on the national scale, too. Recalling the tribal dynamics explained in Chapter 4 and the 
history narrated in Chapter 5, we know that the Ja’aliyīn have held significant power in the Shendi 
Reach and much of the Butana since at least the 16
th
 Century, both under the dominion of external 
forces (the Fūnj, the Turco-Egyptian state and Anglo-Egyptian rule) and since independence in 1956. 
With the additional inertia caused by an absent state, there is evidence of very little social mobility, 
while Ja’alī families have grown into their almost preassigned roles and remain in them. The Ja’aliyīn 
have established channels of political representation and recorded rights to the land: everyone knows 
this is their dār. Because group membership is strictly controlled, there has been little upward 
mobility over time. In comparison with the pastoralists, the Ja’aliyīn are materially wealthy and well-
represented on the national stage: most positions of power in Sudan are held by sedentary 
agriculturalists, many of whom are also members of the Ja’aliyīn, who in the case-study area 
considers the land their home.  
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Second, and perhaps more fundamentally, while the present author is convinced of their sincere 
and well-founded insecurity regarding day-to-day life, it is difficult to overcome the conclusion drawn 
from observation that the Ja’aliyīn do not really want the jobs: it is neither the archaeological wage 
nor most of the non-monetary benefits of such employment which drives the sense of injustice; rather 
it is the sense of being not merely marginalized in employment, but losing out to pastoral outsiders. 
Indeed, reflecting on narratives in interviews with Ja’alī employees, archaeological work did not 
appear to fit with what they appear to see as a respectable occupation, given the type of labour 
involved. Thus, perhaps the most fundamental element to consider is that archaeological 
employment—if not the site itself—is a valued resource in a context characterized by economic 
insecurity and competition for resources between sedentary farmers and pastoralists; a scenario that 
exists in other parts of the world, too.  
Yet herein may lie one, if not the, core problem and indeed the reason why Ja’alī expressions of 
discontent cannot simply be dismissed as rhetoric: there are other important factors driving this 
sentiment. The acute competition for resources between farmers and pastoralists is exacerbated by the 
Ja’aliyīn’s feelings of insecurity over the slow erosion of their hold on economic and political power, 
which has resulted in their deliberate withholding from the pastoralists of basic services under their 
control, such as water and electricity (Chapter 4). Any progress made by non-Ja’aliyīn, especially 
non-Ja’alī pastoralists, is seen as a threat. It therefore seems as if there is widespread inertia to the 
idea of change, and the Ja’aliyīn are deliberately holding on to the reigns of power in terms of basic 
services and settlement areas. The fragility of their long-standing encumbancy of powerful positions 
means that the Ja’aliyn are reacting against any potential dilution of political power, or the space 
taken up in political representation. The discourse of Bashir Kamal and Abdel Hakim is a form of 
reaction, and resistance, to what they regard as unjust. 
Referring again to Chapter 4, it was noted that for farmers living along the Nile, ownership of 
land contributes to social standing and prestige; indeed, many scholars argue that land is a social 
commodity first and an economic one second. These two dimensions of land ownership are thus 
interlinked; a breakdown in the present economic status quo, including changes in the farmers’ 
spending power vis-à-vis pastoralists, has in turn important repercussions for social networks. Thus, 
the possibility of a breakdown in social relations are likely to draw emotional responses. We therefore 
see how marginalization from access to resources, whether perceived or real, is seen as a main 
obstacle to prosperity and thus dramatically “affects human behaviour”. 840 Within the context of 
archaeological employment, this dynamic has a similar effect; it induces the Ja’aliyīn to express 
themselves as they did in interviews and conversations with this author: asserting their role-identity as 
owners of the land, with resulting ‘rights’ to archaeological employment.  
                                                     
840 Sloman 2000: 2. 
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Regardless of whether it is intended or not, it is therefore highly significant that the 
archaeological project directors in Hamadab-Bejrawiya appear to disproportionally hire members of 
the Manāsīr, Hassanī pastoralists and Fadnī semi-pastoralists rather than Ja’alī farmers. In doing so, 
archaeological missions have, in effect, undermined the established privileges of the Ja’aliyīn, the 
group to whom access to opportunities and services are traditionally bestowed; they have also 
provided a route for the traditionally marginalized Manāsīr, Hassaniyya and Fadniyya to sustain new 
forms of influence by virtue of the economic and social impact of archaeological work.  
While the extent of the role of archaeology is certainly arguable, it should not be overlooked that 
the Fadniyya have become an established community in the case-study area; they already have formed 
one Local Committee and begun assimilating to the ways of the riverine Ja’aliyīn. Indeed, there are 
further, political, changes afoot: after having described at length the dominance of the Ja’aliyīn in 
government, Azim Rafiq, a Mansouri employee of UCLQ, told this author, “[i]n the past, there were 
no people from [my village] in the government or education, but now there are.”  
Thus, rather than approaching archaeological work as an exogenous and isolated potential driver 
of change in social and political dynamics in the case-study area, it would perhaps be more prudent to 
seek to place the impact of archaeology within a context in which existing, local social and political 
processes – or change – is being affected, and perhaps even accelerated. As seen in Chapter 6, it 
would be imprudent to seek to gauge the value and impact of archaeological work in absolute terms, 
and in isolation. Rather, it is when placed in the local socio-economic context, and when seemingly 
mundane characteristics of such employment are considered – such as the seasonal timing of its 
availability and the form of payment – that a grasp of potentially powerful, and outsized, ripple effects 
could be properly understood.    
With reference to the evolution of emergent protest or opposition movements, as shown in 
Wiley’s (1992) ‘Political Process Model of Movement Emergence’ (Figure 24), it may be argued that 
the disproportional archaeological employment could potentially act as a catalyzer which accelerates 
the empowerment of the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists which, when combined with 
“expanding political opportunities” and “increases in indigenous organizational strength”, could 
eventually lead to what he deems “cognitive liberation”, and thus the embryo of a social movement.  
Other scholars such as Alavi (1973), Adnan (2007) and Kerkvliet (2009) have also investigated 
the conditions under which everyday (“peasant”) resistance feeds into open, organized, and 
confrontational resistance. One important reason appears to be changing political circumstances that 
favour ‘peasants’ and disfavour the individuals and agencies that peasants have been surreptitiously 
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resisting. Such altered circumstances help ‘subordinates’ to “cross the threshold of fear and 
insecurity.”841 
One question emerging from this, then, is whether archaeological employment constitutes a 
“broad socio-economic process” that provides such conditions. This study does not contain any data 
substantiating such a position; indeed, it is clear that neither employment nor money in itself 
constitute a “socio-economic” process, let alone a “broad” such process. However, what data 
collected for this research suggests is that archaeological employment first and foremost increases 
spending power; and perhaps more significantly, that such an increase in spending power 
disproportionally applies to certain parts of the site-community—and is perceived to occur at the 
expense of others. Thus, the key question, rather than solely the magnitude of the spending power, is 
its relevance for affected communities, and when layered within the local socio-economic context, 
whether, and how, it has an impact. Thus, does increased financial means lead to anything? The 
answer is a clear ‘maybe’, if such means can act to either affect or facilitate change in existing, and 
ongoing, socio-economic processes which have hitherto failed to alter the status quo.  
 
 
Figure 24. Political Process Model of Movement Emergence (Source: Wiley 1992: 102) 
 
Thus, what could arguably be posited with reference to Wiley’s ‘Political Process Model of 
Movement Emergence’ is that existing competition for resources; migration; and, in the Ja’alī view, 
encroachment of pastoral groups into the ‘right’ of others to opportunity presented by the land, 
                                                     
841 Adnan 2007: 214. 
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including archaeological work, all constitute the ingredients for a potential “socioeconomic process.” 
In this model, the establishment, for instance, in the case-study area of Local Committees by 
competing groups is, again, an existing effort to forge “indigenous organizational strength”: indeed, 
interview and conversational data show that these efforts have already begun to alter access, and 
representation, in education and government, presenting a potential basis for “expanding political 
opportunities.” The key challenge, which this research has sought to address, is thus that of forging 
understanding of the relevant socio-economic and political context; identifying reasonable and 
realistic ways to measure the impact of archaeological employment within that context; and, perhaps 
most importantly, prudently situating that impact within the framework of the ongoing socio-
economic and political processes in which archaeological work takes place (see below).      
Questions which have emerged in the process of this research include whether the impact of 
archaeological employment in the case-study area has the potential to have a rather damaging effect 
on inter- and intra-communal relations, and more broadly, whether it could serve to in the long term 
jeopardize the potential of archaeology to, by forging better understanding of an ancient past, help 
provide a path to a different future. In this context, it should not be overlooked that more and better 
understanding of the output of archaeology could function as a foundation for the re-assessments of 
identity which could help forge the kind of dialogue that can overcome the social power dynamics 
that pervade Sudan. The present author posits the latter, mindful of that the uncovering of 
archaeological sites could also involve the proverbial digging up of buried hatchets, most importantly 
by providing contemporary contestations with the means to utilize history as a language or tool for 
mobilization, and perhaps more importantly, claims to authenticity and thus legitimacy (see above).  
In short, archaeological employment also has ramifications for the established social order and 
for what Boyte (2010) and Kerkvliet (2009) call ‘everyday politics’: “people embracing, complying 
with, adjusting, and contesting norms and rules regarding authority over, production of, or allocation 
of resources” beyond the formal political system.842 The disproportional distribution of access to 
archaeological employment by archaeologists in Hamadab-Bejrawiya has therefore had a significant 
impact upon the long-established power dynamic between the groups which reside in the case-study 
area by exacerbating insecurities about the potential for a change in the established social and political 
order. By tracing the dynamics of the mechanics of archaeological employment and the passage of 
money; by concentrating on how the different livelihood groups interact; and by recasting 
archaeological employment as a resource; it can be seen that UCLQ’s archaeological excavations are 
a dynamic resource which shapes and politicizes the interaction between archaeologists and site-
communities and between the site-communities themselves. Like other resource-based tensions in 
Sudan, the (mis)management of archaeological employment has thus potential to cause conflict. 
                                                     
842  Kerkvliet 2009: 232. 
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* 
Inevitably, there is thus the subsequent task of attemping to put the social impact of archaeological 
employment in binary terms: is it ‘good’ or ‘bad’ for the site-communities? As archaeology has the 
latent power to change lives in the case-study area, it also comes with potentially serious 
consequences for social and political relationships more permanently. Indeed, the question of whether 
this makes archaeology’s social impact ‘good’ or ‘bad’ is a complex one. The answer to that question 
must thus depend on whether the status quo is viewed as one that is worth upholding. On one hand, 
some might see the disproportional employment of pastoralists as a ‘good’ thing; a positive (if 
unwitting) consequence of archaeological practice here. Given their socio-economic rank and form of 
livelihoods, the pastoralists arguably need cash income from archaeological work more than the 
farming Ja’aliyīn. Moreover, partly since pastoralists are not recorded in the national census, and 
while Ja’alī-dominated local committees refuse to register pastoralists as part of the communities, 
unless under duress, there is a clear deficit in terms of political representation on the part of groups 
such as the Manāsīr. In the current context, the pastoralists also suffer from the “hoarding” of basic 
services by the Ja’aliyīn. In terms of archaeology as a tool of social action, one might then posit that 
archaeological employment is positively empowering the pastoralists. Reports from around Sudan 
studying the same dynamic argue that there is a  
likelihood that the local elites will reap much of the benefits of the livelihood support services if no 
careful selection is made to target the poor segments of the population in the different locations.
843
  
Thus, there is a clear incentive for socially and politically marginalized groups, such as the 
pastoralists, to seek greater representation. 
On the other hand, others might view the disproportional employment of pastoralists as a ‘bad’ 
thing; a practice that unnecessarily interferes with the local context and actively ‘does harm’.844 
Indeed both positions are reinforced by the all-pervasive feeling of insecurity; and when compared 
with how other resources in Sudan are contested by clashing claims of ownership, this is certainly a 
cause for concern. For instance, Adar (2001) puts into perspective the role of oil exploration; the 
question of ‘who should benefit’ from the riches of (what lies under) the land imposes limitations on 
conflict resolution and undermines the possibility of the establishment of a consensus on national 
identity. As we saw in Chapter 4, and indeed as recent Sudanese history attests, “[b]ehavior [sic] 
regarding producing, distributing, and using resources can range from cooperation and collaboration 
to discussions and debates to bargains and compromises to conflicts and violence.” Of course, 
archaeology itself is not the crux of the matter but rather a catalyzer or stimulant; as noted above, the 
disproportional employment of pastoralists is the result of the long-term dialectic between the 
                                                     
843  World Bank 2014: 17. 
844  See Anderson 1999: ‘doing no harm’ was made part of the humanitarian code of conduct after Anderson examined 
the effect of assistance on conflict. 
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thoughts and actions of a chain of people, particularly the projects directors and the site guards. But it 
is nonetheless worth taking a long-term view of how this might play out.  
 
8.1.2.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice 
An important and related question is whether archaeologists need to change their strategy with regards 
to archaeological employment. Given the agency shown in the assessment of the mechanics, or the 
‘chaîne opératiore’, of archaeological employment, this author suggests less of a reliance upon the site 
guards and more awareness of the local socio-economic and political context. Of course, given the 
emergence of norms and thus expectations with reference to employment practices, and more broadly, 
the disinterest and disincentive for archaeologists to insert themselves into contestations beyond their 
control and interest, it is difficult to alter the status quo overnight, particularly on an individual basis. 
Nevertheless, when offering wage labour on excavations, the project director/s take/s on the role of 
‘employer’ and the residents that of an employee.845 And, even through “[i]t is now widely accepted 
[and] enshrined in the national environmental and social regulations…to promote socially-responsible 
corporate behaviour”,846 there are very few guidelines or rules on how exactly archaeologists should 
behave when working in Sudan. Indeed, there are no rules in archaeological legislation, such as the 
OPA, or in Labour Law, to guide such activities (Chapter 6). And yet, data collected for this research 
suggests that there is a need to do so; more precisely, a necessity for further regulation and support of 
archaeologists working abroad, including rules pertaining to activities to archaeological work such as 
hiring and employment practices.  
For example it should not be forgotten that the local employees inhabit a context in which the 
Sudanese state provides virtually no protection. Although the archaeologists are engaging in an 
employer-employee relationship (above), the associated rules of the Labour Law are not applicable to 
local employees because the work is seasonal, and no worker tends to be hired longer than the 3-
month continuous work period which most of the (albeit causal) Labour Law requires before 
regulations apply.
847
 Working contracts can be verbal or written, but the men hired by UCLQ are 
                                                     
845  Labour Law 1997: 4. An employer, according to Sudan’s Labour Law (1997) is “any person who employs by 
contract of service one person or more for a wage of any kind”. The employee, the man who acts as the ‘worker’, 
is defined as “any person male or female not less than 16 years old who performs work in return for wages of 
whatever type...” It continues, “...in service and subject to the management or supervision of the employer, 
whether his contract of service is written or oral, expressed or implied or for the purpose of training or probation, 
or who performs manual or semi manual work whether skilled or unskilled in consideration of wage of whatever 
kind” 
846  Hildyard 2008. 
847  §95.1 states that “[n]o factory owner shall assign any work to a worker unless he has received sufficient training 
therein or unless such work is performed under the supervision of a person or persons of experience in such field 
of work” (Labour Law 1997: 21). Of course the archaeologist is conducting work outside of a factory setting, but it 
nonetheless highlights the fact that archaeologists here do not train the men who work for them. 
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uninsured, non-unionized and unprotected against loss or injury despite the occupational hazards 
involved in their work.
848
 They operate on a day-to-day basis, and can be replaced or ‘laid off’ 
without notice; essentially working a zero-hours contract. There are no living allowances—instead, 
one employee noted that employees pay for breakfast on rotation at a cost of SDG8/day—and no 
travel expenses; but archaeologists do tend to give smaller one-time sums at the end of the season. If 
the employees are engaged by the project director to work for longer or shorter periods for any reason, 
the pay rate is determined at the discretion of the project director, and the employees can choose the 
extent of their participation. In the case of the UCLQ mission, the latter involves pro rata adjustments 
to pay. The employees are usually given the power to choose a replacement, so if one is unable to 
work he will usually send a male relative or household member to replace him. The project director, 
however, has the power to disallow this choice and choose someone else.849 
Further justification for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad may be 
found in the results of Chapter 6, which show that in the case-study area, archaeological wages for 
local workers, have failed to keep up with inflation despite substantial increases particularly since 
2013. Indeed, while UCLQ and DAI both doubled daily wages from SDG30 in 2013 to SDG60 in late 
2015, high inflation has meant that by 2016, there had been a 10% decline in wages in real terms.  
Parallel with nominal wage increases, working hours were cut from 6.5 hours per day in March 
2013 to 6 hours in 2015. Although this had the effect of increasing the employees’ nominal hourly 
wage, the key indicator is the daily wage. Merely to have kept pace with inflation, the daily wage 
would have had to risen to approximately SDG65 by the March 2016 season. While not a legal 
requirement, it is common practice for employers in places like the UK to increase wages roughly in 
line with inflation. Of note, there is no mention of such a requirement in Sudanese Labour Law. 
As Starzman points out about archaeology in the Middle East more broadly, “[t]he wages paid on 
excavations are extremely low, occasionally even remaining below the local minimum wage level.”850 
However, in the case-study area, wages are above the minimum wage, which in 2014 was by 
presidential decree increased to SDG425 (US$74.5 in 2014) per month, equivalent to SDG5,100 
(US$894.7 in 2014) per year. Indeed, those who were employed by UCLQ over the 53-day period 
spanning between November 2015 and March 2016 on average earned 60% of the annual minimum 
wage. This has a significant impact given that that unskilled labour, especially in agriculture, is often 
                                                     
848  Turkey seems to be the exception in these cases because “social insurance and insurance covering workplace 
accidents are government requirements.” (Starzman 2012: 408). 
849   Mallowan wrote about employing local men, descriptions which, as Gillot (2010) notes, clearly still apply to today: 
“During the excavations we employed 200–250 men, sometimes less, sometimes more. They worked for us from 
sunrise to sunset with an interval of half an hour for breakfast and an hour for luncheon. It was a strenuous day’s 
work for which they were paid at the rate of one rupee, the equivalent of about eighteen pence. In addition, 
bakshish, that is tips, were awarded for all small finds as an encouragement to them to keep their eyes open. The 
gangs consisted of a pickman, a spademan and four, five or six basketmen” (Mallowan 1977: 42-43). 
850  Starzman 2012: 408. 
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paid well below the official minimum wage, if paid at all; on a national level, one-quarter of all 
agricultural workers earn below US$3.2 (SDG20) per day, and almost half receive no income at all.
851
  
Yet, it should be noted that per §35.3 of the Sudan Labour Law, “[t]he wage of the production 
worker shall be calculated at a rate equivalent to that received by any other labourer carrying on a 
similar work.”852  In interviews with this author, particularly the Ja’alī employees, who diversify their 
incomes by doing farm work for other landowners or tenant farmers, reported that seasonal 
agricultural labour paid SDG70-SDG100 (US$11.5-16.4) for a ten-hour day. Meanwhile, it was also 
reported that a ten-hour work day at a government-sponsored agricultural project to the north at 
Mahmia paid SDG90 (US$14.8), while planting onions for local farmers from 2pm to 6.30pm earned 
them SDG50-SDG60.  
When this author alerted the UCLQ project director to the erosion of local employees’ spending 
power due to inflation despite the wage increases, and also general wage levels in the case-study area, 
the reaction was a pledge to increase wages the following season.
853
 While certainly positive, the 
wider reality is that archaeological project directors in Hamadab and Bejrawiya and elsewhere tend to 
look to one another—internally—for hiring and employment practices, rather than looking externally, 
to the context in which they operate: “it is common in professionalized archaeology to accept as 
standard rather than to question exploitative work situations.”854 To a large extent, this is largely the 
outcome of reliance on past, ‘proven’ practices, including reliance on the site guard as an informant, 
and due to the language barrier, also often a liaison with site employees and the site-community alike. 
Yet collected data suggests that, while convenient, sticking to the tried approach may not be sufficient 
to keep up with changes in the local context, and also often involves the overlooking of problematic 
aspects of praxis (Chapter 6). According to Starzman, this is because they allow—nay, enable—the 
archaeologist's way of life: “many archaeologists decline a radical critique of their material and 
discursive practices, because it is these very practices that ensure smooth functioning of our 
discipline.”855   
Yet informal conversations with archaeologists since 2013 shows that they tend to perceive their 
own ability to change the situation to be limited and seem to refer responsibility for the pitfalls of the 
current system upon their site guards or predecessors: for example, when talking about the fact that 
local workers are usually paid very low wages by foreign archaeologists, several people explained to 
                                                     
851 World Bank Group 2015a. 
852  Labour Law 1997: 10. 
853 Further wage increases were given in the 2017 winter season (at the time of post-viva editing of this manuscript) 
and will need to be taken into account in further studies. 
854 Starzman 2012: 410. In most cases, she claims, “the labour politics of foreign archaeological teams working in the 
Middle East aim, in quite strategic ways, at preserving existing power asymmetries between foreign scientists and 
the locally hired workforce, which are symptomatic of neo-colonial control” (Starzman 2012: 404). Starzman 
(2012), and Scheper-Hughes (1995) whom she quotes, see this as ‘artificial moral relativism’ in which 
archaeologists “suspend the “ethical in our dealings with the [vulnerable] ‘other’”” whilst maintaining certain 
standards for ourselves at home. (Scheper-Hughes 1995: 409, in Starzman 2012: 405. Cf. Hamilakis 2012. 
855  Starzman 2012: 412. 
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her that introducing higher standards of employment would mean ‘interfering’ with local conditions. 
Even those that do engage with this discourse find that conversations about the politico-economic 
conditions of archaeological work take place ‘behind-the-scenes’, where they tend to quickly slip off 
into “the anecdotal and non-committal”.856 Ultimately the agency of archaeologists—how much they 
are actually able to act for social good—is not agreed upon more broadly.857 This furthers Starzman’s 
description of how archaeologists ‘discursively frame’ their practices using the idea of trying to avoid 
‘interference’ whilst at the same time deferring responsibility through reliance, inheritance and the 
lack of space for change.  
Overall, the implications this chapter has for archaeological practice is that, as employers, 
archaeologists should be aware of the local and national financial context, including unemployment 
rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates between groups. In the first instance, the 
archaeologist-cum-employer (usually the project director) should reasonably develop awareness of 
local conditions, avoid default perpetuation of past practices and avoid moral relativisim with regard 
to hiring and pay practices. When calculating the seasonal wage, data on local minimum wages for 
daily work should be collected, considered and updated each season; inflation rates and subsidy 
cutbacks on key staples should also be taken into account. Contracts should be drawn up at the 
beginning of the season, stipulating how many days of work the employees can expect. Strategies 
should be formed to ensure that local workers are protected both short and long-term in case of site 
accidents. This is the bare minimum. In the absence of formal rules and regulations pertaining to the 
aforementioned, there is thus a need for self-regulation. As Wait and Altschul suggest, best practice 
can be achieved by “individuals and organizations acting with professional and ethical 
responsibility.”858 An alternative way of perceiving the archaeological mandate might be through 
‘contextual identities’ with correspondingly contextual ‘responsibilities’. In other words, 
archaeologists’ contextual identities in Sudan require them to fulfil associated contextual 
responsibilities.   
 
                                                     
856  Starzman 2012: 406.  
857  See the lively discussion about the ability of archaeologists to ‘change the world’ in Stottman 2010. 
858  Wait and Altschul 2014: 151-2. From the “desert fringes” in Mongolia and Senegal, Wait and Altschul (2014) 
report that neither heritage organizations (such as the International Monetary Fund, the development banks as well 
as the charitable/voluntary sector advocacy organizations) nor development organizations (“‘developers’ whether 
it be mineral extraction, infrastructure construction, urbanization companies or non-profits…”) are enough in 
promoting sustainable economic development, either separately or together, although they note that this is in part 
because there are no NGOs or IGOs in either area. 
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8.1.3 The Impact of Archaeological Management on Local Landscape 
The Sudanese conception of land is a holistic one that encompasses the surface area and whatever lies 
beneath it: ‘land’ is “not just the surface but also subterranean”.859 By custom everything upon the 
land and everything that the land produces belongs to the people who occupy it, including 
archaeological sites. The sites of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe were traditionally used for settlement, 
as grazing land, as a source of building materials (including stone and highly prized fired red bricks) 
and as soil-enriching fertilizer (Chapter 7); had they not been registered as archaeological sites, then 
they would have continued to be used for these purposes. Furthermore, in Hamadab-Bejrawiya the 
importance of land transcends the economic sphere to become part of the social sphere (if, indeed, the 
two spheres can be separated) in which land ownership brings social prestige. This explains why there 
is a tightly-held tradition in Sudan of not selling land.
860
 Far from becoming less important as Sudan 
has diversified its economy, “love of land [has] been growing deeper with every generation”.861  
For the site-community of Hamadab-Bejrawiya, archaeological site management is narrated as a 
gradual process of appropriation, dispossession and displacement from their land by ‘foreigners’ 
backed by the legal authority of the state. As noted in Chapter 4, customary rights are not recognized 
by the Sudanese government and clause §2.9.1 of the OPA (noted above) ordains that “land that has 
archaeological value [can be] requisitioned by the state”862  even if it is sorely needed by local 
communities “to build, or dig irrigation channels, or make a cemetery, or a water tower”. It is 
therefore with impunity that the site boundaries of Domat al-Hamadab and Meroe have steadily 
encroached upon their limited residential, agricultural and grazing (economic and social) spaces. In a 
context of extreme land scarcity (Chapter 4) this has had serious consequences for the livelihoods of 
many residents, and, alongside unequal allocation of archaeological jobs (Chapter 6) has exacerbated 
economic insecurity and social conflict in Hamadab-Bejrawiya.  
It should therefore be unsurprising that in the eyes of the site-communities, the process of 
dispossession by foreigners backed by the state is little different from the piecemeal appropriation by 
the state of communally or customarily owned land for big, commercial agricultural projects, or for 
dam building. The vocabulary of archaeological law supports this comparison: for example, the word 
used to describe the areas of land that NCAM authorizes archaeologists to investigate is a 
‘concession’, which typically range anywhere from 10km to 40km in length.863 The packaging of land 
                                                     
859  Gertel, Calkins and Rottenburg 2014: 10. 
860  Salih 1999: 2. 
861  Salih 1999: 2. 
862  OPA 1999, §2.9.1: 17. 
863  For example in the NCAM Appeal for salvage archaeology in the wake of the Merowe Dam states that, “NCAM 
will continue its investigations from the Dam site to Dar el–Arab (24km). The Sudan archaeological Research 
Society (SARS) will keep its concession in the region between Dar el-Arab and Kerbikan (40km)” (NCAM Appeal 
2007). Archaeological seasons are also often referred to as ‘missions’ or ‘campaigns’, both of which words carry a 
colonial, almost military, connotation. 
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into concessions that are awarded to archaeologists is a familiar and longstanding practice and echoes 
other mining, hydrocarbon and commercial-agriculture industries, wherein the government award 
appropriated concessions to mineral and oil and gas prospecting companies or industrial-agricultural 
firms. The OPA’s use of the word “requisition” in §2.9.1 (above) and the fact that, as noted above, 
Meroe and the pyramids to the east have also been “confiscated” by a special presidential decree in 
2003
864
 only add to this impression. And finally, it is indeed “interesting” that NCAM’s power to 
“specify the modalities of land use within the limits of an archaeological land…is [so] clearly 
stipulated in…[the] clauses of the [OPA]” 865  and that the definition of ‘antiquities’ and 
‘archaeological land’ are kept so broad. It is thus plain to see even by archaeologist’s own discourse 
that site management processes mirror what Calkins (2012) writes about the extension of foreign-
backed commercial agriculture in Sudan, and Calkins and Ille (2014) also note about gold-mining, 
namely that, “[t]he contracts between the [Sudan government] and the [foreign companies] have 
alienated rural populations from what they view as their land”.866 Indeed considering what might be 
called the cultural dispossession described in Chapter 5, site management processes may even be 
likened to what Castree (2003) describes as the two main steps in the commodification of land. In 
short, these are to reduce the land to measurable units; and to separate the land from its social 
context.
867
  
Moreover, it seems that the designation of Meroe as part of the ‘Island of Meroe’ UNESCO 
World Heritage site and the site management proposals in NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan will 
intensify the process of dispossession and alienation. Although the proposals to extend the boundaries 
of Meroe, enclose ‘Greater Meroe’ with a fence, and install more site guards, have not yet been 
implemented, they have already provoked feelings of insecurity at a fundamental level among the 
sedentary Ja’aliyīn.  
Such insecurities are less evident among the Manāsīr and Hassaniyya pastoralists even though, as 
explained in Chapter 7, NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan would arguably inflict far greater 
damage to their livelihoods that it would to the Ja’aliyīn’s. The relative lack of concern of the Manāsīr 
and Hassaniyya pastoralists may be because they have historically been less affected by site-
management processes than the Ja’aliyīn sedentary farmers. More likely, it is because they do not 
know about it and have not been invited to take part in consultations with UNESCO or its 
representatives. However, there can be no doubt that NCAM’s UNESCO Management Plan contains 
                                                     
864  ICOMOS Advisory Body Evaluation (1336) 2011: 106. The full title of the decree is ‘The Confiscation of the 
Region of Naqa, Musawwarat and Begraweya and for the Creation and Register of a National Reserve within this 
Region and managing it.’ The decree was made in 2003 because this is when the nomination file for the UNESCO 
title was being written. 
865  NCAM’s Management Plan 2010: 183. They are clearly referring to the phrase, “The limits of archaeological land 
shall be defined by the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums” (OPA 1999: 13). 
866  Calkins and Ille 2014: 52. 
867  See also Kopytoff (1986) for a discussion of ‘commoditization as process’, and Gonzalez (2014) for an argument 
about how commodification is part of the ‘global’ eclipsing the ‘local’. 
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potentially inflammatory proposals for the re-location of the pastoralists’ settlements between Meroe 
and the pyramids; their exclusion from grazing lands inside the Greater Meroe site; and the 
prohibition of their access to Meroe, whose acacia they rely upon for fodder and fuel.  
The conclusion this leads to is that the protection of Meroe and the Bejrawiya pyramids, if not 
Domat al-Hamadab also, would be achieved by the dispossession of its site-community. At first sight 
the concept of ‘World Heritage’ and the principle of protecting and conserving sites of global 
significance for future generations appear laudable and egalitarian: after all, as Brodie and Renfrew 
(2005) note, by this token archaeology belongs to everyone as part of a ‘common heritage’ that 
represents where we have all come from. However, as the residents in the case-study area feel little 
ancestral connection to the ancient Nubian sites alongside, and upon which, they live (Chapter 5), and 
are identified as major ‘threats’ to the archaeological record (Chapter 7), the implementation of World 
Heritage status is and will continue to be experienced by the site-communities as an act of 
appropriation that ignores their day-to-day concerns and interests. The residents of the case-study area 
trace their ancestry to other sources and see the archaeological sites in their most abstracted state, as 
part of the land and a resource that they need to exploit in a context of economic scarcity. As 
Rodriguez had noted about the residents of Kochol, “the land is materially and symbolically valuable 
as a local communal farm rather than a World Heritage archaeological site or museum.”868 Nor, in fact, 
do the sites need to be put to active use by their customary owners to have value; the assumption is 
that the land is there to be used when needed in the present and future plans of site-community 
households and villages: for them, and unlike archaeologists, there is no ‘untouchable heritage’: the 
past is “…meant for use in today’s world”.869  
The findings of this study demonstrate, in line with those of Bielawski (1994), Gomes (2006) and 
Rodriguez (2006), that site management that is mismanaged because it ignores the socio-economic 
and cultural context of the site-communities does not only cause harm to those communities but can 
also provoke conflict over what they see as the integrity of their land and its resources. Chapter 7 
sought to emphasize that ‘Western’ attempts to prevent conflict, for example by demarcating 
archaeological site boundaries with fences, can be misinterpreted in a Sudanese context and can 
actively do harm. Given the intense economic insecurity in which the site-communities in the case-
study area are living, it is perhaps inevitable—and understandable—that if the NCAM’s UNESCO 
Management Plan goes ahead, the archaeological sites will become sites of conflict over resources, no 
matter what the OPA or Presidential Decrees command.  
For example, it seems clear from the evidence collected by the present author from Ja’aliyīn 
village leaders and residents of New Deraqab that any attempt to incorporate Old Deraqab into the site 
of Meroe archaeological site will be strongly resisted by the residents of New Deraqab, who continue 
                                                     
868   Rodriguez 2006: 167. 
869   Hollowell 2006: 88. 
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to claim ownership of their former village; the only alternative would seem to be the payment of 
generous compensation, which is not currently on offer. And, as discussed in Chapter 7, if NCAM’s 
UNESCO Management Plan proposals to fence Greater Meroe and ring it with a buffer zone go 
ahead, they would be resisted by the Manair and Hassaniyya pastoralists because the proposals would 
end their access the Meroe acacia, cut them off from their grazing grounds inside the Greater Meroe 
site, and oblige them to leave their current settlements: “[p]henomena of resistance, even opposition, 
can thus appear, particularly when the excavations clash with local activities.”870 Indeed, as Salih 
noted of Sudan that “it is rare to find a plot of land without conflicts”871 and “…any attempt to [fence 
off] a piece of land will reverberate and cause disputes.”872  
* 
When it comes to archaeology’s intertwinedness with land expropriation, two elements of the status 
quo need questioning and unpacking. The first is with regard to the development of the layers of site 
protection: the OPA, NCAM, the project directors and UNESCO. The second is with regard to the 
looming, but seemingly benign, presence of Qatar.  
As noted above, the laws and rules that govern the use of archaeological sites are not only 
somewhat ineffective but harmful to the local context. The question that naturally arises from this 
scenario is, why do Sudanese institutions design them in such a way? Surely Sudanese professionals 
would be able to identify and thus avoid the pitfalls of such top-down mechanisms? One response lies, 
in part, in the historic constitution of the archaeological industry in Sudan and the enduring influence 
of Western institutions upon it. The laws outlined in the OPA may be explained by the fact that the 
entire legislative basis of archaeology in Sudan is a product of British archaeologists and 
administrators working for the Anglo-Egyptian administration in the first half of the 20
th
 Century 
(above); since 1952 the OPA has been modified but not substantially changed. The query that 
naturally follows on from this is whether Sudanese archaeology is still ‘colonial’ in nature?  
The OPA’s characterization of the site-community residents as the main manageable threats to 
the sites seems to suggest that it is, particularly as it makes no mention of the fact that the sites also 
need protecting from the interventions made by archaeologists. For example it was the British that cut 
through Meroe with the Khartoum to Atbara railway in 1899
873
 and the western explorers, 
antiquarians and archaeologists that did the most damage to the pyramids. The work of multiple 
institutions at Meroe has also resulted in a radical change of the landscape, as ICOMOS has noted: 
“…archaeological research activities primarily by foreign scholars since the late 19th Century have 
                                                     
870  Gillot 2010: 14. 
871  Salih 1999: 226. 
872  Salih 1999: 256. 
873  Hinkel 1992: 148. 
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left extremely large spoil heaps, particularly in the Western Cemetery and the Royal City, which 
impact on the setting and adversely affect site drainage in some areas.”874  
Despite the Sudanization of senior posts within SAS-NCAM from the 1960s onwards, the 
influence of Western thought remains strong: a prime mover within NCAM over the last two decades, 
Salah el-Din Mohammed Ahmed, is French-trained and has been responsible for the applications for 
UNESCO World Heritage Site status for Jebel Barkal and the Sites of the Napatan Region in 2003 
and for the Island of Meroe in 2010. He has also been one of the main brokers of the Qatar-Sudan 
archaeological alliance (below). The UNESCO Nomination File he co-authored was written with 
Western colleagues
875
 including Welsby, a curator at the British Museum, who has been working in 
Sudan for over thirty years.
876
 Indeed if anything, the UNESCO World Heritage List has “contributed 
to strengthening the role of foreign experts in the definition and management of archaeological 
heritage.”877 
To scholars such as Starzman, “the discipline of archaeology is embedded in discursive practices 
shaped by European colonialism and imperialism,” 878  which has given the management and 
conservation of archaeological sites a contentious heritage. As noted in Chapter 2, the first ‘proto-
archaeologists’ in Sudan arrived under the rubric of colonial enterprise, which was geared towards the 
acquisition and exploitation of land and resources, including archaeological ‘treasures’; “colonial 
regimes [attached] themselves to antiquity as much as conquest”.879 As ancient objects were taken 
from pre-colonial and colonial Africa and Middle East they became the ‘property’ of private 
individuals and museums, which had a keen interest in the development of techniques to restore and 
conserve them. Site management practices thus have similar roots, namely in the desire of colonial 
authorities to ‘rescue’ archaeological sites from the damaging effects of their natural environment and 
to ‘protect’ them within legally-reinforced boundaries with controlled access.880 It is therefore not 
insignificant that in Chapter III article 28(b) of the OPA (1999), institutions participating in salvage 
archaeology “have the right to own a representative portion of their discoveries.” As Starzman notes, 
“[i]n the present-day context of global capitalism”, these activities “reveal distinctly neo-colonial 
                                                     
874  ICOMOS’ UNESCO Advisory Body Evaluation (1336): 102. 
875  The UNESCO Nomination File lists the authors of the document. They are: ‘Preparers: Dr Salah Mohamed Ahmed 
[and] Dr Derek Welsby; Preparer (Consultant): Pr. Henry Cleere; Team of the “Draft” Management Plan: Dr Paul 
Bidwell, Dr. Nick Hodgson, Mr. Terry Frain [and] Dr. David Sherlock; Management Plan: Dr. Sami el-Masri; 
Topographical Work: Dr. Mario Santana Quintero [and] Miss Sarah Seranno.” (UNESCO Nomination File 2010: 
1) 
876  Again, this is not a criticism of Dr Welsby, who is actually a very close friend, nor of Dr Ahmed, a long-term 
colleague. Both have worked tirelessly on behalf of the Sudanese—this is merely part of my assessment of 
archaeological culture in Sudan. Regarding Hinkel’s work at Bejrawiya, we might note that it, too, was inspired by 
European ideas, specifically those of an Italian architect, de Angelis d'Ossat, who was then associated with the 
International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property (ICCROM). 
877  Gillot 2010: 8. 
878  Starzman 2012: 401. 
879  Anderson 1991: pg. 
880  Again, for holistic treatement of the roots of archaeological thought and the changing archaeological mind, see 
Trigger 1989. 
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features”.881  Indeed when seen from the angles described above, archaeology in Sudan seems no 
different. Therefore archaeologists must accept that this supports archaeology’s purported status as 
‘colonial’.  
The presence of Qatar within Sudanese archaeology is also worth questioning and examining 
further in light of this discussion. Qatar is, after all, not only involved in archaeological site 
management, being one of the main bodies sponsoring such management processes in the case-study 
area, but also one of the major states involved in the leasing of land along the Nile Valley that has led 
to land expropriation and scarcity on such a fraught scale. Qatar thus openly contributes to the 
dispossession of site-community residents in the case-study area via two paths. The question, then, is, 
what is actually happening here? And what are the implications of this for archaeologists? 
As mentioned above, in 2014
882
 the state of Qatar donated $135 million—an unprecedented 
amount of funding—to archaeological projects in Sudan via their main cultural heritage body, Qatar 
Museums.
883
 The money has since been overseen by the Nubian Archaeological Development 
Organization (NADO) and its managing body, Qatar-Sudan Archaeological Project (QSAP), both of 
which are, somewhat ironically, registered in the Registrar of the Ministry of Welfare and Social 
Security, under the section of ‘Humanitarian Affairs’ in the Ministry of the Interior, and subject to the 
Law of Voluntary and Humanitarian Work. The deeper functions of this donation have not, however, 
been publically discussed (although see Bradshaw 2015, below). At the time, the Sudanese happily 
reported that this was “Qatar rain[ing] money” (qatar garush matar); archaeologists were similarly 
delighted because rarely do such sums make their way into the archaeological sphere. According to 
the Qataris’ most recent announcement, they have “rescued” of some of Sudan’s most precious 
archaeological sites;
884
 the Goethe Institut has also presented projects such as the Qatari Mission to 
the Pyramids of Sudan (QMPS) as an unequivocal “success”.885 One newspaper (clearly in the service 
of the Qatari state) describes how QM has “increased accessibility to the sites for the local population” 
and that an “updated touristic infrastructure has already been developed in their proximity,” because 
“QSAP was designed with accessibility for the local community and ownership by this population in 
mind”.886 Recent visits and reports from friends and colleagues on the ground suggest that most of this 
is rhetoric. The rationale behind such positive German reportage is therefore likely to be because the 
German Archaeological Institute (DAI) is a major partner of QMPS: it is co-directed by the DAI 
                                                     
881  Starzman 2012: 401. 
882  The news of the donation (below) emerged in March 2014, but archaeologists had been aware of and even received 
money well before this date, apparently as early as 2012. Certainly UCLQ was up and running in Sudan by this 
date.  
883  A number of outlets reported news of the ‘donation’, such as G. Gibbon, ‘Qatar invests $135m in archaeological 
heritage of Sudan’, Arabianindustry.com, 24 March 2014; and M-B. Griggs, ‘Qatar Gives $135 Million to Sudan 
for Archaeological Projects’, Smithsonianmag.com, 27 March 2014. 
884  Embassy of Qatar, ‘Qatar rescues the pyramids in Sudan with the support of Germany’, 9 June 2017.  
885  Goethe Institut, ‘Press release: Qatar Museums and the German Archaeological Institute present fascinating 
findings from five years of fieldwork’, 3 May 2017. 
886  Gulf Times, ‘QM shares latest success of landmark Qatar-Sudan archaeological project’, 3 September 2017. 
Quotes from QM’s acting chief archaeology officer, Ali al-Kubaisi. 
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Domat al-Hamadab project director, and several other German scholars are involved in proceedings at 
the highest level. British, Polish, American and indeed many other multi-national teams also receive 
funding from QSAP; unilateral silence on the potential political machinations behind the funding is 
thus not surprising. If archaeologists were—or are—dubious about Qatar’s motivations, their 
suspicion has expediently remained behind closed doors. 
In short, and in the opinion of this author, the clear incentive behind Qatar’s granting of this 
funding has been to cement relations and ensure political cooperation between itself and Sudan: this is 
what Winter (2015) and Kernel and Luke (2015) call ‘heritage diplomacy’—a form of Nye’s (2004) 
‘soft power’—at its most obvious. Heritage diplomacy can be seen elsewhere across the globe, 
notably in China’s initiatives along the Silk Road.887 But what are the benefits for each state in forging 
such an alliance? And how effective has archaeology been in reaching such an objective? 
For Qatar, such a donation provides them with a reliable, and fundamentally malleable, partner to 
help further its domestic and international interests. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, Sudan allows 
Qatar to lease land and take water to feed and quench its own population; since c. 2013 Qatar has 
lacked the ability to adequately provide for its citizens from its own resources. A solid Qatari-
Sudanese relationship also serves to further Qatar’s geopolitical aspirations in the region. Support of 
Sudan furthers Qatar’s goal of undermining President Abdel Fatah Sisi’s secular military state in 
Egypt, whose 2014 overthrow of the Qatari-sponsored Muslim Brotherhood President Mohammed 
Morsi was upsetting for them to say the least. Reports from the same year certainly suggest that Egypt 
has been concerned that sponsorship of Sudan’s heritage industry will somehow dent their own.888 At 
the same time, an alliance forged through archaeology also allows Qatar to compete for regional 
influence with Saudi Arabia’s House of Saud who also lease vast tracts of land in the Nile Valley and 
who, since at least 2015, have enjoyed the support of Sudanese ground troops in its war against 
‘Houthi’ (Shia) ‘rebels’ in Yemen.889 Qatar also has a clear investment in the Yemeni war, but has a 
fundamentally troubled love-hate relationship with Saudi Arabia based, at least in part, upon the 
(Qatari) Salafist vs. (Saudi) Wahabi world vision. Therefore, while it might seem cynical to disbelieve 
Qatari rhetoric about caring for cultural heritage,
890
 it is seems much more likely that the alliance is 
                                                     
887  See Winter 2016. Similar relationships may emerge between Sudan and Japan (“…we are planning for exhibitions 
in Qatar, Japan and Korea,” said Mr. Ali of the National Corporation for Antiquities. I. Kushkush, 2013. ‘Ancient 
Kingdoms in Land of War’, The New York Times, 31 March 2013.) Cf. Sudanese Media Centre, ‘Sudan: Academic 
Cooperation between Japan and Sudan’, Sudanese Media Centre, 2 October 2017.  For the example of Japanese 
interventions in Jordan, see Kernel and Luke (2015). 
888  “Qatar's move to invest $135m (£100m) in projects to develop Sudan's archaeological sites is seen by many in 
Cairo as an attempt to undermine the struggling tourism sector in Egypt and part of ongoing efforts by the Gulf 
emirate to discredit Egypt and its leadership.” BBC, ‘The Qatari princess, Angelina Jolie and the battle of the 
pyramids’, 20 May 2017. 
889  G. Cafiero, ‘Sudan gets $2.2bn for joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen war’, Al-Monitor, 23 November 2015. 
890  Several things are claimed by QM: that they “delivered long-lasting and positive impact in preserving World 
Heritage sites and promoting tourism in Sudan” as well as that “As a country, Qatar has a strong commitment and 
interest in celebrating and preserving cultural history, heritage and traditions and putting people in touch with their 
past,” (Gulf Times, ‘QM shares latest success of landmark Qatar-Sudan archaeological project’, 3 September 2017). 
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forged on these bases; if archaeology has anything to do with this scenario in and of itself, it is 
because Qatar wishes to improve its standing at home and abroad. 
 
For Sudan, Qatar provides an opportunity to generate much-needed revenue from the land and 
water it leases. As noted in Chapters 4 and 6, the loss of oil revenue following the 2011 split from 
South Sudan has negatively affected the Sudanese economy, and with military spending taking up to 
70% of the national budget,
891
 they are in need of filling a considerable financial deficit. Of course 
Russia, China, and the UAE are also major partners of Sudan (in the gold mining, water, and food and 
water industries respectively), but they have not been so clearly involved in cultural and heritage 
diplomacy too.
892
 Unlike Saudi Arabia, and indeed unlike Iran (with whom Sudan definitively cut off 
relations in 2014-15
893
), Qatar and Sudan also share ideologies of political Islam, as Sudan has been 
run for the past 30 years by a Muslim Brotherhood-dominated government. Qatar also acts as a 
mediator for Sudan’s peace process with ‘rebel’ groups in Darfur894 and long-desired rapprochement 
with the West. Although it seems that the UAE ended up being the main broker between the Sudan 
and the US, this Gulf-facing strategy has paid dividends: in September 2017, the US removed Sudan 
from the list of countries in the travel ban
895
 and eased the sanctions it had held over Sudan for the 
past 20 years.
896
 Such is the importance of Qatar to Sudanese foreign policy that at the time of writing, 
Sudan was endeavouring to stay neutral in a tussle between Qatar and Saudi Arabia states;
897
 that it 
allowed Qatar to use Sudanese air space when it had been shut off by Saudi Arabia and other pro-
Saudi Gulf states was not insignificant. 
It is thus possible to see the ways in which archaeology is used as a diplomatic strategy by both 
Qatar and Sudan in contemporary foreign policy and international relations. In this instance, 
archaeology helps one state influence the behaviour of another in order to achieve certain (positive, 
beneficial, ‘better’) outcomes. This, in turn, has an impact upon archaeology’s impact upon site-
community residents because it has provided archaeological teams with money that previously would 
have been untenable, even when armed with the title of ‘World Heritage’ and the nominal support of 
UNESCO. Again, this is ‘soft power’ (Nye 2004) and ‘heritage diplomacy’ as enticement and 
                                                     
891  Nuba Reports, ‘Sudan Now Spending Up to 70% of Its Budget on War’, 12 February 2016. 
892  See Lane, Kleinitz and Gao (2016) for Sino-African relations with regard to heritage, which basically argues that 
there is one pre-development rule in China and none in Africa, although it depends on the level of regulation 
insisted upon by the home country. 
893  Reuters, ‘As economy crumbles, Sudan ditches Iran for Saudi patronage’, 12 January 2016. Al-Monitor, ‘Why 
Sudan wants to stop the ‘spread of Shiism’, 19 January 2016. 
894  See the Doha Document for Peace in Sudan. Also see Gulf Times, ‘Bashir lauds Qatar’s role in Sudan peace 
process’ 12 September 2016. 
895  C. Baynes, ‘Donald Trump drops Sudan from US travel ban ‘after lobbying by UAE’’, Independent, 25 September 
2017. 
896  BBC, ‘Sudan sanctions: US lifts most economic restrictions after two decades’, 6 October 2017. 
897  At the moment a delicate situation for Sudan, between Saudi and Qatar: G. Cafiero, ‘Qatar-GCC crisis unsettles 
Sudan’, Al-Monitor, 20 June 2017; Middle East Monitor, ‘Saudis pressure Sudan’s Al-Bashir to boycott Qatar’, 3 
July 2017; W. Hussein, ‘Egypt, Sudan stray further apart over Gulf crisis’, Al-Monitor, 17 August 2017. 
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coercion rather than physical force:
898
 geopolitical support is the ‘string attached’ to the 
archaeological funding.
899
 Superficially, the suggestion made earlier in the chapter that World 
Heritage and Salafism are two opposing global forces, might seem ridiculous: surely Qatar and 
UNESCO are working towards the same goal? However, when seen in the light of ideology and 
foreign policy, and when put together with land grabbing, Kernel and Luke’s (2015) argument that 
these policies “reify neo-imperialistic legacies”900 becomes convincing. 
 
8.1.3.1 The Implications for Archaeological Practice 
What is abundantly clear from these findings is that, first and foremost, archaeological site 
management plans cannot be made without consultation with communities about their economic 
needs: as ICOMOS noted in 2011, “there are sufficient means to control [site management] as long as 
the antiquities authority (NCAM), the local authorities and local communities hold regular meetings 
to discuss development plans.”901 A major first step towards being able to understand the perspectives 
communicated in such meetings is to see land with “a broader integrative view...[that] also includes 
natural resources: soils, minerals, waters and biodata that the land comprises”902 and to remember that 
what might seem like ‘disuse’ of or ‘disconnection’ with land cannot be presumed to be so nor used as 
a justification for displacing people from their land.
903
 If alternative solutions to site management 
plans that damage the livelihoods of site-communities and destroy their social connections to the land 
cannot be found, they may thus need to be accompanied by fair compensation, the provision of 
alternative jobs and improvements to the local infrastructure. However, the Sudanese government’s 
record in these areas is poor, which has led to conflict in the past. As Heierland (2011) has written 
about the nomadic pastoralists living around the monumental Kushite archaeological site of Naga 
(also part of the Island of Meroe UNESCO site), “the voice and destiny of local people living near the 
sites is not present at the events [she] studied”:904 Even if they are held, ‘consultation meetings’ of 
‘stakeholders’ do not guarantee solutions that meet the needs of the site-communities and promises 
are often seen as lies.
905
 As Meskell notes about communities in South Africa, “reparations have not 
been forthcoming in their lifetimes and there is always the hopeless sense that promises are meant to 
sustain people and stave off potential conflict.”906  
                                                     
898  Further study would clarify the extent to which Qatari funding of archaeology involves Cornago’s (2013) three 
diplomatic tracks (official statecraft, unofficial dialogue, grassroots programmes). Also see Goode 2007. 
899  Kernel and Luke 2015: 72. 
900  Kernel and Luke 2015: 70. 
901  ICOMOS Advisory Body Evaluation (1336) 2011: 104. 
902   Salih 1999. 
903   Galaty 2014. 
904  Heierland 2011: Résumé. 
905  For critiques of UNESCO also see Deegan 2012; Eriksen 2001; Meskell 2011, 2012, 2013a, 2013b. 
906  Meskell 2007: 398. 
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Responsibility for resolving these issues clearly resides with the state and especially with NCAM, 
the body to which the state devolves operational responsibility for the preservation, conservation, 
management and presentation of the archaeological sites. However, as was noted in Chapter 7, the 
Sudanese state does not fund NCAM well enough to allow it to provide adequate protection for the 
archaeological sites. And, in many ways, NCAM and its relationship with the central government can 
actually prohibit and constrain the work of archeologists on the ground, particularly when it comes to 
forming relationships of trust (mentioned above). Yet there is no reason why the job of ensuring that 
site management takes the needs of the site-communities into account should rest solely on the 
shoulders of archaeologists. Nevertheless, there are ethical reasons for archaeologists to get involved. 
They are certainly well-placed to play a mediating role between the site-communities among which 
they work and bodies such as NCAM and UNESCO, and they are, after all, already playing an 
important economic role in the area through the provision of wage employment (Chapter 6).  
However, if archaeologists are to play such a role it is important that they understand the 
perspective of the site-communities on the economic and social issues that archaeology raises for 
them (as concluded above). It is clear, for example, that archaeologists have under-appreciated the 
importance of acacia to the site-communities, especially to the pastoralists, which is highlighted by 
the characterization of residents as the main ‘threat’ to archaeological sites, the site management plans 
themselves if not also by the absence of a discussion about acacia in NCAM’s UNESCO Management 
Plan. A people- and context-centred way of examining the issues would instead aim to look beyond 
concerns for “the site or structure”907 and reassess the idea that “cultural identity is literally”—and 
only—“embodied in material objects”908 to consider how structures and objects exist in relation to the 
socio-economic concerns of the people that live around them. Indeed some progressive archaeologists 
have questioned the hierarchy of values behind this imperative to preserve (who, for example, decides 
which sites are ‘worth’ protecting?) and asked whether the principle to try to preserve sites is always 
applicable in non-Western contexts. Mydland and Grahn (2014) as well as Smith (2006) have 
described how decisions about preservation and conservation are almost exclusively made in 
alignment with authorized heritage discourse (Chapter 2). For scholars in this camp, the gulf between 
top-down Western ideas of archaeological preservation (such as those embodied by UNESCO) and 
indigenous value systems requires new approaches. Mire, for example, argues that a material-centred 
view of Somalian cultural heritage, including archaeology, may not only be impractical but misguided; 
she has suggested that archaeologists should “preserve knowledge rather than objects”, particularly in 
resource-scarce contexts.
909
 Churchill’s comment in 1902, that “…the people [must] starve in order 
that professors may exult and tourists find some place on which to scratch their names”,910 seems 
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particularly relevant. As Arenas notes for Latin America, “So long as archaeologists and 
ethnohistorians are concerned exclusively with the recovery of material objects, their research 
contributes nothing to explanations of the contemporary realities…”911  Trigger again provides a 
summary of the present author’s opinion: 
[B]ecause they require permission from Sudanese authorities to work in the country, these 
archaeologists must ponder the consequences for their research of what they say and do to a far greater 
extent than they ever had to before…Intellectual integrity requires an awareness of the social and 
political conditions in which archaeology is practiced…912 
In practical terms such an approach will cost the archaeologists time and money, and require 
them to review their mandate, putting Western-created (and colonial-inspired) heritage law and 
ideology on the backburner and learning how to adjust practices in line with Sudanese needs. 
Currently, the archaeological discipline is based around a number of ‘core,’ self-reflexive, practices 
and ‘peripheral’, optional, practices. Excavation, recording, interpreting and publishing are the core 
and self-reflexive practices; community outreach, multivocal interpretation and political engagement 
are very much at the periphery. The present researcher observed that it was uncommon for 
archaeologists to spend time in the community and those who did were noted for it by the residents; 
there was certainly no culture of intensive interaction. Again parallels might be raised with oil: 
speaking of the contestations in Sudan the early 1980s, Warburg concludes,  
…those disputes showed that in tense situations…any decision concerning border regions, especially 
ones potentially rich…had to be taken only after consultation with the local inhabitants – taking their 
sensitivities into account – and after careful consideration of the rights and wrongs of the case.913 
There can be no doubt, however, that getting close to the site-communities is genuinely hard for 
archaeologists; time ‘in the field’ and control over their project is what they have worked hard for. 
Because foreign archaeological field campaigns in Africa and the Middle East usually take place once 
a year and only last several weeks, the excavators work under extreme time pressure, requiring 
members of excavation teams to work long hours (15-hour working days are typical). Financial 
constraints are a constant issue; the research institution is invested because they have given money 
and logistical help and are expecting a successful write up. As Brodie notes,  
It is easier to attract funding for a project with a recognizable product of intellectual significance (an 
excavation report) than for associated conservation and educational initiatives that have a less well-
defined public utility.
914
 
                                                     
911  Arenas 1995: 58. 
912  Trigger 1994: 345. 
913  Warburg 1992: 158. 
914 Brodie 2010: 266. 
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 And, as Hourmouziadi and Touloumis have argued, there is already a worldwide crisis in the 
humanities with underpaid graduates and a great deal of “professional uncertainty”.915 There would, 
therefore, need to be change at an institutional level: academic establishments and funding bodies 
would have to give financial support for ethnographic projects (such as this one) that would work to 
understand the economic, social, political and cultural impacts of archaeology, in addition to funding 
for the ‘core’ purpose of archaeological investigation.916 This would herald in a paradigm change, a 
‘democratization’ or, even better a ‘decolonization’, whereby the archaeologists privilege their 
relationship with the site-communities as much as they do with the state,
917
 and work hard at building 
trust with site-community residents.
918
 Lack of open resistance by site-community residents cannot be 
presumed to be agreement, nor even of acceptance:  
…outward signs of peasants’ quiescence or acceptance of impoverishment, exploitation, and the like 
cannot be taken at face value…often such appearances are facades hiding different, often contrary 
views and actions that grow from peasants’ discontent and antipathy to how higher status, more 
powerful people and institutions treat them. Rather than accepting the status quo, peasants often 
harbour alternative visions, values and beliefs for how resources should be produced, distributed, and 
used.
 919 
  
Silence is also a topical theme considering archaeologists’ lack of open and public discussion 
about Qatari intervention in Sudanese archaeology. Naturally archaeologists have privately debated 
the dimensions of the funding: as Shankland observed, “…it is only in informal conversation” that the 
archaeologists discuss “the political context of the[ir] funding award”. 920  Typical justifications 
include(d): “Someone’s got to do it”; “if I don’t someone else will”; “there are lots of good things that 
come from Qatar’s money…” They are all correct in some senses: there are no doubt other 
archaeologists that would lift the baton of any scholar who ‘dropped out’; and, as seen in Chapter 6, 
Qatari money can also trickle down to site-community residents in positive ways. Yet the point 
remains: no one has publicly questioned the motivations behind the donation, except perhaps the 
present author.
921
 Even then the author’s article, published by Middle Eastern online news outlet Al-
Monitor, was written to purposely end on a positive note to avoid jeopardizing the work of the many 
archaeologists in receipt of said funding. Simply put, the desire not to rock the boat silences this 
aspect of the archaeological industry even though archaeologists are actively playing the role of 
                                                     
915 Hourmouziadi and Touloumis 2010: 303. 
916 Starzman 2012: 407. For a more detailed discussion of the conditions and constraints (financial as well as 
administrative) of archaeological fieldwork, see Pollock (2010). 
917  Pollock and Bernbeck 2004: 41-44. 
918  Gomes 2006: 153; Meskell 2007: 386. 
919  Kerkvliet 2009: 233. 
920  Shankland 1999: 141. 
921  R. Bradshaw, ‘Will Qatar’s investment in ancient pyramids bring tourists to Sudan?’, Al-Monitor, 7 December 
2015. For example Elbagir correctly notes the tie between antiquities and foreign policy but stops short of 
criticising Qatar who also pour millions into land grabbing. See Y. Elbagir, Sudan’s antiquities are under threat as 
Gulf crisis rages’, Financial Times, 10 August 2017. 
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‘unofficial cultural ambassadors’ or ‘diplomats’ in what is, in the opinion of this author, an ethically-
charged operation.
922
  
Of course there are few instances in which the objectively ‘correct’ course of action is clear. 
What is important is that increasingly  
Portraying politics as something we can choose to do or not, as a place or an occupation to go into or 
not, has the pernicious effect of allowing, even encouraging, anyone who is not a politician or self-
consciously engaged in political activity to somehow think s/he is above or beyond politics.
923
 
The implications for archaeological practice are therefore to openly recognize that archaeology is 
“entangled between Sudanese institutions at various levels – local agreements, national laws and 
global ideas”,924 to talk about them, and to be able to justify the decisions made.925 
* 
Although they have received more archaeological attention than most, Hamadab and Bejrawiya are 
typical examples of sedentary agricultural villages in Sudan’s Nile Valley, most of which are located 
between the fertile strip of cultivation along the Nile and the desert hinterland, and therefore of site-
communities in Sudan more generally, because archaeology is a predominantly Nile-based rural 
phenomenon. The approach taken here—that is, to go beyond identity to look at the socio-economic 
impacts of archaeology—and the results presented may very well have bearing and applicability 
elsewhere in the Nile Valley and indeed across Sudan. Extant literature from Chapter 2 actually 
suggest that there are many other places across the Middle East where these results find their parallel: 
the work of Shankland in Turkey, Burtenshaw in Jordan and Gillot in Syria are just three examples of 
site-communities about which similar things might be said, not to mention Rodriguez and Gomes 
about Latin America. The thesis—its impacts and implications—therefore has relevance not just for 
Sudan but the rest of the world. 
 
 
                                                     
922  Kernel and Luke 2015: 72. 
923   Kerkvliet 2009: 240. 
924  Gertel, Calkins and Rottenburg 2014: 8. 
925   Winter’s 2016 piece on China’s heritage diplomacy initiative, ‘One Belt, One Road’, that aims to build 
connectivity and cooperation across China itself, Central Asia and the Middle East, is a good example of the in-
depth awareness that should be required by practitioners working in the heritage industry. 
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8.2 Collaborative Archaeologies: A Regional Comparison of Initiatives 
The previous sections have highlighted that this study has a number of important implications for the 
practice of archaeology in Sudan. With regards to the findings about archaeology’s ideational impact 
upon identity, it suggested that: 
1. the state is a very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which modern 
populations connect with archaeology. 
2. archaeologists should simultaneously consider if they should stop writing exclusively ‘Nubian’ 
history and also distribute their own findings to the local residents in a more meaningful way;  
3. site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between the 
residents and archaeological sites;  
4. archaeologists stop assuming that archaeology is of importance to residents in the same ways 
in which it is important to them; and  
5. archaeologists have more egalitarian views of what constitutes ‘archaeology’ and ‘heritage’ 
and to cease conceptualizing the residents’ history as ‘folklore’.  
Archaeologists in Sudan therefore need to amend the culture of knowledge production in two ways: 
first, they need to invest more in the production and serious recording of the archaeologies and 
knowledges of the local residents, even if this proves tricky in practice; second, they need to distribute 
the archaeologies and knowledges they produce themselves more equally. 
Chapter 6, the section on archaeology’s economic impact, further showed that  
6. there may be a necessity for further regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad, 
including rules pertaining to activities to archaeological work such as hiring and employment 
practices.  
7. as employers, archaeologists should be aware of the local and national financial context, 
including relative salaries, unemployment rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates 
between social groups. 
Finally, Chapter 7 regarding site management and local livelihoods illustrated that  
8. archaeological site management plans cannot be made without consultation with communities 
about their economic needs;  
9. what might seem like ‘disuse’ of or ‘disconnection’ with land cannot be presumed to be so; 
and 
10. it is important to understand the perspective of the site-communities on the economic and 
social issues that archaeology raises for them.  
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Like the implications outlined above, such an approach will cost the archaeologists time and 
money, and require them to review their mandate in practical terms. More fundamentally, 
archaeologists need to openly recognize that archaeology is “entangled”, and could benefit from 
talking about these issues in a non-confrontational manner so they can justify decisions they make. 
However what has not yet been fully discussed are the collaborative archaeologies that have been 
initiated by archaeologists and other professionals in response to such findings and that can provide 
insights into how alternative socio-economic dynamics might be developed. The colonial and neo-
colonial structures that have produced such results have been shaped by archaeological practices in 
Africa and beyond,
926
 but are increasingly subject to inspection by archaeologists and other heritage 
professionals. Such scrutiny has bred forms of ‘community’927 and ‘public’928 archaeology and other 
collaborative practices that are inclusive of the needs and rights of the relevant stakeholders,
929
 
publics,
930
 and communities;
931
 practices that are viewed as tools with which to begin ‘decolonizing’ 
the damaging paradigms archaeologists uphold and represent.
932
 
The aim of such ventures (here signified by the umbrella term ‘collaborative archaeologies’) is 
thus to redress the global economic, social and cultural imbalances, which archaeology has played a 
part in constructing.
933
 However as many others have noted, collaborative archaeologies take many 
forms and there is considerable heterogeneity in how they are conducted. To understand the 
theoretical paradigm of collaborative archaeology, it has been useful to ask three questions: ‘What 
should collaborative archaeology be?’; ‘What should collaborative archaeology do?’; and, ‘How 
should collaborative archaeologists seek to accomplish their aims?’ Answers to these questions help 
establish some of the many qualities and objectives that collaborative archaeology is perceived to 
require, as well as the methods necessary to become a ‘decolonized’ phenomenon. 
 
Qualities: What should collaborative archaeology be? 
The philosophy of collaborative archaeology is that it adopts a number of overlapping characteristics 
and thus engenders a change in the discipline’s fundamental nature. These characteristics include, but 
are not limited to, archaeology becoming: 
                                                     
926   Baharani 1998, Díaz-Andreu 2007. 
927   Marshall 2002, Belford 2014. 
928   McGimsey 1972, Moshenka 2010. 
929  Matthews 2008, for whom ‘descendant communities’ are a key stakeholder group and thus entitled to be ‘co-
creators’ of the particular contexts in which archaeological knowledges are produced. 
930  Moshenka 2010. 
931  Atalay 2012; Belford 2014; Straight et al. 2015. 
932   Hamilakis 2008 for Greece, Schmidt 2016 for Africa.  
933  Smith 1999; Atalay 2006; Hamilakis 2008; Pollock 2010. 
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 Interpretive: Archaeology and archaeologists as providing interpretation not fact, and/or open 
to, if not directly inclusive of, multivocal interpretations of the same materials;
934
  
 Reflexive: Writers being aritically self-aware of their own biases and influences in the 
production of knowledge;
935 
 
 Therapeutic: Mindful of the quality of experience which archaeology can, and should, bring 
to contemporary society. In this vision, archaeology can act as a “therapeutic service” that 
gives “spiritual and economic upliftment”936 and even “ontological security”, not only to 
individuals (Giddens 1991) but also to states (Steele 2008); 
 Relevant: Connected to contemporary identity, history and culture;937 rejecting the idea of 
“assimilating excluded communities into an understanding of traditional definitions” and 
moving towards practices that “serve a diversity of cultural and historical experiences”;938 
 Useable: Providing some tangible insight into modern-day problems, for example “to review 
the environmental narratives that inform current policy interventions”;939 and, 
 Ethical: Respectful and sensitive to the experience and knowledge of others; Indeed, as 
Hamilakis notes, “[a]rchaeological ethics must be politically aware, sensitive to the pain of 
the other, or they are nothing.”940 
 
Objectives: What should collaborative archaeology do? 
Scholars broadly agree that there are at least two things that a decolonizing collaborative archaeology 
should seek to do: 
a. Empower 
For scholars who live and work in developing countries, or even in low-income areas in the West, 
there has been an increasing feeling that archaeology needs to be used for social action and 
empowerment
941
 above and beyond a veneer of multiculturalism that shrouds the fact that for the 
communities in question, nothing has really changed.
942
 For example, viewing archaeology as a type 
of ‘applied anthropology’, Pyburn envisions its future as a positive political-power force, which, using 
                                                     
934  See references above.  
935  See references above. 
936  Meskell 2005a: 82. Also see Meskell and Scheermeyer 2008 and Little 2009 for archaeology and ‘peace’. 
937  Atalay 2012; Straight et al. 2015; Selvakumar 2010.  
938  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 567 using Waterton and Smith 2010: 11. Waterton and Smith distinguish between 
‘recognition’ and ‘misrecognition’ of community heritage. 
939  Lane 2011: 13. Also see Ranger 1976 (although a historian); Jewsiewicki 1989. 
940  Hamilakis 2003: 108. Also see Tilley 1989; Breglia 2006a; Roynane 2008; Meskell 2010. 
941  Little and Shackel 2007; Pyrburn 2008; Stottman 2010. 
942   See Wallace 1994 and Gnecco 2015. 
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a Participatory Action Research model, can achieve parity between communities and archaeologists in 
the ethical production of knowledge.
943
 In real terms, such visions imply increased interaction 
between archaeologists and communities as well as the significant involvement of the latter in project 
design, from the questions asked, and the methods chosen as site management, to the publication and 
display of findings. As Mydland and Grahn have noted, this principle has now reached the Council of 
Europe, two of whose recent conventions emphasized “local participation in decision-making 
processes related to heritage.”944 
As a consequence, collaborative archaeologies that are truly decolonizing often advocate a 
reduction in their own right to control in favour of shared control with local communities. With 
reference to her work with the Parauá in the Amazon, Gomes echoes all of the scholars above when 
suggesting that “the only solution to conflict of interest between researchers and communities is to 
facilitate partial control by the latter over access to the past.”945 Of course, this is not easy: in their 
study of implementing a collaborative archaeology project with the Samburu in Kenya, Straight et al. 
(2015) show that even projects that are collaborative in conception can be riddled with ethical and 
political pitfalls when it comes to implementation. Nevertheless, the use of archaeology for social 
action and the relinquishing of control are widely recognized as important steps in creating a new and 
improved archaeology.  
 
b. Develop 
Site management often involves the building of fences, walls, buildings and signposts, which has had 
an obvious impact upon the landscape and often disrupted the lives of local communities, e.g. through 
requisitioning of farmland or blocking of traditional thoroughfares. A key concern for proponents of 
social archaeology has been to ensure that site-management plans minimally offend and 
disenfranchise locals, mindful of how, for instance, extraction of mineral resources has caused 
degradation of environments, destruction of livelihoods, and deterioration of human rights and local 
identities; Meskell’s (2013a, 2013b) comments about UNESCO are typical of this trend. 
These concerns have matured over time, and a primary contemporary aim of archaeology, beyond 
Joyce’s principle of ‘not doing harm’, is pro-actively ‘doing good’ and even ‘developing’. If 
“[e]conomies are going to continue to develop and communities are going to continue to be 
confronted with change”, then “heritage and archaeology cannot avoid being at the centre of that 
                                                     
943   Pyrburn 2008; Hollowell and Nicholas 2008. 
944  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 565, referring to “The Framework Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for 
Society (the ‘Faro convention’, which came into force in 2011, and the European Landscape Convention, which 
came into force in 2004.” 
945  Gomes 2006: 149; see Layton 1994. 
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process.”946 Indeed, Shankland believes in the principle that “as well as any ideological influence, 
excavations, particularly large ones, [should] have a very significant effect on the economy of village 
communities as they develop, particularly on those less well off.”947 Thus, archaeology’s mandate is 
now seen to include being a critical force for human, rather than short-term economic or abstractly 
cultural, development: archaeology’s future, anywhere, cannot be conceived in isolation from 
development. 
 
Methods: How should collaborative archaeology be conducted? 
In its current paradigm, collaborative archaeology is interdisciplinary, utilizing tools common to a 
range of disciplines (see Chapters 2 and 3). Most scholars cited in this review have used ethnography, 
a research method employed most commonly in anthropology and which uses participant observation 
to gather data. For Lane (2011) and Hamilakis (2008), for example, key tools include critical and 
reflexive ethnography within the context of an archaeological project (echoing Hodder et al.), and also 
hybrid methodologies
 
that create alternative histories (echoing Schmidt et al.).  
* 
The idea of designing projects with such pronounced social elements stretches back as far back as 
1972
948
 and should therefore be part of archaeology’s mainstream; it is certainly an ever-growing 
discourse. However while there have been notable successes within indigenous archaeology with 
‘descendant groups’ such as Native Americans949  and Native Australians (also see Chapter 2), as well 
as more limited but nonetheless pioneering work with African Americans,
950
 it is only more recently 
that the broad field of community archaeology is gaining real traction. As Wylie notes, such a 
paradigm shift 
has generated responses [from archaeologists] that fall along a continuum, ranging from hostile 
resistance at one extreme, through grudging compliance with requirements of consent and consultation, 
to a range of creative, collaborative forms of practice in which control over archaeological goals and 
products, conduct and authority is redistributed among partners.
951
 
Having watched the development of indigenous archaeology go from its beginnings in satisfying 
descendant communities’ ‘moral and political concerns’ to something ‘robustly epistemic’, Wylie’s 
frame of analysis is useful when considering such a scale of collaborative practice. Indeed from these 
responses she has identified three forms of collaborative practices, all of which are theoretically based 
                                                     
946 Gould and Burtenshaw 2014: 5. 
947  Shankland 1996: 356. 
948    For example McGimsey’s Public Archaeology (1972). 
949   Echo-Hawk 1997; Smith 1999; Atalay 2006, 2012; Colwell 2016. 
950    E.g. McDavid 1997, 2002. 
951    Wylie 2015: 4. 
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upon the principles mentioned above, but differ in the level to which archaeologists commit to the 
various elements of paradigm. The first form of collaborative practice, namely ‘syncretic pluralism’, 
frames the archaeologists as having baseline respect for the principles and agreeing with all the 
ideational criteria of ‘collaborative archaeology’ (respect, reciprocity, reflexivity and so on) but not 
actively engaging with it or allowing it to shape their practice. Archaeologists in this group still 
constitute the majority of practitioners (indeed see below). The second form of collaborative practice 
is the first of two forms of ‘dynamic pluralism’ namely ‘limited cross-fertilisation’, in which some 
ideas are exchanged from archaeologist to community and vice versa, but ultimately fails to really 
destabilize the traditional boundaries of interaction and authority. The third form of collaborative 
practice is what Wylie terms ‘epistemic engagement’, the second form of dynamic pluralism, and 
describes projects in which archaeologists and community members take on board and shape one 
another’s epistemologies through processes of shared decision-making. As Derry has suggested, “if 
the community does not help define the questions, the answers probably will not interest them”.952 
Of course this framework is not the definitive measuring stick for what constitutes a 
collaborative archaeology: a similar evaluative framework might ask about whether in its current form 
archaeology is ‘colonial’ or ‘neo-colonial’, 953  whether general practices contribute towards 
‘decolonizing’ archaeology, and, increasingly, whether archaeology is a hybrid practice and thus 
whether it can become a ‘post-colonial’ discipline. 954  However Wylie’s is a useful model for 
evaluating the range of collaborative archaeologies that exist in the region and will be used to situate 
Sudan in comparison with some of its neighbours. 
                                                     
952  Derry 1997: 24. 
953  Shepherd 2003 and Starzman 2012 certainly see archaeology as part of a colonial structure. Matthews (2008) has 
also revisited the asymmetrical power dynamic between ‘colonist’ and ‘colonized’ to show how it continues to 
structure relations in developing countries between archaeology’s main stakeholders namely government, 
archaeologists and local communities, with the latter positioned as the weakest party. Lane (2011) also points to 
Baharani and Schmidt as scholars who, “in spite of the decolonization process”, still see archaeology as “the 
‘stepchild’ of imperialism.” (Lane 2011: 9; also see Baharani 1998; Schmidt 1995, 2009).  
954  Not all scholars agree that archaeology is a colonial or neo-colonial practice; some suggest that archaeology is 
and/or is becoming a hybrid post-colonial practice. Gillot suggests that such criticism wrongly implies that 
“archaeology is only a tool of [colonial] domination with no popular basis.” (Gillot 2010: 4). Referring to the 
development of archaeology in Syria in his argument about hybridity, Gillot points to the participation of large 
numbers of what he calls “the Syrian intellectual and urban elite, as members of archaeological societies and 
heritage associations” (Gillot 2010: 11) and also to the nationalization of the Syrian Antiquities Service in 1959 as 
evidence of early local involvement in archaeology. Gillot thus draws upon post-colonial theories which stress the 
importance of the local population and the mutual influence between Western and Syrian archaeologists, 
institutions, civil society and communities in all archaeological aspects, even though he acknowledges that most 
archaeological missions in Syria are foreign. Indeed he asks: If we take into account the local reformulation and 
appropriation of foreign research, as well as local discourses about the past, why should we not consider ‘Syrian’ 
archaeology as a ‘hybrid’ practice? (Gillot 2010: 15). Hamilakis (2008), too, prefers to conceptualize modern 
Greek archaeology as the product of a “syncretic process” whose roots lay in “a series of indigenous, alternative, 
pre-modern archaeologies” rather than in a cultural vacuum. Lane (2011) also takes this perspective when 
evaluating what he calls the ‘useable pasts’ approach and the ‘indigenous epistemologies’ approach (both noted 
above). While Lane recognizes that there has been a limited take-up of such approaches, he nevertheless suggests 
that archaeologists working in this milieu adopt a less monolithic view of archaeology’s development to consider 
post-colonial theories that suggest that colonialism was capable of provoking “new, hybrid or creolized forms of 
culture.” (Lane 2011: 9.) For Lane, archaeology is, and has been, participatory, hybrid, independently meaningful 
and anti-colonial. This aligns with the views of many non-Western scholars who, as Lane (2011) notes, have long 
aimed to transform archaeology into a practice that can address critical economic and political issues in addition to 
aiding cultural diversity and integrity. 
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8.2.1 Sudan 
It has already been shown in Chapter 8 that, in the view of this author, there is a lingering colonial 
framework structuring archaeological practice in Sudan, one which chimes with the neo-colonial 
practices of the GCC. Furthermore Chapter 2 (‘Gaps’) showed that little archaeological ethnography 
takes place in Sudan, and the ‘Rationale’ for this thesis (also Chapter 2) was itself based upon the lack 
of conversations surrounding archaeological practice despite the significance of the events 
surrounding dam building. It is thus unsurprising that the same might be said for community-
orientated archaeologies in Sudan: they are notably lacking. Even an ‘indigenous archaeology’ for 
Nubians has not developed.  
There are some important exceptions, of course: several teams have noted the lack of impact 
archaeologists have had with regards to community outreach and begun providing the residents of the 
nearby communities using short booklets and/or children’s books in Arabic about the history of 
archaeological sites they work on (booklets can be found detailing the archaeological history of 
Amara West, Kawa, al-Khandaq, Dangeil, Meroe and Hamadab to name a few, although not all are 
published in Arabic or have been widely disseminated in the community); other teams have produced 
children’s books (the Amara West mission’s book is titled, ‘Life in the Heart of Nubia: Abri, Amara 
East and Ernetta Island’, of which 650 were disseminated;”955 the Mograt Island mission’s book is 
titled, ‘Discovering Mograt Island Together’, of which 1,000 were disseminated956). Other types of 
educational engagements have also taken place, such as the British Council in the Sudan's Cultural 
Heritage and Museums Festival, held at the National Museum in Khartoum in 2014 and organized 
with Dr Mahmoud Suliman Bashir of the National Corporation for Antiquities and Museums in Sudan 
(NCAM). The aim of this festival was to create a more effective learning environment for the 
museum’s school-aged visitors, to train young Sudanese archaeologists in the field of heritage 
management and the theory behind the museum’s role in education, and to highlight to decision-
makers the need for the museum to develop a separate education department.
957
 The UCLQ 
community team, which is currently implemented by the present author (see below ‘Impacts of this 
Research’), has also sought to use such tools since the early stages of the project, beginning with a 
programme of community engagements. These engagements ranged from the team making extended 
house visits and attending social events to delivering community lectures (given by residents to the 
archaeologists and vice versa), meetings held in 2014, 2015, 2016 and 2017 in a total of six villages, 
film-screenings and festivals, building a small information point, distributing DVDs, 1,350 children’s 
books, and generating multi-media output in English and Arabic in open access settings.
958
  
                                                     
955    Fushiya n.d. 
956    Tully and Näser 2016; also see Tully 2014 and Tully 2015 for further details. 
957    Pers. comm., Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Head of Fieldwork NCAM, July 2016. 
958    Humphris and Bradshaw 2017. 
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Only a few teams have begun collaborative heritage ventures, in which archaeologists are framed 
as the ones learning. An important exception that as part of their efforts to valorize and promote 
engagement with local heritage spaces on Mograt Island, Kleinitz and Merlo (2014) used GIS 
movement-tracking technology and collaborated with local community members to map the island’s 
important mnemonic points. The University of Michigan has also begun a programme of heritage 
activity at the site of el-Kurru in Northern State, but the details are not clear and not yet clarified or 
evaluated in a publication.
959
 There are no doubt several more instances of such community-focused 
endeavours currently in operation in Sudan uncited by the present author, perhaps because they are 
often not termed as such, or are perhaps not considered significant enough in relation to broader 
research projects to warrant an official title. Lack of publication about endeavours, and lack of open 
discussion more broadly, also hampers a full audit of ‘community archaeologies’ in Sudan. The 
projects above are nevertheless the most well known.  
In terms of the implications outlined at the start of this section, the above initiatives that focused 
upon education and knowledge dissemination go some way to addressing implication number 2, that 
each project’s results need to be disseminated more widely, and show a level of ethical and reflexive 
muscle which long-term could help empower and develop the communities they work in. The heritage 
projects go somewhat farther to addressing implication number 5, about reconfiguring the dominant 
hierarchy of ‘heritage’ values, and satisfy the criteria of being interpretive, relevant, therapeutic and 
useable. The individuals making changes now are thus to be applauded: considering archaeology in 
Sudan is a 100-year-old endeavour, their programmes are positive events that will inevitably 
precipitate others that can expand upon these foundations.  
However, to some people all of these ventures might be interpreted in light of what many might 
deem to be ‘Eurocentric’ ideas of ‘educating’ the local Sudanese residents and ‘assimilating’ them 
into Western archaeological ideology via the dissemination of easy-to-read information booklets 
around the locale, rarely deviating from archaeology’s authorized heritage discourse or pushing for a 
more ‘multicultural’ approach that valorizes and includes local histories into the academic enquiry 
(see above). (Such has been the flurry of booklets that one initial project aim had been to record the 
reception of this method and somehow measure its capacity to increase awareness and understanding 
of Sudanese archaeology (although initial findings from Dangeil in 2013 and 2014 and Hamadab-
Bejrawiya in 2015 did not suggest that they had any tangible impact at that time)). Furthermore, 
despite the booklets, the core spaces in which archaeologists disseminate their work have yet to the 
democratized: for the sake of their own professional survival, archaeologists predominantly 
disseminate their publications (inevitably written in high academic style) through Western-English 
intellectual platforms.  
                                                     
959    An article by Humphris, Bradshaw and Emberling (f/c) seeks to remedy this. 
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It therefore remains true that as of 2017, collaborative initiatives by archaeologists have had little 
take-up in Sudan and are severely limited in their scope and duration: the above list makes it sound as 
if Sudan is a hive of activity, but relative to the large number of teams working in the country, it is not. 
Of course current archaeologists are working in spaces where the theory of social archaeology has 
been normalized and where the theory of decolonizing archaeology is emerging, but the impression of 
this author is that in Sudan only a few individuals do collaborative archaeology.
960
  This puts 
archaeology in Sudan at the level of what Wylie would call baseline respect and syncretic pluralism 
with a limited cross-fertillization of ideas; only in a couple of poorly-documented cases does it seem 
that there is robustly epistemic exchange and even this has not translated into a project in which 
residents have decision-making power. 
 
8.2.2 Islamic North Africa 
A similar situation seems to exist within the immediate region. In the Mediterranean, there are only a 
handful of ‘public’ archaeology programmes,961 and in Turkey, even though the Çatalhöyük project 
undoubtedly practices the most paradigmatic form of social archaeology in terms of engaging with 
multivocal interpretations of the site and conducting archaeological ethnographies (see Chapter 2), 
even this is limited. As Tully concluded in her own critique of the Çatalhöyük project:  
[it] focused on scientific analysis rather than community involvement and is an anthropological study of 
the archaeology/community relations rather than a programme of collaboration itself…962 
 
Furthermore, there is the issue of language. Gillot (2010) credits archaeologists in Syria with 
“usually try[ing] to learn some Arabic words to communicate with local populations.” However, for 
Shankland, and the present author, it appears that archaeologists rarely speak the language of the 
country in which they work, instead “cultivating rather a serviceable patois in order to communicate 
with the workmen and officials.”963 While Shankland does not highlight it as a problem as such, he 
pointedly notes that the villagers of Küçükköy showed him, a fluent Turkish speaker, things never 
                                                     
960    In 2014, the introduction of QSAP funding did allow and encourage archaeologists the freedom to expand 
activities (all the teams above used QSAP money to produce their booklets), but this public component was 
prescribed by NCAM-QSAP as a key aim of each team that was funded: it was not necessarily the initiative of the 
archaeologists. Thus it does not seem right to overstate the importance of the funding to people’s subscription to 
the moral and intellectual theory of community archaeology or indeed to their subscription to other concepts 
related to it (e.g. decolonizing archaeology). Again, although it seems to herald institutional change, in Sudan there 
is a gulf between theoretical acceptance of the idea and taking concrete and long-term steps towards making them 
real. 
961    Hodder and Doughty 2007 
962    Tully 2007: 166. 
963    Shankland 1996: 351. 
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before shown to archaeologists because “they would not dream of being so confiding with someone 
with whom they could not communicate directly.”964  Such linguistic difficulties also hamper the 
development of collaborative archaeology in these regions. 
The same situation seems to exist in Islamic North Africa, including in Egypt and Libya. As 
attested by a number of scholars, Egyptology has been slow to follow in using collaborative 
archaeology, and the obsession with (the authorized heritage discourse of) Pharaonic history has not 
lessened in favour of pursuing more diverse time periods and parts of the country.
965
 Critical 
community museology has proved a somewhat popular focus,
966
 providing an insight into how 
archaeologists might respond to implication 4, about stopping assuming that archaeology is of 
importance to residents in the same ways in which it is important to them, but overall collaborative 
projects are limited. 
One particular exception is the long-running Community Archaeology Project at Quseir al-
Qadim (CAPQ), on Egypt’s Red Sea coast, the seven key tenets of which are laid out by Moser et al. 
(2002) and Tully (2007): 1, Communicating and collaborating with all members of the local 
community; 2, Providing employment and training for employees and volunteer workers; 3, 
Systematically delivering public presentations; 4, Conducting interviews and collecting oral histories 
from community residents; 5, Providing educational resources; 6, Creating a photographic and video 
archive; and 7, Negotiating the emergence of community controlled merchandising.
967
 As Moser et al. 
described at the time,  
The project is the first of its kind in Egypt, seeking to bring about a change in the way archaeology is 
conducted in a country where local communities have been systematically excluded both from the 
process of discovering their past and in the construction of knowledge concerning their heritage.
968
 
The CAPQ’s scope is admirable and takes into account most of the implications listed for 
archaeology above (notably 2, 4 and 5). The methodology has inspired, in part, a project about 
community archaeology and oral histories in the Egyptian Delta, 969  as well as being used as a 
comparative model for UCLQ’s community archaeology programme.970 However, although education 
is prioritized on the basis that in her comparison of five community-focused projects in Turkey, the 
                                                     
964    Shankland 1996: 351. Rodriguez also attributes some of the misunderstandings between archaeologists and local 
communities to “different languages” (in his case Maya, English and Spanish), which created “divergent 
understandings.” (Rodriguez 2006: 165). Rodriguez draws on the work of Sullivan (1989) who wrote about the 
miscommunication between the Maya of Tusik and an archaeologist at Chichén Itzá and how lack of common 
language further problematized the “different and almost incommensurable sets of values were being attributed to 
the same terrain” (Rodriguez 2006: 166). 
965    Mitchell 2000, Meskell 2001, Fushiya and De Trafford 2009, Tully 2007. 
966    Jones 2004, f/c; Tully 2007, f/c. 
967    Tully 2007: 160. Also see Tully 2010. 
968    Moser et al. 2002: 221. 
969    Lorenzon and Termini 2016. 
970    Bradshaw and Humphris f/c. 
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US and Egypt, providing educational resources accounted for only 13% of activities,971 it nonetheless 
limits the extent to which it is ‘robustly epistemic’ and truly collaborative. 
In Libya, a few teams have begun collaborative practices, prompted at least in part by the need to 
effectively manage archaeological sites threatened by civil war. One multi-national team spent three 
two-week sessions training six members of the Libyan Department of Archaeology in landscape 
archaeology, remote sensing and GIS.
972
 Together they created a strategy for how to best record and 
then manage the heritage of the country (in this instance Jebel Nāfusa in north-west Libya). With a 
focus on landscape archaeology they were able to conceptualize the archaeological sites within what 
was earlier termed a ‘broader integrative view’ of land (Salih 1999), thus providing a way in which 
implication 8, ‘archaeological site management plans cannot be made without consultation with 
communities about their economic needs’, might be addressed. With similar collaborations the Libyan 
Department of Archaeology in place, Biagetti et al. (2013) also surveyed and recorded the Messak 
region of south-west Libya threatened not only by civil war but also by oil extraction. Biagetti et al. 
write that their project, “represented an important and coordinated effort — a way of working that is 
rare in the Sahara”.973 
On one hand, as Nebbia et al. (2016) point out, these two projects are successes in and of 
themselves because conflict makes working in the field so dangerous. However, training programmes 
for antiquities service members is common elsewhere, including in Egypt, where Supreme Council of 
Antiquities (SCA) inspectors have long since trained and collaborated with archaeologists,
974
 and in 
Sudan, where there is a rolling attendance of NCAM staff in the British Museum International 
Training Programme and at other institutions, particularly in Germany and Poland. Moreover the 
dialogue between foreign teams with their governmental peers hardly represents the full scope of 
collaborative practice. The same might be said of the project by Biagetti et al.: although their plans 
were rather more holistic, with the pursuit of a tripartite structure (‘knowledge’, ‘conservation’ 
and ‘sustainable development and dissemination’, involving “the construction of touristic facilities in 
the most visited areas, the creation of a documentary, and the organisation of an international 
conference”975), only phase 1, ‘knowledge’, was completed.  
Overall it therefore seems that like archaeology in Sudan, archaeology in the Mediterranean, 
Turkey, Egypt and Libya is at the level of what Wylie would call baseline respect and syncretic 
pluralism, only occasionally including cross-fertillization of ideas and dynamic pluralism; it has not 
yet graduated to the level where paradigmatic interpretive, reflexive, therapeutic, relevant, useable, 
                                                     
971    Tully 2007: 167. 
972    Nebbia et al. 2016. 
973    Biagetti et al. 2013: 56. 
974    See Habachi 1981; Fushiya and De Trafford 2009. 
975    Biagetti et al. 2013: 56. 
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and ethical programmes of collaborative archaeology that empower people and develop communities 
are being conducted.  
In some ways this is understandable because as in the past, archaeologists today are funded to 
conduct archaeological research, with grants all too often stretched to the limit to discover as much as 
possible about the past. Time-consuming and logistically-demanding community-related endeavours 
do not often play a significant role in such projects. Because funding bodies rarely insist upon such 
endeavours, and because the theory of community engagement is not yet a mandatory part of many 
archaeological training courses, such programmes remain peripheral and ‘additional’ to 
archaeological work, which still revolves primarily around the discovery of the material past.  
However, what this means is that, as Mydland and Grahn write about Norway, “the international 
focus on democratization, participation and involvement has so far had no major influence within the 
field of…heritage practice or for people in local…communities”;976 “‘the new focus’ [of] moving 
from the object to the people is not easily recognizable in the field of practice.”977 
 
8.2.3 Sub-Saharan Africa 
Archaeology elsewhere in Africa, however, serves as an important comparative example because 
although “the practice of archaeology in Africa has [so far] failed communities within which 
archaeologists work,”978 archaeologists tend to embark on community engagement programmes as 
part of general practice. Indeed community archaeology, heritage work and the direct involvement 
and training of African archaeologists have a long history,
979
 embedded in the practice of ethno-
archaeology, studies of indigenous knowledge systems, and the collaborative study of oral traditions 
and other intangible heritage, examples of which can be drawn from across South Africa,
980
 West 
Africa,
981
 and Eastern Africa.
982
 Unsurprisingly then, these projects can shed light upon how to 
address a number of the implications listed at the start of this section but unaddressed by the studies 
mentioned heretofore.  
For example with regards to the findings about archaeology’s ideational impact upon identity, it 
suggested that the state is a very important part of the picture and directly affects the ways in which 
modern populations connect with archaeology. For this line of enquiry, Ndlovu’s (2016) study of how 
                                                     
976  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 581. 
977  Mydland and Grahn 2012: 583. 
978    Schmidt and Pikirayi 2016: 19. 
979    Schmidt 2014, 2016; McDavid, Rizvi and Smith 2016; Posnansky 2017. 
980    Chirikure and Pwiti 2008; Pikirayi 2016. For a critique see Ndlovu 2016. 
981    Mayor and Huysecom 2016 re. Mali; Aleru and Adekola 2016 re. West Africa. 
982    G. Abungu 2016. 
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the state constrains community archaeology in South Africa is useful because it demonstrates a keen 
awareness of state orientation beyond slogans of ‘unity in diversity’. Alongside a critical and 
comparative appreciation of Schlanger’s (2016) message to consider the ‘nation’ as an important 
archaeological context (mentioned above), such insights provide frameworks for how to understand 
archaeology and the (post-colonial) nation/state. 
A further implication of the section about archaeology’s ideational impact upon identity is that 
site management plans must take into account the current (dis)connections between the residents and 
archaeological sites. Here, too, African approaches to archaeology can provide insight because while 
they may be descended from more colonial-style anthropologies of African belief systems, studies of 
oral traditions
983
 and perceptions of the past
984
 have come to be used in the search for sensitively 
conceived but ‘robustly epistemic’ studies of how archaeological and historical landscapes might 
otherwise be conceived. A good example of this might be the studies of archaeological and ancestral 
intertwinedness which are ongoing in Southern Ethiopia,
985
 long term ethno-historical research in 
Kenya
986
 or grassroots locally-conceived heritage research from Tanzania.
987
  
Finally, Chapter 7 regarding site management and local livelihoods illustrated that what might 
seem like ‘disuse’ of or ‘disconnection’ with land cannot be presumed to be so; and that it is 
important to understand the perspective of the site-communities on the economic and social issues 
that archaeology raises for them; such has been the aim of Mehari and Ryano (2016) who study the 
slow appropriation of land in Tanzania. Successful remedies to such situations have also been 
forthcoming, for example from G. Abungu (2016) who demonstrates the importance of dialogue and 
openness as a counterweight to misunderstandings between land users, and also from P. O. Abungu 
(2016, in Kenya) who presents the same results from collaborations between government institutions, 
researchers and communities. 
This is not to say that collaborative archaeologies in Africa have reached the height: Schmidt 
(2016) is one of many who continue to critique archaeology in Africa. Alongside him stands Meskell, 
and her argument against those that claim it, that “hiring local workers as labourers is hardly 
tantamount to an innovative collaborative venture, in fact it is strongly reminiscent of colonial 
practice”988 and that the politicized nature of South African archaeology was “generally considered [to 
be] an obstruction to [her] colleagues.”989 Nevertheless, insights drawn from community-oriented 
archaeology in Africa might profitably be used to develop alternative socio-economic dynamics in 
                                                     
983    Mbunwe-Samba 1994, Raharijaona 1994.  
984    Nwana 1994. 
985    Arthur et al. 2017. 
986    P. O. Abungu 2016, Kusimba 2017. 
987    Schmidt 2010, 2017. 
988   Meskell 2007: 389-90. 
989   Meskell 2007: 391. Gomes, too, noted that it was only the occasional archaeologist colleague who was willing to 
collaborate (Gomes 2006: 153). 
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other regions, such as Sudan. In particular, the principle of ‘epistemic engagement’ needs unpacking 
more as it has been in sub-Saharan Africa.
990
 
A final word must thus go to the implications this thesis has but are not covered by community 
archaeology projects, to the knowledge of this author. The first regards the implication that 
archaeologists should cease writing exclusively ‘Nubian’ history (or in broader terms, should stop 
writing ethnicity into the archaeological record); the second and third regard Chapter 6, the section on 
archaeology’s economic impact, which further showed that there may be a necessity for further 
regulation and support of archaeologists working abroad, including rules pertaining to activities to 
archaeological work such as hiring and employment practices. This thesis therefore stands on its own 
as a text in which such recommendations are made and which have been addressed, at least to some 
extent, by the author (see below). 
 
 
8.3 Further Lines of Enquiry 
Chapter 8 has sought to provide a clear summary and analysis of the main findings of the research 
project, their implications for the state archaeological authorities and the foreign missions.  Such a 
wide-ranging study inevitably throws up a number of questions that would benefit from further 
examination. Although this is clearly nor an exhaustive list, some ideas are presented here. Several 
research areas suggest themselves, but the most salient are those regarding identity and those 
regarding economics. 
8.3.1 Identity 
The first profitable enquiry could certainly go into the data from Hamadab-Bejrawiya in increasing 
depth, for example regarding the different statuses of the respondents, for instance looking acutely at 
the difference in attitudes between men and women; old and young; intelligentsia and non-
intelligentsia. These are all backgrounds from which the archaeological phenomenon can be viewed 
and thus experienced differently. Indeed while the present study has attempted to understand the 
general attitudes of the farming and pastoral residents of Hamadab-Bejrawiya towards archaeology, 
there is plenty of evidence to suggest even more nuance. For example, the few members of the 
                                                     
990   This is somewhat ironic because in her (albeit limited) comparison of five community-focused projects in Turkey, 
the US and Egypt, Tully (2007) found that “[m]ost community projects focus on interviews and oral history” as 
well as “communication and collaboration” (Tully 2007: 166). 
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intelligentsia this author conversed with suggests their ‘disconnection’ with archaeology is 
compounded by a conceptual problem with ancient Nubia’s link to Egypt; Hamza al-Ja’ali mentioned 
thinking that pre-Islamic Sudanese history was nothing more than a “tail” of Egyptian history. This 
certainly echoes part of the problem on a state level (see the discussion about Qatar, above, for 
example), and may help to explain why many residents in Khartoum (but not in the case-study area) 
consistently asked whether Sudan’s pyramids are older than Egypt’s. Analyzing the link between 
respondents’ ages and the changes made to the national curriculum between 1970 and the present 
could thus offer prime lines of investigation, as could a comparative study between the attitudes of 
those living in urban Khartoum and rural Sudan. Indeed further linking of different factors to 
outcomes—beyond the considerable influence of the state and its imagery and ideology, the failure of 
nation and weakness of state, as well as the different modes of living—would provide many 
additional lines of enquiry. 
Second, this author would propose to do a comparative analysis between data collected in 
Hamadab-Bejrawiya and data gathered elsewhere, for example in 2013-14 in Sai Island and Dangeil 
(Chapter 3). The first line of enquiry could compare the ways in which archaeology impacts processes 
of identity construction in ‘local’ contexts, for example in Dangeil compared with Hamadab-
Bejrawiya. This would no doubt yield interesting results, particularly as the areas share certain 
characteristics: both are predominantly farming communities situated in the Nile Valley; both are in 
River Nile State and are thus governed by the same state administration (though Dangeil sits in Berber 
Province and Hamadab-Bejrawiya in Shendi Province); and both lie in the heartland of the ‘non-
Nubian’ Ja’aliyīn kinship group. A second line of enquiry could compare testimony from Dangeil and 
Sai Island, using the frameworks laid out in the thesis. Initial reflections suggest that this comparison 
could strengthen the arguments laid out in Chapter 5: Sai Island is inhabited by Mahas-speaking 
Nubian Sukōt residents, and unlike the Ja’aliyīn in Dangeil (and Hamadab-Bejrawiya) do self-identify 
as ‘Nubian’; they take full ownership of archaeology’s ‘Nubian’ authorized heritage discourse (even 
if their formal knowledge of it is largely lacking). Of course other sites in the Nile Valley may be 
considered, too, to become something of a comparative ethnographic survey; many of the sites in the 
Dongola region would also be ideal places to examine archaeology’s impact upon processes of 
identity construction because it is the region in which residents are ‘formally’ identified as ‘Nubian’ 
Danagla, but, as a rural stronghold of many government members, also play a large role in upholding 
the current regime’s Arab-Muslim image (see Chapter 4 and 5). Dongola also has some incredible 
monumental Christian remains, such as churches and cathedrals, so the impact of this would also be 
interesting to pursue. 
A more transnational (third) perspective of this question might take into account any extant data 
about the Nūba, another example of an ‘indigenous descendant community’ in Sudan, who inhabit the 
Nuba Mountains in South Kordofan State, well outside the boundaries of ‘ancient Nubia’. According 
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to some reports, the Nūba see the ‘ancient Nubian’ archaeological sites as part of their heritage, for 
example tracing the history of their wrestling competitions back to ‘ancient Nubia’, whose wrestlers 
are depicted on Egyptian Pharaonic reliefs.
991
 The Nūba also speak a variety of Nubian, in their case 
Hill Nubian, which, like Nile Nubian, descends from Old Nubian. However, Hill Nubian, like Nile 
Nubian, is not related to the language likely spoken in ‘ancient Nubia’. Considering what has been 
noted above about South Sudan, an even broader approach could incorporate a comparative study 
there. 
The concept of ‘descent’ is, of course, fluid, and while most ‘descendant communities’ are 
indigenous to their claimed ‘ancestral lands’, some are not. The group of trans-continental scholars of 
the Africanist movement, such as Cheikh Anta Diop, have long claimed links between West Africa 
and ‘ancient Egypt’ and ‘ancient Nubia’, asserting that the histories of these civilizations have been 
dislocated from their African context and erroneously inserted into the Middle East or, even worse, to 
Europe.
992
 At the height of the Africanist movement in the 1980s its members stressed the roles of 
Egypt and Sudan within intra-African cultural events, exchange and relations. While the movement 
has had little impact in Sudan, it would nevertheless be of great interest and import to add a fourth 
line of enquiry to understand how these claims cohere or clash with those of other ‘descendant’ 
communities.  
Finally, a slightly different approach could be taken to understanding the ways in which 
archaeology impacts processes of identity construction in local, regional, transnational and 
international contexts that seeks instead to utilize the masses of extant data already available. For 
example the data gathered by this author in Cairo in 2014 from the Nubian Research Projects 
Collection at the Social Research Centre at the American University in Cairo could also add a historic 
dimension to this examination and a fifth line of enquiry. The NRPC collection is made up of six 
distinct series and contain data gathered by archaeologists and anthropologists during the Aswan dam 
displacement processes in the 1960-70s. It consists of the interview transcripts of the SRC Nubian 
Ethnological Survey (‘Series 1’) as well as the reports and administrative records from the Nubian 
resettlement programme (‘Series 2’). This archival research is of great relevance to the arguments in 
this thesis, particularly as a distinct ‘Nubian’ identity is said by scholars such as Poeschke (1996) to 
have emerged at precisely this time. Considerable archives also exist at the offices of the Sudan 
Archaeological Research Society (SARS) at the British Museum in London, the National Records 
Office in Khartoum, and the Sudan Archive at the University of Durham (see Ward 2016) could also 
provide historic data to add to this thesis.  
 
                                                     
991 H. Kuka, ‘Preserving cultural heritage: Nuba Wrestling in Yida Camp’, The Niles, 6 March 2013. Also see Haynes 
1992, above. 
992 Diop and Cook 1989. 
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8.3.2 Economics 
Turning now to further studies of archaeology’s economic impact, a sixth further line of enquiry could 
expand the quantitative examination presented in Chapter 6 through the inclusion of revenues 
generated from archaeological resources that are not restricted to the formal economy. As shown in 
Chapter 2, for example, the ‘looting’ and sale of antiquities can constitute a major part of a locale’s 
informal economy; that Chapter 6 does not take into account the economic impact of archaeology 
upon the informal economy via practices such as ‘subsistence digging’ (Staley 1993) and other forms 
of ‘undocumented excavation’ (Hollowell-Zimmer 2002, Hollowell 2006) that occurs in the area and 
which is undertaken with economic aims in mind, is a major limitation of the method presented 
(although see Chapter 7 for the non-commercial uses of archaeological materials for construction). 
Indeed the present author hastens to add that this is not to say that the existence of subsistence digging 
was not fully apparent; it certainly was: Chapter 7 presents a list of thefts in recent years, and 
archaeological literature written by project directors as well as by the authors of the NCAM World 
Heritage Nomination File do note that unauthorized excavations have taken place. One archaeological 
project director (outside the case-study area) even confided to the present author that they preferred 
the site-community residents not to know the details of the nearby burials because they had ‘learned’ 
that different types of burials could hold objects of different worth. In the example given by her, 
Kerma burials were known by residents to be more ‘well-stocked’ than Christian burials, which were 
in turn richer than Muslim burials. This is, in fact, very reminiscent of Hollowell and Wilk’s (1995) 
finding that, out of 84 archaeological projects under examination, it was those that incorporated 
educationally-focused community outreach programmes that reported the highest incidences of 
unauthorized digging. Encounters with diggers themselves, usually in the context of them asking for 
advice about the commercial sale of objects, have also been a common part of this author’s 
experience. At the same time, other residents expressed exasperation that there is little government 
control of ‘looting’ despite the presence of site guards and policemen; the site guards and members of 
the Tourism Police also spoke of the ineffective measures taken by NCAM to combat ‘looting’ in the 
area. (These measures seem to consist of fines of “100, maybe 200 [SDG]” for those who try to sell 
objects and small rewards for those who hand objects in.) One archaeologist interviewed for this study 
(whose testimony is otherwise not included) was of the opinion that the Sudanese are so dedicated to 
the concept of hospitality that they will not ask archaeologists (their guests) for a higher share in 
archaeological ‘profits’, and are thus forced to ‘loot’ in order to gain some sense of what Brodie (2010) 
would presumably refer to as ‘economic justice’.  
An economic study could also be taken further in a seventh way, through the inclusion of 
interviews with other stakeholder groups, particularly with the directors of the projects described here 
plus other international and Sudanese archaeologists, although the interviews undertaken by this 
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author and which have not been included in this thesis
993
 suggest that while some are, practitioners in 
Sudan are generally not willing to scrutinize and iteratively improve their practices (see Chapters 2 
and 3). Indeed, Chapter 7 could have been augmented several times over if permission had been given 
by the DAI Domat al-Hamadab and DAI Royal Baths team project directors for the present author to 
use data pertaining to their projects. Both project directors have in recent years fenced off 
considerable tracts of land, and the impacts of these initiatives have not gone unnoticed. Furthermore, 
and as mentioned above, communities affected by dam building projects have often perceived 
archaeologists to be complicit in government agendas. The interviews this author did with engaged 
anthropologists and anti-dam activists in 2013
994
 would also be fruitful if this economic angle were to 
be explored more. Looking at economics from the perspective of ‘global’ ideas in ‘local’ contexts, 
interviews with archaeologists working at Jebel Barkal, Sudan’s other UNESCO World Heritage Site, 
could provide good transnational comparative material against any that was forthcoming from Meroe. 
Equally, interviews with archaeologists who have worked on sites over the years would provide 
interesting data about how their motivations, activities and plans changed across time, but about long-
term hiring practices and the economics thereof. Like the sites in Hamadab-Bejrawiya, Sai Island has 
multi-period sites of great ancient importance (recent research has confirmed its place in the gold 
mining trade in the Late Bronze Age, and it has a large Meroitic pyramid cemetery), and international 
and Sudanese teams have been conducting fieldwork here since the 1950s. This would nicely allow 
the dynamics of change over time to be explored, and might very well be compared with 
developments at Dangeil, where archaeologists have been coming for just over 15 years.  
* 
A final intriguing and, in all likelihood, prudent line of inquiry would be to turn the focus of this 
research on its head, to address the question: how do site-communities impact archaeologists and 
archaeology? While some sections of this research address the likely impact of, for instance, site 
guards on the decision making of project directors, including hiring and employment practices, there 
is a great deal to be learned from the role often played by site-community residents in influencing 
both archaeology and archaeologists. Rather than merely reviewing the impact of action such as 
mobilization in favour or against certain projects, research into the outcome of long-term interaction 
between site-communities and archaeologists, in terms of impacting the approaches of the latter, will 
likely be fruitful. 
                                                     
993 Interviews and conversations with: Mahmoud Suliman Bashir, Rihab Khider and Mohammed Saad, NCAM 
archaeologists (November 2013); Shahid Halfaween, a graduate trainee with NCAM (November 2013); Tim 
Kendall, an American archaeologist at Jebel Barkal (November 2013); Fatma Keshk, an Egyptian archaeologist at 
Sai Island (January 2014); a group of PhD students at Sai Island (January 2014); plus the anonymized university 
lecturer and NCAM inspector whose testimonies were briefly included but not expanded upon in the thesis. 
994 Interviews and conversations with: Hamza Uwais and Geili Farah of the Anti Dal-Kajbar Dams Committee 
(August 2013); Nick Hildyard, the CEO of Corner House (August 2013), with Natalia Chan, Coordinator of the 
Sudan Associate Parliamentary Group (September 2013); and with anthropologists Nicholas Hopkins (October 
2013), Kurt Beck (May 2015), Karin Willemse (May 2015) and Tag Elkhazin (November 2013). 
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8.4 The Impacts of this Research 
Before this thesis ends, it seems reasonable to speak briefly about some of the positive impacts this 
research has had so far. By the time of writing (spring 2017), a number had already become apparent: 
1. As discussed in Chapter 8, once the low rate of wages became apparent to the author and 
thence to the project director, they were raised. Although it arguably did not go far enough, this 
is not an insignificant event and can safely be said to be the direct outcome of this research 
(taken for Chapter 6) and which addresses the implication that as employers, archaeologists 
should be aware of the local and national financial context, including relative salaries, 
unemployment rates and the fierce competition for jobs it creates between social groups. 
 
2. Since late 2015, the knowledge gathered in the course of this research has been applied in a 
practical setting through the work the present author does for UCLQ’s community engagement 
programme. One concrete example of this has been that the author has been to advise the 
project director about things such as the need to hire women. The winter 2015 season thus saw 
the first hiring of a woman by the team; 
 
3. Through the translation work done with Hana Ahmed, Basil Kamal Bushra and Omer Sharif I 
learned about the lack of support for students and began training them. As part of this I knew 
that there was also a lack of conferences for students in Sudan and decided to run a student-led 
conference in Khartoum (which happened on 28
th
-29
th
 December 2015). Thanks to sponsorship 
by the Royal Anthropological Institute and the British Museum, an event was also held for 
practitioners in London in May 2016. Thematically, the conferences were also designed to 
provide critical material on ‘Nubian Living Heritage’; an idea that again sprung directly from 
this research.  
However, arguably the most impactful elements of this research are the frameworks that have been 
used regarding the analysis of archaeology’s ideational, economic and social impacts on site-
communities: the need for a keen understanding of national political rhetoric and the role played by 
the nation (ideology) and state (economics) in contextually framing archaeology’s impact (Chapter 5); 
the importance of marrying qualitative and quantitative data to arrive at a nuanced understanding of 
economic impact, as well as forging understanding of the relevant socio-economic and political 
context, identifying reasonable and realistic ways to measure the impact of archaeological 
employment within that context; and, perhaps most importantly, prudently situating that impact within 
the framework of the ongoing socio-economic and political processes in which archaeological work 
takes place.      
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Appendix 1 
Site-Community Profile Sheet    
 
(created November 2013) 
 
REGION 
VILLAGE  
NEIGHBOURHOODS 
 
Geographical setting (sights, sounds, smells, landmarks) 
 
 
Available Services (education, transport, water, electricity) 
 
 
Socio-Political Hierarchy (who is powerful, why, where does the power come from) 
 
 
Domestic Organisation (who lives where, why) 
 
 
The Archaeological Site/s (its physical nature, its location, use, visitors) 
 
 
Professions and Livelihoods (who does what, where, for how long, with whom) 
 
 
Visibility of the State (signs of threat or security provided by state apparatus) 
 
 
Sources of Cohesion and Conflict (who argues over what, and what reconciles them) 
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Appendix 2 
Interview Questions for UCLQ Excavation Employees 
 
(created February 2015) 
 
Demographic Information 
 
Name      Age 
Gabīla      Marital status 
Residence/s     Household size/s 
No. of dependents    Education 
 
 
General Employment 
 
Employees’ other jobs 
 
Wages received from other jobs 
 
Household’s sources of income 
 
 
Archaeological Employment 
 
Previous archaeological employment 
 
Seasons worked with UCL Qatar  
 
Hired by/through 
 
Previous seasons’ salary (total/if known) 
 
Relatives in archaeological employment (if any) 
 
Wages spent on 
 
Opinion of archaeological employment 
 
 
 
Questions? 
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Appendix 3 
Respondents’ Profile Sheet 
 
(created November 2013) 
 
SITE:       VILLAGE: 
 
Name of interviewer/s 
 
Name of interviewee     Pseudonym 
 
Date and place of interview/conversation 
 
Age / approx. date born 
 
Kinship group (gabila)  
  
Parents / spouse / children 
  
Livelihood / basic economic situation 
  
Language/s spoken 
  
Religion / specific tradition 
  
Place of residence (past and present) 
  
No. of years education / where / studied what / highest grade attained / reading and writing  
 
Questions posed to the interviewers 
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Appendix 4 
Post-Interview Notes Sheet 
 
(created November 2013) 
 
Interview arrangements  
e.g. time of day / specific details 
 
Interview location, setting and dynamic 
e.g. the way in which the individual behaves; who else is there; sensory impressions (sights, sounds, 
tastes, smells, textures); activities going on in background and who is doing them 
 
Reflections on methods used 
e.g. what questions worked and which did not work; why 
 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Summary of content 
e.g. specific words, phrases, insider language, have meanings emerged through talk and action; 
understandings change over time 
 
Reflections on account 
 
Reflections on emerging themes 
e.g. are there any shared sets of assumptions and practices throughout the community; how did people 
grapple with uncertainty. Think: WHEN, WHERE and according to WHOM? 
 
To follow up / questions for future interviews 
 
 
Additional information 
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Appendix 5 
Historical Timeline: ‘Ancient Nubia’ 
 
Compiled from: EDWARDS, D., 2004, The Nubian Past London: Taylor & Francis; WELSBY, D.A., 1996. 
The Kingdom of Kush London: British Museum Press; WELSBY, D.A., 2002. The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia 
London: British Museum Press.  
 
5
th
 Millennium BCE: Prehistory 
There is archaeological evidence of settled cultures in this area from at least 5000 BCE. In the 3
rd
 
millennium BCE a powerful state
 
grew up between the Second and Fifth Cataracts of the Middle Nile, 
with its capital near the modern town of Kerma some 20km south of the Third Cataract. The state was 
based on the control of trade between the Lower Nile and central Africa and on the extraction of high-
quality building stone, copper and gold. Welsby has suggested that this state might usefully be 
thought of as the ‘First’ Kingdom of Kush.  
  
16
th
 Century BCE: An Egyptian Colony 
Protected by the Nile Cataracts, especially the sequence of rapids above the Second Cataract, Kerma 
preserved its independence until the 16
th
 Century BCE when the expansionist pharaohs of Egypt’s 
New Kingdom overthrew it and turned it into an Egyptian colony ruled from Napata just below the 
Fourth Cataract near the modern town of Kareima. As an Egyptian possession Kush was governed by 
an Egyptian official, the ‘Viceroy of Kush’. 
 
9
th
 Century BCE: The (Second) Kingdom of Kush 
Egyptian control weakened with the disintegration of the New Kingdom around 1070 BCE and by the 
9
th
 Century BCE Kush had again become an independent state, known to archaeologists as the 
‘Kingdom of Kush’ or, as Welsby would prefer it, “the Second Kingdom of Kush”. Kushite history is 
conventionally divided into two; a Napatan period from the 9
th
 to the 4
th
 Centuries BCE, when the 
royal cemeteries were near Napata; and a Meroitic period from the 4
th
 Century BCE to the 4
th
 Century 
CE, when the royal cemeteries were in the region of Meroe near the Fifth Cataract. It is not clear 
when the capital of Kush moved from Napata to Meroe and scholars of the period differ over the 
cultural significance of the move of the royal cemeteries. Welsby argues that “The history of Kush is 
a continuum and it is not desirable arbitrarily to divide it into periods”, but Edwards argues that “[t]he 
differences between Napatan and Meroitic culture are often much more marked than the similarities 
[and that] continuing to use this fundamental division seems unavoidable, and indeed essential”.  
 
8
th
 Century BCE: Kushite Rule in Egypt 
In c.760 BCE, while Egypt was suffering from political instability, King Kashta (“the Kushite”) 
extended Kushite control north to Thebes; and in around 727 BCE Kashta’s successors Piye and 
Shabaqo, posing as the protectors of the ancient gods of Egypt, brought the whole of Egypt under 
Kushite control, established Egypt’s 25th Dynasty, adopted the titles of pharaoh and moved the 
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Kushite capital to Thebes. However, the Kushite pharaohs came into conflict on their north-eastern 
frontiers with the expanding Assyrian empire, who invaded Egypt in 671 BCE and whose Egyptian 
vassals had driven the Kushites out of Egypt by 654 BCE. For the next five centuries Kush was 
subject to periodic invasion by successive rulers of Egypt, Persian, Ptolemaic and Roman. 
   
7
th
 Century BCE: The Apogee and Decline of Meroitic Kush 
Meroitic Kush controlled an area from the First Cataract in the north to well below the Sixth Cataract 
in the south (roughly from modern Aswan to Khartoum) a distance of over 1,000km.  Its economy 
was based on agriculture, trade along the Nile and to and from the Red Sea and gold mining. It also 
had a significant iron industry. The exchange of people, products and ideas from north to south and 
east to west made Meroitic Kush one of the most significant zones of interaction between sub-Saharan 
Africa, the Mediterranean and the Near East during the early Iron Age.   
According to Welsby, Egyptian was used by the Meroites as their “religious, diplomatic and 
administrative language” but their own Kushite language was “already of considerable antiquity and 
certainly not derived from Egyptian”. The Meroites worshipped Egyptian gods but also some of their 
own; and they buried their rulers in pyramids. The Meroitic period was a time of significant artistic 
and stylistic development; the evidence for this ranges from elite expressions and idealized renderings 
such as those found in the pyramid chapels at Napata and Meroe to the funerary goods found inside 
the graves of female commoners who lived near the Sixth Cataract at Botri, which almost always 
include arrowheads and other pieces of weaponry. Together with the now well-known existence of 
Nubian Queens this suggests that social roles were not necessarily gendered in the way that might be 
expected. Finds such as these have made the Meroitic period appear to be a paradigmatic example of 
an independent ancient African state that existed, and played a pivotal role, within a broad 
international community.  
Meroitic Kush reached its apogee in the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 Centuries CE. The evidence is scanty and 
ambiguous but its slow decline and eventual fall was probably the result of a number of interrelated 
factors. The economic strength of the kingdom appears to have weakened as the trade down the Nile 
between central Africa and Egypt, which had brought Kush great wealth, was steadily supplanted by 
sea-borne trade through the Red Sea.  
The weakened Kushite state appears to have faced growing faced aggression from groups, possibly 
nomadic, including the Noba, from the west of the Nile and the Blemmyes from the eastern desert. 
According to Welsby the literary and epigraphic evidence suggests that by the late 4
th
 Century CE the 
Kushites had lost control of Lower Nubia where the Noba and the Blemmyes fought one another for 
power. Some historians have suggested that the end of the Kingdom of Kush was marked by the 
destruction of Meroe c.350 CE during an invasion by the rising Ethiopian kingdom of Axum to the 
south-east. However, Welsby says that the archaeological record suggests that the Kushite state 
fizzled out more slowly after fragmenting into a number of political units in which some Kushite 
traditions persisted into the 5
th
 Century CE or even later.  
  
6
th
 Century CE: The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia 
By the early 6
th
 Century CE three kingdoms had emerged to replace Meroitic Kush; Nobadia, which 
extended from the First to the Third Cataracts with its capital at Pachoras near modern Faras; Makuria, 
which extended from the Third Cataract to somewhere between the Fifth and the Sixth Cataracts with 
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its capital at Old Dongola; and Alwa, which extended from Makuria well to the south of the 
confluence of the Blue and White Niles with its capital at Soba near modern Khartoum. Alwa was 
probably the richest and most powerful of the Christian kingdoms but is the one about which the least 
is known.  
The three kingdoms seem to have been strongly influenced by Byzantine traditions flowing south 
from Egypt and in the mid-6
th
 Century CE following the arrival of missionaries from Byzantium the 
kingdoms converted to Christianity. Welsby regards this event as “the most radical cultural change 
experienced by the dwellers along the Middle Nile since the first arrival of the Egyptians millennia 
before”. Christian churches were established along the Nile and ancient temples converted for the new 
religion.  
The Arabs who conquered Egypt in 639-641 CE made an unsuccessful attempt to extend their rule 
south of Aswan in 642. In 651-652 CE another invading Arab army was held up at Old Dongola by 
the determined resistance of Makuria (which had by then absorbed the kingdom of Nobadia) and the 
two sides signed a treaty of non-aggression and non-intervention known as the baqt (from the Latin 
pactum). The baqt also called for an exchange of goods, essentially of slaves from Makuria and wheat, 
barley and cloth from Egypt, which took place annually at Philae near the First Cataract, on the border 
between Egypt and Makuria. The baqt allowed for the free movement of Makurians and Muslims in 
each other’s country but forbade them to settle. Despite periodic infractions by both sides the baqt 
remained in force for over 600 years. 
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Appendix 6 
Historical Timeline: Medieval to Modern Sudan 
 
 
Compiled from: HOLT, P. M., 1961. A Modern History of Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the Present Day. 
London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; WELSBY, D.A., 2002. The Medieval Kingdoms of Nubia. London: British 
Museum Press; WARBURG, G., 1992. Historical Discord in the Nile Valley. Series in Islam and Society in 
Africa, Hurst. 
 
9
th
 Century CE: The Arab Incursions 
Despite the ban on Arab-Muslim settlement south of the First Cataract contained in the baqt, the 
peace treaty signed between the Arabs and Makuria c. 650 CE, Arab-Muslim groups, many of them 
nomadic, began to enter northern Makuria from the 9
th
 Century CE onwards. The presence of Arabs 
and Muslims in the Christian kingdoms also increased with the arrival of increasing numbers of Arab-
Muslim merchants and holy men. The decline of Makuria’s power in the 14th Century opened up the 
country to increased immigration of Arab-Muslim groups from Egypt, and smaller numbers from the 
Arabian Peninsula, which speeded up the Arabization and Islamization of the country. The adoption 
of Islam by the Funj Sultanate of Sennar, which overran Alwa and Makuria in the early 16
th
 Century 
institutionalized the link between Islam and power. Sudan became part of the ‘land of Islam’ (dār al-
Islam), in which Islamic law is in full force. Christianity had probably disappeared by the mid-16th 
Century.  
By the late 13
th
 Century, then, the Makurian state had begun to decline amid dynastic infighting. By 
the mid-14
th
 century the kingdom appears to have fractured into a number of small states, which were 
unable to prevent the incursion of nomadic Arab tribes, such as the Juhanya. These incursions caused 
widespread disorder and a further weakening of central authority. The Makurian capital, Old Dongola, 
was abandoned in 1365 and power passed into the hands of Arab leaders. Political power in the region 
appears to have remained dispersed until the early 16
th
 Century when the recently established Funj 
Sultanate of Sennar expanded north as far as the First Cataract. However, in 1550 the Ottoman Turks, 
who had seized Egypt from the Mamelukes in 1517, pushed the Funj back to the Third Cataract, 
where a fortified border was established that held until 1821. 
Geographical distance meant that Alwa did not suffer military attack from Muslim Egypt. However, 
like Makuria, Alwa was subject to frequent incursions by Arab-Muslim nomads and seems to have 
“declined into a condition where it could be snuffed out without opposition”. The kingdom appears to 
have fractured into a number of tribal chieftaincies. According to Holt there is some evidence to 
support the Arab tradition that Soba, Alwa’s capital, and its surrounding territories were seized in the 
mid- to late-15th Century by Arabs led by ‘Abdallah Jamma’, the eponymous ancestor of the 
Abdallab tribe.  
 
16
th
 Century CE: The Funj Sultanate of Sennar 
However, in c. 1504 Soba was taken by ‘Amara Dunqas, the leader of the Funj, a non-Arab, non-
Muslim group of uncertain origin, possibly from what is now South Sudan or from the upper Blue 
Nile. The Funj established their capital at Sennar on the Blue Nile some 150km south-east of modern 
Khartoum. According to Holt, the Sultan and the aristocracy converted to Islam in 1523 following 
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“considerable Muslim missionary work”. The power of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar was based on a 
large standing army of armoured cavalry and infantry, the former drawn from the military aristocracy, 
with which they impose their rule over the tribal chieftaincies as far north as the First Cataract and 
west into Kordofan. However, as described above, in 1550 the Funj were pushed back to the Third 
Cataract by an invasion of Ottoman Turks. The Sultan’s economic power was based upon his control 
of trade in gold and slaves, but by the 18
th
 Century the Sultan’s monopoly was being eroded by the 
growth of a wealthy Arab merchant class. Arab tribes played a prominent role in the Funj Sultanate, 
notably the Abdallab, some of whose chiefs “ruled as hereditary, and virtually autonomous, princes of 
the Arabs” of the Gezira and the region around the confluence of the Blue and White Niles. Indeed, 
the Funj state steadily fragmented into what Holt calls “a succession of tribal chieftaincies strung out 
along the banks of the river [Nile]” including those of the Ja’aliyin, whose capital was at Shendi.  
 
19
th
 Century CE: The Turkiya  
In 1821 an army sent by the autonomous Ottoman viceroy, or Khedive, of Egypt, Muhammad ‘Ali 
Pasha, and commanded by his son Ismail Pasha, invaded the territories still nominally subject to the 
Funj Sultanate. These lands were collectively referred to by the Ottomans as ‘Sudan,’ from the Arabic 
bilad al-sudan or ‘country of the blacks’. Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha wanted to strengthen his position in 
Egypt by extinguishing a potentially dangerous enclave of Mamelukes, who had been proscribed in 
Egypt in Old Dongola; subduing the troublesome Shagiyya tribal confederation; reviving trade along 
the Middle Nile that had been damaged by political disorder; increasing the trade in slaves in order to 
assemble a slave army; and building his economic power by seizing the region’s gold mines. After 
minor resistance from the Shagiyya the Turco-Egyptian army progressed up the Nile accepting the 
submission of local rulers, including those of the Ja’aliyin, and of the last Funj Sultan, Badi VI. In 
1821 Muhammad ‘Ali Pasha sent an expedition to conquer the Sultanate of Darfur, but this was not 
successful. Attempts by the new rulers to impose heavy taxes led to a revolt in the central regions led 
by the Ja’aliyin under Mek (king) Nimr, and the Abdellab, which spread after Ismail Pasha was killed 
when his headquarters in Shendi were burned down by the rebels. The revolt was brutally suppressed, 
partly with the help of tribes such as the Shagiyya.   
The invasion of 1820-21 left the Turco-Egyptians in control of Nubia, Sennar and Kordofan, the 
territories running south from the Second Cataract to the Ethiopian border, which form the core of the 
modern Sudanese state. Khartoum, at the confluence of the White and Blue Niles, was established as 
the administrative capital and the Taka region was added in 1840. In 1841 the Ottoman Sultan issued 
a decree (firman) granting Mohammed ‘Ali Pasha dominion over the “States of Nubia, Darfur and 
Kordofan and Sennar”. Khedive Isma’il incorporated the Red Sea coast (Suakin) in 1865 and annexed 
the southern half of Darfur in the 1870s. In an effort to stamp out the slave trade he also sought to 
control the upper reaches of the Nile in what is now South Sudan. Turco-Egyptian Sudan was thus 
created by Turco-Egyptian empire-builders out of several earlier political entities. It was a much 
bigger entity than ancient Kush, the medieval Christian kingdoms, or the Funj Sultanate and included 
a large number of groups with different languages, cultures, ethnicities, livelihoods and religions.  
The early years of Turco-Egyptian rule, which the Sudanese call the ‘Turkiya,’ were marked by 
efforts to revive the economy, which had been badly damaged by disruptions caused during the 
invasion. There were some efforts to improve agriculture with the first large-scale irrigation schemes. 
Turco-Egyptian Sudan was ruled from Khartoum by a governor-general (hakamdar) while governors 
(mudir) ruled over the provinces, which were themselves divided into districts known as qisms in 
rural Sudan and khatt in the towns. 
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Late 19
th
 Century: The Mahdiya 
However, mismanagement, corruption and harsh taxation caused periodic outbreaks of unrest almost 
immediately. Attempts by the government to suppress the slave trade, which had been prohibited by 
the Ottoman Sultan in 1857 at the request of the Western powers, resulted in widespread support in 
Sudan for the uprising led by Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdallah, a religious ascetic from Dongola who 
declared himself to be the Mahdi (‘leader chosen by God’) to purge Islam of its faults, whose coming 
was widely proclaimed in Sudan at that time. Muhammad Ahmad declared jihad against the Turco-
Egyptian authorities in 1881 and inaugurated what the Sudanese call the Mahdist period, or Mahdiya. 
He managed to forge an alliance that included most (but not all) of the Arab tribes and most religious 
orders. The breadth of this alliance has led some Sudanese to see him as Sudan’s first nationalist 
leader. He led his followers, the Ansar, on a successful military campaign that began with the 
conquest of Kordofan in 1883 and spread gradually to other parts of the country, restoring the slave 
trade, denouncing wealth and luxury and imposing shari’a. In 1885 the Mahdi’s forces took Khartoum, 
but within six months he was dead. After a power struggle among the Mahdi’s senior followers 
Abdellahi ibn Muhammad, an Arab from the Baqqara gabila, emerged victorious and assumed the 
title of khalifa (successor).  
The severity of the Khalifa’s rule, in which millions are believed to have died from war, persecution, 
famine and disease, aroused opposition from the population. The favour that he showed to the 
Baqqara, a tribe of Arabic-speaking cattle nomads, who monopolised senior positions, angered other 
members of the Ansar. Between 1887 and 1893 the khalifa’s armies launched invasions of Ethiopia, 
Egypt, Equatoria and Eritrea but were repulsed. In 1896 the British who had occupied Egypt in 1882, 
ostensibly to support Khedive Muhammad Tawfiq against a revolt led by the army leader ‘Urabi 
Pasha, decided to put an end to the instability in Sudan and to secure the country for themselves 
before the French or the Belgians did so. A military expedition under General Herbert Kitchener was 
launched from Egypt in 1896 and ended with the decisive defeat of the Khalifa’s forces at the Battle 
of Omdurman in 1898. The Khalifa escaped and managed to re-assemble the remnants of his forces in 
Kordofan; however, he was killed in a final battle at Umm Diwaykarat. 
 
20
th
 Century: The Anglo-Egyptian Condominium (the ‘Omadiya’) 
The Khedive expected that Egypt and Sudan would be re-united as in the time before the Mahdiya, 
but the British were opposed to the resumption of Egyptian domination of Sudan. The Condominium 
Agreement of 1899 between the British and the Khedivate established joint sovereignty over Sudan 
with a governor-general appointed by Egypt on Britain’s recommendation. Holt argues that in reality, 
however, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan was run as a British colony. In its early years the government had to 
put down a number of petty revolts and pacify parts of the country. It also had to define Sudan’s 
frontiers, especially where they bordered Ethiopia and French and Belgian colonies in the Upper Nile 
and Equatoria (the Condominium Agreement had set the boundary between Sudan and Egypt at the 
22nd parallel). In 1916 the government suppressed the Sultanate of Darfur and annexed it to Sudan. 
The Anglo-Egyptian government abolished the old Turco-Egyptian administration and divided the 
country into provinces each headed by a British governor (mudir) and districts each run by a British 
district commissioner (omda) assisted by a subordinate Egyptian (later Sudanese) district officer. The 
term omda gave the 58-year Condominium its Sudanese name of the ‘Omadiya’. The Anglo-Egyptian 
government introduced a new code of law (which separated civil law from shari’a) and a system of 
courts similar to those in British India, with a high court and provincial and district courts. It reformed 
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the education system to ensure a supply of literate administrators and technicians and land ownership. 
The government improved the infrastructure, extending the telegraph and rail lines, founding Port 
Sudan and building dams to provide water for the large-scale production of cotton in the Gezira for 
export.  
After the First World War an explosion of militant Egyptian nationalism fuelled by resentment over 
increasing British influence in government and trade led to Britain recognising Egyptian 
independence in 1922 and the accession of the Egyptian Sultan, Fuad, as King (the title of Khedive 
had been suppressed in 1914 after the Ottoman Empire allied with Germany and Egypt became a 
British Protectorate). Egyptian nationalists, and some Sudanese nationalists, called for Sudan to be 
united with Egypt in a single independent state, which Britain continued to oppose. The assassination 
of the Governor General of Sudan, Sir Lee Stack, in Cairo in 1924 brought things to a head. Field 
Marshal Viscount Allenby, the British High Commissioner for Egypt and the Sudan, decided to 
separate Sudanese and Egyptian institutions. Egyptians serving in the Sudanese army were ordered to 
leave Sudan, and the locally-manned Sudan Defence Force was set up. Soon afterwards Egyptians 
serving in the Sudan civil service were also ordered out. Egypt’s role in the administration of the 
condominium became negligible. From the late 1920s the British ruled indirectly through native 
leaders such as emirs and sheikhs of tribes, districts and villages, under the supervision of an omda. 
From 1924 the British ran Sudan as two entities, the Arab-Muslim north and the animist and Christian 
south, which was largely closed to Arab-Muslim northerners and where Christian missionaries 
operated schools that produced English-speaking recruits for the civil service. The British 
administration discouraged the spread of Islam and sought to re-vitalise African customs and tribal 
life, in preparation for the region’s eventual integration with British East Africa. 
 
Early 20th Century: The Growth of Sudanese Nationalism 
It is likely that Egyptian independence stimulated the growth of nationalist sentiment in Sudan. One 
of Sudan’s first nationalist groups, the White Flag League, founded by army officers, organised 
demonstrations in Khartoum and some of its supporters in the army mounted a short-lived mutiny in 
1924. The Sudanese nationalist movements that emerged in the 1930s were dominated by Arab-
Muslims from the north who saw Sudan as an Arab-Muslim state. However, they were deeply divided 
for reasons of personal ambition and also over whether Sudan should seek independence or union 
with Egypt. Of the two leading nationalist groups the Ansar favoured independence and the Khatmiya 
favoured union. The Ansar and other moderate nationalists went on to form the Umma Party; and the 
Khatmiya and other radical nationalists formed the Ashigga, which was later re-named the National 
Unionist Party (NUP).  
The Egyptian revolution of July 1952 had important consequences for Sudan. The revolutionaries, led 
by Muhammad Naguib and Gamal Abdel Nasser, deposed King Farouq, abolished the constitutional 
monarchy and established a republic. They also aimed to end British occupation of Egypt and British 
rule in Sudan. However, they understood that the British would not leave Sudan unless Egypt also 
abandoned its own claim to the country. Thus, in 1953, Egypt and Britain signed an agreement 
guaranteeing Sudan’s self-determination and a period of transition from British rule began. 
Parliamentary elections held at the end of 1953 were won by the NUP, with the Umma in second 
place, and NUP leader Ismail al-Azhari became prime minister. The ‘Sudanization’ of the 
administration and army was speeded up in readiness for independence, British forces were evacuated 
by November 1955 and on January 1st 1956 Sudan became an independent sovereign state with a 
government led by the NUP and al-Azhari. 
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1956: Sudanese Independence  
However, the NUP’s monopolisation of power and the exclusion of the Umma and other opposition 
groups led to widespread dissatisfaction with the NUP government. In 1958, amid a growing 
economic crisis, the NUP negotiated a coalition with the Umma, but it was not allowed to function. 
The civilian government was overthrown in a military coup led by Major General Ibrahim Abboud. 
Parliament was dissolved, political parties were banned, demonstrations prohibited and the press 
controlled.. The stability brought by the military regime allowed the economy to improve and in 1965, 
after seven years in power, Abboud stepped down in favour of a civilian coalition of the NUP and the 
Umma under Prime Minister Mohammad Ahmad Mahjoub. However, factionalism, economic 
stagnation and conflict, especially between the government and non-Arab groups in south Sudan, led 
to a second military coup in 1969 led by Colonel Jaafar Nimeiri. 
 
1969: Military Rule 
Nimeiri abolished parliament, outlawed political parties, jailed hundreds of politicians and ruled 
through a Revolutionary Command Council. Nimeiri initially pursued pan-Arab and socialist policies, 
but after he was briefly ousted by a communist-led coup in 1971 he became friendlier towards the 
West. In 1972 he signed the Addis Ababa Agreement which granted autonomy to the south and ended 
the civil war there. Under Nimeiri the economy became more open and loans were taken out to 
mechanise agriculture, boost production of export crops such as cotton and sugar, and search for oil. 
However, in the 1970s commodity prices fell and debt-servicing costs rose and a financial crisis 
followed. Sudan was obliged to sign a structural adjustment programme with the IMF in 1978 in 
return for substantial loans. In the late 1970s Nimeiri moved towards Islamism and in 1983 he 
imposed shari’a throughout the country, precipitating the renewal of the civil war in the south. In 
1985 Nimeiri was overthrown by his defence minister and Sadiq al-Mahdi, the leader of the Umma, 
formed a coalition of the Umma, the DUP and the National Islamic Front, a radical Islamist party led 
by Hassan al-Turabi. Al-Mahdi’s weak leadership led to an army coup in 1989 led by Omar al-Bashir. 
 
1989: Sudan as an Islamic State 
Once again political parties and associations were suspended, politicians jailed, the army purged and 
independent newspapers closed. For the next ten years the radical Islamist ideas of al-Turabi and the 
NIF dominated government policy and there was a ruthless top-down Islamisation of the state, army, 
economy and education system. In 1993 al-Bashir made himself president with dictatorial powers. 
Sudan became a police state where Islamist policies were enforced by Islamist militias. Radical 
Islamist leaders, including Osama bin Laden, were invited into the country, leading the US to label 
Sudan a sponsor of terrorism. But by 1999 al-Bashir wanted to dilute al-Turabi’s radical policies and 
expelled him from the government. In October 2005, al-Bashir negotiated an end to the civil war in 
the south, where a referendum vote in favour of self-determination eventually led to the independence 
of South Sudan in 2011. However, al-Bashir also presided over the bloody repression by the army and 
Arab militias (known as the Janjaweed) of a rebellion in Darfur, which started in 2003 as a result of 
economic and political marginalization of the non-Arab Fur. According to human rights groups the 
conflict in Darfur has resulted in the deaths of 200,000-400,000 people, mostly civilians, and the 
displacement of over 2.5m. The ICC has indicted al-Bashir of crimes against humanity in Darfur and 
has issued two international arrest warrants, both of which have been rejected by the Sudanese 
government. 
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Appendix 7 
The Histories of the Gabāīl in Hamadab and Bejrawiya 
 
Compiled from: BJØRKELO, A., 1989. Prelude to the Mahdiyya: Peasants and Traders in the Shendi Region, 
1821-1885. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; HÄNSCH, V., 2012. ‘Chronology of a Displacement: The 
Drowning of the Manȃsȋr People’ in Meroitica 26: 179-228; HASAN, Y, F., 1967. The Arabs and the Sudan. 
Edinburgh University Press; HILLELSON, S. 1935. Sudan Arabic Texts (Cambridge 1935, p. 172-203) and 
HILLELSON, S. 1923. ‘Tabaqāt Wad Dayf Allah: Studies in the Lives of Scholars and Saints’ in Sudan Notes 
and Records VI: 191-230; HOLT, P. M., 1961. A Modern History of Sudan: From the Funj Sultanate to the 
Present Day. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; INNES, N. McL., 1930. ‘The Monasir Country’ in Sudan 
Notes and Records 14: 185-191; MacMICHAEL, H.A., 1922. A History of the Arabs in the Sudan. The 
University Press; MALIÑSKI, P., 2014. ‘Some Remarks on the Role of Volcanic Craters in the Traditional 
Economy of the Manasir Tribe of the Bayuda Desert’ in Gdansk Archaeological Museum African Reports 11: 
79-88; MANGER, L. O., (ed.) 1984. Trade and Traders in the Sudan. Bergen: University of Bergen; REID, J. 
A. 1930. ‘Some Notes on the Tribes of the White Nile Province’ in Sudan Notes and Records 13: 149-209; 
SPAULDING, J., 1988. ‘The Business of Slavery in the Central Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, 1910-1930 in African 
Economic History 17: 23-44; WARBURG, G., 1992. Historical Discord in the Nile Valley. Series in Islam and 
Society in Africa, Hurst. 
 
N.B. This account is intended to be read in conjunction with Appendix 1, the Historical Timeline of 
Sudan, and with Chapter 5.  
 
The Ja’aliyin and Manâsîr 
There are four tribes (gabāīl) in the case-study area, the Ja’aliyin, the Manâsîr, the Hassaniya and the 
Fadniya. The Ja’aliyin are a group of Arabic–speaking Muslim gabaayil who traditionally occupied 
the Nile valley from the Fourth to the Sixth Cataracts. They include the Ja’aliyin ‘proper’ and the 
Mirafab, the Rubatab and the Manâsîr. The Ja’aliyin ‘proper’ have traditionally occupied the Nile 
valley from the Sixth Cataract downstream to the confluence with the Atbara; the Ja’aliyin of 
Hamadab and Bejrawiya in the case-study area are part of this group. From the Atbara to the Fifth 
Cataract is the traditional homeland, or dār, of the Mirafab; from the Fifth Cataract to Abu Hamad is 
the dār of the Rubatab; and beyond Abu Hamad to the Fourth Cataract is the dār of the Manâsîr, 
which is another of the four gabāīl found in the case-study area.  
All of the Ja’aliyin claim to descend from ‘Abbas, the uncle of the Prophet Mohammed, through a 
probably mythical individual named Ibrahim Ja’al; the Manâsîr say that they take their name from a 
certain Mansur, who they claim to be one of Ibrahim Ja’al’s descendants.  
Today the Ja’aliyin gabāīl are mostly settled farmers (awlad al-bahr) but some are still nomadic 
(awlad al-balad) or semi-nomadic, migrating around the Butana, the great plain that lies between the 
Nile and the Atbara, or the Bayuda, the volcanic desert enclosed by the great bend of the Nile. For 
example, while the Manâsîr al-Nil are settled farmers, the Manâsîr al-Badiyah have traditionally 
grazed the northern Bayuda desert.  
The Ja’aliyin were first recorded as a distinct group in the 16th Century during a period of acceleration 
in the otherwise slow process of Arabization and Islamization of the Nile valley’s formerly non-Arab 
Christian population.
 
It was at this time that they came under the rule of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar, 
which was established in 1504 and which converted to Islam in 1523. Under the Funj, and until the 
coming of the Turco-Egyptians in 1821, the Ja’aliyin formed a tribal kingdom ruled by a king (mek), 
whose capital was at Shendi. At this time historians at the Funj court, often religious leaders (fakis), 
began to compile histories and genealogies (nisbas) and many gabāīl genealogies date from this time. 
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Groups like the Ja’aliyin wanted to validate their links to Arab and Islamic figures and historians such 
as Wad Dayf Allah compiled, erroneously tracing their genealogy back to Abbas in his Tabaqāt, 
written around 1700 CE. The references to the Ja’aliyin in the writings of Wad Dayf Allah were a 
source of pride for Ja’aliyin respondents in the case-study area.  
During the centuries after the establishment of the Funj Sultanate of Sennar the Ja’aliyin were Nile-
based farmers and long-distance traders (jallaba). The routes taken by the jallaba ran from the Shendi 
Reach north and south along the Nile to Egypt and Bahr al-Ghazal respectively; west to Kordofan and 
Darfur; and east to the Red Sea ports of Suakin and Massawa. Shendi became an important trading 
centre and the jallaba became rich from expeditions to the Nuba Mountains in Kordofan and the upper 
Nile for slaves to sell or to use as labourers on their farms. The Manâsîr have a similar background as 
farmers and traders, although their dār was further north than that of the Ja’aliyin and not as well 
positioned for slave–trading expeditions to the south. Nevertheless, the extant literature tells us that in 
the 18
th
 and 19
th
 Centuries the Manâsîr meks wielded significant regional power. 
By the late 18
th
 Century the Funj Sultanate had broken down and power was fragmented among tribal 
leaders including the mek of the Ja’aliyin and the mek of the Manâsîr. When the Ottoman viceroy 
(khedive) of Egypt, Mohammad Ali Pasha, sent his army to invade Sudan in 1821 the Ja’aliyin were 
among the most powerful gabāīl on the Middle Nile. The Ja’aliyin chief, Mek Nimr, initially accepted 
Turco-Egyptian overlordship and was confirmed in power. However, when the Turco-Egyptians tried 
to monopolise the slave trade and introduced punitive taxation the Ja’aliyin revolted and massacred 
the Turco-Egyptian garrison at Shendi; the Khedive’s son, Ismail, was burned to death when his 
headquarters went up in flames. In retaliation, the Ottomans sacked Ja’aliyin towns including Shendi, 
ed-Damer and Matamma prompting many jallaba to leave the Shendi Reach for a time. Nevertheless 
by the 1840s the jallaba were flourishing again and many Ja’aliyin and Manâsîr were employed in the 
Turco-Egyptian administration. One prominent Ja’ali slave trader, Zubeir Rahma Mansour, who was 
based in Bahr al-Ghazal, annexed Darfur on the Khedive’s behalf. The Ja’aliyin did well under the 
period of Turco-Egyptian rule, which the Sudanese call the ‘Turkiya’.  
In the late 19
th
 Century the Ja’aliyin and Manâsîr jallaba opposed attempts by the Turco-Egyptian 
rulers of Egypt and Sudan to restrict the slave trade, which the British were putting pressure on them 
to do. The Ja’aliyin and Manâsîr farms relied on slave labour and the jallaba on the trade in slaves. 
When a Dongolawi Sufi of the Sammaniya order, Muhammad Ahmad ibn ‘Abdallah, the Sudanese 
leader later known as the Mahdi (‘leader chosen by God’) launched his campaign against Turco-
Egyptian rule in 1881 most Ja’aliyin gave him their support, and it was Ja’aliyin resistance that held 
up the British relief column sent to rescue General Charles Gordon from Khartoum in 1885.  
After the Mahdi’s death the Ja’aliyin turned against his successor, Khalifa Abdallahi ibn Muhammad, 
who concentrated power among members of his own gabila, the Baqqara. When an Anglo-Egyptian 
army under General Herbert Kitchener began the re-conquest of Sudan in 1896, the Ja’aliyin resisted 
an attempt by the Khalifa’s forces to occupy the strategic Ja’aliyin town of Matamma; the Khalifa’s 
army sacked Matamma and killed thousands of Ja’aliyin including many women and children. The 
Ja’aliyin subsequently supported Kitchener’s advance on the Khalifa’s base in Omdurman, which 
brought the Mahdiya to an end.    
As they had done under the Ottomans, the Ja’aliyin joined the ranks of the Anglo-Egyptian 
bureaucracy, especially after Egyptians were removed from the system in 1915. Many Ja’aliyin 
passed through the colonial education system and provided the bedrock of the Sudanese literate class. 
They were also prominent in the first waves of Sudanese nationalism that were dominated by a 
northern-based elite, specifically the literate riverine Arab Muslims such as the Ja’aliyin. 
In 1901, Hamadab and Bejrawiya were registered as part of the district of Greater Kabushiya, centred 
on the town of Kabushiya, which was run by a British district commissioner (omda) assisted by a 
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subordinate Egyptian (later Sudanese) district officer. Greater Kabushiya included thirty-six tribal 
sheikhdoms from Jebel Umm Ali to Demagarai (a town just south of el-Hassa). Under the ‘native 
administration’ the British ruled through the tribal chiefs, whose authority was formalised in 
ordinances of 1922 and 1927. When Sudan became independent in 1956 lines of power were so 
entrenched that the same tribal families tended to retain their positions of authority.  
The way in which leading Ja’aliyin families inherited power from the Turco-Egyptian period to the 
present day can be illustrated by an example from the case-study area. Mohammed Elamin Ahmed 
Mohammed Ahmed Ba’ashom the maternal grandfather of Hamza al-Ja’ali, one of the key 
respondents for this study, was a sheikh under the Turco-Egyptian and Anglo-Egyptian 
administrations and omda from 1921 until 1935. He lived in Hamadab and was invested with a great 
deal of regional power, being in charge, amongst other things, of the allocation of agricultural lands. 
Hamza al-Ja’ali, a property mogul, is a former Head of the Hamadab Village Committee and all-
round spokesman for the people of Hamadab and a very influential figure in the area. Even if they are 
currently not post-holders and are no longer officially invested with decision-making or legislative 
power, Ja’aliyin families are powerful until this day, often in their traditional roles of dispute 
adjudicator, merchant and money-lender. Although census figures are unreliable they may number 
3m-4m today, most of whom live in towns, including Khartoum.  
The Manâsîr in the case-study area are pastoralists (Manâsîr al-Badiyah) who have been displaced 
from their ancestral dār over the past 50 years because of the drying up of the Bayuda Desert. 
Sedentary Manâsîr, the Manâsîr al-Nil were also displaced when their land was flooded by the 
Merowe Dam in 2007-8. Hänsch, who spent a long time with the Manâsîr al-Nil during their 
displacement, explains that when plans for the dam were first announced in 1983/4 there was no 
protest from the Manâsîr al-Nil; Hänsch puts this down to their mistaken belief that the government 
had other priorities and that the dam would never be built. Nor was their much reaction from them 
when construction started in mid-2003. However, in December 2005, when Chinese construction 
workers began to erect electricity pylons on land belonging to the Manâsîr al-Badiyah and confiscate 
the desert wells, the Manâsîr al-Badiyah launched mass protests, which prompted similar protests 
from the Manâsîr al-Nil. The intimidation and arrests of protestors in 2007 and the government’s 
shooting of protestors at Kajbar in 2008, caused the Manâsîr al-Nil to turn from acquiescent pro-
government citizens to staunch opponents. As Maliński puts it: the “Manâsîr had to abandon their 
lands, inhabited by their ancestors for many generations, and [have] been resettled in culturally 
foreign regions, living in enclaves among other tribes”. Today, according to Hänsch, “[t]he political 
power of the Manâsîr [and] their range of influence in the central government, is extremely limited”. 
 
The Hassaniya and Fadniyya 
The other two gabāīl in the case study area, the Hassaniya and Fadniya, are among the many tribes 
that belong to the large and complex Juhayna group, who also claim Arab descent. According to Holt, 
“In Sudanese genealogical usage the term Juhayna is practically a comprehensive term for all tribes 
claiming Arab descent but not asserting a Ja’ali-’Abbasi origin.” The Juhayna of Sudan also claim 
descent from ‘Abbas, the Prophet’s uncle, but in their case through an eponymous ancestor Abdulla 
el-Juhani. They claim kinship with a tribe of the same name in Saudi Arabia, members of which 
migrated to Egypt after the Arab conquest. In addition to the Hassaniya and Fadniya the Juhayna also 
include the Shukriyah and Kababish camel-nomads who live in the southern Butana and in the desert 
north of Kordofan respectively; the Baqqara cattle-nomads of southern Kordofan and Darfur; and 
other assorted groups. Holt notes that the nomadic Juhayna “played a leading role in the [Arab] break-
through into Nubia [from Egypt] in the fourteenth century, and there has been a tendency for elements 
of varied (and even non-Arab) origins to link themselves with this successful tribe.” 
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Nevertheless, the histories of the Hassaniya and Fadniya are less clear than those of the Ja’aliyin. 
There are brief references in travellers’ accounts to the Hassaniya and Fadniya as pastoralists who 
caused problems for settled communities. Otherwise they are barely mentioned in the historical record 
until the early 20
th
 Century, when the Anglo-Egyptian government recorded the Hassaniya’s dār in 
White Nile state south of Khartoum and the Fadniya’s dār in the Gezira between the White and Blue 
Niles.  
Like most Juhayna the Hassaniya and Fadniya were originally nomadic pastoralists. Spaulding notes 
that their traditional pastures were extensive and contained good quality level land that “was 
comparatively abundant and not dependent upon mechanical irrigation; it was held under communal 
forms of tenure and rarely encumbered.” Although pastoralists’ rights were in theory, protected by the 
Powers of Nomad Sheikhs Ordinance of 1922, they were denied by the Anglo-Egyptian government 
of legal title to their extensive traditional dārs, which they considered to be theirs by virtue of 
customary use over a long period of time. However, it was on their land that the British focused their 
efforts to develop large-scale irrigated commercial farming, particularly of cotton, which was 
accompanied by large-scale dam-building. The Sennar Dam on the Blue Nile was inaugurated in 1925 
and the Jebel Aulia Dam on the White Nile south of Khartoum in 1937; the latter caused flooding for 
about 200 miles upstream. The Hassaniya and Fadniya were therefore among the first groups in Sudan 
to be displaced by dam building and large-scale commercial agriculture. However, unlike the Ja’aliyin 
they were had little political influence; they were not well-placed in the administration and played 
little role in the nationalist movements. 
Warburg shows that the public and private agricultural schemes that were inaugurated in Gezira and 
While Nile States reduced the pasture available to the nomadic Hassaniya and Fadniya. As cotton 
cultivation gained ground and towns at Kosti, Kurmuk, Jebelain and Renk developed, there was an 
increasing tendency for them to settle along the river as semi-nomads. Like many others they also 
began to turn away from pastoralism to wage labour following the mechanisation of commercial 
agriculture. Spaulding estimates that the Hassaniya were over a century behind the Ja’aliyin in terms 
of this process: 
The ensuing commoditization of agricultural production in the lands along the White Nile south of 
Khartoum began to generate social transformations that resembled those characteristic of eighteenth 
century society in the irrigated north; for example, the early twentieth-century “big men” of the 
Hassaniya…ventured into the business of grain speculation, thus converting older forms of power over 
their inferiors into that of bourgeois creditors. 
However, those Hassaniya and Fadniya who have maintained a nomadic was of life have found their 
pastures increasingly squeezed by the extension of commercial agriculture, and have moved away 
from their traditional dārs to other parts of Sudan, some of them to the case-study area of Hamadab 
and Bejrawiya. There, as noted in Chapter 4 and Chapter 6, they have come up against the long-
established Ja’aliyin. 
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Appendix 8 
Kindergarten Administrative Booklet (excerpt)  
 
The ‘interim calendar card’ for kindergarten children by the Minister of Education and Knowledge in River Nile 
State. Publication date unknown, but collected by the author in 2013. 
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Appendix 9 
Year 7 School Textbook (excerpt) 
 
The contents page of the school textbook for Year 7 students, written in 2008 by the Institute of Education 
(referred to here by the Institute’s location in Bakht al-Rudah). 
 
(In the Name of Allah) 
The Ministry of Public Education 
The National Centre for Curriculums and Educational research 
Bahkt al-Rudah [2008] 
We and the Islamic world 
Grade Seven 
[not shown in photos below] 
Introduction —PAGE 3— 
 Page No. 
Unit 1: We and the Ancient World 
Objectives 
We and the ancient world 
The civilization of Kush 
The end of the Kush state 
The links between the ancient worlds 
Calendars 
Ancient world religions 
The political and social systems 
Unit 1 summary 
 
Unit 2: The Arabian Peninsula 
Objectives 
The Arabian Peninsula 
Social life 
Economic life 
Political life 
The Arab Kingdom before Islam 
Sabaa Kingdom 
Al-Ambat Kingdom 
Religious life 
Cultural life     
Unit 2 summary —Contents page 4, book page 38— 
 
Unit 3: Prophet Mohammed and the Islamic message 
Objectives 
Prophet Mohammed, his birth and upbringing 
His manners 
His wives 
His mission 
Stages of the message 
Quraysh resistances against the message 
Immigration to Abbasinya 
Unit 3 summary 
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Unit 4: The establishing of the Islamic state 
Objectives 
The establishing of the Islamic state 
Byata al-Agaba 
Al-Medina state 
The breaking of covenants by the Jews with Prophet Mohammed 
Saraya and openings 
Badr Foray 
Ahod Foray 
Al-Ahzad Foray 
Al-Hudibya Reconciliation 
Muta Foray 
The opening of Mecca 
The events of the opening 
Unit 4 summary  
     
Unit 5: Spread of Islam —Contents page 5, book page 73— 
Objectives 
The spreading of Islam 
The spread of Islam during the Era of Khulafa al-Rashideen  
The spread of Islam after the Era of Khulafa al-Rashideen 
Unit 5 Summary 
 
Unit 6: Islamic Civilization 
Objectives 
Islamic civilization 
The Golden stage of the Islamic civilization 
The influence of the Islamic civilization on the European civilization 
Media in Islamic civilization 
Unit 6 summary 
 
Unit 7: Islamic Kingdom in Africa 
Objectives 
Islamic Kingdoms in Africa 
The ways Islam entered Africa 
The methods of spreading Islam 
Kalwa Sultanate 
West African kingdoms 
Unit 7 summary 
 
Unit 8: Islamic Kingdoms in Sudan 
Objectives 
Islamic Kingdoms in Sudan 
Islam in Sudan, Funj Kingdom 
Religious teaching / Education    
Al-Fur Kingdom —Contents page 6, book page 109— 
Unit 8 summary 
 
Unit 9: The Islamic world today 
Objectives 
The Islamic world today 
The habitats of the Islamic world 
Muslims in the Asian continent 
Muslims in the African continent 
Muslims in Europe 
The sources of the Islamic world wealth / fortune 
The Islamic world unity 
Unit 9 summary  —book page 124—    
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Appendix 10 
The Invention of ‘Ancient Nubia’ 
 
10.1 (below) Extract from HAYNES, J. L., 1992. Nubia: Ancient Kingdoms of Africa. Boston: Museum of Fine 
Arts given in De Simone (2014) as Annex 1 (pp. 272-3).  
 
10.2 (below) Extract from DE SIMONE, C. M., 2014. Nubia and Nubians: the 'Museumizations' of a Culture. 
Doctoral Thesis, Leiden University, Annex VII (pp. 285-6) entitled ‘Table of Nubian artifacts displayed at 
Sudan National Museum which are still in use in modern Nubian society’.  
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